Force 2001: The Employment Of Marine Aviation In Offensive Air Support CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Force 2001: The Employment of Marine Aviation in Offensive Air Support Author: Major Oly OLSON, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Marine air power must be utilized in the strategic deep and deep areas first and not arbitrarily set aside for CAS, especially if we have the opportunity to destroy the enemy's will and means to fight before we have to engage him on the ground. Background: The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept has made the Marine Corps a unique and special fighting force. The MAGTF concept laid the foundation for a combined arms organization which can be task organized and mission oriented. In a new era highlighted by the attempt to "fight" the MAGTF, we will need this warfighting MAGTF to use all its might to destroy an enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible in order to prevent excessive friendly losses. A new look at the integration of combined arms with maneuver warfare which is supported by an integral Combat Service Support (CSS) is necessary in order to win the next war. Marine aviation provides the MAGTF with the overwhelming combat power needed to destroy the enemy quickly. The Marine Corps presently thinks and employs its aviation combat element as a supporting arm of the ground combat element (GCE). Post Desert Storm, with the introduction of the MEF commander as a warfighter, Marine aviation must be allowed to fight the deep and strategic deep battle while supporting the GCE commander with close air support (CAS). Today, Marine aviation can no longer be held in reserve for CAS and the GCE but must be apportioned and allocated to the full horizontal dimension of the battlefield. Marine aviation must be used to fight the deep battle first and when available, and in accordance with priorities as set by the MEF/MAGTF commander, scheduled for CAS. The Marine Corps cannot afford to hold a majority of its offensive air support (OAS) capable aviation in reserve for the GCE and his scheme of maneuver as is the present case. Those assets capable of reaching out and touching the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities must be allocated to the deep and strategic battle. The enemy must be shaped and, if possible, destroyed prior to the requirement for ground battle. The MEF/MAGTF commander possesses aviation assets, in the form of F/A-18 and A-6 aircraft, capable of taking the battle to the enemy and attacking those critical areas that may produce the desired end-state of the war perhaps even without a ground battle. Recommendation: Marine air power should be utilized in the deep and strategic deep battle areas first and assigned to CAS once these targets have been fully serviced. FORCE 2001: THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE AVIATION IN OFFENSIVE AIR SUPPORT Thesis: Marine air power must be utilized in the strategic deep and deep areas first and not arbitrarily set aside for CAS, especially if we have the opportunity to destroy the enemy's will and means to fight before we have to engage him on the ground. I. Mission of Marine Aviation II. Functions of Marine Aviation A. Offensive Air Support (OAS) 1. Close Air Support (CAS) 2. Deep Air Support (DAS) B. MAGTF's Role in War C. Air Force Offensive Air Support 1. Air Interdiction (Al) 2. Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) III. Marine Aviation in OAS as Part of the MAGTF A. Apportionment B. Deep Air Support Versus Close Air Support IV. DAS and CAS as applied in Desert Storm V. Marine Aviation in Offensive Air Support and Conventional Warfare During Medium or High Intensity (MIC/HIC) Conflict A. Strategic Deep Battle B. Deep Battle C. Close Battle D. Rear Battle VI. Future Conflicts A. The Strategic Deep and Deep Battles B. The Close and Rear Battles C. Low Intensity Conflicts D. Amphibious Operations FORCE 2001: THE EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE AVIATION IN OFFENSIVE MR SUPPORT The rough draft of FMFM-2 states: For the MAGTF to seize the initiative and compel the enemy to react to its will, the MAGTF commander visualizes the multidimensional battlefield and decides when and where the MAGTF will fight. He then simultaneously shapes a chosen aspect of the enemy's warfighting capability (deep battle) which have [sic] not yet joined the engagement while orchestrat- ing available resources to generate superior combat power at the chosen place and time (close battle). (emphasis added) (13:16) The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept has made the Marine Corps a unique and special fighting force. The MAGTF concept laid the foundation for a combined arms organization which can be task organized and mission oriented. There is, however, an increasing trend to prepare for tomorrow's war with past experiences. In a new era highlighted by the attempt to "fight" the MAGTF, we will need this warfighting MAGTF to use all its might to destroy an enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible in order to prevent excessive friendly losses. A new look at the integration of combined arms with maneuver warfare and supported by an integral Combat Service Support (CSS) is necessary in order to win the next war. Marine aviation provides the Corps with the overwhelming combat power needed to destroy the enemy quickly. This Offensive Air Support (OAS) can be used as Deep Air Support (DAS), in the strategic deep battle areas, or in the close battlc area in the form of Close Air Support (CAS). For whatever means that aviation is used, it must be employed with full clarity as to the expected and capable result. In the past, aviation has been used to support the Ground Combat Element (GCE) commander in his scheme of maneuver with a relatively minor emphasis placed on shaping the enemy prior to battle. This task in previous conflicts, for a large part, was left up to the Air Force which was responsible for the strategic deep and deep battle areas. If the 1990s are going to be a period where the Marine Corps is to play in "Yankee stadium" with its MAGTF and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) concept, then it must understand fully the horizontal dimensions of the battlefield. Marine air power must be utilized in the strategic deep and deep areas first and not arbitrarily set aside for CAS, especially if we have the opportunity to destroy the enemy's will and means to fight before we have to engage him on the ground. I. Mission of Marine Aviation The mission of Marine Aviation is to participate as the Air Combat Element (ACE) of the MAGTF in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases and for battle as may be essential to a naval or land campaign. An additional mission is to participatc as an integral part of a joint or combined force in the execution of such other aviation functions as the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) requires. (11:16) MAGTFs normally possess the organic equipment and personnel to accomplish all six aviation functions required by the mission and enemy threat. Additionally, Marine tactical aviation can stand alone or operate as part of the concerted air-ground effort. Marine aviation has a powerful and direct effect in ensuring success in battle, and in exercising this power creates the opportunity for overwhelming combat power by deceiving, dislocating, and disrupting the enemy. The air combat element of the MAGTF is employed to meet the priorities and requirements established by the mission. ACE assets are best employed when available assets are brought together in a coordinated manner to weight the main effort. (11:16) It is important to note that the MAGTF main effort can be assigned to aviation in the deep battle. Additionally, as stated in FMFM-2, "Aviation assets are not normally held in reserve." (emphasis added) (13:16) II. Functions of Marine Aviation The capability to conduct successful tactical air operations is essential to the execution of an amphibious operation or land battle. For this, the Marine Corps has designed an effective aviation combat element capable of meeting all requirements for amphibious and land battle. To achieve this requires a flexible, responsive ACE specifically tailored to meet the anticipated tactical situation. At this point, the specific functions of Marine aviation need to be understood and are stated in FMFM 5-1: Aviation tasks include planning and employing air power to assist in seeking out and destroying enemy forces and supporting installations, gaining and maintaining air superiority, preventing movement of enemy forces along routes of communication into and within the area of responsibility, and to provide direct air support to the ground combat element [MAGTF] in order to assist in the attainment of assigned objectives. The numerous tasks required to support the Marine aviation mission are categorized into six functional areas. These functional capabilitles include antiair warfare (AAW), offensive air support (OAS), electronic warfare (EW), aerial reconnaissance, assault support, and control of aircraft and missiles. Of these functions, OAS provides the most powerful firepower capability. (14:16) A. Offensive Air Support in Marine Aviation. As stated in FMFM 5-4: OAS is a function of Marine aviation where the actual delivery of firepower against the enemy ground forces for the destruction or neutralization of installations, equipment, and personnel is executed. OAS missions are grouped according to the degree of coordination required with ground elements and fall into two categories--close air support (CAS) and deep air support (DAS). (20:17) 1. Close Air Support. This is a mission where aviation is brought to bear against hostile targets which are in proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. If targets are not in proximity to friendly forces and are generally outside the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) then they are designated a part of deep air support. (20:17) CAS is the forte of Marine aviation. 2. Deep Air Support. These missions are air attacks against hostile targets which are at such distances from friendly forces as to require no coordination with the fire and movement of those forces. DAS missions are usually attacks beyond the FSCL to destroy, neutralize, or delay enemy ground forces before they can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces. (20:17) The Marine Corps possesses suitable and substantial assets capable of performing this function. B. The MAGTF's Role in War The MAGTF is the Marine Corps tactical warfighting organization through which joint or combined commands conduct strategical, operational and or tactical maneuver from the sea or the land. The MAGTF is task organized to fight land or amphibious battles in support of the theater commander. It is important to note that the MAGTF is specifically organized, equipped, and trained to offer a variety of amphibious and expeditionary options to support a theater campaign as well as a capability to support sustained land operations. (13:16) The MAGTF commander, through his ability to command and control air, ground, and logistics operations, develops a complete vision of the battlefield. He uses this vision of the battlefield to shape that battlefield by applying aviation resources to the deep battle first. Thus, having decided when, where and how the MAGTF will fight, and having shaped the enemy to his liking, the MAGTF commander then orchestrates available resources to the close battle where he controls combined arms warfare conducted by the GCE commander. FMFM-2 goes on further to state: "The most critical of the MAGTF command elements functions include the planning and conducting of deep and rear operations." (13:16) The MAGTF commander is now given the responsibility to conduct the deep battle through the ACE by execution of offensive air support. OAS functions are provided by missions involving DAS, CAS and Close-In Fire Support (CIFS). C. Air Force Offensive Air Support. Air Force OAS operations are similar to the Marine Corps with the exception that they break down DAS into two sub- functions. The functions include air interdiction (AI) and battlefield air interdiction (BAI). (19:17) It is recommended that these terms be included in the OAS function. 1. Air Interdiction. AI is the same as Marine DAS where operations are conducted to destroy, neutralize or delay enemy ground or naval forces before they can be brought to bcar against friendly forces. These operations also restrict the combat capability of enemy forces by disrupting their lines of communications (LOCs) and by destroying the supplies that sustain an effective level of enemy activity. These missions are affected at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration with the fire and maneuver of friendly forces is not required. The Air Force goes one step further in the deep battle by providing for attacks against targets that have a near-term effect on the operations or scheme of maneuver of friendly forces, but are not in close proximity to friendly forces. These are referred to as BAI. (19:17) 2. Battlefield Air Interdiction. BAI and AI are both a part of DAS but differ in the near-term effect and influence produced against the enemy in support of the GCE scheme of maneuver. BAI attacks require joint coordination at the component level during planning and may require coordination during execution. If the Marine Corps is going to assume a larger force and "fight" the MEF, then it will need to incorporate more of the deep battle into its plan and provide for both AI and BAI in the DAS portion of the campaign. III. Marine Aviation in OAS as Part of the MAGTF In MAGTF operations prior to the Gulf War, Marine aviation was used primarily to support the GCE scheme of maneuver in battle. The planning process began with the GCE commander apportioning his aviation assets to best support his maneuver units with offensive air support mainly scheduled in the close air support role. Marine aviation was used to fill the void caused by the Marines' designed lightness on artillery assets. As such, planning for operations before ground battle or apportioning DAS missions was usually met with resistance due to the reluctance to use aviation direct support assets for anything but GCE close fire support requirements or CAS. Hence, scheduling of aviation assets capable of performing OAS were usually held for the CAS mission and few, if any, DAS or shaping the battlefield missions were flown. An additional OAS mission is the antiair mission which is performed with most of the same present-day multirole assets required for the CAS mission (F/A-18). The normal apportionment provides for AAW and air superiority followed by the OAS sorties next which include CAS and DAS. The apportionment and allocation of aviation sorties for CAS and anti air warfare usually leaves few sorties available for DAS missions. This is the beginning of a problem and is where the MEF commander in "fighting" the MAGTF must now allocate his assets for fighting the deep war. The answer to apportionment is not in more aviation assets, though that would help, but in a reprioritization of those assets at the MAGTF level. A. Apportionment. Apportionment is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as, "the determination and assignmcnt of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time." (6:16) In order to be able to fight the MAGTF and successfully accomplish the mission of the MEF and MAGTF operating in "Yankee stadium," the future apportionment of assets must be done at the MAGTF level with priorities that include a stronger emphasis on DAS. Additionally, a new role within DAS must be to attack targets in the strategic deep battle area if they possess the qualities that are referred to as enemy critical vulnerabilities and possible centers of gravity. The MAGTF must in the apportionment process be willing to sacrifice the long-range artillery mission of the ACE in the CAS role for missions that will influence and shape the enemy before the ground battle. The apportionment process must at least emphasize the DAS mission equally to that of the CAS mission, especially if DAS can be used to shape and destroy the enemy and perhaps even prevent a ground confrontation. B. Deep Air Support Versus Close Air Support Marine Aviation has the capability to carry the fight to the enemy before he can influence the battle. This can be done by medium-range strike and attack aircraft presently in the Marine inventory. The Gulf War provided the Marine Corps with the opportunity to exploit this capability and test the--fighting MAGTF commander concept. The Marine Corps, as part of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), apportioned its aircraft to the deep and strategic deep areas to shape the enemy before ground combat commenced. Though not allotted to the full potential, the effort demonstrated the capability and the idea that DAS is very important and should be the focus of effort by the MAGTF commander early in a conflict. Apportionment and subsequent allocation for each functional area of aviation must be viewed in light of first shaping and destroying the enemy, and then scheduling CAS sorties as needed and available. The focus of effort between the ACE, GCE and the CSSE must be evaluated constantly in order to provide the best momentum for the campaign. As this evaluation is underway, emphasis must be placed on what will critically impair the enemy and hurry his defeat and the pursuit of peace. DAS must be weighed on its comparative destruction and prevention capability as to that of CAS. The MAGTF commander must use his aviation to apply overwhelming firepower deep before the enemy engages friendly forces and the need for close combat exists. IV. DAS and CAS as Applied in Desert Storm Desert Storm provided the US a view of a present and possible future scenario of conventional warfare that could be encountered. I contend that the Gulf War wasn't an aberration of historical warfare as it is sometimes called, but rather it was a decisive war that was won by applying US strengths against the enemy's weaknesses and centers of gravity and to a large degree destroyed his critical vulnerabilities before ground combat began. In the Gulf War, the MAGTF commander fought two GCEs and an ACE with a view of the battlefield both vertically, as has been most comfortable in the past, and horizontally, as the Air Force has viewed it. (15:16) Additionally, the ACE was given the focus of main effort in the air campaign and apportioned roughly 50% of fixed-wing assets, 36 F/A-18, and 10 A-6, to DAS and the strategic air campaign. Though this may be the first time that Marine aviation has been used jointly in a combined strategic air campaign, the remaining fixed-wing aircraft, 80 AV-8B and 36 F/A-18, were held in reserve in case a ground campaign was necessary. The outcome of providing aviation assets, to the tune of 200 sorties a day, to DAS and the deep and strategic deep battles was successful. This success should be cultivated in order to breed additional victories in future conflicts. (2:16) In addition to the MAGTF commander apportioning assets to DAS first and retaining some for CAS and contingencies, aviation in the Gulf War provided reinforcement of the fundamental concepts of maneuver warfare which include: focusing the air on the enemy rather than terrain objectives, avoiding enemy strengths on the ground, using the ACE in attacking enemy critical vulnerabilities, and acting more quickly than the enemy can react. (5:16) This is precisely what happened for the 43 days of Desert Storm. Having obtained complete air superiority in the initial hours of the operation, a massive number of aircraft sorties were launched against thousands of Iraqi targets carefully selected for their strategic, operational, and tactical value. (2:16) As Col Edson so aptly stated in a Gazette article, Iraqi forces were quickly deprived of intelligence, their air arm [was] put out of action, command and control centers destroyed, communications disrupted, supply dumps leveled, reserve units battered, weapons systems obliterated, bridges and roads destroyed. The attack created widespread chaos and confusion at every level. Attempts at maneuver by Iraqi forces rendered them more vulnerable and more exposed to immediate destruc- tion. As a result of these actions, the initiative passed entirely to coalition forces. In maneuver warfare terms, the air campaign not only put the allies "inside" the Iraqi observation-orientation- decision-action loop (OODA) but actually destroyed Iraq's ability to employ an OODA cycle.... The systematic destruction of selected targets simply collapsed the Iraqi forces... and much of their will to fight.... 2:16) The principal goals sought by maneuver warfare doctrine were brilliantly achieved, but the job was done by aviation and with a clear definition of the horizontal and vertical battlefield. What was witnessed in the Gulf War was a demonstration of the new relationship between maneuver and aviation as applied against an enemy by air and subsequent ground confrontation. V. Marine Aviation in OAS and Conventional Warfare During Medium or High Intensity (MIC/HIC) Conflict Marine aviation is capable of operating in both high and medium intensity level conflicts of conventional-land warfare and amphibious operations. In applying air to these conflicts, the MAGTF commander must be able to "fight" the MAGTF with both mission orders and a commander's intent. The ACE must be an equal part of the commander's decision and should be designated as the focus of effort early in order to shape and attack an enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. As demonstrated in the latest conflict, the commander must be willing to sacrifice some CAS, or long-range artillery, in order to optimize all of the MAGTF assets on the battlefield and better utilize the ACE potential. A. Strategic Deep Battle. The ACE is fully capable of providing attacks on targets in the deep strategic battle. For the MAGTF to enter the "big leagues," the MEF commander must be willing to take on these targets which usually include the enemy centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Some of these targets may be more suitable for strategic and Air Force assets, but as demonstrated in the Gulf War and Vietnam, Marine tactical aviation can effectively target strategic deep area targets. Additionally, many of the strategic/operational reserves are located in an area which can directly influence the MAGTF and GCE commander and are considered to be in his area of responsibility (AOR). The ACE must be employed to the maximum extent possible by the MAGTF commander for targets in this area in order to shape and destroy the enemy before close combat ensues. B. Deep Battle The MAGTF commander must conduct the deep battle with the ACE and not hold back those assets capable of destroying LOCs, communication and control centers, military production areas, critical transportation nodes or theater reserve forces. An apportionment decision that saves aviation assets for CAS and the GCE scheme of maneuver will jeopardize the capability to influence the enemy critically and shape him for close combat. Any asset that has the capability to disrupt and disorganize the enemy away from the front will provide a multiplying type advantage if ground or close combat is required later. The deep and strategic deep battles are targeted in order to isolate the close and rear battle areas. Additionally, DAS must be sustained for the duration so that the enemy is not allowed to recuperate from the effects of previous strategic deep and subsequent deep battle area attacks. C. Close Battle. Once the close battle becomes necessary, those aviation assets required from the ACE should be sequenccd into battle along with the other fire support agencies to support the GCE and his scheme of maneuver. The apportionment and allocation of assets must support the GCE and the focus of main effort with a second effort applied to strategic deep and deep targets that will influence tomorrow's battle. The deep battle areas must not be abandoned once the close battle is underway. This is still where the biggest bang for the buck can help achieve operational objectives. D. Rear Battle. The rear battle will also be conducted by the MAGTF commander, or his representative, and consist of CAS or close-in fire support (CIFS) sorties allocated to the rear commander. It is anticipated that this allocation can come from the apportionment of assets for the close battle, as is presently the case. Most important is the capability of aircraft such as the AH- l in the CIFS role to accomplish this mission. DAS capable assets should be allocated as a last resort with CIFS-capable platforms scheduled primarily. VI. Future Conflicts In the next conflict requiring US resolve, the CINC may turn to the MAGTF commander and direct him to undertake operations for the accomplishment of missions as stated in the tasking order. In order to best accomplish the mission in a high intensity conflict (HIC) or medium intensity conflict (MIC) conventional-warfare environment, the MAGTF commander may turn to the ACE commander and design a strategic deep and deep campaign to shape and disrupt the enemy before engaging him with ground forces. It is important to note that, as stated in FMFM-2, future employment of the Marine Corps may be as a MEF where the MAGTF commander conducts the strategic deep and deep battle through his ACE and the close and rear battle through his GCE and CSSE. The MAGTF commander is not the GCE commander as is presently the case. (13:16) A. The Strategic Deep and Deep Battles Either before, during or after ground combat begins, the enemy's centers of gravity can be targeted with present A-6E or F/A-18 aircraft. Critical vulnerabilities should be targeted with remaining aviation assets to deprive the enemy of sanctuaries for his war base logistic, transportation, and communication systems. This targeting can also occur if enemy forces exploit neutral territory or when political constraints prevent unlimited attacks against specified areas or target categories. Consistent with political constraints, an aggressive air campaign can be sustained against targets authorized for attack through the ability of tactical air assets to implement selective target destruction. Following the initial apportionment of ACE assets, the interdiction campaign against deep targets must be undertaken so that the enemy is not allowed to recuperate from the effects of previous air attacks and support ground operations. A key point is to isolate the battlefield and concentrate on the enemy's vulnerabilities. The scale of operations deep will generally be the greatest in the early stages of the program, followed by a reduction in operations to that required to maintain the objective of deep interdiction or DAS. A good example of this is the air campaign in the Gulf War where air was properly used against key targets that were both new and previously attacked for 38 days prior to the ground war. (2:16) Sufficient resources must be allocated to insure the attainment of the objective while at the same time economizing on the effort required through careful targeting. (13:16) It would assist the MAGTF commander if DAS was broken up into AI and BAI for allocation purposes. The Air Force breakdown of the deep battle area allows for proper targeting and better availability for additional ACE assets to be employed in this area. Primarily this would bring in the Harrier to the BAI area and release the F/A-18 and A-6 to AI targets in the deep area as well as to targets in the strategic deep battle area. (19:17) B. The Close and Rear Battles The close and rear battles should be the primary domain of artillery and CIFS aircraft such as the AH-1 Cobra. Additionally, aircraft that specialize in CAS, such as the AV-8B Harrier, should be assigned this mission. There are sufficient CAS and CIFS aircraft assigned to a MEF to accommodate the close and rear battle as required by the MEF and subsequent GCE commander. The aircraft capable of deep and strategic deep targeting should be used for that mission first and not held in reserve for possible CAS. The present F/A-l8 and A-6 have a multi-mission capability and can exploit the advantages of the deep and strategic deep battle very well. Future aircraft procurement will in all probability have the same capability as these and must be apportioned and subsequently allocated to the deep and strategic battle first. When required to stem the enemy momentum and blunt his forces in the close and rear battles, the DAS and interdiction capable aircraft can and should be used to support the GCE commander. The area of contention, and thesis of this paper, is in the proper weighting of the deep and close battle and the asset apportionment for them. It must be understood that a tremendous potential exists in taking the war to the enemy before we are engaged on the ground. All assets capable of striking deep and strategic deep must be apportioned/ allotted deep until absolutely required for the close or rear battle. As stated in FMFM-2, Time and spatial considerations come into play for requirements of the GCE commander. Given a fixed force, an increase in air interdiction (DAS) sorties produces a corresponding reduction in CAS capabilities. Analysis may demand that, initially, air inter- diction (DAS) be assigned a higher priority by the MAGTF com- mander than CAS and the GCE commander may have little influence in the assignment of this priority. The decision to emphasis air interdiction (DAS) over CAS in the future must be made at the operational level or MAGTF level. The GCE commander may not readily discern the payoff of this prioritization until they begin pushing toward their objectives and observe destroyed enemy supply dumps, vehicles, tanks, and enemy casualties. Or perhaps not note the lack of enemy forces or support caused by the strategic deep and deep targeting. (13:16) Many military analysts, including those in the Air Force, believe the key to OAS is to destroy or to neutralize the enemy targets through full-scale interdiction before they become targets for CAS. In the long run, more friendly lives are saved in the achievement of tactical ground objectives through an emphasis on the strategic deep and deep area targeting. MAGTF and GCE commanders may misunderstand the value of interdiction because they are much more interested in CAS from the standpoint of attaining immediate objectives either before or after the ground war is underway. The MEF commander must have a better appreciation of the merits of air interdiction since sortie for sortie, air interdiction may be the most effective function in the furtherance of ground operations. This importance should be fully understood by both MAGTF and GCE commanders if they are to success- fully utilize all the combat assets available to full combat potential. (19:17) C. Low Intensity Conflicts. The OAS targeting and allocation function is primarily for the HIC and MIC environment. For LIC, the MAGTF commander will need a different view of OAS, DAS, CAS and the inherent problems involved with this environment. LIC probably would require less interdiction, etc.... D. Amphibious Operations The planning and execution of the ACE in an amphibious environment is no different than in a HIC or MIC situation. Aviation assets normally will be required to conduct the strategic deep and deep battles before the ground forces are employed on the land. Once the GCE is ashore, the ACE must support the close and rear battles as well as the strategic deep and deep battles. The apportionment of ACE assets should be clearly in support of the GCE until such a time as the emphasis can be redirected back to the DAS targets. Again, the ACE must be involved in destroying or neutralizing the enemy targets through full-scale interdiction before they become targets for CAS. More can be accomplished in DAS and interdiction targeting--if timely--for the overall achievement of operational objectives than holding back for CAS. The MEF commander's view should be of striking deep into strategic and interdiction targets in order to shape the battlefield, such as was done in Normandy during WW2 for operation Overlord. Constant pressure on the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, such as the LOCs in Normandy, must be maintained to produce early and decisive results. It must be remembered that the tactical requirements for conducting air interdiction are initially high and the enemy's mobility and air defense systems make extended flights through his home territory more difficult. This equates to a higher aircraft loss possibility, but the expectation, though, is that the requirements for CAS will decrease as the success of DAS on deep and strategic deep targets increases. DAS is more cost effective in the long run. Conclusion The tasking of tactical aviation is directly dependent upon the prioritization of targets and subsequent declaration of operation requirements. After targets and missions are prioritized, tactical aviation assets are assigned to support those priorities. This prioritization of targets and missions culminates in the production of the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The process leading up to the ATO is by far the most important step and demands the most detailed planning. The future of the Marine Corps is being written now as--being able to compete in the "big leagues" and "Yankee stadium." To do this we must rethink aviation and fire support as they support the MEF commander--and not the GCE commander as has been the way of the past. Aviation, like artillery, must not be kept in reserve to support the GCE, but, rather it must be utilized to its fullest extent on the horizontal battlefield. Some aviation assets offer the MAGTF commander the capability to attack the enemy before the ground battle commences and essentially take the war to the enemy deep where it will hurt the most. The Marine Corps possesses the aviation assets capable of destroying the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities; therefore both shorten and even eliminate a ground conflict. If Desert Storm taught the Marine Corps one lesson it should be that we own assets that can go deep and be effectively employed against an enemy in a HIC or MIC environment. Sortie for sortie, DAS may be the most effective function in the furtherance of ground operations and that this function should be understood fully by the MAGTF, GCE and ACE commanders. Marine aviation must be utilized and emphasized in the deep battle especially if we have the opportunity to destroy the enemy's will and means to fight before he is ready on the ground. Sun Tzu said "know yourself, know your enemy. I propose that we know our enemy and his centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities and then apply all our might against them. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. "Defeat of Iraq Sparks Debate on Which Air Role Was Critical." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 136/4 (January 27, 1992), 60. 2. Edson, J.J., Col, USMC (Ret). "A Perspective on Desert Storm." Marine Corps Gazette, 75/6 (June 1991), 25. 3. Garrett, Thomas. "Close Air Support: Which Way Do We Go?" Parameters, 4 (Dec 1990), 29-38. 4. "Marine Air: There When Needed." 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