Attack Helicopters In Search Of The Right FARP CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Attack Helicopters in Search of the Right FARP Author: Major S. E. Mills, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The Marine Corps must greatly improve its Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) capability if Desert Storm was any indication of what ground forces will demand of attack helicopters during future conflict. Background: The FARP concept was designed to project aircraft (mainly helicopters) into the ground battle taking place forward of secure air bases. During the Vietnam War this meant placing fuel and ordnance at firebases, the FARP could remain stationary as long as the firebase existed. The Army has determined the modern battlefield will demand mobility of its FARP. In order to support its agile attack helicopters the Army has equipped and trained itself to meet this challenge. The Marine Corps has not been as quick to recognize the importance of the FARP to the attack helicopter mission and has remained stagnate in its ability to employ FARPs. The speed at which the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions advanced across Kuwait during the ground offensive of the Gulf War should have awakened Marine aviators to the reality of the importance of mobility to the FARP. Recommendation: The Marine Corps must reexamine how it equips its units, trains its personnel, and tactically employs its FARPs if it is to realize the full value of the modern attack helicopter. ATTACK HELICOPTERS IN SEARCH OF THE RIGHT FARP Thesis: The Marine Corps must greatly improve its Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) capability if Desert Storm was any indication of what ground forces will demand of attack helicopters during future conflict. I. Background, how we got here A. Forward basing in history B. Southwest Asia experience C. Doctrine II. Equipment, how do we stand A. Old, but reliable B. Modify existing systems III. Mobility, as the key A. Truck mounted B. Helo transportation IV. Training, or lack of A. Why is it so hard? B. Building Block approach V. Personnel, the old problem A. Multiple sites B. One can do the job of three? VI. Command, who is it? VII. Conclusion A. CAX for doctrine and training B. Commanders role ATTACK HELICOPTERS IN SEARCH OF THE RIGHT FARP In a recent award winning article published in the Marine Corps Gazette Major Bill Cronin proposed that the attack helicopter should be considered the primary aircraft for the Marine Corps' Close Air Support (CAS) mission. His thesis is that modern fixed wing aircraft are too detached from the close battle to respond as quickly and accurately as the attack helicopter which has the ability to loiter within the close battle area for long periods. This theses is largely based on the premise that attack helicopters are supported by Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) located very near the target area. (7: 56) The success of the Marine's AH-1Ws and the Army's AH-64s involved in the recent Gulf War supports Major Cronin's belief in the attack helicopter's superior ability to respond to the ground commander's request for CAS. But he would undoubtedly be surprised and disappointed to discover the status of Marine aviation's ability to employ tactical FARPs in support of the attack helicopter mission. The Marine Corps must greatly improve its FARP capability if Desert Storm was any indication of what ground forces will demand of attack helicopters during future conflict. The purpose of this paper is to examine the current status of FARP employment in the Marine Corps as it relates to the modern attack helicopter, to identify shortcomings in critical areas, and to offer some solutions to problems associated with FARPs. BACKGROUND The advantages of forward aircraft basing have been recognized for almost as long as military aviation has existed. Hans Rudel, the most feared German Stuka pilot of WWII, relied on forward bases that had been cached with fuel and ammunition which allowed him to maneuver his aircraft wing along the entire Eastern Front.(13:131) The ability to resupply his aircraft virtually anywhere along the front gave Rudel the logistical support required for him to extend aviation's influence over a vast area. He was able to plug holes created by penetrating Russian armor forces located long distances away from his organic support base. Rudel could also strike deep to interdict reenforcing enemy units. The Germans had learned early that when logistically sustained near the target area, aviation was, more often than not, the decisive element in the outcome of a battle. Today's modern Marine attack helicopters are doctrinally employed in much the same manner as Rudel's Stukas were in WWII. The Marine Corps' AH-1 attack helicopter is generally used in concert with, and in support of ground forces engaged in close battle. Also like Rudel, the attack helicopter commander's success or failure is often dependent on his ability to quickly respond to changing battlefield situations. Therefore the commander's ability to maintain his sustainment resources close to the fight is always crucial. Every military commander is aware that firepower is virtually useless if it can not be focused at the right time and the right place, and then sustained over a decisive period. The Marine Corps' concept of maneuver warfare demands more than ever that firepower be responsive, flexible, and sustainable. FMFM 1 describes maneuver warfare as a philosophy that: . . . seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope. (14: 59) The attack helicopter can be the decisive tool which the MAGTF commander uses to implement the modern principles of maneuver warfare. But, attack helicopters can be decisive only when they are responsive to the commander's needs. The attack helicopter's ability to takeoff and land almost anywhere offers a weapons platform that can be highly mobile, and which can deliver lethality with pinpoint accuracy virtually anywhere on the battlefield. But like earth-borne mobile weapons delivery systems, helicopters must constantly be fed with fuel and ammunition to be effective. By placing fuel and ammunition closer to the battle area, attack helicopter pilots can remain in the forward battle area indefinitely and offer better responsiveness and flexibility to the commander. The FARP can also be used to increase the range of the attack helicopter for special operations that require sustainment well forward of the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA). Despite the obvious force multiplying effects which the FARP offers attack helicopters, the Marine Corps has been slow to recognize the important role the FARP plays in the mission of the MAGTF. Events in the Gulf War brought to light just how critical the FARP is to the overall mission of the MAGTF, and in some cases just how unprepared the Marine Corps is to perform this demanding task. Comments in an after-action report submitted by a Marine Air Weapons and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS-1) officer summed up his observation of the Marine Corps' ability to employ FARPs during the Gulf War: Some units deployed to Southwest Asia (SWA) with a less than desirable level of knowledge concerning current usage and employment of FARPs . . . some units were reluctant to plan for the use of FARPs. . . Proper training of those involved in planning (FARP) operations, especially on group and wing staffs where these type operations are coordinated and planned, would help ensure that current operational employment techniques are in the "bag of tricks" available to the planners. (9: 1) A recent change to FMFM 5-1 has attempted to define the Marine Corps' doctrine for Forward Operating Basing (FOB). The concept of FOB is to base aircraft in areas that will optimize aviation's ability to meet the needs of the MAGTF Commander by increasing " . . . responsiveness through basing flexibility and aircraft dispersal and by decreasing distances to support areas." (15: 2-9) When deployed to a theater of operations (TO) the Marine Corps plans to use friendly host government airfields, abandoned or captured airfields, and roadways or highways to maximize the concept of FOB. When these facilities are not available, or their location does not meet mission needs, expeditionary airfields will be constructed. The FOB concept calls for multiple aviation basing sites in the TO. These sites will be defined mainly by their logistical capabilities. At the most functional end of the spectrum, Main Air Bases will handle all types of aircraft up to and including theater lift assets, and will provide spaces for Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMA). Moving down the spectrum of FOBs, Air Facilities, Air Sites and Air Points are employed, each demonstrating a reduced capability in general logistical support. FARPs come under the classification of Air Points, and are the most austere form of basing and sustaining aircraft. The FARP is located as near the objective area as possible and is task organized to meet only the basic needs of its users for a specific mission. Normally the mission of the FARP is to provide fuel, ordnance loading and ordnance arming/dearming necessary to support forward helicopter operations. The FARP is normally temporary and transitory in nature, and established for a specific duration and mission. By definition, fueling sites created for the convenience of easing congestion at airfields and ships, or sites located in rear secure areas are not considered FARPs. FARPs are created for tactical use with the ultimate objective of minimizing aircraft response time and decreasing turnaround time in support of sustained operations. EQUIPMENT The Marine Corps currently possesses Forward Arming and Refueling Equipment (FARE) that is designed to be ground and air mobile and has proven to be generally reliable. One, or any combination of four different types of fueling systems are used to support the FARP: the Helicopter Expedient Refueling System (HERS), the SIXCON Fueling System, the CH-53D/E Transfer Refueling System, and the CH-53D MK 105 Refueling System. Each system has its own advantages and limitations that planners must be aware of, but all FARE has proven to be generally dependable and adequate when employed correctly. The oldest and most common piece of equipment found at the FARP is the HERS. This system consists of several collapsible 500 gallon fuel bladders, 100 or 50 gal/min fuel pump, filters and separators, and hoses. The HERS is easily transported in trucks and trailers of almost any type, or it can be delivered internally or externally with helicopters. Once delivered the system can be made operational within minutes. One of the advantages of the system is that it can pump and filter fuel from almost any container. The greatest limitation of the HERS however is that it is delivered as several bulky components, and each component must be placed so that hoses can be connected to each fuel bladder as well as the pump. This is not a problem if the fuel bladders remain loaded and operate from truck beds or from within helicopters. But, if the bladders are placed on the ground indiscriminately they must often be moved in order for the hoses to reach the bladder connections. Fuel bladders weigh over 3,400 pounds each when filled and are extremely difficult to maneuver even under the best conditions. The SIXCON system is new to the Marine Corps FARE and is currently being examined by the Army for their FARP use. The system contains modular 900 gallon stainless steel fuel tanks which can be bolted to another modular frame. (16: 1-3) The frame contains the 100 gal/min fuel pump, hoses, filter and separator. The SIXCON system can be delivered by truck or externally from CH-53D/E helicopters. Because all connections are completed before the system is delivered to the FARP site, the SIXCON requires no setup time and can pump fuel immediately. Planners must take into account that if the SIXCON is delivered by helicopter, the system must be placed exactly where it will be used because it can not be moved without heavy equipment. The major advantage of the system is that it is ready for operation the moment it arrives at the FARP. The CH-53 Fuel Transfer System and the Mk 105 System have both resulted from modifications to existing aircraft systems. The Fuel Transfer, or "dump pump" method of fuel delivery allows the CH-53 to pump fuel directly from its internal and external tanks using the airframe's organic equipment. Fuel pumps that are normally used to transfer fuel between fuel tanks within the aircraft are used to deliver fuel through modified hoses to other aircraft. The system pumps fuel at approximately 38 gal/min and has a capacity of 8500 pounds of fuel.(12: encl 4-3) The Mk 105 system was originally incorporated to give the CH-53D a capability to refuel Magnetic Mine Countermeasures Sleds.(6: 1-36) There is no requirement that fuel or FARE to be carried within the cargo area of the helicopter as this system is capable of delivering over 11,000 pounds of fuel directly from the aircraft's internal or external fuel tanks, at a rate of up to 150 gal/min.(8: 1) Planners must remain aware that the CH-53D/E is a valuable multi-mission asset that will be in great demand for other logistical operations throughout the MAGTF, and therefore may not be available to support the FARP mission. As can be seen by the discussion above the Marine Corps is not suffering from a shortage of FARE. The Marine Wing Support Groups (MWSG) in all three Marine Aircraft Wings possess sufficient HERS and SIXCON systems, and most CH-53D/E aircraft fuel systems are modified to support the FARP mission. The difficult task for the Marine Corps lies in how it will mobilize this equipment and sustain it adequately while simultaneously conducting other important missions with assets that are already in short supply. MOBILITY Marine Corps doctrine calls for the FARP to be located 17 to 25 kilometers from the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA). (5: D1) Because of the static nature of FARPs deployed during the ground offensive of the Gulf War, attacking Marine AH-1W helicopters were forced to fly as much as 70 to 90 kilometers from the battle area for resupply of fuel and ammunition.* Without mobility the FARP can not provide proper support to the attack helicopter in a fast paced environment . This mobility is normally provided in the form of truck or helicopter transportation. *. 24-25 February 91 Marine attack helicopters supported 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions from arming and refueling sites located in Saudi Arabia. These sites were used until the afternoon of 26 February. Like ground commanders, aviation commanders depend primarily on ground transportation to move their tactical resupply items. Trucks can give the FARP self-sufficiency that normally can not be realized when depending on helicopters for movement. The use of trucks normally ensures the FARP can be moved anytime, day or night, and during weather conditions which could prevent logistic helicopters from flying. Trucks also give the FARP its own capability to resupply itself from logistical points located at rear bases or mobile supply trains. All FARE can be transported by almost any type of truck, however it must be recognized that the FARE plus the resupply of ordnance which the FARP is required to maintain can sometimes have an enormous "footprint" that far exceeds the transportation assets organic to the Aviation Combat Element (ACE). The requirement for transportation becomes even more critical when one considers that a single FARP is often not sufficient to support the needs of aviation. The ideal situation would be to employ several FARPs. While one FARP is operational other FARPs could be relocating or resupplying. If only one FARP is available, and is rendered non-operational during its relocation or resupply operations, then the contributions of attack helicopters to the momentum of the battle can be quickly lost. During the Gulf War the shortage of trucks available to the Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG) eliminated the possibility of creating mobile FARPs to meet even minimal requirements developed by the attack squadrons. Limitations of transportation assets will be even more dramatic for smaller units such as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) The Marine Corps must determine how it will meet the ground transportation needs of the FARP in the future. The Army recognized the importance of the FARP some years ago, and through their Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) , the Army provides suff icient transportation assets to its attack helicopter companies and battalions to support their own organic FARP needs. (2: 3-4) Until the Marine Corps addresses this problem, and supplies the ACE commander with sufficient vehicles to mobilize his FARPs, the MAGTF commander must consider augmenting the ACE's FARP transportation requirements with his Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) transportation assets. Helicopters have often been relied on to move FARE and personnel as a tactical necessity and as a solution to the truck shortage problem that is prevalent within the ACE. When operating across long distances, poor terrain, or if speed is of tactical importance, transporting the FARP by helicopter may be the most efficient and effective way of movement. But the limitations imposed by the use of helicopters for transporting and even resupplying a FARP must be addressed by planners. FARP planners that rely exclusively on helicopters for transporting the FARP must be realistic. First, they must recognize that the ACE will have to compete with the rest of the MAGTF for limited helicopter resources. Un less the MAGTF is willing to set aside sufficient dedicated helicopter assets specifically to support the FARP throughout its employment, the FARP may quickly lose its flexibility and experience delays in sustainment. Secondly, the movement and resupply of a FARP by helicopters is gambling its success on the status of the weather or visibility not only at the FARP site, but also on those weather conditions encountered enroute. Even heavy smoke or dust can prevent helicopters from being able to support the FARP. Resupplying or moving a FARP at night, although manageable on a small scale, becomes a risky operation as its size escalates. Lastly, the transport helicopter is severely limited by the cubic payload which it can carry. Two CH-53's have reached their cubic capacity when carrying sufficient FARE, Hellfire and TOW missiles, and personnel to reload and refuel one division of attack helicopters. In comparison, two five-ton trucks with trailers will carry the same FARE and personnel, but will also carry twice the amount of ordnance. (6: 12) TRAINING The goal of a FARP training program should be to mold the FARP personnel into a cohesive team that is capable of performing the FARP mission during any conceivable tactical situation they may encounter. Aviation planners have usually viewed the FARP mostly in the terms of an expedient gas station with the only benefit being convenience. Rarely in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) are FARPs tactically employed during training with the overriding goal of improving helicopter on station or response time. And even more rarely are FARPs employed to be mobile. Several obstacles must be dealt with by the Marine Corps before personnel can be effectively trained in FARP operations. First, the Marine Corps has not established doctrine in sufficient depth for its concept of FARP employment. FMFM 5-3 and FM 5-1 broadly address the subject of FARP doctrine, but more detailed guidance is needed. Individually, Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), Marine Aviation Wings (MAWs), Marine Air Groups (MAGs), and Squadrons have published Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that often differed greatly in their concepts and procedures for establishing FARPs. These SOPs address safety regulations, equipment check lists, personnel requirements, and even give some examples of how to lay out a FARP on the ground. However, the SOPs do little to educate the reader on how to tactically employ the mobile FARP during combat. Second, personnel and equipment required for the FARP are spread between several units throughout the MAWs. This lack of centralization means the majority of planning for FARP training goes into coordinating procurement of vehicles, FARE and personnel. Planners also spend much of their time researching numerous outdated FARP SOPs and documents that belong to individual participating Groups and Squadrons. This task is difficult, time consuming, and extremely frustrating to the young First Lieutenant that is usually assigned to the task. For this reason the results of planning are often diluted training events that never approach the actual goals and missions of the FARP. Third, units that employ FARPs spend very little time planning and supervising FARP training. Many planners believe that once the personnel, equipment and transportation have been arranged the rest will work like magic, that aircraft will receive fuel and ordnance at the right place and time. Nothing could be further from the truth. In order for a FARP to meet its missions and objectives it must be tactically employed near or even beyond the FEBA. To operate under these conditions FARP personnel must be trained to perform as a team and not as individuals. An ad hock group of personnel thrown together at the last moment will have been previously trained to pump fuel or load ordnance as individual tasks, but they will be poorly prepared to be employed as a cohesive tactical unit ready to meet the demands that may be required of them to support the FARP under quickly changing or even hostile conditions. All three of the above factors combine to result in a weak or misdirected training program for FARP employment throughout most of the Marine Corps. Because of the maze of bureaucracy associated with changing doctrine or unit task organization (T/O), the first two factors will require time and money to be fixed. However, today's commanders can greatly improve their readiness to employ FARPs by examining and aggressively addressing the third factor. As his first step a commander should begin to include tactically employed mobile FARPs as part of their normal aviation training program. The commander's training program should strive to break the mold of using the FARP as a stationary gas station. A building block approach should be taken to exercise the FARP's mobility and flexibility under a variety of terrain, light and weather conditions. The personnel selected to perform the FARP mission should be highly qualified in their MOS and motivated to learn under difficult conditions. Because of limited transportation and the tactical nature of the FARP, the number of personnel participating in a FARP must be kept to an absolute minimum. This means the luxuries of having specially trained personnel to perform specific tasks will not be available in the FARP. Often a job that requires several Marines to accomplish in garrison must be done by only a few at the FARP. FARP personnel must become "dual-hatted," therefore members of the FARP team must learn new skills through cross training. Fuelers must learn the basics of loading ordnance and ordnance specialists must learn how to fuel aircraft. Marines that have not looked at a topographical map since boot camp must learn to navigate a truck, during the day and at night. Because many FARPs will be supported by helicopters delivering sling loaded cargo, some members must be trained and qualified in helicopter support operations. Most importantly, because of the FARP's austere and self reliant nature, personnel must be trained to tactically employ the FARP with very little guidance from superiors. In most cases Staff Non-Commissioned Officers will be placed in charge of these FARPs and they will often make critical decisions which will directly affect the ACE's ability to complete its mission. Without an aggressive training program these officers are placed in a position of great responsibility for which most are poorly prepared. PERSONNEL During Desert Shield and Desert Storm FARP planners quickly found that the number of ordnance specialists and fuelers were deficient, therefore requirements for these personnel to support multiple sites could not always be sufficiently met. Squadron ordnance specialists and MWSS fuelers were needed to work multiple ship decks, CH-53D/E on-call FARPs, Air Sites, and ground mobile FARPs. Due to lack of personnel some FARP missions could not be adequately supported to meet combat mission requirements. The shortage of personnel to support the FARPs that were established slowed the attack helicopter ordnance loading and arming process, and could have proven to be a critical deficiency if the enemy would have offered more resistance. HMLA-369's Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS) report from Desert Shield gives testimony to the frustrations which the squadrons experienced when dealing with the FARP personnel shortages: Lack of a complete infrastructure at the forward base (Lonesome Dove) and Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) sites hampered the smooth transition of the squadron into these sites. Manpower and lack of squadron organic assets caused a slow down (in) the mission accomplishment.(10: 1) The 5th MEB's ACE, MAG 50, found similar frustration during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They discovered that the MAG was not staffed with ordnance personnel who could plan and supervise their multi-deck and FARP ordnance evolutions: It has become very clear that a Commander Amphibious Group/Marine Expeditionary Brigade/Aviation Combat Element (COMPHIBGRU/MEB/ACE) aviation ordnance T/O should be established and filled. Peace time MEB aviation ordnance T/Os do not meet the requirements of the ... unique operations of an Amphibious Task Force (ATF) . . . (11: 1-2) The T/O of unit ordnance specialists and fuelers must be reexamined in light of the recent after-action reports. The expedient nature of the Marine Corps will demand the use of multiple sites that are capable of providing ordnance and fueling functions to helicopters, and a realistic T/O should be developed to support this requirement. In the meantime commanders must decide what increased risk they are willing to accept by supporting FARP sites with less than the optimum number of personnel. COMMAND The senior aviation commander who will be supported by the FARP should retain responsibility for every facet of the FARP, from its initial planning to the tactical execution. This person will normally be the MAG or ACE commander. In the past some of these senior commanders have "pushed down" the responsibilities and tasks associated with the planning, coordination, and execution of the FARP to one of their subordinate unit commanders. This situation causes problems when the commander tasked to implement the FARP does not have authority over the personnel or equipment assets required for support of the FARP. Additionally, several subordinate commands will typically be supported by the same FARP, and traditionally, disagreements will arise during the planning phase that will have to be resolved by the senior commander. The subordinate commander has the motivation and skills to plan and coordinate a FARP, but in most cases he simply does not possess the authority over the personnel or equipment that are required to execute the plan. His attempts in working through the chain of command to resolve controversies are cumbersome and time consuming. For these reasons it is most important that the senior commander retain the responsibility for planning and task organizing of the FARP. Even a senior commander will most likely find that he will be required to go outside his command to secure assets to fulfill the manning and equipment requirements. CONCLUSION The attack helicopter community is one of the very few that is going to continue to improve in technology and expand in numbers during the Marine Corps' reduction of forces of the 1990's.(1: 6) Attack helicopter squadrons will grow from twelve to eighteen AH-1Ws. New night targeting systems for the AH-1W are high on the Corps' priority list for procurement and enhanced navigation systems are being installed today. It is obvious that the Marine Corps Is betting the attack helIcopter can provide the responsiveness, flexibility and fire power to take the Marines into the 21 century. The FARP is an often forgotten element in the attack helicopter's "food chain." Without it the attack helicopter is handicapped, and much of the technological advantages gained over the past twenty-five years is never realized. Commanders must include FARP training in their overall aviation training plans. Combined Arms Exercises (CAX) are an excellent opportunity to train personnel and develop the Marine Corps doctrine on FARP employment. It should become mandatory that the ACE at all CAXs be required to employ a truck mobile FARP during the final three day fire exercise. During the two and one half weeks prior to the CAX the ACE could conduct building block FARP exercises with the eventual goal of supporting a twenty-four hour mobile FARP that would support attack helicopters during the three day CAX. This would be an important first step in identifying and solving problems associated with FARP as it is employed by Marine aviation. If the attack helicopter is to shoulder an even greater portion of the supporting arms requirement in the future, then the FARP must become a priority within the Marine Corps; its importance has been ignored for much too long. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. "Aviation Deactivation and Restructuring Announced. "Marine Corps Gazette, March 92, 5-6. 2. Department of the Army. Forward Arming and Refueling Points, FM1-104, 31 July 85. 3. Department of the Army. Attack Helicopter Battalion, FM 1-112, July 86. 4. Department of the Army. Army Aviation in Combat Operations, FM 1-100, February 89. 5. Department of the Navy and Marine Corps. Assault Support Helicopter Tactical Manual, NWP 55-9-ASH/FMFM 5-3, January 90. 6. Department of the Navy and Marine Corps. CH-53 NATOPS Manual, NAVAIR 01-H53AAA-1, June 85. 7. Cronin, William R. "The Future of Marine Close Air Support." Marine Corps Gazette, April 92. 8. Leavitt, R.N., NAVAIR Washington DC. Letter to Major B.T. Johnson about Mk 105 expedient refuel system, (no date) 9. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Forward Arming and Refuel Point (FARP) Employment and Usage, MCLLS no.20457-03897, 8 February 91. 10. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Helicopters in the Field, MCCLS no.30640-44076(04906), 8 March 91. 11. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Table of Organization for Aviation Ordnance, MCLLS no.32701-49221 (05579), 22 February 91. 12. Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261. Standard Operating Procedures of the Conduct and Establishment of Forward Arming and Refueling Point, HMM-268 FARP SOP, 4 December 89. 13. Rudel, Hans-Ulrich. Stuka Pilot. Costa Mesa CA: Noontime Press, 1986. 14. U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting, FMFM 1, 6 March 89. 15. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1 w/ch 4, 24 August 72. 16. U.S. Marine Corps. SIXCON Fuel Tank Module, TM09002A-15/1, March 88.
