The Standing Joint Task Force Afloat CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Standing Joint Task Force Afloat Author: Lieutenant Commander Patrick M. McMillin, United States Navy Thesis: To support the National Military Strategy the CINC must structure his limited assets to respond to regional contingency and peacekeeping operations. Background: The United States National Military Strategy has identified future conflicts, where our forces may become involved, are likely to be regional, sudden, and widely dispersed. Naval expeditionary forces are the most likely assets utilized by the CINC to accomplish his mission within his theater of influence. These naval expeditionary forces are mobile, rapidly deployable and have the capability to embark a standing JTF afloat staff. Past failures in joint operations highlighted command and control problems with the Services all attempting to get involved in the action, but with frequent often costly, misunderstandings of who's in charge. The standing JTF afloat embarked on a CV or LHD/LHA platform, in direct support to the JTF, would function as the CINC's regional warfighter allowing the CINC to focus on the strategic and operational level of war. Joint opera- tions must be organized in peacetime to better fight, as we train, in wartime. Recommendation: The CINC should establish a standing Joint Task Force (JTF) afloat to maximize his decision response times to exploit the inherent flexibility and mobility of the naval expeditionary force. THE STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE AFLOAT OUTLINE Thesis statement: The CINC can establish a standing Joint Task Force (JTF) afloat to maximize decision and response times to exploit the inherent flexibility and mobility of a smaller military force. I. National Military Strategy Environment A. Overview B. Forward Presence C. Expeditionary Forces II. Combatant Commander A. CINC's Mission B. Exploiting Flexibility III. Formation of the JTF A. Doctrinal Perspective B. Historical Perspective C. Standing JTF D. Command and Control IV. Standing JTF Headquarters Afloat A. Supporting Naval Platforms of Choice B. Structure and Training THE STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE AFLOAT by Lieutenant Commander Patrick M. McMillin, United States Navy Many dynamic geopolitical changes have occurred around the world in the last two years. The United States finds itself in a unique position as the only remaining military superpower. We are at a crossroad in terms of our National Military Security Strategy, struggling to formulate a strat- egy to protect our national interests and exert a sense of stability throughout the world. Recently the Secretary of the Navy made the following statement as part of his Department of the Navy 1992 Posture brief before Congress: The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet empire have offered the United States an historic opportunity to reshape its strategy and milit- ary forces. The risk of global superpower confronta- tion has virtually disappeared; the type of conflicts in which the United States might become involved in the future are likely to be regional, sudden, and widely dispersed. (2:20) Our National Security Strategy is shifting from an emphasis on fixed forward defenses against a continental superpower to one of flexible forward positioning of forces designed to shape and influence regional events. (2:21) The world was a much simpler place prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union. Our justification for maintaining a large standing military force was to check the expanding and rapid technological advances of the Soviet military. In response to the dissolving Warsaw Pact, beginning in 1989, we proposed downsizing our military forces. Now, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. no longer faces a major military threat and the political and economic realities have made our military force reductions a reality. The Defense Department has turned to the unpopular task of further draw-downs by cutting personnel, retiring weapons, closing bases, and shelving future plans. Unilateral service operations are unlikely in future military conflicts. However, joint operations may prove more difficult and vastly different from those of the past. At the operational level, the combatant commander, the Commander in Chief (CINC), will rely on reduced joint forces to respond to contingency or peacekeeping operations. Our ability to project power has strategic value beyond crisis response. "It becomes an even more critical part of our military strategy since overseas presence will be reduced and our regional focus has been enhanced. "(10:10) How can the CINC better structure his limited assets to meet region- al theater requirements? The CINC can establish a standing Joint Task Force (JTF) afloat to maximize decision response times to exploit the inherent flexibility and mobility of a smaller military force. This standing JTF afloat will provide the CINC with a flexible, capable, and continual subordinate C3 (command, control, and communications) struc- ture within his region of influence. There are four key foundations to our most recent (1992) National Military Strategy: strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitu- tion.(10:6) This new strategy emphasizes flexibility and is regionally oriented responding decisively to challenges of this decade. (l0:1) Our future threats are more likely to be regional rather than global. Forward presence is replacing forward basing as the cornerstone of U.S. defense policy, which will be more regionally focused. Forward presence helps to reduce regional tensions, to deter potential aggressors, and to dampen regional arms proliferation. The National Military Strategy states: Forward presence includes periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exer- cises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts. (10:7) The capability to respond, on short notice, to the many and varied regional crises is one of the keys to our military strategy. Although joint operations are widely considered the force structure for future conflicts, the Navy-Marine Corps expeditionary force capabilities will likely be the initial choice of the CINC for developing a joint force. Expeditionary forces were described by the Chief of Naval Operations in his recent report, on the Navy's 1992 posture: Expeditionary forces are those which are mobile, im- mediately responsible, self sustaining and ready to meet the requirements of the CINC for a wide variety of military and humanitarian operations including: disaster relief, non- combatant evacuation operation (NEO), protection of U.S. citizens and property overseas, anti-terrorists actions, special operations, limited strikes, and full-scale, joint combat operations. (2:25) Naval (Navy-Marine Corps) forces are non-intrusive (able to steam in international waters, over the horizon, as opposed to requiring land basing), and they are mobile (able to reach nearly 75 percent of the worlds population). (11:3) An expeditionary force must be available on short notice to protect U.S. interests. Often naval forces `are the wedge which opens the way for full-scale joint military of humani- tarian operations." (2:21) Naval forces have long been our means of forward presence and will become more important as forward bases are reduced in this decade. Some new concepts currently in development consider a naval expeditionary force consisting of Navy and Marine Corps elements. (12:49) This idea encompasses the possible mutual operations of a carrier (CV) and an amphibious land- ing-dock/assault (LHD/LHA) in a regional area. These re- gional areas would correspond to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and North Pacific. General Mundy (Commandant of the Marine Corps) states in his report to Congress: Naval forces are self-contained sea-air-ground teams, which can rapidly respond and project a selective combina- tion of air and/or amphibious forces. They have the ability to fight independently and jointly. (11:4) Thus highlighting fundamental operational concepts of naval forces: operating in forward areas, flexible response, maneuver from the sea, joint operations capable, and sus- tained from the sea. (11:10) A CINC, as combatant commander, is responsible for the strategic environment of his theater, in both peace time and wartime, in support of national security strategies. (8:I-1) His doctrinal guidance provides for a combination of methods to organize his theater forces: Subordinate Unified Command, Service Component Command, Joint Task Force (JTF), or Func- tional Component Command. (7:Chap 3, Sect II) Our National Military Strategy states: As the nation is called upon to respond to crises, regional CINCs will form appropriately tailored joint task forces. These joint task forces will include an increasing number of both forward presence and crisis response forces as the intensity of regional crises grows. (10:18) Our deployed forces are often the most responsive in cases of regional crises or natural disasters. The CINC has ultimate responsibility for his entire theater of operations, or region of influence. Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 established greater influence to the CINC as a warfighter for the forces under his control. He now has greater capab- ilities to conduct training and organize his theater forces to conduct joint or unilateral service operations. Joint operations are defined as: A military action on the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, training, or administrative military mission by forces from two or more services; also the conduct combat . . . needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (8: xii) With future emphasis on jointness and the inherent capab- ilities of naval forces, the CINC can focus his effort on a standing JTF to conduct his regional warfighting or peace- keeping missions. However, jointness should not be established for the sake of service participation; in Desert One (attempted Iranian hostage rescue) and Urgent Fury (Grenada), the Services wanted a "piece of the pie". (3:12) A JTF is normally established by the CINC. The joint task force is defined as: A force composed of assigned elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two of more of these Services, which is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command [CINC], a specified command, or an existing joint task force. (6:199) The JTF is used to execute a contingency operation to poten- tially include a wide variety of military activities. This force is normally established when the mission has a specif- ic limited objective. (9: Chap II) However, if the CINC were to form a standing JTF afloat he would have a joint warfighter already in existence. Thus allowing the CINC to stand back and function at the opera- tional level of war where he may be most useful. In order to exploit flexibility in his forces, the CINC should es- tablish a standing JTF afloat rather than putting together an ad hoc team to build up a JTF headquarters while a crisis is in progress. The standing JTF afloat has the several advantages of being in the region and working as a team in preparing for regional contingencies or peacekeeping opera- tions. Creation of a standing JTF afloat will allow the CINC numerous advantages. For example, after Desert Storm was over the majority of joint military forces were redeployed back to their home bases and CINCCENT returned to Florida. However, as is usually the case, a carrier task force remains on station in the region to provide stability and rapid response to any peacekeeping operations or conflicts in the region. A standing JTF deployed on board the carrier with the nucleus staff elements of all the military services would maintain updated plans on joint contingencies and allow flexibility to rapidly respond to any unilateral or joint scenario. Command and control is, more often than not, the key to success or failure of a joint operation. Past experiences with joint forces have demonstrated that failure is forth coming when a joint command is hastily thrown together and sister services fail to train together in joint exercises. Focusing in on the command and control issue is important in understanding past failures resulting in misunderstandings of who was in charge and who works for whom during joint operations. A standing, deployable, JTF embarked on a naval vessel, provides the CINC an on-scene joint warfighter in his region who can exploit flexibility and the need to maximize decision and response times. Doctrinally, joint task forces were established for a limited duration to complete a contingency operation. By doctrine: A JTF is established when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics . . . A JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been dissolved. (7: 3-27) The JTF had the ability to respond to diverse, unexpected and unpredictable crises. They were created by assigning forces from each service and assigned to execute rapid deployment, forced entry, peace keeping operations, and humanitarian assistance. (3:27) In today's environment military resources are in short supply and the CINC does not have the luxury of previous forward basing assets. The majority of previous joint operations have usually resulted in establishing the JTF ashore to optimize the vast C3 resources of the Army or the Air Force. With the excep- tion of recent JTFs formed for Law Enforcement Operations (LEO) for drug interdiction, the CINC normally forms up the JTF when a crisis has evolved, either a building regional conflict or an emergency peacekeeping operation. But, this system has required host nation support which may not exist in future joint operations. Past failures in joint operations, especially the Mayaguez operation and Desert One (1980), highlighted short notice contingency operations which were unexpected, con- fused, time sensitive, remote, limited available forces, no previous existing plan, and ad hoc command and control arrangements. After these failures a Special Operations Review Group (Holloway Commission) identified several key reasons for failure: Ad hoc nature of the joint organizations and planning were related to most of the major failure issues. By not utilizing an existing JTF organization, JCS had to start, literally from the beginning, to establish a JTF, find a commander, create an organization, provide a staff, develop a plan, select units, and train the forces before attaining even the most rudimentary mission readiness. (3:18) The first standing JTF was the Rapid Deployment Task Force (RDJTF), established in October 1979 with a permanent staff- ed JTF headquarters.(3:26) Establishing a standing JTF afloat will provide the CINC today with greater flexibility in his decision process. The increasing involvement of U.S. military forces in interdicting international drug operations would greatly benefit from a standing JTF afloat. Whether a CV or LHD/LHA were deployed in the region, the JTF would have a joint C3 structure to deal with an almost unlimited myriad of contin- gencies without host nation support or sovereignty violations. Whether controlling the Air Force's Airborne Warning and Control system (AWACS), the Army's Special Forces, the Marine Corps' MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force), or the Navy's battle group, the standing JTF afloat is in an optimum position to provide the CINC with decisive actions. A potential scenario in which the rapid escalation of joint forces is evident would be strongly supported by the standing JTF afloat. For instance suppose a CV, with a standing JTF headquarters on board, is within several hundred miles of a region where a low intensity conflict (LIC) is developing. The potential for transition into a mid intensity (MIC) is great and countries in the region disapprove U.S. forward-basing requests. The JTF afloat now becomes the central controlling point for the CINC's decisi- ons and actions. Army and Air Force involvement is limited but still under the control of the JTF. Navy and Marine Corps elements will have the greatest participation. C3 and planning are both adequately accomplished by the JTF afloat in the region. The lack of basing requirements does not prevent accomplishing the CINC's mission. As evident in past joint operations command and control are critical factors to ensure the success of a regional mission for the CINC and his forces. The number of standing JTFs and precise organizational structure is a detailed subject in itself and not within the scope of this paper. Past lessons learned from exercises have often identified the fact we should train as we operate and fight. Therefore a standing JTF should be established in peace time to allow the commander, his staff, and joint elements to train as a joint organization. "This can be accomplished by organizing our contingency forces in peace time the way we will most likely fight them in war time, as a single entity, a stand- ing JTF." (3:25) Most CINCs and their staffs will find it difficult to "concentrate on the strategic, operational, and tactical level details inherent in a crisis with the required mili- tary forces." (3:24) The CINC needs a joint warfighter in the region to focus his effort on the mission at hand and become familiar with the details and idiosyncracies of the area. An existing standing JTF headquarters afloat, even with a small staff and only limited assets assigned, would provide an organizational frame-work of joint professional expertise around which a larger tailored joint force could quickly coalesce. "The commander and his staff should be hand-picked based on ability as proven warfighters, ability to forego service parochialism and view forces from a holis- tic, functional perspective. "(3:23) The standing JTF head- quarters should light, rapidly deployable characteristics and be maintained at a high state of readiness. The rotation the JTF afloat staffs can be worked out the CINC staff. The naval platforms of choice for embarking the stand- ing JTF commander and his staff are the CV, LHD, or LHA. All three platforms have the command and control spaces and basic accommodations to support a deployable JTF. Naturally this is not an easy task, as embarking any staff is only accomplished with meticulous planning and management of available spaces on board a ship. However, the ship which embarks the JTF staff would not be considered to embark other staffs. Staffs such as a carrier group commander, cruiser-destroyer group commander, squadron commander, amphibious squadron, amphibious task force commander, landing force commander, or a MAGTF commander would need to embark on a separate vessel. A CV, LHD, or LHA supporting a JTF staff would then be assigned in direct support of the JTF commander. This idea of direct support to the JTF may not rest well with carrier commanding officers or group staffs, but is the best way to operate. In all but the most unique cases, a CV operating in a CINC's theater of influence would be positioned where it can best support the JTF in a crisis. If this is the case, then an ideal situation would have the carrier always in direct support of the joint warfighter (standing JTF com- mander) in the region. Thus in creating the standing JTF afloat, the mission of the CV or LHD/LHA may change to primarily that of support of the JTF. These naval platforms offer the mobility and the best C3 environment for the JTF to adequately support the CINC in his region of influence. Previous missions of the carrier to provide sea and land strike operations would remain valid, but now these missions would be conducted under the control of the JTF in support of joint operations. In particular, the proposed fifty percent reduction of aircraft carriers will require modification of their missions to provide the CINC with the maximum flexibility in response to a crisis. Training with the standing JTF afloat is a must for deployed naval units and other service organizations who may eventually support the JTF, either directly or in general. Naval forces, as a part of their deployment cycle could chop into the standing JTF to conduct a variety of exercises or provide direct support to the JTF for a limited period of time. The very dynamics of future warfare and the location of regions of potential conflicts continues to be hotly debated. However, one predictable element is our ability to rapidly respond to most crises in the world. The CINC's capability to establish a joint force and C3 structure within his region is greatly enhanced by establishing a standing JTF afloat. The JTF afloat, in fact, provides the CINC greater flexibility to maximize his decision process and reduce response times to a variety of contingencies. While many may object to maintaining a standing JTF afloat, the future of our reduced military forces will require this capability to support the CINC's needs. The concept of the standing JTF afloat is much needed to meet the needs in this decade and perhaps the beginning of the 21ST century. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Betros, Maj Lance A., USA. "Coping with Uncertainty: The Joint Task Force and Multi-Service Military Operations." School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 May 1991. 2. Garrett, H. Lawrence III; Kelso, Adm Frank B; Mundy, Gen Carl E. "Department of the Navy 1992 Posture Statement." Marine Corps Gazette. April 1992. 3. Helmly, James R. "Future U.S. Military Strategy: The Need for a Standing Joint Task Force." Study project for the United State Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, PA, 5 April 1991. 4. McCartney, Lcdr P.G., USN. "The Amphibious Fleet of Tomorrow." Reportfor Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Quantico, VA, May 1991. 5. McCartney, Lcdr Pat G., USN. "The Amphibious Fleet of Tomorrow." Marine Corps Gazette. April 1992. 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS PUB 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, 1 December 1989. 7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Publication 2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Washington, December 1986. 8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Publication 3-0 (Test): Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations. Washington, January 1990. 9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS PUB 5-00.2 (Test): Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures. Washington, 15 June 1988. 10. The Pentagon. National Military Strategy. Washington, January 1992. 11. The Strategic Concept of the Naval Services. Report on the Navy/Marine Corps Team for the 21ST Century. March 1992. 12. Thornell, Ltcol John, USMC. "The Expeditionary Task Force." Amphibious Warfare Review. Summer 1990: 48-50. 13. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, August 1991.
