Integration Of Naval Forces: The Time Has Come CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Integration of Naval Forces: The Time Has Come Author: Lieutenant Commander M. P. McMillen, United States Navy Thesis: U.S. Naval Forces must respond to declining budget allocations with innovative methods for employing available forces to ensure that they adequately provide for the national defense. Background: U.S. Maritime Strategy and National Military are the same. Deterrence, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution are the keys to this. However, the U.S. Navy's budget will shrink dramatically in the immediate future. This situation is likely to continue into the next decade. To ensure that its roles and missions adequately provide for the national defense, naval planners must take positive steps to deal with actual budget allocations and develop innovative methods for employing existing forces. Key components of the force are Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Readiness Groups who provide the preponderance of our forward strategy. Major items to be resolved are the use and disposition of forces, and the revision of warfighting doctrine to accommodate both the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. Recommendation: Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Readiness Groups should be combined. CV's/CVN's should be reconfigured to carry amphibious forces. The Navy's Composite Warfare Commander concept (CWC) should be revised to include Amphibious Warfare as a key element. Flag and General officers should be interchangeable at the CVBG/OTC/CWC level. INTEGRATION OF NAVAL FORCES: THE TIME HAS COME OUTLINE Thesis Statement: The U.S. Navy must respond to declining budget allocations with innovative methods for employing available forces to ensure that it adequately provides for the national defense. I. The U.S. Navy in the aftermath of the Gulf War and Cold War A. Overextended 1. Within the national military establishment a) Diminished credibility with sister services following Gulf War (1) Aloofness led to under- utilization in battle (2) Apparent non-participation in Joint arena (3) Performance and planning failure in certain key roles b) Backlash following roles and missions struggle of 60's - 80's (1) Sacrificed all for high ticket weapons systems (2) Achieved missions (and dollars) at expense of sister services 2. Strategically, operationally, and tactically a) Capable of single response, countering Soviet threat with: (1) Strategic deterrent: submarine- launched ballistic missiles (2) Theater level attacks against the Soviet homeland (3) Tactical battles against the Soviet fleet b) Assumption that all lesser threats are automatically countered by preparation for more severe ones 3. Materially a) Procurement failures have left the Navy with no replacement systems b) Many systems nearing end of useful service life (1) Aircraft (2) Surface ships (3) Submarines 4. Financially - funds no longer available for future use a) Diverted to expensive weapons systems b) Strategic homeporting base construction c) Loss of prime defense contractors B. Regrouping in progress: "Less is more." 1. Clearly define roles and missions a) Striking capacity against land (1) Forward presence (a) Deployed forces (b) Strategic deterrence (2) Power projection (a) Naval aviation (b) Amphibious forces b) Transitioning forces (1) Sea control (lines of communication) (2) Sealift c) Self-defense 2. Capabilities amidst fewer dollars, fewer systems, fewer people a) Strong naval tradition b) Flexible options with weapons systems, ships, aircraft c) Renaissance in naval thought - flexibility solves longstanding problems II. Possibilities in emerging naval presence A. Traditional naval task forces 1. Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) a) Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) b) Subordinates for AAW, ASUW, and ASW (along with a cast of several other significant area commanders) 2. Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) a) Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) b) Commander, Landing Force (CLF) B. Who should exercise command at sea 1. Historically a) Ships - surface officers b) Aircraft squadrons (and aircraft carriers) - aviation officers c) Submarines (and submarine support vessels) - submariners 2. Realistically a) Those commanders at sea who best under- stand the operational and tactical application of their source disciplines throughout the levels of warfare (1) Naval aviators command aircraft carriers - sensitivity to personnel conducting flight operations (2) Marines are most prepared to assume command of Amphibious Task Forces b) Capitalize on strengths of backgrounds to produce the most credible defense (and threat) C. Scarcity of personnel makes regrouping critical 1. Single battle force capable of amphibious warfare, offensive air strikes, and self-protection 2. Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) becomes a complete task force commander, available to serve as a JTF Commander 3. CVBG and CATF/CLF responsible to CWC a) All three could be aviators b) All three could be Marines c) All three could be both III. Development of strong, flexible and small task forces A. Capable of all mission areas 1. Sea, air and land 2. Strategic, operational and tactical levels of warfare 3. High, middle and low-intensity conflicts B. Make most use of available platforms to carry out mission (nearly all ships have some aviation and amphibious capability) 1. Forward presence through deployment 2. Power projection through composition and capability of forces C. Provide operational commanders with strongest naval warfighting backgrounds INTEGRATION OF NAVAL FORCES: THE TIME HAS COME OUTLINE In the aftermath of the Cold War and the Gulf War the U.S. Navy is operationally overextended and its warfighting doctrine outdated. It stands out among the nation's armed forces for its recent bitter, inconclusive soul-searching regarding its roles, missions, and relevance within the contemporary U.S. national defense. Ultimately global and regional situations will continue to arise which call on naval forces as a key element in joint and combined efforts during crisis: we are a maritime nation and our national strategy recognizes the necessity for us "to control vital sea lines of communication through naval superiority.1" Recent Maritime Strategy has evolved from the roles of Peacetime Presence, Crisis Response, Warfighting and War Termination cited by ADM Watkins in 1986 (2) to coincide with the 1990's National Military Strategy of Deterrence, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution. 3 Presence and deployment patterns of naval forces remain an important element of deterrence against key areas of U.S. vulnerability. Effective forward presence will require that naval forces do more with less: the composition of deployed forces must change to meet the realities of the current national budget and political climate without placing naval personnel on a near-wartime footing while the international security environment (and U.S. society) enjoys the current peace. 4 Naval preplanning and rehearsal in the joint arena are required to prepare the Navy for joint crisis-response scenarios. While previously unchallenged as the first force on-scene for regional contingencies,5 the Navy today enjoys limited credibility with sister services following the Gulf War. What appeared as aloofness was in fact a lack of practice at joint doctrine. The result was the same: under-utilization in battle. Reconstitution will be difficult at best in terms of naval forces as we know them: once personnel and equipment have been reduced, substantial time and expense will be required to restore the force to something comparable to its original configuration. While the role of reserve forces is clear, restoration of an adequate shipbuilding base with less than four or five years' lead time is unlikely. Navy planning and strategy over the past fifteen years shaped the CVBG to project power against a single threat, the Soviet Union, at the expense of the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) and amphibious shipping. Planners developed tactics and weapons systems to protect the CVBG against Soviet regimental bombing raids and retaliate with carrier air wing (CVW) strikes against the Soviet homeland and fleet. With the Soviet Union's collapse low and mid-intensity conflict have emerged as the most likely threats, and CVBG tactics must change. While the assumption that all lesser threats are automatically countered by preparation for high-intensity war with the Soviet Union is fallacious, the equipment and forces which resulted from that stimulus are quite capable. It is obviously better to plan for the future with an initial excess than to attempt an arms buildup in an austere economy. During the previous ten years Navy planners established the service's future agenda with no requirement to consider the impact of today's increasingly inflexible defense budget coupled with the obligation to maintain absolute accountability for hard national concerns (as opposed to parochial service issues). Important naval missions such as Amphibious Warfare were inadequately addressed during the 1980's defense buildup and deficiencies now threaten our ability to project power. Simply stated, there are insufficient hulls afloat to conduct all naval missions as they have evolved today. The problem is not limited to the failure to translate roles, missions, and Maritime Strategy into practical, affordable shipping. Total ship numbers are declining, and there is no plan for replacing more than a fraction of those scheduled for decommissioning. Maintaining the remaining ships in the fleet becomes prohibitively expensive as the ships near the end of their useful service lives. The Navy's amphibious capability continues to decrease in both quantity and quality. Not only are amphibious ship numbers decreasing as available ships reach or exceed their useful service life, remaining ships show wear and reduced efficiency which translates into higher repair budgets. The total end-strength number of ships slated for new construction has shrunk (LSD 41, LHD 1), and planning for entire new ship classes has ceased (LST X). This review is made more urgent when one considers that the United States will be faced with an increasingly uncertain, multipolar world, with the potential for shifting alignments and alliances, and when one considers that 20-30 years are required to conduct a shift in fleet architecture.7 The Navy's planners have routinely revised lift requirements downward vice committing additional funds to maintain forward presence and power projection missions. It is clear that sufficient funding will not be available to resolve this dilemma. Certainly none of the armed services escaped the optimism which placed tremendously expensive weapons systems within their reach. Nor did any service escape the inevitable snow-balling expenses of high-technology equipment which resulted in drastic re- prioritization as funding quickly eroded. Although Navy planners failed to anticipate the extent of this predicament as it developed over the past fifteen years, they provided the foundation for a clear alternative to it in the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG). The aircraft carrier (CV) remains a flexible weapons platform with significant combat power. Proposals for employing CV's scheduled for decommissioning beyond their original design are an indicator of lift scarcity: two leading proposals have the CV as either a Mine Warfare platform or as an Amphibious Command and Control ship (LCC).8 It has dramatic potential for employment beyond its original conception in transporting Marine troops, carrying Marine amphibious equipment, and reconfiguring its air assets to include Marine air. 9 Notionally the Carrier Air Wing (CVW) could be modified as follows from Figure 1 to Figure 2 to accommodate the Air Combat Element (ACE) of the embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit Click here to view image Space is available for such large equipment as sixteen to eighteen Light Amphibious Vehicles (LAV's), four to six 155mm Howitzers, and fourteen to eighteen High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV's). The CV's capacity to berth troops is above both the doctrinal and practical minimums for a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Although the Carrier Air Wing's (CVW) combat redundancy will be decreased, total air assets would be carefully matched to a broader variety of the spectrum of conflict. The Amphibious Task Force gains the added capability of a complete Air Intermediate Maintenance Facility for the ACE, the availability of E-2C aircraft to provide command and control/early warning, and the additional firepower in the CVW immediately on call. This plan is not without disadvantages: reduction in the numbers of CVW aircraft reduces combat power and strike capacity, and requires a willingness on the part of high level planners to accept more risk in a high-threat air scenario (mid-to-high intensity conflict). Planners should, however, take into account the availability of Anti-Air Warfare ships escorting the CV as well as the MEU ACE's ability to supplement the CVW in defense of the CVBG. The Amphibious Task Force will require additional troop space for up to 2500 troops, lift for four tanks and twelve Armored Amphibious Vehicles (AAV's) elsewhere within the CVBG/ATF. These changes significantly enhance the CVBG's capability. Command and control are improved through the co-location of the CVBG commander, the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and the Commander of the Landing Force (CLF)0. The Amphibious Task Force can travel in the CVBG at speeds greater than thirty knots if required. Finally CVBG logistics support will improve immeasurably as the result the additional heavy lift helicopters (CH-46's/53's). Expanding the use of the CV and the CVBG to amphibious warfare makes the most of existing resources. It immediately expands amphibious lift by a factor of twelve, the number of large-deck aircraft carriers in the fleet today, and it can be accomplished regardless of defense budgetary constraints. Most importantly it significantly increases the Navy's flexibility, ability to accomplish deterrence, maintain forward presence, and respond to crises from our most likely threats. The Navy accomplishes its deterrence, forward presence, and crisis response missions in one of two ways: through traditional naval task forces, which are either Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG) or Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARG). Carrier Battle Groups, holding the bulk of afloat assets are commanded by a flag-rank warfighter working directly for a Unified CINC. Functionally he serves as the Officer in Tactical Command OTC) of all forces and the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) with subordinate Warfare Commanders task-organized for Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti- Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW).10 The central thesis for this organization pictures the CVBG dispersed over large areas where individual warfare commanders are required to counter rapidly developing threats independently, especially in multi-threat environments.11 Notionally a Strike Warfare Commander has been added to this group. There are several main supporting players to the CWC's main cast including the Aviation Readiness Coordinator (AREC), the Electronic Warfare Coordinator (EWC), and the Screen Coordinator (there are also several other significant supporting commanders).12 The Amphibious Readiness Group has traditionally been an entity separate from the CVBG with the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) as a flag-rank warfighter, who in many cases is tasked to serve under a CWC, the commander of a Carrier Battle Group. The Commander, Landing Force (CLF) doctrinally has been tasked under the CATF during transit to the Amphibious Operating Area (AOA) until he has established a beachhead with his forces ashore as described in JCS Pub 3-02.13 This relationship and its attendant coordination problems have been the source of recurring rancor between both elements of the naval service. Doctrinally CATF and CLF are to be co- located. When they are not, their joint planning, decision- making, and execution between them (including the work of their staffs) suffer to the extent that the success of entire operations is jeopardized.14 With the added dimension of a CWC in the same organizational (as well as physical) arena, further complications arise over who is the "real" OTC. The CWC is overall OTC, but once an AOA is established (complete with a CATF and CLF), then CATF doctrinally becomes the OTC within his AOA. What if the AOA is so large that the CWC and his CVBG must transit it or conduct operations within it? Who then is the OTC? While some have recommended that CWC/OTC be designated CATF in the initiating directive for the AOA,15 recent developments in the Gulf War have left CATF and CLF adrift without establishment of an AOA ("We'll make one when we need one"16). Recent moves to make the CATF and CLF Warfare Commanders in their own right within the CWC are a practical solution, especially without the establishment of an AOA.17 This would have the benefit of placing all individual warfare commanders' assets at the disposal of CATF/CLF, along with coordinated planning of any amphibious operation. CATF and CLF as coequal Warfare Commanders would not only practically combine amphibious doctrine with CWC, it would signal the end to "this tactical separation of responsibilities during . . . amphibious operations that precludes the amphibious forces from achieving more integration and mutual support at the tactical level.18" Considering maneuver warfare, I would argue that this integration is important at the operational level of war as well. While Marines must depend on strong leadership from the Navy through the vagaries of CWC, some have posited that a reciprocal level of Amphibious Warfare knowledge is not a necessity at the OTC/CWC level - the OTC/CWC depends on his Warfare Commanders to be strong in amphibious operations.19 To believe that amphibious training and the study of littoral warfare is "below" the position of an officer capable of attaining CVBG command and serving as OTC/CWC is to doom the "campaign general" to failure by preventing him from seeing (or making him responsible for) the battlefield he has been tasked by a CINC to control. Consider the case of junior aircraft carrier aviators in the 1920's who found themselves in the unenviable predicament of fighting against the larger community of surface officers for the idea "that the full potential of the carrier could not be truly realized unless the officer who commanded her was himself an aviator," not to mention promotion and command (20): President Coolidge's aircraft board (the Morrow Board) reported on 30 November, 1925, in part, . . . there should be a recognition in principle that an officer with both sea and air experience should, other things being equal, be better fitted for command than an officer who has had sea experience only . . . officer should have a general knowledge of all branches of his profession and a specialized knowledge of one.21 The following excerpt from U.S Navy Regulations (Article 1349.2) was the result of the Morrow Board's recommendation, the basis of an Act of Congress of 24 June 1926: "The officer detailed to command an aircraft carrier or an aircraft tender shall be an officer of the line, qualified as a naval aviator, eligible for command at sea." 22 Who should exercise command at sea? Historically, ships have bee commanded by surface officers, aircraft squadrons (and aircraft carriers) have been commanded by naval aviators, and submarines (and submarine support vessels) have been commanded by submariners. "Our reluctance to envision new command arrangements is the obstacle to achieving one doctrine for our forces." 23 Realistically, those commanders at sea should be officers of the naval service who best understand the operational and tactical application of their source disciplines and have best studied their "battlefields" across the spectrum of warfare: The Morrow Board quotation above could just as easily read "an officer with both sea and land combat experience should, all things being equal, be better fitted for command than an officer who has sea experience only." While naval aviators command aircraft carriers, Marines may be the best prepared to assume command of Amphibious Task Forces. Is command at sea thrust onto unprepared naval aviators? No, they are groomed for command within their own community, then selected to serve in training with an abbreviated series of shipboard assignments which lead to command. Could a parallel course be developed for Marines, and would there be any value in pursuing it? Naval aviators transition from successful aviation command through a shipboard executive officer tour, then proceed to command of a larger auxiliary or amphibious ship prior to attaining command of a CV/CVN (with follow-on to Carrier Group/CVBG/OTC/CWC). Marines could pursue the same proven procedure from command of troops through executive officer and commanding officer afloat (with follow-on to Amphibious Group/ARG). Considering the combination of CVBG and ARG into an Expeditionary Task Force (24), the sources for Task Force Commander would not necessarily be limited to the traditional Carrier Group or Cruiser-Destroyer Group Commanders. By capitalizing on strengths of backgrounds to produce the most credible deterrent, the scarcity of personnel makes regrouping critical: what is required is a single battle force capable of amphibious warfare, offensive air strikes, and self-protection. Thus the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) becomes a complete task force commander. In this conception the CWC, CATF, and CLF could all be aviators, Marines, or both, despite views to the contrary ("existing relationships have stood the test of time and are satisfactory 25") The development of strong, flexible and small task forces, capable of all mission areas, will accomplish the objectives of U.S. Maritime and National Military Strategy. Combining Carrier Battle Groups with Amphibious Readiness Groups is not only fiscally sound in view of current defense funding forecasts, it provides enhanced response for mid and low-intensity conflicts, those which are most likely given the current world environment. Possessing capabilities across the broad spectrum of warfare, the Navy can readily make most use of its available platforms to carry out deterrence, forward presence, and crisis response missions since nearly all ships have some aviation and amphibious capability. Naval forces can best be led by developing existing manpower to provide operational commanders with the strongest warfighting backgrounds regardless of service. As General P.X. Kelly, USMC so aptly stated in his 1986 Amphibious Warfare Strategy, "It is only through the dynamic synergism of the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious brotherhood that risks are minimized, obstacles are overcome, and victory is achieved. 26" ENDNOTES 1. P. X. Kelly and Hugh K. O'Donnell, Jr. "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy," Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1986, p. 24. 2. James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1986, pp. 7-13. 3. Stan Weeks, "Crafting a New Maritime Strategy," Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1992, p. 32. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., p. 33. 7. Michael L. Bosworth, "Fleet Versatility by Distributed Aviation," Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1992, p. 100. 8. Marc E. Liebman, "The Auxiliary Carrier, Mine Countermeasures (AVM)," Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1992, p. 97. 9. Interview with Colonel W. C. McMullen, United States Marine Corps, Office of Aviation Plans and Policy, Headquarters USMC, Quantico, Virginia, January 1992. 10. U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Warfare Publication 10-1, Composite Warfare Commander's Manual (U), Chief of Naval Operations (OP- 953), June 1985, p. 1-1. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Terry C. Pierce, "MAGTF Warlords: A Naval Perspective," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1991, p. 38. 14. USREDCOM/J3, "Colocation of CATF/CLF," April 1980, Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Report Number 10843-03989 (01317), Marine Corps War College, Quantico, Virginia. 15. Commanding General, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, "Command Relationships for Composite Warfare and Amphibious Warfare," February 1988, Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Report Number 20634-78079 (00481), Marine Corps War College, Quantico, Virginia. 16. Interview with Major General Harry W. Jenkins, United States Marine Corps, Director, Intelligence Division, Headquarters USMC, Quantico, Virginia, January 1992. 17. Pierce, "MAGTF Warlords," p. 39. 18. Ibid. p. 38. 19. Ibid., p. 40. 20. Malcom W. Cagle, The Naval Aviator's Guide. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1963), p. 126. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Pierce, "MAGTF Warlords," p. 38. 24. John Thornell, "The Expeditionary Task Force," Amphibious Warfare Review, Summer 1990, p. 49. 25. Interview with Major General Harry W. Jenkins, United States Marine Corps, Director, Intelligence Division, Headquarters USMC, Quantico, Virginia, January 1992. 26. Kelly and O'Donnell, "Amphibious Strategy," p. 29. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bosworth, Michael L. "Fleet Versatility by Distributed Aviation." Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1992, pp 99-102. 2. Cagle, Malcom W. The Naval Aviator's Guide. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1963. 3. Jenkins, Harry W. Major General, United States Marine Corps. Director, Intelligence Division, Headquarters USMC. Quantico, Virginia. Interview, January 1992. 4. Kelly, P. X., and O'Donnell, Hugh K., Jr. "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy." Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1986, pp 18-29. 5. Liebman, Marc E. "The Auxiliary Carrier, Mine Countermeasures (AVM)." Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1992, pp 96-99. 6. McMullen, W.C. Colonel, United States Marine Corps. Aviation Plans and Policy, Headquarters USMC. Quantico, Virginia. Interview, January 1992. 7. Melhorn, Charles M. Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911-1929. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974. 8. Pierce, Terry C. "MAGTF Warlords: A Naval Perspective." Marine Corps Gazette, July 1991, pp 38-40. 9. Thornell, John. "The Expeditionary Task Force." Amphibious Warfare Review, Summer 1990, pp 48-50. 10. U.S., Department of the Navy. Naval Warfare Publication 10-1, Composite Warfare Commander's Manual (U). Chief of Naval Operations (OP-953), June 1985. 11. Watkins, James D. "The Maritime Strategy." Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1986, pp 2-17. 12. Weeks, Stan. "Crafting a New Maritime Strategy." Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1992, pp 30-37. 13. Quantico, Virginia. Marine Corps War College. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System. Report Number 20634-78079 (00481). Commanding General, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, "Command Relationships for Composite Warfare and Amphibious Warfare," February 1988. 14. Quantico, Virginia. Marine Corps War College. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System. Report Number 10843-03989 (01317). USREDCOM/J3, "Colocation of CATF/CLF," April 1980.
