The Structure Of The US Strategic Mobility System: Is It Adequate And Cost Effective? CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Structure of the US Strategic Mobility System: Is It Adequate and Cost Effective? Author: Major L. A. Mercado, Jr., United States Marine Corps Thesis: An analysis of the probable type of conflict involving US forces in the future leads to the realization that the present structure of the US strategic mobility system does not possess sufficient sealift assets to sustain deployed forces beyond the initial phase of the contingency. Background: The dissolution of the former Soviet Republic has altered the international balance of power from a bipolar to a multi-polar balance of power. The reduced threat to national security has led to a shift in the military strategy from one of forward presence to one based on power projection. In order to support this new military strategy, the US strategic mobility system will be required to project a substantial amount of combat power from CONUS to coincide with the reduced forward presence overseas. The present mobility system was designed during the Cold War era and emphasized airlift at the expense of sealift as the primary mobility asset. Consequently, the sealift has experienced a degradation in quantity and quality, particularly with US-flag commercial shipping. Several factors have contributed to this degradation: increased shipyard and operating costs, an increasing void of trained crewmen, a lack of coordination between the military and maritime industry, and insufficient government assistance. These ships are the cornerstone of military strategy due to their inherent delivery capability to sustain deployed forces. As DOD reductions are implemented, Congressional appropriations for future acquisitions will be evaluated on cost effectiveness, utility, and joint interoperability. As demonstrated during the recent war in Southwest Asia, the US must retain the ability to project and sustain its combat power a substantial distance from CONUS. The present structure of the US strategic mobility system with its emphasis on airlift will not be adequate to sustain deployed forces if the contingency escalates to a major conflict of significant duration. Recommendation: The US government should implement the necessary measures to acquire and maintain a strategic mobility system emphasizing an enhanced sealift capability. The Structure of the US Strategic Mobility System: Is It Adequate and Cost Effective? Outline Thesis: An analysis of the probable type of conflict involving US forces in the future leads to the realization that the present structure of the US strategic mobility system does not possess sufficient sealift assets to sustain deployed forces beyond the initial phase of the contingency. I. Evolving Military Strategy A. Shift in US military strategy B. Principles of new military strategy II. Possible scenarios for committment of US forces A. Perceptions of low-intensity conflict B. Probability of mid-intensity to high-intensity conflict C. 1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance Scenario Set III. Strategic Mobility System A. US concept of employment of strategic mobility assets B. Necessity for combination of airlift and sealift assets. C. Impact of previous threat of Warsaw Pact attack in Europe on stratgic lift acquisitions IV. Importance of Sealift A. Percentage of war materiel transported by sealift B. National Security Sealift Policy C. Relationship of government and maritime industry in crisis V. Status of US-flag Shipping A. Primary sources of sealift for contingencies B. Degradation of US Merchant Marine C. Dependence on foreign-flag ships for contingencies D. Mission of strategic sealift during crisis VI. Necessity of Sealift as Primary Strategic Mobility Asset A. Impact of decreasing DOD budget for future acquisitions B. Comparative costs of airlift and sealift assets C. Delivery capability of sealift VII. Benefit of an Enhanced Sealift Capability A. Strategic mobility system emphasizing sealift B. Importance of ability to deploy and employ forces in contingency The Structure of the US Strategic Mobility System: Is It Adequate and Cost Effective? During an address to the Aspen Institute on 2 August 1990, President George Bush outlined the new military strategy which the US will pursue in the post Cold War era: Our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to guard our enduring interests -- the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, [and] to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed. (7:64) The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has signified the passing of the Soviet Union as the predominant threat to national security. Consequently, US military strategy will shift from one of containment to one based on forward presence, enhanced power projection to respond to crises, and the ability to reconstitute forces if necessary. The focus will be on power projection rather than the forward defense of Western Europe and Korea which emphasized collective security in the form of military alliances. In concert with the reduction of the US armed forces, this strategy envisions employing small, flexible, and rapidly transportable forces capable of responding to a regional crisis anywhere national interests are threatened. The underlying principle of this military strategy is that the US must maintain strategic mobility necessary to project sufficient combat power to respond to regional crises in the minimum amount of time. At present, the US strategic mobility system is capable of rapidly projecting initial combat power to a single regional contingency. However, an analysis of the probable type of conflict involving US forces in the future leads to the realization that the present structure of the US strategic mobility system does not possess sufficient sealift assets to sustain deployed forces beyond the initial phase of the contingency. A perception is present among policymakers that the conflict in Southwest Asia was an anomaly and that future US involvement will primarily be in the spectrum of low-intensity conflict. However, it could be argued that experiences in Korea and Vietnam have made the American populace extremely hesitant in becoming involved in a limited war. Mr. Michael J. Mazaar of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has stated that the probability of mid-intensity wars in the Middle East and Korea are more likely than either a high-intensity clash in Europe or a major low-intensity conflict in the Third World. (9:35) Further substantiation of this assessment is contained in a 1990 CSIS report which concludes: . . . conflicts that might be termed 'mid- intensity' will dominate U.S. planning concerns. The potential for U. S. involve- ment in mid-intensity conflict -- wars with or between powerful regional states -- will provide a key justification for military budgets during the 1990s and will establish most of the threats against which U. S. forces are sized, trained, and equipped. (3:23) The Department of Defense (DOD) was tasked by Congress to develop a planning document which could be utilized to determine what type of force structure the armed forces should reflect in the future. The result of this tasking was the 1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance Scenario Set. This planning document supports the conclusions of Mr. Mazaar and the CSIS study in that several of the scenarios can be characterized as mid-intensity to high-intensity conflict. The document discusses several scenarios where US forces could be committed to support national policy objectives. The scenarios discussed include: a Russian invasion of Lithuania, an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, a North Korean invasion of South Korea, a simultaneous conflict in Southwest Asia and Korea, a coup in Panama, a coup in the Philippines, and the reemergence of a hostile superpower. (4:8) Each scenario, other than the coups, depicts a requirement to project and sustain substantial combat power a significant distance from the contiguous United States (CONUS). Despite the shift from a bi-polar balance of power in the global community, it is unlikely that the US will abandon its commitment to a strategy of forward defense. Consequently, if war or a limited conflict occurs US policy will continue to prefer to fight on foreign soil. Therefore, the basic requirement for strategic mobility will continue to be a crucial factor in the projection of US combat power. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-02) defines strategic mobility as "the capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy." The present system utilizes airlift to provide a rapid strategic movement capability during the initial days of a contingency. In a complementary role, sealift provides the capability to sustain the forces during the conflict. The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Richard B. Cheney, summarizes the continuing importance of this concept: For crisis response, we must be able to deploy to regions of U. S. interest sufficient forces with the capabilities needed to counter a wide variety of contingencies. Thus, the restructured force will include high airlift and sealift capacities . . . (2:13) The present strategic mobility system is "threat based" and was developed during the Cold War era. Military planners concentrated on the most critical scenario of general war with the former Soviet Union -- a Warsaw Pact assault against Western Europe. The geographic proximity of Warsaw Pact forces to western Europe precluded a significant amount of "warning time" in the event of hostilities. In response, a significant stockpile of war materiel was prepositioned to deter the Soviet threat and fulfill the US commitment to NATO. As a result, for the last several decades military planners have concentrated on how to rapidly increase combat power into the European theater within the initial thirty days of war. The amount of prepositioned war materiel in Europe negated a significant concern with the sustainment of deployed forces. Consequently, airlift capability received the primary emphasis over sealift. The anticipated decrease in future DOD appropriations will present significant challenges in the acquisition of additional strategic lift resources. Government officials will be hesitant in the allocation of fiscal appropriations without conducting a detailed cost analysis and evaluation of utility. The president of the Shipbuilders Council of America, Mr. John J. Stocker, has observed that although 95 percent of all US military cargo must go by sea, the DOD spends only 5 percent of its strategic lift budget on sealift. Conversely, 95 percent of the budget is allocated toward airlift which carries only 5 percent of the cargo. (11:50) Despite the change in US military strategy, the acquisition and maintenance of the resources necessary to project combat power will not diminish. Maritime analysts have assessed that sealift will continue to move 95 percent of all dry cargo and 99 percent of all petroleum products during wartime or any long-term overseas deployment. Therefore, the requirement of sustainment will make sealift the predominant strategic mobility asset. The Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command, General Hansford T. Johnson, USAF has said: Airlift will be the first to arrive in [a] crisis or contingency, but ships will carry 90 percent of materials and equipment in a large-scale operation. This is a well-known fact within the transportation community, but not a well-known fact in the press and general public. It is a fact that will not change in the next decade or century. Sealift will remain the bedrock of America's defense transportation system. (5:30) The National Security Sealift Policy is the primary document which delineates the relationship between the government and maritime industry. An unclassified version was released to the public during October 1989. The premise of the policy is that "the national sealift objective is to ensure that sufficient military and civil maritime resources will be available to meet defense deployment, and essential economic requirements in support of our national security strategy." The guidelines specified in the policy address the reliance on US-flag commercial ships, DOD requirements, available shipping resources, sustainment of deployed forces, and the development of sealift programs. (1:204-205) The significance of this policy directive is in its overall objective of ensuring the US retains the capability to meet sealift requirements in crisis or war. Understandably, it places a heavy reliance on US-flag commercial shipping. However, a brief examination of the present status of the sources of sealift and maritime industry will indicate that significant deficiencies exist in the fleet of US-flag commercial carriers. There are four sources of sealift in the inventory of US-flag assets: the Military Sealift Command (MSC), the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), and the private sector of the US-flag merchant marine. These "fleets" are primarily comprised of breakbulk, container, crane, tanker, and Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) ships. The estimates for these assets in fiscal year 1992 are: MSC, 72; RRF, 96; and NDRF, 122. In regard to the merchant marine, maritime strategists have stated that it is an essential part of America's national security infrastructure and considered to be "the fourth arm" of national defense. When activated by the MSC during a contingency or crisis, these ships will provide the US with readily available seaborne assets for the sustainment of deployed forces. There are presently 423 commercial ships in the US Merchant Marine. However, the continued degradation of the US merchant fleet has diminished this quantity. If this trend continues, maritime experts have projected there will be less than 200 ships by the turn of the century. Unless measures are taken to correct this situation, a significant deficiency will exist when these ships are required to support US military strategy during a crisis. The quantity of these ships has diminished over the last several decades primarily due to the high costs of building and operating US-flag commercial ships. As an example, it would cost approximately $4 million to build a medium-size bulk ship in a shipyard located in the United States and another $2.8 million to operate the vessel with an American crew. In comparison, it would cost approximately $1.8 million to build one in a foreign shipyard and only $600,000 if a crew from the Western Pacific were employed for its operation. Understandably, shipping magnates would be hesitant to invest in American built and crewed dry bulk carriers. Due to increasing shipyard costs and a decreasing number of trained merchant seamen, the US merchant fleet is unable to remain competitive in the world market. Additionally, the insufficient attention the government has given to developing the merchant fleet as a naval and military auxiliary has reduced the compatibility of the maritime fleet with military needs. (6:2) An analysis of the problems and possible solutions for the shipbuilding industry would be beyond the scope of this discussion to address in sufficient detail. It would suffice to say that despite the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, a profit-oriented maritime industry cannot provide wartime sealift readiness incidental to its peacetime operations. (8:36) The former legislative affairs officer of the Military Sealift Command, Mr. Larry C. Manning has addressed this issue in stating: It [the maritime industry] should not be expected to do so, especially not if the military is unable to establish specific requirements and to provide necessary resources, beginning with funding. Ships in the merchant marine are designed to be economically competitive, are highly specialized, non-self-sustaining, part of an integrated international ocean distribution system. (8:37) As a result of the commendable efforts of the US Transportation Command, it can be argued that the present quantity of sealift assets were more than adequate during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. However, it took the US several weeks to deploy a credible defensive capability, and seven months to transport the necessary force to conduct offensive operations. Should a scenario of the magnitude of Desert Storm be experienced in the future, it is highly improbable that the adversary will provide the US several months to project overwhelming combat power into the theater of operations. During a crisis, the mission of strategic sealift is surge shipping during initial mobilization and resupply or sustainment shipping. The insufficient quantity of US-flag shipping was evident during the "surge phase" of Desert Shield. During the first three months, 47 of the 73 commercial ships were foreign-flagged. Had actual combat operations commenced during this period, it is unlikely that foreign shipping companies would have jeopardized their ships and crews. As stated by Mr. L. Edgar Prina, ". . . it took the United States a month to deploy even a relatively modest force and, as the build-up continued in early September [of 1990], the lack of an adequate, quick-response US-flag sealift capability was becoming more apparent." (10:46) The sustainment phase was also an area of concern due to insufficient assets. Vice Admiral Francis R. Donovan, Commander of Military Sealift Command, testified before Congress in February 1991 that "the US alone couldn't meet the surge requirement, and the sustainment requirement would be met with difficulty." (14:12) Of the 195 ships which sustained US forces during the war in Southwest Asia, 74 were foreign-flagged ships. Justification for DOD acquisitions in the future will be scrutinized for cost effectiveness. If a comparative cost analysis is conducted it will indicate that the delivery capability of sealift assets will be more cost effective in utility than airlift. An enhanced sealift capability is the most cost effective means for future strategic mobility acquisitions because 95 percent of all equipment and sustainment supplies must be moved by sea. Supporting this assessment is Mr. Richard B. Rainey of the Rand Corporation: If a purely economic comparison is made of sealift and airlift, treating it as a routine transportation problem, initial responsiveness, and capability in subsequent redeployments, sealift is almost certain to be dominant since it is a much cheaper way of transporting the kinds of materiel which are required for the support of ground forces. (13:15) As US forward presence overseas decreases, a dichotomy will exist in that combat power will have to be projected from CONUS in response to regional crises. Although the US presently maintains approximately 120 overseas bases, a reduction in defense spending and evolving military strategy will result in a substantial decrease in the number of these installations in the future. Consequently, as forces are based in CONUS, sealift will be the most cost efficient means to transport the bulk of combat power. As stated, the most cost effective means to sustain these forces will be achieved with seaborne assets primarily because of their inherent delivery capabilities. Delivery capability is dependent upon several factors: the carrying capacity of the asset, the time required to load and of fload, and transit time between points of embarkation and debarkation. The Interagency Committee on Maritime Policy published a report in July 1982 comparing airlift and sealift carrying capacities. The report stated that a combat package of four light ground combat divisions, five tactical fighter wings, and minimum air/ground support units would be comprised of approximately 150,000 personnel. This force would weigh about 270,000 tons. If this force were armor/mechanized, the tonnage might be from 150 to 200 percent of this amount. On the basis of mere tonnage, one modern containership can carry as much cargo as can be carried in 150 C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft sorties. The Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPS) concept provides an additional example of the carrying capacity of sealift. The five MPS ships which initially arrived in Southwest Asia were configured to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) with equipment and thirty days of sustainment. In contrast, a MEB deployed in its entirety by airlift assets would require 4,400 C-141 equivalent sorties. Once again, this comparison of carrying capacity depicts the predominant advantage of sealift in comparison to airlift. Although airlift is undoubtedly much faster, sealift should not be discounted in terms of response time. The Fast Sealift Ship is designed for a maximum speed of 33 knots. Strategically deployed, these ships would be capable of responding to a regional crisis within hours of notification. At the present time, there are eight fast sealift ships maintained by private contractors. Together, these eight ships provide adequate lift for the unit equipment of an Army mechanized division and can make a trans-Atlantic crossing from CONUS to Europe in four days. In terms of relative response time and carrying capacity, these ships are much more beneficial than aircraft. Another aspect of delivery capability is the time required to load and off load cargo. Within the context of the carrying capacity of these ships, the time required to accomplish these tasks is minimal. Breakbulk ships which are capable of carrying 20,874 metric tons of cargo can be loaded in four days at the point of embarkation (POE) and of floaded in four days at the point of debarkation (POD). Similarly, containerships, which are capable of carrying 13,881 metric tons, can be loaded at the POE in two days and offloaded at the POD in two days. The RO/RO ships, which are utilized in MPS, carry 38,755 metric tons and can be loaded in a day and a half and off loaded in a day and a half. The final aspect of delivery capability which will be discussed is that of transit time between the POE in CONUS and an overseas POD. The transit times (in days) have been extracted from the Distances Between Ports (HO. Pub. No. 1) and are based on an average speed of 24 knots. Additionally, these PODs are commensurate with the geographic regions previously discussed in the contingency scenarios: Atlantic Pacific Point of Debarkation 7 12 Bizerte, Tunisia 18 10 Pusan, Korea 19 12 Subic Bay, Philippines 3 2 Canal Zone, Panama 7 14 Marseille, France 15 20 Ad Damman, Saudi Arabia As stated previously, the DOD budget will continue to decrease. Inherently, the competition for future acquisitions will increase. Therefore, in regard to The National Sealift Security Policy guideline addressing costs and benefits, a cost comparison would assist in the justification for a continued enhancement of sealift capability over airlift. For the cost of a single B-2 Stealth bomber, presently estimated at $850 million per aircraft, the government could build two large RO/RO ships with money remaining. (12:21) It is not the intent of this discussion to imply that a strategic mobility system comprised solely of sealift assets would be the most effective means of projecting a credible response to a regional crisis. However, in view of current reductions within DOD and US forward presence overseas, a system emphasizing sealift will provide a higher delivery capability than an equal cost system which emphasizes airlift. The US is presently focused on domestic issues and, in particular, the federal deficit. As a result of the "reduced threat" to national security, DOD appropriations will be the primary source of relief for the federal deficit. As previously discussed, the forward presence of US forces overseas will continue to decrease as DOD reductions are implemented. 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