Amphibious Warfare And The Composite Warfare Commander Concept: Doctrine In Need Of Change CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Amphibious Warfare and the Composite Warfare Commander Concept: Doctrine in need of change Author: Major J. V. Medina, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Amphibious warfare doctrine requires significant revision to incorporate the Marine Corps doctrine of maneuver warfare into the Navy's composite warfare commander (CWC) concept. Background: Amphibious warfare doctrine demonstrated its worth during and immediately following World War II. The Navy developed the CWC concept to enable the fleet to effectively carry out a multi-threat defense for a carrier battle group. According to this concept, the CWC exercises control through subordinate warfare commanders while retaining overall respon- sibility for the force. The Marine Corps' warfighting philoso- phy changed dramatically with the recent adoption of maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare is easily applied to amphibious operations, but current amphibious doctrine is incompatible with the CWC concept. While the Navy's fleet doctrine has evolved to cope with quickly developing technology, amphibious doctrine has remained virtually unchanged. During any future large scale amphibious operation, simultaneous application of these two doctrine will prevent optimum utilization of naval forces. The time has arrived for revision of amphibious doc- trine to allow maneuver warfare to be incorporated into the CWC concept. Four options are considered as possible solutions to this dilemma. Recommendation: A serious review of amphibious doctrine must be conducted, with the purpose of making it more than compli- mentary to the CWC concept. Amphibious warfare doctrine should be modified to include the AWC and CLF as separate warfare commanders and to realign the responsibilities to include the Composite Warfare Commander. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND THE COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER CONCEPT: DOCTRINE IN NEED OF CHANGE OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Amphibious warfare doctrine requires significant revision to incorporate the Marine Corps doctrine of maneuver warfare into the Navy's composite warfare commander (CWC) concept. I. Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) Concept A. Development of CWC B. CWC Organization II. Maneuver Warfare and Amphibious Warfare Doctrine A. Principles of Maneuver Warfare B. Amphibious Warfare at the Operational Level of War III. Changing Missions of the Navy IV. Significant Problem Areas A. Dilemma of two doctrine B. Defensive versus offensive orientation C. Unity of Command V. Alternative Solutions A. Modify each situation B. Integrate the ATF and the CVBG (senior officer as CATF) C. CATF as Warfare Commander (CLF subordinate) D. Modify Doctrine: AWC and CLF as Warfare Commanders VI. Recommendation: Modify Doctrine, AWC and CLF as Separate Warfare Commanders, and assign CWC specific responsibilities AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND THE COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER CONCEPT: DOCTRINE IN NEED OF CHANGE by Major J. V. Medina, USMC Amphibious warfare requires the closest practicable cooperation by all the combatant services both in planning and in execution, and a command organization which definitely assigns responsibility for major decisions throughout all stages of the operation, embarkation, overseas movement, beach assault, and subsequent support of the forces ashore. Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, USN Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command. Napoleon: Maxims of War Since 490 B.C. when the Persians were repelled during their amphibious assault on Marathon, amphibious warfare has under- gone many changes. For the United States, the two decades following World War I were a watershed in the development of amphibious doctrine. Refinements to this doctrine during World War II resulted in an extremely effective doctrine for amphi- bious warfare.1 This doctrine was institutionalized in the naval service as Landing Force Manual (LFM) 0-1 and has since become joint doctrine as JCS PUB 3-02 (JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS). During the last forty years this doc- trine has remained relatively unchanged. Fleet doctine for the operating forces of the Navy has undergone significant changes since the World War II era. In the mid 1960's, increasing ranges and technical complexity of new weapon systems led the Navy to develop the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept. This concept was intended to enable the officer in tactical command (OTC) to effectively carry out the multi-threat defense of a carrier battlegroup (CVBG). In most instances, the OTC is also the CWC. Although still undergoing change, this doctrine is contained in the Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 10-1. Amphibious warfare doctrine and CWC doctrine are both currently in use in the operating forces, but not without significant problems. In many instances (Southwest Asia for example) "quick-fixes" are made to overcome blaring deficien- cies. Amphibious warfare doctrine requires significant change to incorporate the Marine Corps' doctrine of maneuver warfare into the Navy's CWC concept. COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER (CWC) CONCEPT Naval warfare has experienced a growing reliance on com- plex technical systems, greater threats from increased ranges of enemy weapon systems, and greater likelihood for informa- tion overload with corresponding reduced response times. As a result, the Navy attempted to provide for varying degrees of decentralization through the assignment of subordinate warfare commanders to handle specific responsibilities and the delega- tion of authority to carry out these responsibilities. The technique which evolved to meet this need is the CWC concept. NWP 10-1 spells out the specifics of the CWC concept. Briefly, the CWC retains overall responsibility for the force but exercises his control through subordinate warfare comman- ders. Three subordinate warfare commanders are specifically designated, although NWP 10-1 allows that "under certain cir- cumstances the OTC/CWC may find it convenient to assign com- manders and coordinators above and beyond those shown."2 Those detailed in NWP 10-1 include Anti-air Warfare Commander (AAWC), Anti-submarine Warfare Commander (ASWC), and Anti- surface Warfare Commander (ASUWC). In actual practice, how- ever, current fleet operations include a Strike Warfare Com- mander (STWC) as a fourth subordinate warfare commander. This change is already contained in the recently published JCS PUB 3-04 (Doctrine For Joint Maritime Operations). Figure 1 de- picts the doctrinal CWC command structure.3 Click here to view image Other subordinates may be designated as coordinators to assist in the management of specific assets of the force. The Air Element Coordinator (AREC), Submarine Element Coordinator (SEC), and Electronic Warfare Coordinator (EWC) are examples. The difference in the warfare commanders and the coordinators is spelled out as follows: The supporting coordinators differ from the war- fare commanders in one very important respect. When authorized by the CWC, the Warfare Commanders have tactical control over resources assigned and may automatically initiate action. The supporting coordi- nators execute policy, but do not initiate autonomous action. 4 MANEUVER WARFARE AND AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE The warfighting philosophy of the Marine Corps changed dramatically with the adoption of FMFM-1. The key principles of this doctrine are: to orient on the enemy rather than on terrain, avoid his strength and attack his weaknesses, disrupt his cohesion, exploit tactical opportunities (therein lies the importance of mission orders), and being able to operate in uncertainty (the fog of war).5 In essence, the aim is to be better at creating and exploiting advantages over your enemy. Maneuver warfare recognizes that amphibious forces offer greater opportunities for military actions at the operational level of war than would normally be the case considering the relatively small size inherent in today's amphibious forces. Amphibious doctrine of the 1940's and 1950's demonstrated that the application of a relatively small force employed in an amphibious role could successfully be applied at the opera- tional level. An excellent example is the Inchon landing early in the Korean War. This amphibious assault led to the collapse of the North Korean offensive and contributed signi- ficantly to the expulsion of all North Korean forces from South Korea in a matter of weeks. Unquestionably it was the Amphibious Task Force's (ATF) superb execution which made this happen. We should recall that this ATF consisted of several carriers in addition to the amphibious shipping with the embarked landing force.6 The task organization of this ATF cannot be emphasized enough. The CATF fully understood his purpose and applied the synergistic effect of his entire force towards this goal. This is a key to successful application of maneuver warfare during amphibious operations. As stated by LCDR Terry Pierce in the Naval Institute Proceedings: To employ maneuver warfare successfully during amphibious operations, we need a commander who can visualize the entire campaign at the operational level, who can combine the results of individual tactical actions to fulfill the needs of strategy. Joint doctrine has dictated that this person be the CATF. As a result, the Marine Corps depends upon the CATF to command and to delineate a commander's clear intent at the operational level of war, which should convey the CATF's overall scheme for accomplishing the strategic aim.7 Amphibious warfare clearly exemplifies the principles of maneuver warfare. The breakdown is not between maneuver war- fare and amphibious warfare doctrine, but rather between amphibious warfare and CWC doctrine. CHANGING MISSIONS OF THE NAVY Since Alfred Thayer Mahan published The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660 - 1783, the U.S. Navy has focused on sea control as the primary mission of a world class navy. Early in the 20th century, we began to incorporate the "Nelson at Trafalgar" model (i.e. sea control) in the structure of our navy.8 By the end of World War II, we saw the need for, and effectively applied, the "Nelson at Copenhagen" model (i.e. power projection) in the Pacific. However, upon war's end it was quickly forgotten. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has become clear to Department of Defense planners that a navy designed pri- marily around a mission of sea control is not logical. The national security strategy of the United States includes a mission to maintain regional stability.9 For naval forces that translates into power projection. This is not a totally new idea. Over thirty years ago Timothy Shea noted: The seas are no longer a self contained battle- field. Today they are a medium from which warfare is conducted. The oceans of the world are the base of operations from which navies project power into land areas and targets. The mission of protecting sea- lanes continues in being, but the navy's central missions have become to maximize its ability to pro- ject power from the sea over land and to prevent the enemy from doing the same.10 SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AREAS When these two doctrine are applied together, as they must be during any large amphibious operation, major problems sur- face. Unless current amphibious doctrine is modified to incor- porate the CWC concept, key commanders will always be faced with the dilemma of having to select which doctrine to apply or to how to modify both. Since each situation generates different sets of circumstances, and the various commanders will have different backgrounds and levels of knowledge, it should be expected that personalities will significantly im- pact how doctrine is applied and what modifications are made. The importance of command relationships during amphibious operations was a lesson we learned long ago from Gallipoli, and one we had better not forget! CWC was developed as a defense-oriented doctrine. The addi- tion of strike warfare gives it an offensive capability, however, its basic design was built on the need to protect a large naval force. The Amphibious Task Force (ATF), on the other hand, is offensively-oriented. Another potential disaster area due to conflicting respon- sibilities is unity of command. Amphibious doctrine has codi- fied that the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) is res- ponsible for all aspects of the amphibious operation. In order to accomplish this, he is given command of all military activ- ity in the Amphibious Operation Area (AOA).11 Yet, what hap- pens when forces belonging to a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) are needed to support the ATF? Does the CWC take a back seat to the CATF? This is not likely to happen since the CWC is often senior to the designated CATF. While not executed, Desert Storm plans for both the assault at Ash Shuaybah and for the raid on Faylakah contained extremely small AOAs, approximately 20 by 30 nautical miles. The Commander Naval Forces recognized the need for CVBG support of the ATF, how- ever the CVBGs would remain outside of the AOA and would not fall under the command of the CATF. A surface threat to the ATF also existed, and a surface combatant screen was desig- nated to protect the ATF's seaward flanks. This force was also to remain outside the AOA and not under the direct control of the CATF.12 Will there be sufficient resources made available to the CATF/CLF to accomplish the amphibious mission? This includes not only carrier air, but naval gunfire, special warfare, logistics support, and in-transit escort. As long as the CATF (the commander who receives the mission) does not command all the assets required to accomplish the mission, there will be problems with priorities and allocation of scarce resources. SOLVING THE DILEMMA In solving the problem of two conflicting doctrine, four possible alternatives exist. They are: (1) Leave the two doctrine separate, and handle each situation by adapting the command relationships to fit. (2) Integrate the ATF and the CVBG when the mission requires both forces, and assign the senior officer as the CATF. (3) Make the CATF a separate warfare commander in the CWC concept with a subordinate CLF upon embarkation. (4) Use the CWC concept and modify existing amphibious doctrine so that the CWC assumes certain responsibilities previously held by the CATF. The first alternative appeals to many amphibious warfare purists. "If it ain't broke, why fix it?" Although I agree it's not completely broken, command relationships can cer- tainly be much better. The following comments were made in a study following the recent war in Southwest Asia. During Desert Storm, a strike warfare commander was included in the structure, but amphibious warfare was not. The comments from Marine Officers centered around the confusion created when different doctrine or structure does not fit the situation. Several senior officers stated that this issue needs to be resolved before the Marine Corps can make decisions on our structure and doctrine for Component Commander and compositing issues in amphibious operations. Interviewees also felt that there are too many questions left to be answered on who fulfills CATF and CLF roles as it relates to the CWC concept... The major impact on the Marine Corps is the CWC influence on CATF selection, CATF/CLF relationships, and how current amphibious warfare doctrine fits into the CWC structure. CWC procedures vary by fleet and condition. These differences must be taken into account when considering command and support relationships. 13 Clearly, there was a problem in trying to get the command relationships to conform to doctrine in Southwest Asia. This was not solved, and, unless it is solved, it will again be a problem during any future large scale amphibious operation. The second option, integrating the ATF and the CVBG(s) with the senior officer as CATF, offers many benefits. It also has serious problems which must be considered. Let's look at a hypothetical situation In which it is determined that in order to accomplish the mission a force of one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is required as the landing force. Thirteen or more amphibious ships will make up the assault echelon ship- ping. It is further determined that one CVBG is required to support the amphibious operation. Using this option, we would integrate all naval forces into one combined task force. Further, let's call the commander of this organization the Commander ATF-CVBG Task Force (CACTF). In coining this new title, my purpose is to look at the tasks and responsibilities of the CACTF without getting confused by the current doctrinal responsibilities of the CATF. In the situation I have described above, the CACTF is the commander of all naval forces. He has responsibility for the amphibious mission which is spelled out in the initiating directive. He can utilize the CWC concept for defense of the force and to accomplish the amphibious mission. He has the carrier air and naval gunfire assets to ensure the landing force is adequately supported, which is not the case for most current CATFs. Before we immediately jump on this bandwagon, however, we should look at the drawbacks. The CACTF will probably be the commander of the CVBG. He and his staff may have very little, if any, amphibious warfare experience. Amphibious warfare is the most difficult of all military operations and requires detailed planning and coordination. Since the best platform for command and control of amphibious operations, the LCC, is no longer available to amphibious forces, the CACTF will probably locate on a carrier. This platform may have good command and control capabilities for carrier operations, but it does not have adequate capabilities for amphibious operations. The CACTF could not accomplish the responsibilities as presently assigned the CATF under current amphibious warfare doctrine. This solution offers definite advantages, but the problems it creates makes it a poor alter- native. The third alternative, making the CATF a separate CWC warfare commander with a subordinate Commander of the Landing Force (CLF), would solve the problem of which doctrine to follow. Current JCS amphibious doctrine would have to be modified to indicate that the CWC has overall command, other- wise we again have conflicts. The problem with this alterna- tive is that the CATF and CLF become "bit players" in a major play. Since the CATF will not own everything he requires, he will have to compete for scarce CWC assets to accomplish his mission. This will be an even bigger problem for the CLF. What happens when he feels he Is not getting sufficient support? Does he go to CATF? Since his direct superior, CATF, does not own naval gunfire, carrier air, submarines, etc., he is likely to find the landing force without adequate support to accom- plish the mission in the most effective manner. The fourth option is a combination of the previous two. It optimizes the advantages and eliminates some deficiencies. Amphibious doctrine can be modified to fit into the CWC con- cept. Major realignments of responsibilities will have to be made. First, we must get rid of the term CATF! The term has definitive meanings to everyone in the naval service, and continuing to use it will only slow down or confuse required changes. There are three key commanders for the conduct of modern amphibious warfare: the commander of all landing forces (still the CLF), the commander of Navy amphibious ships (what is called the Amphibious Warfare Commander (AWC) in current operational experiments), and the commander of all naval forces, which I labeled CACTF in the hypothetical situation described with option two. The title is not important, it is the function this commander performs that is. Figure 2 con- tains a matrix which displays current responsibilities of the CATF and CLF in arriving at the twelve key decisions required in amphibious operations.14 Click here to view image The AWC will still have responsibility for detailed planning with the CLF, and will remain responsible for several of these decisions. Key decisions for the CLF will remain the same. Some decisions will now be made or approved by the CWC/CACTF. While this appears similar to option two, what makes it different is that several major decisions and responsibilities formerly belonging to the CATF will now be delegated to the AWC or CLF. This decentralization is already an inherent characteristic of the CWC concept. The key points are that the CWC will now be tasked in the initia- ting directive with accomplishment of the amphibious mission, he will control all forces necessary to accomplish this mis- sion, and the CLF and AWC can address him directly as subordi- nate warfare commanders to resolve problems. Figure 3 is a depiction of recommended realignments of these responsi- bilities. Click here to view image CONCLUSIONS Amphibious warfare doctrine demonstrated its worth during and immediately following World War II. The Navy developed the CWC concept to enable the fleet to effectively carry out the multi-threat defense of a carrier battle group. While the Navy's fleet doctrine has evolved to cope with quickly deve- loping technology, amphibious doctrine has remained virtually unchanged. During any future large scale amphibious operation, simultaneous application of these two doctrine will prevent optimum utilization of naval forces. The time has arrived for revision of amphibious doctrine to allow maneuver warfare to be incorporated into the CWC concept. A serious review of amphibious doctrine must be conducted with the purpose of making it more than complimentary to the CWC concept. Amphibious warfare doctrine should be modified to include the AWC and CLF as separate warfare commanders and to realign responsibilities to include the Composite Warfare Commander. NOTES 1. U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps 1900-1970, Washington: 1973, pp. 41-58. 2. U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 10-1, Composite Warfare Commander's Manual (U), Washington: June 1985, p. 3.3.8, CONFIDENTIAL. 3. U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-04, Doctrine For Joint Maritime Operations, Washington: 1991, pp. 12. 4. NWP 10-1, p. 2.2. 5. U. S. Marine Corps. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting, Washington: 1990, pp. 3-30. 6. Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr. USMC, "Inchon 1950," Assault From the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1983, pp. 337-353. 7. Terry C. Pierce, "MAGTF Warlords: A Naval Perspective," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1991, pp. 38-40. 8. Barry M. Gough, "Maritime Strategy: The Legacies of Mahan and Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power," The RUSI Journal, Winter, 1988, pp 55-62. 9. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991, pp. 1-10. 10. Robert D. 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