WWMCCS In The Marine Corps: Time For Changes CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA - C4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: WWMCCS in the Marine Corps: Time for Changes Author: Major Heinz M. McArthur, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Significant changes in the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) are imminent; these changes and a chronic shortage of expertise dictate the Marine Corps restructure its organization and training for WWMCCS support. Background: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated the importance of WWMCCS to the Marine Air- Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The heart of WWMCCS is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), an automated tool that the CINCs and services use to access and manipulate time-phased force and deployment data. WWMCCS also provides communications functions that assist in the coordination and exchange of essential command and control information. An improved version of JOPES, JOPES 4.0, will soon be in operation. JOPES 4.0 poses problems for the Marine Corps because it is complex and not compatible with the current inventory of Fleet Marine Force computer equip- ment. JOPES 4.O adds to the major WWMCCS problem the Marine Corps experienced during Desert Shield/Desert Storm: a shortage of personnel trained and experienced in JOPES and joint planning systems. To identify personnel with JOPES/WWMCCS skills and billets requiring those skills, the Marine Corps established additional military occupational specialties. The MAGTF Plans/Operations Specialist MOS for enlisted Marines falls short of Marine Corps requirements because it does not ensure progressive training and primary MOS credibility. The MAGTF II/Logistics Automated Information Systems (LOG AIS) are developing systems that offer an alternative to JOPES 4.0. These systems focus on the maintenance of unit deployment data down to the battalion level, and therefore ensure a broad participation in the development and maintenance of this data at all levels of the MAGTF. Recommendations: Incorporate JOPES skills in the private through warrant officer grades of an existing occupational field; the logistics occupational field (04) is a candidate. Consolidate JOPES functions at the Marine Expeditionary Force command element and Fleet Marine Force/component headquarters. The requirements at lower levels can be met by MAGTF II/LOG AIS. WWMCCS in the Marine Corps: Time for Changes Outline Thesis: Significant changes in the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) are imminent; these changes and a chronic shortage of expertise dictate the Marine Corps restructure its organization and training for WWMCCS support. I. WWMCCS functions A. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) B. Subsystems of JOPES (1) Joint Operation and Planning System (JOPS) (2) Joint Deployment System (JDS) (3) Commonality and limitations of JOPS and JDS C. WWMCCS communications II. WWMCCS hardware A. The WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) B. WWMCCS workstations C. Progress on satellite communications for deployed units III. JOPES 4.0 A. Improvements in capability B. The Macintosh and UNIX: not hardware and software compatible with FMF computer equipment IV. MAGTF II/Logistics Automated Information Systems (LOG AIS) A. What does MAGTF II/LOG AIS do? B. Focus on unit deployment data at the battalion level V. Training and expertise deficiencies A. 4th MEB problems during Desert Shield B. Joint planning and execution rely on a small number of gurus C. Use of additional MOSs (9909 and 9919) to track WWMCCS expertise VI. Solutions A. Incorporate WWMCCS expertise in an existing occu- pational field B. Consolidate JOPES functions at the MEF and FMF/ component headquarters WWMCCS IN THE MARINE CORPS: TIME FOR CHANGES by Major Heinz McArthur, United States Marine Corps Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm brought home an important lesson for the Marine Corps: we rely on the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) for the deployment and employment of our forces. The develop- ment of the Marine Corps' portions of the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD), the CINC's WWMCCS-maintained deployment database, was the subject of intense scrutiny at the highest levels. For good reason, for as one participant observed, "if it ain't in the TPFDD, it don't move." (5) The Marine Corps recognized the criticality of WWMCCS during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and successfully exploited the system. Significant changes in WWMCCS, however, are immi- nent. These changes, together with a chronic shortage of WWMCCS expertise, dictate we restructure our organization and training for WWMCCS support. Getting our arms around WWMCCS is essential; the system provides valuable deployment and employment tools for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Its primary function is to support the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) , the automated tool used by the CINCs and their components in operations planning and execution. One of the key products produced through JOPES is the TPFDD, the computer database that supports an operation plan (OPLAN). The TPFDD defines the forces for the OPLAN and when those forces flow into the theater of operations. TPFDD informa- tion also includes movement, personnel, and cargo data associated with deploying units, in-place units, and sus- tainment. The database provides routing information and supports estimates of transportation requirements. (1:I-34, I-35) To simplify the identification of forces in the TPFDD, combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, personnel, and supplies are linked together in groupings known as force modules. JOPES currently consists of two subsystems: the Joint Operation and Planning System (JOPS) and the Joint Deploy- ment System (JDS) . JOPS is a tool for the deliberate plan- ning process and JDS supports time-sensitive planning. The current version of JOPES (version 3.2) allows the access of either subsystem from a common menu screen. The subsystems can exchange data, but for practical purposes operate inde- pendently. (9:8) JOPS software supports TPFDD development and OPLAN maintenance. Some of the major JOPS functions are: force module creation and modification; generation of non-unit cargo transportation requirements; estimation of replacement personnel transportation requirements; medical support requirement evaluation; and OPLAN transportation feasibility estimation. (9:11) The JDS provides a mechanism where deployment data can be exchanged between organizations involved in the deploy- ment planning and execution process. JDS can use a JOPS- developed TPFDD, or can create a TPFDD if one does not exist. Some of the major JDS functions are: creation of TPFDD records; review of unit tasking and deployment status; creation and modification of force modules; display of transportation schedules and manifest information; interface with AUTODIN to send messages containing unit movement information to units and ports; Military Airlift Command coordination; Military Traffic Management Command coordina- tion; and Military Sealift Command coordination. (9:10) The components of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) use the JDS database to pull movement requirements and complete initial transportation scheduling. The system assists the tracking of units during deployment and provides visibility of force closure status. The software design of JOPS is cumbersome and reflects a 1990s-level of technology. Data entry is done line-by- line, and data retrieval is slow and inconvenient. JDS is easier to use, and reflects a 1970s-level of software tech- nology. JDS uses full-screen data entry and an on-line database for rapid access to data. As previously shown, there is a degree of overlap between the two systems. For manipulation of a TPFDD, JDS is preferred under most circum- stances because the user interface is easier, data retrieval is faster, and the link with USTRANSCOM is crucial. The transportation feasibility estimate, a prerequisite for OPLAN approval by the CINC, can only be done in JOPS. WWMCCS also supports important communications services in addition to JOPES. The WWMCCS Intercomputer Network Mail (WINMAIL) system provides worldwide secure electronic mail between commands and individuals. Teleconferences form a bulletin-board message system based on topic or functional areas, and are coordination tools for specific war plans and organizations. The communications functions of WWMCCS have expanded beyond support for the planning process. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, WWMCCS was the primary method used for distribution of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) operation orders and situation reports. The USCENTCOM Joint Forces Air Component Commander used WWMCCS for distribution of the daily air tasking order. WWMCCS was also used to transmit target lists, target bulletins, and battle damage assessment reports between the USCENTCOM Naval Component Commander (NAVCENT) and the amphibious task force. (4) During 4th MEB's Desert Shield/Desert Storm deployment, restrictions on administrative message traffic complicated such mundane but necessary functions as direct deposit verification and adjustment of pay allotments. The impor- tance of these administrative functions to the families left behind (and, therefore, to troop morale) increased steadily as the deployment time lengthened. WWMCCS proved a reliable and expedient method for 4th MEB to coordinate the resolu- tion of such problems with support activities in CONUS. WWMCCS operations are supported by mainframe computers, known as WWMCCS hosts, located at sites in CONUS and over- seas locations. The hosts are connected with each other and with remote users (geographically separated from the host) through the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN), a dedicated packet-switching data communications network. On the users' end, the primary WWMCCS component is the workstation. Workstations consist of IBM or IBM-compatible personal computers (PCs) running terminal emulation and administra- tive support software. Workstations also provide file transfer capability, where the operator can store informa- tion on the PC and later electronically transfer the infor- mation to the WWMCCS host computer. In addition, WWMCCS uses high speed printers to support the large volume of reports created under JOPES. The most critical component for WWMCCS is data communi- cations connectivity. For garrison operations, dedicated government or leased telephone lines provide this connectiv- ity. Deployed units afloat and ashore require satellite communications systems. Due to the speed and volume of data used by WWMCCS, super high frequency satellite communica- tions (SHF SATCOM) is typically employed to provide connec- tivity for deployed WWMCCS operations. In past operations, the fierce competition for satel- lite channels and equipment on board ship was a major imped- iment to sustained WWMCCS support for the deployed MAGTF commander. Previous Marine Corps efforts to place SHF SATCOM on amphibious ships met with little success. Desert Shield provided the necessary impetus to modify the Navy's priorities, and the 4th MEB deployed with WWMCCS terminals and SHF SATCOM on the USS Nassau. The 4th MEB experience validated the requirement for SHF SATCOM on amphibious ships, and growing support for the requirement was voiced at the Eighth Amphibious Warfare Conference in November 1991. (7, 18) The Navy acknowledged the problem through an SHF SATCOM installation initiative to enhance naval command and control capabilities afloat. Under this program, however, initial installation was scheduled for aircraft carriers -- amphibi- ous flagship installation was not scheduled until fiscal year 1995. (19) Headquarters Marine Corps came up with an innovative plan to solve the problem. This plan proposed the use of Marine Corps satellite communications vans from the Marine Corps Reserve and prepositioned war reserves as an interim capability for amphibious ships until the Navy's planned ship modifications are complete. A memorandum of agreement between the Marine Corps and the Navy approved this plan and paved the way for WWMCCS installations on board LHAs and LHDs by 1993. (19, 17) All deploying MAGTFs, including Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) , can expect WWMCCS support in the near-term. The Marine Corps adjusted to the role WWMCCS played in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, but significant changes are around the corner that demand a reassessment of our approach to WWMCCS support. These changes are driven by a long- standing demand by the joint planning and execution communi- ty to consolidate and enhance JOPS and JDS functions. In response to this demand, the first truly integrated version of the system, known as JOPES version 4.0, was developed. JOPES 4.0 supports a modern user interface, complete with a mouse and software windows. The processing of menus, screens, and forms occurs at the workstation instead of the host computer; the user can create and modify local versions of a TPFDD, and data is transferred to the host computer as necessary. The master database remains on the host com- puter. (9:14) This methodology provides an upgraded user interface (easier to understand and use) , more flexibility in manipulating data, and improvements in system performance and response time. Existing WWMCCS terminals lack the necessary horsepower to run JOPES 4.0. Recognizing this, upgraded workstations were developed and are under procurement. The new work- stations are based on variants of the Apple Macintosh com- puter, and use a modified version of the UNIX operating system called A/UX. This selection of hardware and operating system pres- ents some problems for the Marine Corps. The Fleet Marine Forces' standard systems are the AN/UYK-83 and AN/UYK-85 computers. This family of systems, known as the Fleet Marine Force End-User Computing Equipment (FMF EUCE), are ruggedized PCs that are hardware and software compatible with the IBM family of microcomputers. The AN/UYK-83/85 computer inventory is augmented by numerous off-the-shelf, non-ruggedized PCs. As is common with IBM-type PCs, most Marine Corps software applications are designed around the MS-DOS operating system. The JOPES 4.0 workstation is incompatible with FMF EUCE in key areas. While JOPES 4.0's UNIX operating system does have a capability to run MS-DOS software, its performance is so slow that it limits MS-DOS functions to basic file trans- fer operations only. Some variants of the FMF EUCE can support UNIX, but WWMCCS-unique modifications prevent run- ning the JOPES 4.0 software on these systems. The bottom line is that JOPES 4.0 software is tied to the Macintosh -- separate, distinct, and incompatible with other automated systems in the Marine Corps inventory. Another significant problem lies in the complexity of the operating system. UNIX offers a powerful set of tools to the user, and is particularly well-suited for the multi- tasking, networked environment of JOPES 4.0. The price of this power is complexity. An unsophisticated but determined user ("determined" being defined as one who is willing to read the manual), can learn to operate his MS-DOS computer in a reasonable amount of time. UNIX is another story, because it uses a more complex set of procedures to initiate and maintain the system. These procedures, known as systems administration, require a degree of training and computer savvy well beyond that required of current WWMCCS operators. Technical support for JOPES 4.0 will be more difficult. Under the current system, the host computer site provides software and communications troubleshooting, and civilian contractors provide computer hardware maintenance. Marine Corps technicians receive training in some of the special- ized communications equipment used by WWMCCS, but local commands have limited hardware and software expertise on the system. This limited expertise is a potential problem during deployed operations away from the host site, but the similarities between FMF EUCE and the current IBM WWMCCS workstations have kept the problem manageable. Under JOPES 4.0, the complexity of the hardware and operating system will require more detailed technical support at the command level. Because of the loss of commonality with FMF EUCE, specialized and costly training is required for technical support personnel. System support will also require a greater reliance on civilian contractors. Given these compatibility and complexity problems, why the Macintosh? As previously discussed, the characteristics and functions of JOPES 4.0 require more hardware and soft- ware power than existing Marine Corps microcomputers can provide. The Air Force uses UNIX-based systems more exten- sively than the Marine Corps, and Air Force requirements appear to have dominated the UNIX/Macintosh decision for JOPES 4.0. At the end of fiscal year 1991, the Air Force accounted for 58 percent of the total JOPES workstations ordered, where Marine Corps requirements made up only 1 percent of the total procurement. (21:89) In the WWMCCS world, the Marine Corps doesn't drive the train. WWMCCS exists to support the warfighting CINCs, and in the CINCs' environment, training and technical support are available to support JOPES 4.0. JOPES 4.0 represents a major change for WWMCCS, and its development has not been without problems and delays. The system was scheduled for fielding in April 1992. A user evaluation conducted in February 1992, however, concluded that JOPES 4.0 was "at best three times slower than today's system" and "basic functionality was not provided." (13) As a result of this evaluation, the system implementation date was put on hold until the problems are resolved. It is difficult to estimate how long this will take; one analyst described the WWMCCS modernization and JOPES 4.0 effort as "a program which has delivered virtually nothing to users after an investment of twelve years and nearly $1B." (13) Despite such negative reviews, the resources expended and the influence of the CINCs will eventually force JOPES 4.0 into fielding. The present difficulties, however, may give the Marine Corps the time to realistically evaluate our role and support structure for the system. A different approach to planning and execution support is offered by MAGTF II/Logistics Automated Information Systems (LOG AIS). At the heart of LOG AIS is a computer program known as the MAGTF Deployment Support System II (MDSS II) . This program uses encyclopedic data (such as tables of equipment, equipment weight, and displacement characteristics) as well as actual unit allowances and on- hand quantities to build a unit deployment database at the battalion level. This unit deployment database feeds other LOG AIS systems, like the Computer Aided Embarkation Manage- ment System (CAEMS) , which produces computer-generated ship deck diagrams and load plans, and the Computer Aided Load Manifesting System, which produces aircraft load plans and reports. MAGTF II is the next system up in the MAGTF II/LOG AIS family. MAGTF II consolidates subordinate unit MDSS II databases into a MAGTF TPFDD. This allows MAGTF planners to build a TPFDD from the bottom up, with improved accuracy and timeliness for force composition, equipment, and character- istics. A JOPES interface allows the transfer of MAGTF II data into JOPES, as well as the extraction of JOPES data for off-line manipulation of force modules and TPFDDs by MAGTF II. The MDSS II unit database is not some esoteric plan being worked by the CINC's gurus; it is essential unit embarkation and deployment data whose upkeep will demand broad command participation at all levels of the MAGTF. The usefulness of the unit deployment data on a daily basis is the system's selling point, and may help to realize the design goal of MAGTF II/LOG AIS, where "transition to a contingency operating mode is transparent to the operator. (2:2) The Marine Corps' inability to smoothly transition from deliberate planning to contingency operations was the most significant WWMCCS deficiency in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. An after action report from the II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) noted: It was quite evident from the beginning of crisis planning for Desert Shield that the level of knowledge of JOPES and the language of JDS were severely lacking in the II MEF staff as well as the Major Subordinated Commands (MSCs). The inadequacy of trained WWMCCS operators in the MSC staffs slowed the planning process initially. The responsibility for Joint planning resides with G-5/G-3 Plans and the WWMCCS is normally located in these sections. However, it is the respon- sibility of all sections who play a role in JOPES/JDS to have personnel trained who will aid the process for deliberate and crisis action planning. (3) These training deficiencies were most obvious in the deployment of the 4th MEB. For the 4th MEB, a routine planning process to support a European exercise was disrupt- ed by the Desert Storm deployment order. The 4th MEB staff began with their existing exercise TPFDD and modified the data to reflect their (significantly different) Desert Shield force-list and ship-mix. The required modifications proved much more complex than anticipated -- MEB and subor- dinate command planners were swamped by the volume of detail and data entry demanded by JOPES but missing from their of f- the-shelf TPFDD. Detailed coordination of the effort was further complicated by the physical separation of the MEB headquarters (at Little Creek, Virginia) , and its subordi- nate elements (at Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point, North Carolina). (20) A Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, after- action summary stated: The deploying units' unfamiliarity with JOPES, coupled with the lack of qualified and trained personnel with JOPES experience, caused an initial delay in register- ing and reporting those lift requirements during the building of the Time-Phased Force [and] Deployment Data (TPFDD) base. The resulting delay in registering the lift requirements by the 4th MEB caused a delay in securing surface lift assets (i.e., MSC (Military Sealift Command) ships) necessary to embark a major portion of the MEB's AFOE (assault follow-on echelon) assets and the lion's share of its accompanying 30 DOS/DOA [days of supply/days of ammunition] sustainment block. (9) Subsequent Desert Storm deployments offered more lead time, and the planning and execution of these deployments avoided most of the early Desert Shield problems. The 4th MEB experience, however, is probably more representative of the come as you are" deployments of future conflicts. The shortage of JOPES expertise during the Desert Shield crunch reflects two characteristics of WWMCCS use in the Marine Corps. The first is that expertise in the joint planning and execution community is normally limited to the gurus who participate in the development and review of standing war plans. The second characteristic follows from the first: we train the gurus but do not train the larger group of Marines who must deal with WWMCCS during major crises. The result is that the Marine Corps is short-handed when we need WWMCCS capability the most. This reliance on a small cadre of experts also shows a reluctance on the part of commanders and operational staff to deal with the details of deliberate planning. As one planner observed: Deliberate planning efforts, and working knowledge of the products borne thereof, are generally relegated to the few assigned to billets with the word "PLANS" specifically denoted in the title. The unfamiliarity, complexity, and perceived invalidity of the deliberate planning process tends to stymie genuine widespread interest and to curb command support (resources, peo- ple, time) for its pursuit. A perception exists that a deliberate plan/TPFDD is only valid until executed, and that adroit, innovative management during the throes of execution will more than compensate for deficiencies in an existing plan/TPFDD. (5) Training vehicles exist to make inroads on the problem. Joint planning and JOPES courses are offered by the Air Training Command, USTRANSCOM, and the Armed Forces Staff College. The Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff College provide a limited exposure to joint planning processes and concepts. Coordination and management of training quotas can increase the number of Marines involved in this training. A more fundamental problem, though, is the identifica- tion of billets requiring training, training Marines in conjunction with assignment to those billets, and managing the available expertise through retention of personnel and reassignment where necessary. To track this expertise, the Marine Corps has designated an additional military occupa- tional specialty (MOS) for the "MAGTF Plans/Operations Officer" (MOS 9909) and the "MAGTF Plans/Operations Special- ist" (MOS 9919). These MOSs identify Marines with JOPES skills and identify billets requiring these skills. Is an additional MOS the best way to track and manage this expertise? For officers, probably so. As the title implies, the MAGTF plans/operations officer requires a broad understanding of the joint planning process, the MAGTF's organization for deployment and employment, and the capabil- ities and limitations of the MAGTF. The plans/operations officer needs to know the specifics of JOPS, JDS, and TPFDDs, but a broader knowledge of the "big picture" of joint planning is essential. To qualify for the 9909 MOS, an officer must have at least one year of experience in joint planning. (8:1-78) The ideal planner, therefore, has a broad and compre- hensive operational background. To fill plans/operations billets, command G-1s must work closely with Headquarters Marine Corps to identify qualified candidates and to sched- ule appropriate joint planning and JOPES training with the assignment process. Multiple assignments of qualified off icers to plans/operations billets are necessary and inevitable due to the scarcity of experience in this area. This can be managed by alternating assignments between the officer's primary MOS (to ensure MOS credibility) and plans/operations billets. The extended time away from the primary MOS of these officers must be countered through the recognition and consideration of critical planning skills by promotion boards. The 9919 MOS for the enlisted plans/operations special- ist presents a different set of problems. This MOS also requires a minimum of one year of experience with WIN and joint planning systems, and by its nature does not support the entry level training of Marines as JOPES operators. (8:3-399) Commands are forced to pull Marines out of their primary MOS to receive formal and on-the-job training, and plans/operations specialists will normally be retained in WWMCCS-related billets due to their scarcity and value. The enlisted MAGTF plans/operations specialists may have a difficult time competing for promotion in their primary MOS. If promoted, they may be assigned to positions of responsi- bility in areas for which their WWMCCS background leaves them unprepared. Because of this, several commands recommended that MOS 9919 be made a primary MOS. (14, 15) This would establish a community of Marines who are career JOPES gurus. As a primary MOS, a formal training and assignment structure would be established to provide entry level WWMCCS opera- tors. Reassignment of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) to JOPES-related billets could occur without jeopardizing the MOS credibility of these Marines. The small size of this community (currently 58 Marines have the 9919 MOS) makes the MAGTF plans/operations special- ist career track difficult. (10) An occupational field is not practical for such a small group, and the lack of rank structure and career progression within the opera- tions/planning structure would result in poor promotion opportunity. Assignments would be lock-step -- when one Marine is reassigned, many must move due to the shortage of replacement bodies. An alternative is to incorporate JOPES and WIN skills in an existing occupational field. This would provide entry level MOS training, and offer a rank structure from private through warrant officer to support JOPES operations. Logistics (occupational field 04) is a potential candidate to absorb JOPES. The logistics/embarkation specialist MOS (0431) description already includes JOPS and JDS training at the SNCO level, and this training could be extended down to lower grades. (8:3-35) The embarkation officer MOS (0430) is already immersed in the integration of joint planning systems and embarkation through CAEMS and its close ties with MAGTF II, LOG AIS, and JOPES. An expansion of billets and training for embarkation officers could provide a viable community of senior JOPES specialists. The Marine Corps currently supports WWMCCS through JOPES operations at the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) headquar- ters, MEF command elements, MEB command elements, and the MSCs. The current downsizing of the Marine Corps, the need to optimize the availability of our scarce WWMCCS expertise, and the training and support problems posed by JOPES 4.0 dictate a different approach to the way we organize for WWMCCS support. One such approach was informally suggested by Captain G. H. Swain, an action officer at Headquarters Marine Corps. Captain Swain proposed that JOPES functions be consolidated at the FMF and MEF levels, but that MSCs retain their current WWMCCS communications capabilities using organic FMF EUCE. (12) This reorganization would allow the centraliza- tion of JOPES expertise, limit the training, technical support, and costs of JOPES 4.0, and allow a more efficient pooling of our scarce WWMCCS expertise. Command responses to this proposal were uniformly negative. One response stated, "WWMCCS access and full use of WWMCCS/JOPES capability at the [MSC] level is critical to rapid force structure development and refinement of deploy- ment [requirements]." (19) Another response maintained that "the Marine Corps must have the capability to support multiple OPLAN TPFDD maintenance, TPFDD development sour- cing, monitoring, and updating during time sensitive plan- ning by forward deployed MAGTFs, and MSCs not collocated with the MEF." (15) These responses failed to consider two important changes in the Marine Corps' organization for joint planning and execution. The first change is the developing capabili- ty and scope of MAGTF II/LOG AIS. The MSCs currently plug into JOPES to ensure the accuracy and completeness of their share of the CINC's TPFDD. These functions are largely duplicated by MAGTF II/LOG AIS, and MAGTF II/LOG AIS offers significant advantages because it is tailored to Marine Corps requirements and the potential operating environment of the MAGTF. Once fully implemented, MAGTF II/LOG AIS will eliminate the need for MSCs to use JOPES for detailed TPFDD manipulation. The retention of WWMCCS communications functions proposed by Captain Swain would provide the mechanism to coordinate MSC requirements with the MEF. The second important change that impacts our WWMCCS support structure is the current downsizing and reorganiza- tion of the Marine Corps. This reorganization focuses on the MEF as the primary warfighting organization. Changes in the MEF structure include a forward-deployed MEF command element (to replace the MEF-by-composite-MEBs approach of the past) , and a capability for the MEF to provide a stand- ing Joint Task Force headquarters. Another major structure change is the establishment of a deployable component headquarters in each FMF. These component headquarters will be provided by the FMF headquarters, augmented with support- ing establishment and reserve personnel; communications support will come from the MEF. (11) This structure requires a robust WWMCCS/JOPES capabili- ty at the MEF command element and FMF/component headquar- ters. These elements then could provide WWMCCS teams to support forward-deployed units. To ensure manning and equipment for these elements, a reallocation of JOPES responsibilities and resources away from the MSCs to the MEF may be inevitable. The Marine Corps must be able to smoothly plug-and-play WWMCCS in future crises. Our continued shortage of WWMCCS expertise and the changing roles of deployment and execution systems, such as JOPES 4.0 and MAGTF II/LOG AIS, require changes in the way we support WWMCCS. If we centralize JOPES functions at the MEF command element and component headquarters, and extend the maintenance of deployment data down to the battalion level, we can improve our ability to exploit joint deployment assets. The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps and the joint and combined nature of future conflicts demand that we do so. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. AFSC Pub 1. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide. Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, 1991. 2. MAGTF II/Logistics Automated Information Systems (LOG/AIS). Student handout, CSS 307. Staff Planning School, Landing Force Training Command, Pacific, San Diego, CA, Feb 1992. 3. MCLLS 13139-42379 (03098) . "JOPES Trained Personnel & WWMCCS Operations. MCCDC (WF) , Quantico, VA. 4. MCLLS 31259-95795 (09090). "Fire Support (FS) - World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) ." MCCDC (WF) , Quantico, VA. 5. MCLLS 50948-44884 (03915) "Deliberate Planning Process JOPS/JDS/JOPES and TPFDD)." MCCDC (WF), Quantico, VA. 6. MCLLS 5144O-O5112 (0403O). "Training, Proficiency, and Use of JOPES for Deployment of Forces. MCCDC (WF) Quantico, VA. 7. MCLLS 52255-12243 (03990). "World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Afloat." MCCDC (WF) Quantico, VA. 8. MCO P1200.7K. MOS MANUAL. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 30 Apr 1991. 9. JOPES Master Plan. Chapter 4. JOPES Project Group, Scott AFB, IL, Dec 1991. 10. Scally, SSgt D. Interview by the author, 3 Apr 1992. SSgt Scally coordinates the assignment and management of the 9919 MOS at HQMC (POC). 11. Steele, Col M. Force Structure Planning Group briefing. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Nov 1991. 12. Swain, Capt G. H. Teleconference message 20, WIN teleconference COPSLOG, of 29 Jan 1992. Subject: "PROPOSED CHANGES TO MARINE CORPS USE OF WWMCCS." Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT), Washington, DC. 13. USCINCLANT. Teleconference message 28, WIN teleconference VER4, of 25 Feb 1992. Subject: "JOPES USER EVALUATION." Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT), Washington, DC. 14. U.S. Marine Corps. CG I MEF. Message 131631Z MAR 92. Subject: "PROPOSED CHANGES TO MARINE CORPS USE OF WWMCCS." Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT) Washington, DC. 15. U.S. Marine Corps. CG II MEF. Teleconference message 49, WIN teleconference MCOPSLOG, of 29 Feb 1992. Subject: "JOPES USER EVALUATION." Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT), Washington, DC. 16. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters. C4I2 decision paper of 10 Jan 1992. Subject: "SHF SATCOM C2 CAPABILITY ABOARD AMPHIBIOUS FLAGSHIPS (1992-95)." Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT), Washington, DC. 17. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters. C4I2 Memorandum of Agreement between CNO, Navy Space Systems Division, and HQMC, C4I2 Department. Subject: "TEMPORARY LOAN OF MARINE CORPS GMF SATCOM EQUIPMENT (AN/TSC-93B) TO THE NAVY FOR INSTALLATION ON AMPHIBIOUS FLAG SHIPS." Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT-611), Washington, DC. 18. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters. PP&0 comment POR-13 of 10 Jan 1992 on C4I2 r/s dated 7 Jan 1992. Subject: "SHF SATCOM C2 CAPABILITY ABOARD AMPHIBIOUS FLAG SHIPS (1992-95)." Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (PP&O) , Washington, DC. 19. U.S. Marine Corps. HQ FMFEUR Designate. Teleconference message 52, WIN teleconference MCOPSLOG, of 28 Feb 1992. Subj: "PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE WAY THE MARINE CORPS USES WWMCCS." Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT) , Washington, DC. 20. Vermillion, LtCol T.L. Interview by the author, 20 March 1992. LtCol Vermillion participated in the deployment planning for 4th MEB during Desert Shield. 21. "WWMCCS Workstation Program Management Review 14-15 November 1991." Honeywell Federal Systems, Inc., briefing slides. Files of Capt G. H. Swain. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (CCT), Washington, DC.
