Air Power--Maneuver Element Or Pretender? CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Air Power--Maneuver Element or Pretender? Author: Major G.A. Morrison, United States Marine Corps Thesis: All aircraft must ultimately answer the call of gravity; therefore, they are unable to perform the functions of maneuver elements. Background: Just as the term "maneuver warfare" has nothing to do with fighting while walking around, so too the term "maneuver element" has nothing to do with the ability to walk, drive, or fly. Much has been written, particularly since 1989, regarding the use of "air" as a maneuver element, virtually all of it favoring such use. It is most interesting, however, that in no Field Manual, Fleet Marine Force Manual, or article, including the bench mark FM 100-5 of 1986, has any author found it necessary to define the term "maneuver element," yet they have come forward by dozens to claim that "air" is a maneuver element, as though the statement is tautologically true. An analysis is made of the term wherein the ability to hold or to seize terrain is found to be the only relevant criterion for determining who is and is not justified in being recognized as a maneuver element. Comparison is made between artillery, cavalry, and aircraft, the latter often being compared to the former two in other writings. The conclusion is reached that while air power, the Marine's Air Combat Element specifically, should in fact have security force missions, interdiction missions, airspace control missions, as well as close air support missions, these to not render air power a maneuver element; air power is a supporting arm. The implications for the Marine Expeditionary Force are that it is commanded by too high-ranking an officer and that its power is over-stated. Recommendation: The Marine Corps as an institution would help itself by realizing that air power, for all of its capabilities and numerous applications in reconnaissance, security force operations, interdiction and close air support roles is an enabler of victory on the ground--a supporting arm. As such, the implications for command of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces should be considered and our command structure streamlined. AIR POWER- -MANEUVER ELEMENT OR PRETENDER? Thesis: All aircraft must ultimately answer the call of gravity; therefore, they are unable to perform the functions of maneuver elements. I. What is a maneuver element? A. Possesses the ability to seize and occupy, or defend and deny; the term is not self-descriptive B. Uses firepower to enable movement II. What is a supporting arm? A. Its function is support; term is self-descriptive B. Uses movement to enable firepower C. Subordinate in role to the maneuver element III. Artillery A. Elements--observation, communication, transportation, and detonation B. Role and functioning vis-a-vis infantry IV. Cavalry A. Modern mission--primarily reconnaissance/ security force operations B. Role and functioning vis-a-vis infantry V. Aircraft A. Elements and capabilities B. Role and functioning vis-a-vis infantry C. Maneuver element? VI. Relevancy of the argument A. Matter of intent rather than substance B. Implications of accepting aircraft as a maneuver element rather than a supporting arm AIR POWER- -MANEUVER ELEMENT OR PRETENDER? Just as the term "maneuver warfare" has nothing to do with fighting while walking around, so too the term "maneuver element" has nothing to do with the ability to walk, drive, or fly. Much has been written, particularly since 1989, regarding the use of "air" as a maneuver element, virtually all of it favoring such use. The successes of aircraft against the Iraqi Air Force and Army in 1991 has only served to intensify the argument. Air- craft, however, are different from infantrymen and land vehicles. All aircraft must ultimately answer the call of gravity; therefore, they are unable to perform the functions of maneuver elements. The ball is crubal. Well, fine. We know what a ball is but what does crubal mean? Absolutely nothing; it only serves to demonstrate a point--one can't very well say whether a statement is true or not unless all of the terms have definition. It is most interesting that in no Field Manual, Fleet Marine Force Manual, or article I have read, including the bench mark FM 100-5 of 1986, has any author found it necessary to define the term "maneuver element," yet they have come forward by dozens to claim that "air" is a maneuver element, as though the statement is tautologic- ally true. Lieutenant Colonel Harold T. Gonzales USAF states that "the primary maneuver arms of the modern battlefield are infantry and armor. These combat arms develop firepower only to enable them to maneuver better."(6:3) They obviously aren't maneuvering only to move around. There is a purpose; a maneuver element defeats an enemy by moving to occupy the space formerly held by that enemy. It doesn't matter whether we are talking of positional, attrition, maneuver, or any other classification of warfare--when the enemy either quits in confusion or dies by gunshot the maneuver element occupies his spaces. Analogously, a maneuver element defends by physically occupying the space desired by the enemy. This may be by a position defense or mobile defense. Either way the objective is the same--to deny the enemy use of the terrain. A maneuver element uses firepower as an enabling tool in carrying out its occupation. Is this a suggestion that defeating the enemy is not important, that only occupying terrain is relevant? Far from it. Defeating the enemy is the only criterion for success. We defeat him by forcing him to yield; we cannot claim to be victorious so long as the enemy stubbornly holds the terrain and defies our every effort to cause him to yield. Defeat and victory are thus intimately tied to the occupation of terrain. All elements maneuver, but not all are maneuver elements. The term "maneuver element" is not self- descriptive. It is not the ability to maneuver per se which defines a maneuver element, but the ability to take possession of the enemy's space or prevent him from occupying one's own. "Supporting arm," on the other hand, is a self- descriptive term. The role of supporting arms is to provide the means necessary to enable maneuver elements to accomplish their occupation, either in offense or defense. Supporting arms utilize maneuver to facilitate firepower-- they move to bring themselves into the range of their particular weapons, or skills in the case of combat engineers. Perhaps the most salient point regarding supporting arms is the most obvious--they exist to support. As such, they are subordinate in their role relative to the maneuver elements. In a brief article in the April 1981 Marine Corps Gazette, Mr. William S. Lind, the controversial progenitor of the Marine Corps' maneuver warfare doctrine, seeks to define supporting arms as qualitatively different than combined arms. "Combined arms" is defined as when an action to counter one arm makes the enemy more vulnerable to the other arm, and "supporting arms" is defined as when the counter to one arm is also the counter to the other. Mr. Lind makes use of a very clever psychological ploy in offering these definitions. He says that "if Marines understand the difference between combined and supporting arms clearly (as some [unnamed] analysts believe the Soviets do), they will be in a better position to achieve true combined arms and thus make more effective use of their firepower."(9:54) What the Soviets do is a non-entity in 1992, but the point is clear--Mr. Lind thinks Marines just aren't sharp enough to grasp the concept of how the two terms differ and provides a goad to spur us to greater interest. Perhaps more to the point is that Mr. Lind's definitions are needlessly complex and of dubious value. The concept of a supporting arm, whether being utilized alone or combined with maneuver elements and other supporting arms, is clear and well understood historically-- supporting arms support. The concept of holding the terrain or forcing the enemy to yield as the criteria for identifying a maneuver element should cause us to call into question LtCol. Gonzales's concept of infantry and armor as the normally thought of maneuver elements. History is replete with examples, the 1973 Egyptian-Israeli war among them, demonstrating that armor cannot by itself dislodge a disciplined, determined enemy. Nor can armor by itself hold terrain against a determined enemy. The logical conclusion then is that tanks, for all their shock action, armor, firepower, and mobility, do not supplant infantry. Tanks support infantry; they are therefore a supporting arm. Artillery is the weapon most often thought of when supporting arms are mentioned and the weapon with which aviators most disdain to be compared. There are four elements required for successful employment of artillery. They are, for purposes of consonance, observation, communication, transportation, and detonation. Without any one of these elements artillery ceases to be a viable weapon. Observation, or target detection, can be accomplished by either a human in the capacity of the "forward observer," or by other intelligence gathering sources. In any event, accurate target location and description are essential for engagement. Observation of the fall of shot on the target is also necessary in order to collect damage information. The mission of reconnaissance by fire, for example, which is generally conceded to be horribly wasteful of ammunition, is downright suicidal in this age of counter-mortar radars, and is fired at no particular target in hopes of seeing the enemy scurry, thereby giving evidence of his presence, requires an observer in order to have any effectiveness whatsoever. Communication between the observer and the battery's fire direction center (FDC--where the azimuth and elevation for the weapons are computed) and his corresponding Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) is the second key. Its importance cannot be overstated. The lack of a rapid and reliable communications means was the principal draw-back of artillery in the First World War. Indeed, the overwhelming power of land-based rifles has not been duplicated since 1918, yet their power was largely wasted in the generation of vast oceans of mud because of the inability of maneuvering units to control the weapons. Transportation of both the howitzer and its ammunition consumes far more of an artilleryman's time and energy than any other element. The rapid, silent, and coordinated movement between firing locations is practiced ad nauseum in an effort to guarantee minimal breaks in firing capacity. But, for what purpose except to extend the range of the howitzer, which is otherwise quite limited. But, why state the obvious? To emphasize the point that transportation is required to move any weapons delivery means to a distance from which its particular projectile can effectively be employed against a target. Detonation, comprising both the howitzer and its projectile, is the most often thought of element of artillery. Much has been made, particularly during the Gulf War of 1991, of the superior range of the Iraqi 155mm howitzer in comparison to the American M198 155mm howitzer. Those who ask the question are considering only this particular element of the four necessary elements of artillery. It is important to have well designed ordnance with long range. All things being equal, the side with the longer range weapons will have a decided advantage in the counter-fire arena; but, by denying the other three elements to the Iraqis, the small advantage they possessed in delivery means was for nought. The role of artillery within the U.S. armed forces has never been in doubt. Its function is to support maneuver elements. Whether "artillery conquers and infantry occupies" is true or whether artillery is merely an enabler of infantry victory is happy-hour conversation for the well lubricated. No artilleryman ought seriously to purport to being anything other than a supporting arm of maneuver elements. Cavalry is a type of combat organization found in the Army but not the Marine Corps. What does it do that it should have a special organization and title? The first sentence of FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, states that "armored cavalry is organized for the specific purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, and security."(4:1-1) This is succinct and in fact hasn't changed since the American Civil War when horse mounted cavalry had, by 1864, developed an identical purpose. For whom does cavalry perform these functions? The mission statement from the same field manual says: The mission of armored cavalry is to perform reconnaissance and provide security for the unit to which it is assigned or attached. A [cavalry] regiment may also engage in offensive, defensive or delaying actions as part of the main battle or may be employed in an economy of force role.(4:1-18) The mission of providing security for a unit is broken into three different types of security missions. Note the escalation of the severity of fighting intrinsic in each mission as they are enumerated. A screen provides early warning, counters enemy reconnaissance activities, gains and maintains enemy contact, impedes with indirect fires, and is prepared to guide reaction forces. A guard performs the functions of screening but in addition protects the main body from direct fire weapons and surprise attack, and disrupts deployment of the enemy first echelon. The guard force does not withdraw to successive positions without permission from the main body commander, whereas the screening force commander may direct movement to successive screen lines on his own initiative. A cover denies the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and objectives of the main body, destroys enemy reconnaissance and security zone forces, develops the enemy situation to determine enemy strength and disposition, and forces the enemy to deploy first and second echelon elements prematurely. The U.S. Army has helicopters as a regular part of their armored cavalry units. It also has entire units of helicopters only, with similar mission requirements, designated as air cavalry units. FM 17-95 is very clear as to the limits of the air cavalry's employment: "Air cavalry units will not be assigned a cover mission. They do not have the closing and staying power required." (4:8-27) To the naked eye, the armored cavalry has the appear- ance of a maneuver element. Is it one? Again, FM 17-95 gives indications. "Armored cavalry is used by the corps commander. . . to help achieve his overall goals."(4:1-6) "The [cavalry] regiment may be reinforced with maneuver battalions or task forces . . . "(4:1-7) "A [cavalry] regiment can act as a covering force without reinforcement. However, reinforcement by maneuver, combat support, and combat service support units increases the distance and time the regiment can operate away from the main body and the regiment's ability to destroy the enemy."(4:7-23) The point is clear--cavalry is not intended or structured to operate independently; but, rather, it is an enabling force for the accomplishment of the maneuver element's mission. In the vein of using firepower to enable movement it appears to be a maneuver element; however, cavalry chiefly uses stealth to enable movement and uses firepower for defense. In its role as an enabler and in its subordination to the maneuver element commander, cavalry serves as a supporting arm. There is herein an essential difference from FM 100-5 of 1986. In chapter three of the manual we read: "Basic types of maneuver units are discussed in the following paragraphs: Light Infantry. . .Mechanized Infantry. . . Motorized Infantry. . .Armor. . .Cavalry. . .Aviation. . ."(5:43) As previously noted, FM 100-5 makes use of the term maneuver unit" without ever defining it formally or even providing an informal basis for its use. The point is, how- ever, moot for the U.S. Army wherein cavalry and aviation serve as supporting arms, regardless of how they wish to write about them, and are organizationally structured within their corps and divisions subordinate to those commanders. Air power is often compared to the two preceding arms-- to artillery by those who see aircraft as a bigger bludgeon and to cavalry by those who see aircraft in a sweeping, chivalrous light. In fact, of course, there are many kinds of aircraft designed for many purposes and these two views fit easily into the spectrum. Fighters, the aircraft au gallant, exist for a realm far removed from the infantry existentially, yet not really so far at all in their reason for being. These aircraft, since their inception as purpose built craft in the First World War, exist to destroy those opposing aircraft which seek to threaten friendly forces on the ground. Of course, as both sides possess such aircraft, the first task necessary in order to attack ground-threatening aircraft is to remove the threat to one's own self--thus the aerial dogfight and the realm of the air superiority fighter. Attack aircraft, those for whom the fighters clear the way, have a much more visceral, far less romantic, aire about them. They are primarily designed not for speed and maneuverability, as are fighters, but as weapons delivery platforms. As such, ability to lift heavy ordnance loads and accurately release them upon their intended targets is paramount. LtCol. Gonzales's paper, Tactical Air Support of Ground Forces in the Future, seeks to demonstrate that aircraft are not flying artillery. Yet how are attack aircraft different in their essence from artillery; the four elements of artillery are identically the primary elements of attack aircraft. Observation, through the eyes of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) or some other external intelligence agency must locate a target. In some instances, the pilot is given the freedom to choose targets as he observes them from the cockpit, but even in this case, observation of the target must take place prior to engagement. Communication of the target location to the pilot must take place, even if this communication occurs entirely within the pilots own head. Because of the distances involved, and the need to ensure that mid-air collisions don't occur, the radio communications involved, and the number of control agencies through which they must pass, are far more complex than with artillery yet nonetheless are in essence the same. Transportation of the bomb to its release point is the attack aircraft's reason for being. Certainly, if it were possible to accurately propel a 1000 pound shell 40 or 50 miles there would be no reason to consume the fuel and endanger the pilot in his attempt to carry the bomb the same distance. There are a few differences in principle. Chief among these is that aircraft are direct fire weapons in most instances whereas artillery is an indirect fire weapon. In most instances the pilot, once made aware of the target's location, physically views the target and aims his weapon at it. Further, he does not get an opportunity to adjust his fire since, unlike artillery which stays put awaiting word of how it shot, the aircraft must keep moving in order to stay aloft; if he misses, he must start over. Reconnaissance aircraft should probably be termed photography aircraft. They are able to give a portrayal, via the skilled photo-interpreter, of things on the ground at a particular instant in time. They are not able to perform such important features as determining trafficability, stream fordability, bridge load capacity or keep watch for an extended period on a suspected location for tell-tale movement. The information they provide is vital, but does not substitute for reconnaissance forces on the ground. Instead, they serve as an extension of reconnaissance forces, providing some information at extended distances where there would otherwise be no information at all. Rotary wing aircraft are no more all alike in purpose than are fixed wing aircraft. Transport and light utility helicopters are generally self-explanatory in their purposes, whereas reconnaissance and attack helicopters have been specially designed, particularly so in the Army, for the role of ground support in the form of hunter-killer teams. The helicopter is extremely susceptible to small arms fire, so the Army's diminutive OH-58D is designed to hover with its fuselage below covering terrain, while a periscope looks out in search of the enemy. Upon locating and identifying a target, the observer calls in the attack helicopter (AH-64) which, with its missile range and fire control system, doesn't need to jeapordize itself to enemy fire in order to make a kill. The Marine Corps has not been in a hurry to adopt these tactics and instead uses their AH-1 attack helicopter as both scout-observer and killer. So, after the briefest of discussions regarding the aircraft themselves, we arrive at the quintessential question. Is aviation capable of acting as an independent maneuver element or not? Furthermore, why is it necessary that a very strict definition of the term should be applied? Mr. Lind builds the case that aviation should be involved in maneuver warfare--that pilots should "always have permission to act on their own initiative, according to the situation--whether or not they have communications with the ground."(8:63) This within the framework of aviators being "fully read-in on the ground situation," under- standing the scheme of maneuver and the ground commander's intent. (8:58) The spectre of aircraft zipping over the battlefield at 400 miles per hour dropping 1000 pound bombs on their pilot's own initiative, in the hope that the pilot got a positive identification of his heavily camouflaged target, is indeed a daunting one--yet, let us consider that it may happen without catastrophe. What is the implication of Mr. Lind's suggestion? Whose intent is the Air Combat Element (ACE) obliged to follow, whose concept of operations, the Ground Combat Element (GCE) commander's or the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander's? Under the Marine Corps's current doctrine, the ACE commander follows the MAGTF commander's intent and concept of operations--the ACE is thereby treated as an independent maneuver element. Mr. Lind implies, however, that the ACE will act in subordination not to the MAGTF commander, but to the GCE commander, shifting the ACE's efforts as the GCE commander shifts his focus of effort--as all the supporting arms within the GCE do. What do other writers offer to this discussion? LtCol. Gonzales, USAF, writes: The air operations conducted during the Battle of the Bulge were consistent with the active defense operations later envisioned by AirLand Battle doctrine. General Eisenhower's air and ground forces conducted a synchronized active defense against the German attack. Simultaneously, Allied air forces conducted a deep, close, and rear battle. Because of their superior capability to maneuver, they were the spearhead of the Allied active defense.(Italics added)(6:110) Is it true that it was a superior capability to maneuver that made the air forces the spearhead? Would the statement not be more logical if it were written thus: Because of their superior ability to bring massive firepower to bear on the enemy, they were the spearhead of the Allied active defense. Another example is presented in the same article regarding Operation Totalize, the British breakout of the Normandy beachhead in 1944. During this operation, the British Bomber Command repeated the success of the American breakout near Cherbourg--but many of the mistakes had been corrected. Regarding Totalize, Gonzales states, "It is important to note that it was the penetration of the air forces that caused the disorganization of the enemy, not the destruction of the enemy forces per se. . . .Airplanes served as the independent maneuver element creating the penetration."(Italics added)(6:105) Are you impressed when an airplane penetrates the airspace over your house? So, why should the German soldiers in France have been so impressed by airplanes penetrating their airspace either? As the dazed, bleeding soldier emerged from his hole to the sight of his friends lying dead around him, his command and control facilities in complete disarray, the roads leading to him cratered so that resupply was nearly impossible, and he heard the rumble of enemy tanks in the near distance--he was impressed. It is certainly true that aircraft created the opportunity for penetration. They did not create the penetration--aircraft did not and cannot occupy the enemy's position. Had the path of destruction created by the air forces not been followed immediatel by ground forces able to exploit the confusion, the opportunity for penetration would have vaporized. Aircraft, like artillery in these examples, use their ability to maneuver to bring massive firepower to bear in a decisive way. The ability to maneuver in and of itself provides nothing in terms of combat power. Gonzales has made the mistake of repeating his thesis so often that he has believed it--without considering how to prove it. Gonzales is not alone. In the August 1989 Marine Corps Gazette, Major S. Donnell, USMC, claimed that "the ACE is, in fact, far more than a supporting arm; it is an additional maneuver element that can make major and direct contributions to winning on the battlefield."(2:64) No one has suggested that air power's contributions are not major or direct, but suppose the ACE is "merely" a supporting arm. Is that so bad? Artillery and engineers have been supporting arms for over four-hundred years and the maneuver elements still cry for more! Being a supporting arm does not make the battlefield contribution less major, less direct, or less relevant; it does mean that one understands the relative subordination of purpose. The ACE should be given a mission and be left to perform it, as should every other supporting arm. The ACE should be assigned security force missions within the limits of its capabilities, like the cavalry to whom it is often compared, it should have specific interdiction missions with priority of fire to specific types of targets, and it should carry out, unimpeded, all of the associated functions inherent with managing airspace; but, these things do not, cannot, and will not make the ACE a maneuver element. While aircraft, either rotary or fixed wing, are able to deny the occupation of terrain for a time, as any of the other supporting arms can, they cannot hold ground or seize ground from an enemy determined to stay, no matter how miserable they make life for the enemy. Let us leave our thesis that air power is a supporting arm and ask why it is even necessary to raise the issue. Consider the implications of air power, the Marine Corps's ACE specifically, as a maneuver element. It is difficult, if not impossible, to say which is the cause and which the effect of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commander assuming three-star rank and the rise of the concept of the ACE as a maneuver element. With two distinct two-star level maneuver elements within the MEF we have, de facto, a corps-- and a corps is commanded by a lieutenant general. On the other hand, this corps has only one division. Is it fitting to "advertise" that the MEF is a triple-X unit when, under normal circumstances, it has only a single division? There are those who would say that with the Wing, a MEF has the combat power of a corps. We must regard it as highly suspect that these individuals have ever seriously examined the force structure of a corps. Disregarding what impression we leave on others, what does this mean for the Marine Corps? Who is responsible for the success of an operation, the GCE commander or the MAGTF commander? Naturally the MAGTF commander. As such, is it plausible to assume that the MAGTF commander will give a mission to the GCE commander and then keep hands off? One hardly suspects this to be possible. There are simply no other ground forces available for the MAGTF commander to deal with, unlike a corps commander who has two or more divisions plus his own corps level forces to utilize. The Marine Corps has effectively added another layer of command but has provided no ground forces, other than the Division's forces, to the commander in order to influence the battle. The result in essence is having two commanders for the same troops--an arrangement that is likely to be unsatisfactory and often explosive. It is certainly true that the ACE, with its fixed-wing aircraft, has the ability to attack the enemy with great force at distances considerably farther than a normal division could. It is also true, however, that a Marine division is very light in internal fire support and relies upon the ACE to make up the shortfall. In the net then, we have a team in the MAGTF which, under favorable meteor- ological and geographic conditions, is stronger than a regular division, and thus perhaps there may be an argument that something larger than a division should be symbolized-- but it is by no means the equivalent of a corps. There should be no need for a MEF at the lieutenant general level. The division commander, with perhaps a small addition to the division staff, should be capable of commanding the MEF, as was done until only a very few years ago. The three-star level should be for a true corps, with two or more divisions, as was the case in the Gulf War. But, you say, how can this be with a wing commander who may be senior to a division commander; who will be the MEF commander in this case? This is potentially no more of a problem than when an artillery battalion is placed in direct support of an infantry battalion. Even if senior, the artillery battalion commander is the supporting unit and when questions arise, the final decision regarding employment of fires rests with the supported, i.e. the infantry battalion, commander. Air power, for all of its capabilities and numerous applications in reconnaissance, security force operations, interdiction and close air support roles is an enabler of victory--victory which occurs on the ground. Air power is a supporting arm. Major Donnell asserts that "the Marine Corps has got to come to terms with the ACE as a maneuver element. Waging turf wars will only complicate the transition. This means disregarding old perceptions, maintaining open minds, avoiding stereotypes, and dropping the heat shields."(2:66) Major Donnell is correct. One wonders, however, whose minds are closed. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Dixon, Maj. William H. "The ACE Is Not a Maneuver Element--Yet." The Marine Corps Gazette February 1992: 59-63. 2. Donnell, Maj. Steven B. "The ACE as a Maneuver Element." The Marine Corps Gazette August 1989: 64-66. 3. Driscoll, Maj. Daniel A. and O'Neill, Maj. Gordon C. "Maneuver Warfare: Can the ACE Adopt This Philosophy of War?" The Marine Corps Gazette May 1991: 77-83. 4. FM 17-95: Cavalry Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 14 February 1986. 5. FM 100-5: Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 5 May 1986. 6. Gonzales, LtCol. Harold T. Tactical Air Support of Ground Forces in the Future. Center for Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education. Research Report No. AU-ARI-89-7. Air University Press. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. May 1990. 7. Hammes, Maj. Thomas X. "Air as a Maneuver Element: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?" The Marine Corps Gazette February 1992: 65-73. 8. Lind, William S. "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation." The Marine Corps Gazette May 1989: 57-64. 9. Lind, William S. "The 'Maneuver Warfare' Concept." The Marine Corps Gazette April 1981: 53-54. 10. Saxman, Maj. John B. "The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare." The Marine Corps Gazette August 1989: 58-63.
