LAV: Time For A Real MOS CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA - Manpower EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: LAV: Time For A Real MOS Author: Major D.R. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps Thesis: Establishment of a primary MOS for all LAV Marines will capture operational experience, provide focus for the LAV program, enhance training, and ensure combat readiness of LAI/LAR units. Background: The Marine Corps' light armored vehicle program has been an evolutionary process which has not fully matured because of the lack of an MOS community as found in other combat arms MOSs. The absence of an LAV community within the Marine Corps is the result of not having a primary MOS for LAV officers and SNCOs. The current Marine Corps reorganization initiatives will give impetus to reexamine the LAV MOS structure. Other military organizations such as the Army's cavalry and mechanized infantry can provide examples to study as the Marine Corps develops new LAV organizations. Unlike other combat arms MOSs where officers and SNCOs are trained and qualified before reporting to their respective units, new LAV officers and SNCOs are handicapped and as novices find themselves taught by junior Marines. Because there is no primary MOS, the result is the lack of continuity of experienced leadership as well as the absence of any qualified sponsorship of LAV program initiatives in the budget process. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should establish an enlisted LAV MOS structure to support the new LAV organizations and create a primary MOS for LAV officers. LAV: TIME FOR A REAL MOS OUTLINE Thesis Statement: The Marine Corps' reluctance to create a primary MOS for all LAV Marines has had a detrimental impact on the LAV program, and the training of LAV Marines. Establishment of an LAV MOS for all LAV Marines at all ranks will provide focus for the LAV program, enhance training, capture corporate experience, and finally, ensure combat readiness of LAI units. I. LAV MOS Time for Change A. No MOS, No Community B. Marine Corps Reorganization II. The Beginnings of Marine Light Armor A. Concept Development B. Initial Manpower Analysis III. The Evolution of LAV Bn to LAI Bn A. Follow-on Test and Evaluation B. Doctrinal Development C. The Scout Issue IV. The Army Method A. Cavalry - Missions and Tasks B. Mechanized Infantry - A Separate MOS V. Handicapped Leadership A. Impact on Training B. Impact on Maintenance C. Impact on Overall readiness VI. Lack of Focus within the Marine Corps A. Program Initiatives Going Nowhere B. The Training Problem VII. The Solution A. Creation of an LAV MOS Structure B. The View From Headquarters C. Benefits to the Marine Corps LAV: TIME FOR A REAL MOS Since the light armored vehicle's (LAV) fielding in 1983, the LAV has proven its worth for the Marine Corps on two occasions: Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, and most recently, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As with any new concept, the Marine Corps' LAV program has been an evolutionary process and has experienced growing pains. Over the years the LAV concept of employment and Marine Corps light armor doctrine have been continually reviewed, tested, and redefined. Logistics problems not originally foreseen during concept development have been addressed as well as major design flaws and needed hardware improvements identified. Yet, after eight years there remains a lack of focus and institutional dedication on the part of the Marine Corps for the LAV. This lack of focus and commitment can be attributed in some measure to the fact that there is no LAV community as in other military occupational specialties (MOS) within the Marine Corps such as the infantry, armor, or artillery, aviation, and so on. There is no LAV community because unlike other MOS's the Marine Corps has not created a primary MOS for LAV officers nor has it established a enlisted career structure for LAV enlisted Marines. Recent Marine Corps reorganization initiatives, as recommended by the Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) and approved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, have provided the Marine Corps the opportunity to reexamine LAV MOS issues and provide optimal solutions. Among the many force structure initiatives, the FSPG recommended changing the name of the current light armored infantry battalions (LAI) to reconnaissance battalion (light armored (LAR)). This change more accurately reflects this battalion's capabilities and the true nature of its combat role within the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Additionally, the FSPG recommended the creation of a Combined Arms Regiment (CAR) which would include a tank battalion, a reconnaissance company (light armored), and two LAI battalions. The LAI battalions in the CAR will not resemble their predecessors, but will be organized and employed as mechanized infantry. This initiative will increase the number of LAV equipped companies from 12 to 24. The resultant increase in LAV unit structure provides a structure base that enables the Marine Corps to create a primary MOS for officers and more importantly, create an enlisted career track for LAV enlisted Marines from the rank of private to master gunnery sergeant. Establishment of a primary MOS and feeder MOS's for all LAV Marines will create an LAV MOS community that captures corporate experience, ensures sponsorship at the headquarters level, provides trained and experienced LAV leaders, and finally, promotes combat readiness of LAI and reconnaissance units (LAR). THE BEGINNINGS OF MARINE LIGHT ARMOR Marine light armor had its beginning as early as 1973, when the Marine Corps identified a requirement for a mobile protected weapons system that would provide increased firepower and mobility for Marine infantry during the initial phases of the amphibious assault. It was not until 1980, in the aftermath of the Iran hostage crisis and the birth of the rapid deployment force concept that the Marine Corps identified and validated a requirement for a lightly armored vehicle which would provide the MAGTF with greater firepower, operational range, battlefield agility, and strategic and tactical mobility. As a result of convincing congressional testimony by the Commandant and other Marine Corps witnesses before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 1980, funding was subsequently approved for procurement of LAVs for the Marine Corps. Normally the acquisition of major weapons systems or other major defense related hardware is a complex and rather long drawn-out affair which takes place over a five to ten year period. This process involves conducting mission analysis, concept development, research and development, systems engineering, manpower and training analyses, and determining logistic support requirements. While these steps are not inclusive, they do represent the major evolutions within the initial phases of systems acquisition. In the case of the LAV, the Marine Corps, with Congressional and Department of Defense blessing, decided to pursue an off-the-shelf acquisition strategy which shortened the acquisition time by as much as seven years. Within three years of the Marine Corps officially establishing the LAV program, the first LAV unit was activated and LAVs were being delivered to the Marine Corps. The speed at which this evolution took place was heretofore unheard of, at least in a peacetime environment. Even in the light of a much heralded acquisition strategy which provided the Marine Corps a quantum leap in operational capability, there was much in the way of operational and organizational concepts that may have been given only cursory study or overlooked completely. From the outset the concept of employment and the doctrinal role of the LAV within the MAGTF were vague. These are key aspects in the design of an organization, billet structure, and ultimately the types of MOSs that are assigned. It is difficult to build an organization or determine its structure without knowing how that organization will be employed. In an interview in DEFENCE AND ARMAMENT in November 1982, Major General Glasgow, then director of Operations Division, Plans, Policies, and Operations Department, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC), stated that the final organization for the LAV and its concept of employment had not yet been determined. These issues were to be more fully developed after operational experience with the first activated unit at the Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty-Nine Palms, California. (15:66) Initially, the Light Armored Assault Battalion, as it was first named, was seen as a combat unit which would function as part of a larger force, either in direct support or attached. The battalion's primary functions were to provide fire support and ground mobility as well as conduct adjunct reconnaissance and security missions. Based on this rough concept of employment and organization, HQMC conducted a manpower analysis to determine the required personnel numbers and types of MOSs. Because of structure constraints and the views of senior leaders in the Marine Corps at the time, little consideration was given to providing organic infantry to each LAV Battalion. Given the LAV battalion's primary roles of providing direct fire support and ground mobility, manpower analysts created and assigned new primary MOSs only for enlisted Marines who were LAV vehicle operators or mechanics. Billets for LAV officers and SNCOs would filled by infantry MOSs, 0302 and 0369 respectively. Later on, an additional MOS (0303) was created which would be given to officers after a requisite period of on-the-job- training (OJT). THE EVOLUTION OF LAV BATTALION TO LAI BATTALION In 1984 the Marine Corps initiated a follow-on operational test and evaluation (FOT&E) of the LAV. The purpose of the FOT&E was threefold: refine tactical doctrine; verify system performance, reliability and maintainability; determine requirements for the table of organization (T/O) and table of equipment (T/E), training, and logistic support. The test and evaluation called for using the recently published Marine Corps Operational Handbook (OH) 6-6, Marine Light Armor Employment as a baseline for testing tactical employment. OH 6-6 depicts the LAV Battalion as an organization performing those missions and roles that historically were considered cavalry functions. This view of the role of LAV Battalion was radically different from what was originally envisioned, that of providing direct fire support and ground mobility to infantry battalions. The conclusions and recommendations found in the final report and executive summary validated much of the concept of employment as described in OH 6-6, but they also highlighted many deficiencies. The report concluded that the T/O at the time of the test was inadequate. At the time, LAV Battalions did not have organic scout infantry, but were task organized with regular infantry when the mission called for scout-infantry. The report went on to say that because of the special skills required, LAV units must have trained organic scout-infantry in order to accomplish assigned missions in accordance with OH 6-6. LAV-25 squads should consist of a minimum of six Marines, and that they all should be trained as vehicle crew and scout- infantry.(17:185) Simply stated, there should be one MOS for vehicle crew and scout-infantry. Because of structure constraints, the issue of organic scout-infantry for LAV Battalions was not addressed until June 1988. Structure and manning decisions contained in the Marine Corps Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 90-94 made possible the structure necessary to provide scout-infantry to the LAV Battalions.(6:1) On 1 October 1988 LAV Battalions were redesignated as Light Armored Infantry (LAI) Battalions. This name change coincided with the addition of 168 scout-infantry to each LAI Battalion T/O. While this evolution represented a step toward correcting the T/O deficiencies identified by the FOT&E, it only went halfway. The MOS of the scout-infantry in the LAI Battalions remained 0311, basic infantryman. This was contrary to the recommendation made in the FOT&E final report.(17:187) The issue of a single common MOS for LAV vehicle crewmen and scout-infantry has remained a controversial topic to this day. There are those within the Marine Corps who believe that it is only necessary to assign basic infantrymen as scout-infantry and train them by OJT. However, the views of previous LAV and LAI unit commanders contradict this method of assignment. Numerous letters and position papers from LAI unit commanders argued for a common MOS for vehicle crewmen and the scout-infantry who ride in the back of the LAV-25. One such letter points out very succinctly the rationale for a common MOS. We have apparently assumed that changing the title of the units from Light Armored Vehicle to Light Armored Infantry allows Marines assigned to those units to be interchanged with regular infantry Marines. They cannot! The maintenance, vehicle operation, engineer and reconnaissance skills, as well as the skills required to operate their particular weapon system mounted on the LAV requires a Marine that has had the requisite training. The assignment of 0311 MOS Marines to LAI units is not satisfactory, even if given an abbreviated course on LAV basics. The crew of an LAV is a team just as a squad of infantry or the crew of a tank is a team. All crew members need to have the same basic skills and understanding of the LAV and LAV unit in order to conduct sustained operations.(9:2) THE ARMY METHOD One way to measure the efficacy of an organization is to compare it with another organization with similar missions and whose soldiers perform similar tasks. In the case of the new Reconnaissance Battalion (LAR), formerly LAI Battalion, one could examine Army cavalry units and draw parallel conclusions based Army experience. Soldiers assigned to cavalry units are given a different MOS than their infantry counterparts. Cavalry scouts, in addition to possessing basic infantry skills, must also be able to perform reconnaissance and basic pioneer tasks. They must also be able to function as crewmen on the Bradley fighting vehicle and perform vehicle maintenance as a member of a vehicle team. Bradley vehicle crewmen and scouts can switch places when the situation requires. This team philosophy has driven the Army to develop a common MOS for vehicle crewmen and scouts. In describing the role of dismounted riflemen (scout- infantry) in an LAV unit (now LAI), OH 6-6 states: The primary mission of the dismounted riflemen is to enhance the reconnaissance and screening capabilities of the organization and provide limited pioneer and demolition tasks as required.(23:9) Some of the engineer tasks that the LAV scout-infantry may be required to perform include removing roadblocks, constructing bypasses, clearing and laying mines and performing route reconnaissance and bridge classification. In addition to the above tasks, the FOT&E points out that LAV scout-infantry must also be able to function as vehicle crewmen when necessary. The parallel between Army cavalry scouts and Marine LAV scout-infantry is so close that it would lead one to believe that like the Army, the Marine Corps should have a single MOS for LAV crewmen and scout- infantry. The new LAI Battalions as envisioned by the FSPG will become the Marine Corps' permanently organized mechanized infantry. While the organization for the new LAI Battalions has not been approved yet, the organizational concept will revolve around a new LAV, the LAV squad carrier. The LAV squad carrier or LAV personnel carrier (PC) would carry a three man crew and an eight man squad. Rounding out the LAI company would be the standard LAV variants currently in the Marine Corps inventory, such as the LAV-25, LAV-mortar, LAV- antitank, and LAV-logistics. Once again it would be appropriate for the Marine Corps to look at the Army as we develop a concept of employment, design the organization, and establish individual training standards for LAI units within the CAR. Since the introduction of the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Army determined that because of the complexity of the system as well as the change to tactical doctrine, that it was necessary to create a separate MOS for mechanized infantry. Although the basic infantry skills for mechanized infantry and "straight-leg" infantry are the same, the manner in which mechanized infantry or straight-leg infantry are employed is different. In a mechanized infantry unit, the vehicle, its crew, and the infantry squad are considered as parts of a single system and when employed together provide a synergistic effect. Just as in Army cavalry units, for mechanized infantry there is no MOS distinction between the Bradley crew and the infantrymen who ride in the back. HANDICAPPED LEADERSHIP Until now I have focused on the need for a common LAV MOS structure for enlisted Marines within LAV units, be they in the LAI Battalion or Reconnaissance Battalion (LAR). However, we will now turn our attention to the assignment and training of LAV leaders. Currently, above the rank of sergeant there is no LAV MOS with the exception of the additional MOS awarded to officers after a requisite period of OJT. When an 0313 sergeant is promoted to staff sergeant, his MOS changes to 0369, a basic infantry staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO). Sergeants who have grown-up in LAV units become part of a larger community of 0369s and inevitably are eligible for reassignment to billets for which they are unprepared either by training or experience. Conversely, Infantry SNCO's without formal LAV training or prior experience were and still are routinely assigned to LAI units. Unlike infantry, artillery, tank, assault amphibian vehicle (AAV), engineer and other densely populated combat arms MOS units who have the benefit of formally trained and seasoned SNCOs, LAI units are faced with a continual process of training their SNCO leadership from ground zero. In the past, officer assignment to LAI units has been accomplished by seeking volunteers from or assigning quotas to infantry regiments as well as tank and AAV battalions. Although the preponderance of LAV officers came from infantry units, some previous LAV and LAI battalion commanders have discovered that having a mix of combat arms officers within the battalion provides a balance and depth of knowledge in the absence of any formal training or experience. For instance, infantry officers provide the necessary infantry expertise, while tank officers contribute the gunnery know-how. Additionally, tank and AAV officers, given the nature of their MOSs, can provide the proper focus for maintenance. While this balance of MOS knowledge when coupled with OJT and LAV operational experience can improve the personnel and training readiness picture, it is at best a bandaid approach to LAV officer assignment and training. It cannot take the place formal instruction in tactics, gunnery, vehicle operation, and maintenance. When first assigned to an LAI Battalion, untrained and inexperienced officers and SNCOs are at a disadvantage in the exercise of their leadership responsibilities. These leaders may find it difficult to assess training or supervise the maintenance effort without a fundamental base of knowledge of LAV tactics, training standards, as well as the operation and technical aspects of the vehicles and weapons systems in their charge. Becoming proficient as an LAV leader is a process of self-instruction and OJT, relying on their subordinates to teach them. What develops is a role reversal; junior Marines are training their leaders. This a far cry from General Lejeune's description of a leader as a teacher. Some LAI Battalions in the past have established informal schools and conducted training for newly assigned officers and SNCOs. But this effort is not without cost in terms of time, manpower, and fiscal resources and is at the expense of the LAV unit commander. Given time, LAV officers and SNCOs are trained and gain experience. Unfortunately, maintaining this corporate LAV experience is a fleeting proposition. Trained and experienced personnel are reassigned after two to three years in the Battalion. While this problem may be manageable if the numbers are small, any major turnover would seriously degrade personnel and training readiness. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that few if any LAV trained and experienced Officers and SNCOs ever return to LAI units at a later time during their career. LAV units become a revolving door for transient amateurs. Finally there is the issue of combat replacements. The recent Gulf War was a unique situation where our enemy gave us time to build forces in theater and train. At the 1991 Armor Conference at Ft Knox, Kentucky, during a discussion session in which Marine Corps tank, AAV, and LAI issues were addressed, LAI commanders or unit representatives discussed the likely impact of the lack of a primary MOS for LAV officers and SNCOs on operational readiness of LAI units in combat. The following is a synopsis of their discussion. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm the need to have a permanent LAI MOS for officers and SNCOs became quite apparent. With the possibility of a protracted ground campaign, the lack of qualified replacements became of great concern for the LAI Battalions.... During hostilities, as casualties occur within the officer and SNCO ranks, no qualified replacements are available to place in combat. An infantry officer or SNCO cannot take over an LAI company or platoon during combat and be expected to perform as one who is trained and worked with an LAV. (29:6) LACK OF PROGRAM FOCUS WITHIN THE MARINE CORPS The lack of a primary MOS for LAV officers and SNCOs has resulted in the absence of any proponency or qualified sponsorship for the LAV program or LAI units at Headquarters or elsewhere within the supporting establishment. Seldom are LAV-experienced officers assigned to billets responsible for developing or improving LAV hardware, training, or doctrine. As an example, in the recent past the succession of MOSs the of LAV proponent and requirements officers at the Warfighting Center in Quantico has been infantry, tank, infantry (recon), and tank. None of these officers had any previous LAV experience. The current LAV proponent and requirements officer is an AAV officer who has had LAV experience. However, his assignment was more a case of opportunistic circumstance rather than purposeful design. The LAV proponent and requirements officer is responsible for identifying LAV warf ighting deficiencies, validating operational requirements, resolving structure issues, and reviewing doctrinal and training changes. While any Marine officer assigned to this particular billet would be dedicated to the task of resolving LAV issues and promoting LAV programs, nonetheless, he is handicapped initially by his lack of knowledge. A neophyte LAV requirements officer, who has no LAV experience may spend half his tour learning the LAV and developing an appreciation for LAV and LAI issues. Just as this officer becomes knowledgeable and effective in his job, it is time for him to leave, and once again the program goes back to the starting gate. This absence of qualified proponency and sponsorship has resulted in the lack of institutional dedication for the LAV program. Approximately nine years have passed since the first LAV was fielded. And although major design flaws or critical required operational improvements were identified early on, only a few minor modifications have been made. One example of a critical operational deficiency is the lack of a thermal sight for the LAV-25. From the time the LAV-25 was first introduced, the Marine Corps has highlighted the need for thermal sight. Year after year during POM development, the LAV thermal sight initiative, as well as other critical LAV initiatives, took a backseat to other initiatives which had the support of their respective MOS communities and therefore sponsorship at the headquarters level. It was not until the recent Gulf war that LAI commanders were able raise the visibility of need and convince Marine Corps leadership of the critical need for a thermal sight for the LAV-25. Similarly, the lack institutional dedication also has had a detrimental impact on training. Presently, no formal school exists for LAV officers or SNCOs even though this critical training deficiency has long been officially recognized by the Marine Corps. On this subject the final report of the LAV FOT&E states that: Officer training for LAV commanders is inadequate. - No formal doctrinal training - Unlike any other MOS, LAV officers are not basic "experts" upon arrival at the LAVB. - LAV officers are unprepared in -- Maintenance management -- Gunnery (section and platoon) -- Tactics SNCO training for LAV unit leaders is inadequate in the same areas indicated for officers.(17:186-187) In 1988 the U.S. Naval Audit Service conducted an audit of the Marine Corps' LAV program. As a result of the audit, the Naval Audit Service found that many of the problems within the program could be attributed in some measure to the lack of formal training for officers and SNCOs.(28:4) The Marine Corps responded to the Naval Audit Service acknowledging the need for a formal school and outlined a plan for establishing such a school. However, as of the writing of this article no formal school exists. The continuous train of studies, surveys, audits, and analyses, while confirming the obvious, have produced little more than a perennial topic for discussion. Other training issues which have not been given adequate attention include individual training standards (ITS), gunnery training, and combined arms exercise (CAX) participation. Until September 1990 there were no officially published ITSs for LAV crewmen and as for Scout- Infantry, ITS's have yet to be published. Prior to the Marine Air Ground Training and Education Center publishing the LAV crewmen standards, individual LAI Battalions developed their own in order to have some measure by which to assess their efforts. For years gunnery training for LAV-25 crews has been a "hit and miss" endeavor. Previous LAI unit commanders have borrowed from the Army's Bradley gunnery manual what was applicable in addition to soliciting help from Marine tank master gunners. Only recently has a gunnery manual for the LAV-25 been written. Embarrassingly, it was written by the Army after they took possession of 16 LAVs in 1989 on temp- loan from the Marine Corps in order to conduct operational testing. The Army found that unlike other major weapons systems such as the tank or Bradley fighting vehicle which have gunnery manuals that spell out the vehicles' weapons technical characteristics, manner of tactical employment, and method of training, there was no such manual for the LAV. Currently, the Marine Corps is "Marinizing" the Army's manual and will soon publish and distribute the new reference for Marine Corps use. THE SOLUTION Creation of an LAV enlisted MOS career structure and primary MOS for LAV officers would be a major step toward solving the problems that have been outlined thus far. It is not a simple solution, but nonetheless provides the means to develop a corps of LAV experts and not transient amateurs. The first recommendation, and perhaps least contentious, is the establishment of an LAV enlisted career structure. From the rank of private to sergeant there would be four MOSs: light armored infantryman (0313), scout-infantryman (0312), LAV antitank crewman (0353 -currently 0352), and LAV mortarman (0343 - currently 0341). An LAV crewman and light armored infantryman would have the same MOS (0313) and would be interchangeable as crewman or inf antryman. The scout- inf antryman MOS (0312) would be an additional MOS given to light armored infantry Marines who are assigned to the Reconnaissance Battalion (Light Armored). The additional skills required as a scout-infantryman could be taught as part of formal package of instruction at the School of infantry or within the battalion upon arrival. The LAV antitank TOW missile system is descriptively and functionally different from the TOW missile launcher version mounted on the High Mobility Medium Vehicle Wheeled (HMMVW). Yet, Marines who operate the two different systems are given the same MOS. By creating an LAV antitank MOS(0353), the Marine Corps is able to accurately identify those LAV-AT Marines and train them from the outset on the weapons systems and vehicles to which they will be assigned. While the 81mm mortar mounted in the LAV is not significantly different from its ground-mounted counterpart, there are differences in its manner of employment. More importantly, an LAV mortarman becomes an integral part of the crew and therefore must learn how to operate and maintain the LAV. Inclusion of LAV crewman and light armored infantry (0313), LAV-AT Marines (0353) and LAV mortarmen (0343) as well as a scout-infantry MOS into a single MOS structure would broaden the LAV enlisted population to the extent that it would provide the MOS rank structure necessary to afford promotion opportunity from private to master gunnery sergeant. When an LAV Marine, regardless of his specific MOS, is promoted to staff sergeant, his MOS changes to 0370, LAV unit leader. He will keep this MOS to the rank master gunnery sergeant (Figure 1.) Click here to view image LAV enlisted Marines upon completion of the basic infantry course at the SOI would go on to a basic LAV course. Those individuals identified as antitank operators or mortarmen would follow a course of instruction pertaining to those particular LAV variants. The more exceptional students would receive instruction on the LAV-25 and some limited gunnery training. Others would receive this training at their future battalion. Assignment of LAV Marines to the Reconnaissance Battalion (Light Armored) would be managed in much the same way as was done with the old Reconnaissance Battalion. LAV Marines (0313, 0343, 0353, and 0370) after serving a period of time in an LAI Battalion would given an opportunity to transfer to the LAR Battalion or the LAR Company within the Combined Arms Regiment. LAV Marines, who are new to a LAR unit, would undergo a period of formal instruction or OJT before being awarded an additional MOS of 0312, scout-infantryman. There are a number of ways to address the LAV officer MOS and assignment problem. One solution is to continue with the current policy of assigning combat arms officers and awarding them an additional MOS. One exception is that these officers must attend a formal school. After the their initial tour, these officers are tracked by the manpower system, and later in their careers, they could be reassigned to an LAV unit. The important point here is that these officers must receive formal training on the LAV with emphasis on tactics, gunnery, and maintenance. There also must be an assignment mechanism in place that guarantees reassignment of LAV experienced officers. A more plausible solution is to create a primary LAV MOS for officers. This would serve as a catalyst for the establishment of a formal LAV officer school much like the current AAV officers'course. Assignment of a primary LAV MOS for officers would take place at The Basic School (TBS), as is the case with other officer MOSs. After completion of TBS, lieutenants would attend the Infantry Officer's Course, and then the LAV school. Initially, other ranks, such as captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels, that are required to establish the grade shape or rank structure pyramid within the MOS would be filled by encouraging moves from other combat arms. After formal training, each officer would be assigned the LAV MOS as his primary MOS. This would be required until the LAV officer population matures. Of the two solutions that are presented here for the LAV officer assignment and the MOS issue , there are a number of derivations which can be developed. Central to each solution is the establishment of a formal LAV officer school and the need for continuity in follow-on assignments. However, it is this author's opinion that the LAV MOS should be a primary MOS for officers. The official recognition of the need for a formal school for LAV officers and SNCOs, as pointed out earlier in this article, should lead one to recognize that there is a special body of knowledge required to correctly employ an LAI/LAR unit, maintain vehicles and train personnel. Assignment to an LAI or LAR unit should not be merely viewed as a career broadening tour. The establishment of an enlisted LAV MOS structure and the creation of a primary LAV MOS for officers are not without their detractors. Not everyone shares the same perceptions of the problems or agrees to the solutions. The prevailing argument in the past against creating a primary MOS for officers and an enlisted career track has been that the LAV population is too small to justify primary MOSs above the rank of sergeant. Manpower administrators cite grade-shape problems as well as question the cost-effectiveness of managing a small MOS community. This reference to grade- -shape reflects a priority of administrative management concerns over combat readiness. Additionally, many in the Marine Corps believe that by creating another MOS we are becoming too specialized and as such are losing our versatility and our ability to adapt. However, as the Marine Corps gets smaller and yet more technical, the effort to achieve efficiency and versatility through economies of scale will become more difficult. Combat skill and task proficiency become victim to the generalist's warfighting philosophy of "jack of all trades". The increased LAV structure as recommended by the FSPG will support an enlisted LAV MOS structure from the rank of private to master gunnery sergeant. The maturation and more importantly the retention of enlisted LAV leaders will provide the Marine Corps with a well of expertise and experience which in turn will ensure combat readiness. The litany of problems and issues previously discussed are directly or indirectly related to the absence of an LAV community. Establishment of an enlisted LAV career track and creation of a primary MOS for LAV officers will provide the genesis for such an MOS community. These steps will provide qualified program sponsorship, raise visibility of LAV warfighting issues, capture corporate experience, improve training, and ultimately enhance our warfighting capability. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Memorandum, Subj.: The Marine Corps Force Structure Plan. Washington D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. 16 December 1991. 2. Besch, Edwin W. "Light Armored Vehicles - Needs and Candidates." Marine Corps Gazette December 80: 33-44. 3. Besch, Edwin W. "Light Armored Vehicles - Uses and Organizations." Marine Corps Gazette January 81: 55-62. 4. Besch, Edwin W. "Light Armored Vehicles - Pending Issues." Marine Corps Gazette December 81: 16-17. 5. 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