Marine Reserve Aviation: Capable Of A Larger Role? CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Marine Reserve Aviation: Capable of a Larger Role? Author: Major C. E. Mamzic, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Through the transfer of more aviation units to, and a reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve, the Marine Corps can effectively reduce force structure while maintaining combat capability. Background: The end of the Cold War and the lack of any clear, discernable military threat , along with the lack of money to fund it, has resulted in a mandate for change in the size of the military. All services are trying to structure their forces accordingly to reduce size, yet maintain combat capability. Transferring forces to the Reserves has been a cost effective method of reducing force structure while maintaining capabilities. Lessons learned from Reserve participation in Operation Desert Storm show that Reserve aviation units are generally combat ready and able to deploy on short notice. However, Reserve inf antry units may require additional training after mobilization before they are ready for deployment. Additionally, when mobilized, Reserve units serve in active duty commands. Recommendation: In order to maintain combat capability while reducing force structure, Marine Corps force planners should transfer more aviation units to the Marine Corps Reserve, and incorporate Marine Reserve units in active duty commands. Marine Reserve Aviation: Capable of a Larger Role? Outline Thesis: Through the transfer of more aviation units to and a reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve, the Marine Corps can effectively reduce force structure while maintaining combat capability. I. Present defense situation A. World tension reduced B. U.S. cannot afford a large military C. All services will be smaller II. The Marine Corps will be smaller A. Need to be smaller and cost effective B. Need to maintain combat capability C. Transferring assets to the Reserves is a solution III. Reserves are cost effective A. Cost less than active duty B. Capabilities similar to active duty C. Participated in recent combat operations IV. Lessons learned from DESERT STORM A. Reserve infantry not effective 1. Marine performance versus National Guard 2. Small versus large unit employment 3. Historical problem 4. Possible problem for Marines B. Aviation performed well V. Reasons for Reserve aviation performance A. Technical skill specialization 1. Aircrew 2. Enlisted aviation specialists B. Require aircraft adaptable to Reserves 1. Easy to fly 2. Easy to maintain VI. Marine Corps implementation A. Considerations of units B. Reorganization considerations Marine Reserve Aviation: Capable of a Larger Role? With the end of the Cold War and the defeat of Iraq, world tension has been significantly reduced. With this reduction in tension, and the lack of any clear, discernable military threat has come a mandate for change. The traditional American aversion to maintaining a large, standing military coupled with the fact that we can't afford it anyway, means the armed forces will be considerably smaller in the future. All the services are trying to plan and structure accordingly. This task is especially challenging for the Marine Corps. But there is a way that it can be done. Marine Corps force planners are faced with the task of structuring not only a smaller force, but one that is still strong and capable enough to deal with any future contingency. Furthermore, the Corps must not only be smaller, but more cost effective as well. Therefore, the search is on for a way to reduce size while maintaining capability at the minimum cost. Through the transfer of more aviation units to and a reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve, the Marine Corps can effectively reduce force structure while maintaining combat capability. Transferring forces to the Reserves has been one of the most cost effective ways to reduce active duty forces. This is because Reserve units cost approximately 30% of what regular units of the same size and type cost. (1:18) And, although it varies from unit to unit, Reservists' capabilities are generally as good as active duty units. Indeed, it was recognition of the cost effectiveness of Reserve forces that led to the increased reliance on the Reserves and eventually to the Total Force Policy of the Department of Defense. This policy, an accepted fact of life, in effect mandates that the U.S. cannot respond to an emergency without mobilizing at least part of the Reserve forces. (14:47) The mobilization and participation of Reserve units in all recent major crisis has clearly validated this policy. Reserve forces were mobilized and participated in both recent major combat operations conducted by the United States: Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989, and Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1990-1991. While the preponderance of Reserve units that participated in these operations were combat support, combat service support, and strategic aviation units, some ground combat and tactical aviation units did participate in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. In general, they performed very well, providing vital support to coalition forces throughout the theater. (4:31) The important lesson to be learned from these operations is why some forces performed better than others, and then shift forcesto the Reserves accordingly. The Marine Corps has already shifted enough of its relatively limited combat support and combat service support forces to the Reserves. It has also already transferred its least mobile artillery systems (self-propelled howitzers) to the Reserves, leaving little room for force structure reduction in the limited remaining artillery organizations. By default, what remains for consideration are infantry and tactical aviation units. Very few Reserve infantry units were mobilized during Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Of those units mobilized, only the Marines were found to be combat ready. The primary reason for Marine Reserve infantry units being found combat ready was that they were mobilized as companies and battalions to fill out active duty divisions. This absolved them of the requirement to master the complexities of larger unit fire support coordination maneuver, logistics and so forth. (4:32) The present Marine Corps active duty infantry force structure enabled the Reserves to be employed as company/battalion fill-outs. With Marine active duty infantry units already heavily tasked with forward presence/deployment missions, any further reductions in the size of the active duty infantry force structure could lead to a concomitant increased reliance on larger Reserve units. The Marine Corps can expect to experience problems similar to those experienced by the U.S. Army in 1990 in mobilizing and employing regimental size Reserve infantry units. Most Reserve infantry units are organized and drill primarily at the company level, rarely training at the battalion/regimental level, and even less often as parts of divisions/corps. They sometimes participate in larger unit operations during their two weeks of active duty each year, but not often enough to maintain proficiency. It was lack of proficiency at the regiment/brigade level that led to the Army National Guard roundout brigades being considered not ready for combat. As lessons learned in World War II, and relearned in Korea and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM show, it takes more than 40 days of active duty training a year to be an effective regimental size maneuver unit. (2:41) This lack of proficiency in larger unit operations means commanders planning to use Reserve infantry forces for combat operations must allow suff icient time after mobilization for training as larger units. (10:22) Time that may not be available for our nation's "force in readiness," the Marine Corps. For example, the 48th Infantry Brigade (Georgia Army National Guard), the roundout brigade of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), required 70 days of intensive training at the National Training Center, Ft. Irwin, California after mobilization before it was certified combat ready. (13:15) Fortunately, the brigade was not needed in the brief war, and it never deployed to the theater. Clearly, transferring forces you might need on short notice to the Reserves is not the way to go if it will take two months or more before they are ready for combat. On the other hand, Reserve tactical aviation units participated in both Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Their performance in combat, was by all accounts outstanding, equal to that of their active duty counterparts. (9:44) They were mobilized, deployed, and hit the ground running. This performance validated the mobilization criterion for Reserve tactical aviation units requiring them to deploy to a theater of crisis within 72 hours of mobilization. (14:117) Why are Reserve aviation units better prepared to assume their combat role than are Reserve ground combat units? Primarily because aviation missions are flown by a handful of highly trained and skilled aircrew who normally operate independently or in larger packages with other highly skilled aircrew. Therefore they do not have the problems associated with trying to fight and maneuver a large unit whose members are not accustomed to working together. The challenge is to obtain, train and then maintain the proficiency of highly skilled aircrew. Reserve aviation units have been able to do this. Military aviation is a skill that takes a great deal of time and expense to learn and master, but once mastered is comparatively easy to maintain proficiency in. The general capability of an aircrewman is a function of experience, and the generally accepted measure of experience for aircrew is accumulated flight time. It is an accepted fact that the more flight time experience a pilot has in his warfare specialty (air-to-air, air-to-ground, transport, etc.) the better an aircrewman he is. Once you get above a certain level of flight experience, you need considerably less flight time to maintain proficiency. All you have to do to maintain proficiency is to fly. This is why it is so important that aircrew stay in flying billets and keep their hands on equipment. Active duty aircrew often find themselves being assigned to non-flying billets such as recruiter, forward air controller, Headquarters staff officer, etc. Reserve aircrew rarely fill billets such as these. Rather, they stay in flying billets throughout the Reserve establishment. It is a truism that in the Reserves, every aircrewman who wants to fly can fly. They therefore keep flying, maintaining the proficiency they gained on active duty, and, in many cases accumulating as much military flight experience as their active duty contemporaries who are periodically assigned non-flying tours. As a result of these career patterns, Reserve aircrew are as proficient as active duty aircrew. They are one of the keys to the success of Reserve aviation units. They are not however, the only key. The other key to the success of Reserve aviation is the enlisted aviation specialists. Like the aircrew in squadrons, they are for the most part highly trained and skilled technicians. (14:69) What must also be recognized, however, is that these technical skills take time to master, and once mastered, must be properly utilized to maximize gains on training invested, and to prevent skills atrophy. As in the case of sending aircrew to non-flying billets, sending skilled, experienced enlisted aviation specialists to the drill field, recruiting duty or one of the many other non-Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) related billets makes little sense. Unfortunately, it is a fact of life on active duty, but not in the Reserves. It is not unusual therefore, to find Reserve enlisted aviation specialists with as much MOS proficiency as their active duty contemporaries. The major lesson learned from Operation DESERT STORM was that units that specialized in a single weapons system or function deployed effectively. (4:32) It was the specialized nature of the jobs of the aircrew and enlisted aviation specialists that enabled them to function as well as they did when mobilized. Whether operating from a base in the United States or one in Saudi Arabia, the tasks Reserve aircrew and airmen are required to perform remain the same. For those who doubt the value of the "specialist" career path, consider that Air National Guard/USAF Reserve units have won "Gunsmoke," the biennial Air Force-wide bombing competition three out of the last six times, beating out the best of the active duty Air Force. (3:15) Marine Corps Reserve aviation units routinely do outstanding on their Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES), using the same standards as active duty units.* Both of these events are evaluations of combat readiness in that they require well trained personnel and well maintained equipment to score well. From personal experience, I routinely observed high standards of performance by many units of the Air National Guard and the Marine Reserve while serving as Operations Officer for two years of a Marine Reserve A-4M Skyhawk/CH-53A Sea Stallion aircraft group. Clearly, specialization pays off, is necessary, and should be capitalized upon. The Marine Corps should capitalize on the adaptability of aviation to the Reserves. Significant reductions in active duty force structure would result, with no reduction in ground combat units. The actual size of a force structure change moving aviation forces to the Reserves is larger than what most people think. All Marine Corps aviation units have a large tail-to- tooth ratio when you consider the supply, support and intermediate/depot level maintenance activities required to support them. Proportionate shares of these units could also be transferred to the Reserves, or, in some cases, eliminated entirely. Recruiting, administration, infrastructure, etc., could also be reduced, making the total reduction greater than just the sum of the personnel in the actual squadrons transferred. In total, a significant reduction in manpower and costs with negligible loss of capability. The question is which units to transfer to the Reserves. The first units to consider for transfer to the Reserves are the Fighter/Attack (VMFA) F/A-18 units. In this era of joint operations, it is difficult to envision the Marine Corps going it alone. More likely we will fight under an air superiority umbrella provided initially by either U.S. Navy carrier aviation or U.S. Air Force assets, and eventually in conjunction with them. Indeed, in many future contingency scenarios, such as low intensity conflict, we may not need supersonic strike-fighters at all. The Marine Corps cannot afford to maintain twelve squadrons of F/A-18's on active duty for a mission they are unlikely to be called to fill. The Marine Corps should, however, maintain a smaller number of F/A-18's on active duty, but the preponderance in the Reserves. The F/A-18 Hornet is an outstanding aircraft that once mastered by your average Reserve aviator is easy to maintain proficiency in. It is also easy to maintain. Both these points make it a natural for the Reserves. Additionally, an examination of the capabilities of potential adversaries would show that Reserve F/A-18 forces would have both an experience and technological edge over all of them. The F/A-18 is the finest multi-mission aircraft in the world; we would be foolish to give up its capabilities when we could retain it for a fraction of the cost. This is especially so if we face the prospect of the Navy "borrowing" the remainder for carrier deployments. The Marine Corps should also consider transferring more aerial refueling (VMGR) KC-130 assets to the Reserves. A requirement for a large number of KC-130s on active duty existed when the Marine Corps used to ferry its own squadrons to Europe and WestPac, but not since the U.S. Air Force assumed the strategic refueling mission. Tactical in- flight refueling, the primary mission of VMGR, is a mission that tactical aviation units need to practice infrequently. (11:149) The Reserves can easily support this training requirement through coordinated block training and scheduling. As in the case of the F/A-18, the KC-130 is a perfect airplane for the Reserves: easy to maintain proficiency in (especially since it is multi-piloted) and relatively easy to maintain. Considering that 33% of the Marine VMGR aircraft that participated in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were from the Reserves, it is easy to make the case that we could locate a larger percentage of the Marine VMGR assets in the Reserves with no loss of capability. (5:35) In the rotary wing community of Marine aviation, units from all aircraft communities (UH-1, AH-1, CH-46 and CH-53) were mobilized in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM or to replace active duty units participating in that operation, indicating the already high reliance the Marine Corps has on Reserve helicopter units. These units also performed well, but were often hampered by flying aircraft not compatible with active duty units (i.e., RH-53, AH-1J), of limited capabilities, and that, due to their age, were much more maintenance intensive. Due to the present lack of organic lift capability in the fleet Marine forces, and the importance of vertical assault/support in any future Marine Corps contingencies, the present rotary wing active/Reserve mix is satisfactory. What is not satisfactory is, as previously mentioned, the equipping of Reserve helicopter units. Unlike Reserve fixed wing aviation units who have upgraded to newer aircraft like the F/A-18 and KC-130T, reserve rotary wing units are now flying a mishmash of helicopters that are even more obsolete than their active duty counterparts. Presently, in addition to the obsolete CH-46 Sea Knight, the Reserves also fly the RH-53 Sea Stallion (never on active duty in the Marine Corps) and AH- 1J Cobra (with no anti-tank capability). Plans call for all of these aircraft to be upgraded in the future. However, if we are to truly rely on the Reserves to reinforce the active duty Marine Corps, we must ensure these upgrades actually take place, and sooner rather than later. The remaining fixed-wing aircraft, the AV-8B Harrier, EA-6B Prowler, and F/A-18D Hornet (night attack variant) are ill-suited to the Reserves. These aircraft require either more frequent flying (AV-8B) or significant specialized operations (F/A-18D, EA-6B) to maintain proficiency in than Reserve pilots are capable of (11:45-87) It would therefore not be prudent to place any of these units in the Reserves. Lastly the remainder of the active duty Marine aircraft wings, the command and control, wing support and anti-air defense units are organized to provide functional support to a Marine aircraft wing of any size. Regardless of future reductions in size of the active duty wings, all of these organizations need to remain on active duty for the safe, effective operation of the wings. No reductions in these organizations should be considered. The preceding analysis dealt with the transfer of forces from the active duty force to the Reserves to reduce costs, but save capability. With an increased reliance on the Reserves, the Marine Corps also needs to consider other organizational changes to improve combat readiness. Specifically, transferring Reserve forces to active duty commands. To make the best use of its limited Reserve assets, and to achieve additional force structure reductions, the Marine Corps needs to incorporate the units of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing into the active duty wings. In most mobilization scenarios, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing units would be mobilized and serve in active duty air groups anyway. Assigning them to the active duty groups (or as Reserve groups in active duty wings) would be a logical progression in the move to a Total Force. Positive benefits of this change in command structure would be: 1. Streamlined command and staff functioning. 2. Decreased command structure, both active and Reserve. 3. Improved combat readiness through: a. The active duty unit commanding a Reserve unit would be responsible for the readiness of that unit. b. Increased inter-operability of active and Reserve units. c. Increased pride in Reserve units. If these changes cannot be accomplished, at a minimum the Marine Corps should establish habitual relationships between Reserve units and active duty groups and wings, similar to the long-standing relationships between Marine direct support artillery battalions and infantry regiments. Additionally, active duty wings should be assigned to MCCRES Reserve units who would be under their command upon mobilization. These two steps alone would have positive effects on combat readiness, for little to no cost. Operation DESERT STORM showed that the uneasiness of depending on the Reserves can be eliminated. If needed, they will be mobilized, and if mobilized, they will serve. It also showed that some Reserve units, due to their specialized nature perform better than other Reserve units. By exploiting the unique capabilities of Reserve aviation, along with an improved Reserve command structure, the Marine Corps can reduce force structure, both active and Reserve while maintaining combat capability. To reduce size and save money while maintaining combat capability, the Marine Corps should transfer more active duty aviation units to the Marine Corps Reserve, and incorporate Reserve units into the active duty wings. These changes will result in an overall better manned, trained and equipped Marine Corps, in sync with the Total Force Policy of the Department of Defense. * A review of MCCRES "Unit to Average" Reports for 1989-1991 shows Reserve aviation units scoring well above many similarly equipped active duty units. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. The Active and Reserve Components: Partners in the Total Army. Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army: 1989. 2. Adams, Gary L. (Col) and Crowson, Dwain L. (LTC). "The Army National Guard in a Changing Strategic Environment." Military Review, (October 1991), 35-44. 3. Beall, Jean Marine (Maj). "175th Hogs Outgun All Others For Title." National Guard, (January 1992), 14-18. 4. Blackwell, James, et al. The Gulf War: Military Lessons Learned. Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1991. 5. Cancian, Mark F. (LTC). "Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Southwest Asia." Marine Corps Gazette. (September 1991), 35-37. 6. Hoffman, F.G. (Maj). "Reversing Course on Total Force?" Marine Corps Gazette, (September 1991), 27-40. 7. Heller, Charles E. (Col). Total Army Cadre/Integration Study. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1991. 8. Killey, Phillip (MG). "Why is the Air Force the Leader in Total Force?" National Guard, (January 1992) 86-88. 9. "Lessons Learned from Desert Storm." National Guard, (January 1992), 40-44. 10. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1990: The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1991. 11. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Aviation Training and Readiness Manual, MCO P3500.14C. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1989. 12. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System, MCO P3501.1. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1991. 13. Vuono, Carl E. (Gen). "The 48th Brigade - A Chronology from Invasion to Demobilization." National Guard, (May 1991): 15 14. Wilson, Bennie J., III (Editor). The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985.
