Combining Naval Aviation's Helicopter Communities: The First Step CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Combining Naval Aviation's Helicopter Communities: The First Step Author: Lieutenant Commander A. R. MacConnell, United States Navy Thesis: In the current climate of declining military budgets, mandated personnel reductions, and shrinking resources, naval aviation can no longer afford the luxury of maintaining two separate and distinct infrastructures to support the HS and HSL MK III helicopter communities. This paper proposes combining these two communities, which will increase our carrier battle group warfighting capabilities, maintain current helicopter command opportunity, reduce overhead operating costs, and provide for more efficient use of our limited manpower assets. Discussion: The HS and HSL MK III communities have invested considerable effort to convince navy decision makers that because of their different missions and operating environments, they should remain two separate entities. The introduction of the technologically advanced SH-6OF aircraft negates most of these old arguments. A new squadron structure is proposed and scrutinized with potential improvements in operational flexibility, aircraft availability; and significant overhead cost savings in manpower, training, and logistics/maintenance, identified. The impact this new structure will have on the navy's helicopter community is reviewed and is followed by the summary which includes challenges for the future in implementing this controversial proposal. COMBINING NAVAL AVIATION'S HELICOPTER COMMUNITIES: THE FIRST STEP Outline In the current climate of declining military budgets, mandated personnel reductions, and shrinking resources, naval aviation can no longer afford the luxury of maintaining two separate and distinct infrastructures to support the HS and HSL MK III communities. This paper proposes combining these two communities, which will increase our carrier battle group warfighting capabilities, maintain current helicopter command opportunity, reduce overhead operating costs, and provide for more efficient use of our limited manpower assets. I. Combining the HS and HSL MK III communities II. Debunking the mission and environment myths A. Missions 1. Antisubmarine warfare 2. Antiship surveillance and targeting 3. Search and rescue, combat search and rescue B. Operating Environment 1. "Small boy" operations 2. Carrier operations III. Proposed new structure IV. Operational Impact A. Increased operational flexibility B. Increased aircraft availability C. Increased CVBG coordination and understanding V. Reduced overhead costs A. Manpower savings B. Training pipeline savings C. Logistics/maintenance savings VI. Community Impact VII. Future challenges COMBINING NAVAL AVIATION'S HELICOPTER COMMUNITIES: THE FIRST STEP In the current climate of declining military budgets, mandated personnel reductions, and shrinking resources, naval aviation can no longer afford the luxury of maintaining two separate and distinct infrastructures (administrative, command, training, and logistic) to support the Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron (HS) and Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron Light (HSL) communities. From FY 1990 through FY 1997 naval aviation is projected to see its number of aircraft carriers reduced from 15 to 12, its carrier air wings reduced from 13 to 11, and the number of fixed-wing, shore-based patrol squadrons (P-3) reduced from 24 to 18. The total number of personnel billets assigned to naval aviation will be reduced from approximately 164,000 to 141,500. (A total of 22,500 deleted billets, 2,500 officer and 20,000 enlisted). A prudent look to the future reveals a likely probability that these numbers will go down further.1 Throughout this draw down, VADM R. L. Dunleavy, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare), OP-05, has repeatedly asked for better, more innovative and efficient ways to accomplish the missions of naval aviation.2 This paper proposes combining the HS and HSL MK III helicopter communities which, I intend to show, will increase our carrier battle group (CVBG) warfighting capabilities, maintain current helicopter command opportunity, reduce overhead operating costs, and provide for more efficient use of our limited manpower assets. One bright spot for Naval Aviation during this draw down has been the introduction of the Sikorsky SH-60F helicopter as the HS mission replacement for the venerable SH-3H Sikorsky Sea King. With this introduction of the SH-60F the HS and HSL MK III communities have, for the first time, been equipped with essentially the same airframe. Because of the similarities of airframes and assigned missions, it only makes sense to investigate whether it would be advantageous to combine these two communities. CAPT George Galdorisi, in his Fall '91 Rotor Review article "Strike Force Air Power For The Twenty-First Century", calls for a new squadron structure to incorporate the missions of HS, HSL, and HC (Helicopter Combat Vertical Replenishment Squadron) communities.3 Since my personal experience is limited to the HS and HSL MK III communities, I feel unqualified to discuss the issues involved in incorporating the HC community into his proposed squadron. However, I submit that combining HS and HSL MK III squadrons is the most logical first step given the missions assigned: Inner/Outer Zone ASW, ASST, SAR, and Strike Rescue. His proposal to include the HC community into this combined structure should be deferred until resolution of what the follow-on aircraft to the HC mission CH-46D helicopter will be. Debunking the Mission/Environment Myths The idea of combining these two antisubmarine warfare communities usually elicits cries of horror and dismay from both sides of the aisle, followed by mutual denouncement of the messenger as being disloyal, (bordering on traitorous) to his assigned community. The reason for this sometimes less than rational reaction is the assumption that any combining of communities will naturally result in decreased number of fiefdoms, meaning fewer command opportunities. Having functioned for years as a neglected "second class" partner within Naval Aviation (with jet and prop communities being the "first class" partners), the U.S. Navy helicopter community has jealously guarded against any encroachment on its perceived "niche" in Naval Aviation. Historically, both the HS and HSL communities have lived in fear of being "swallowed up" by the other. Both communities invested considerable time and effort in protecting their independent "rice bowls" by establishing themselves as having unique missions and different operating environments. For example, the HS community performs the "inner zone" ASW mission using primarily active/passive dipping sonar while the HSL community performs "outer zone" ASW using primarily passive sonobuoys in conjunction with a surface combatant's acoustic tail. HS operates off a carrier (CV) conducting planeguard (SAR), logistic, and Strike Rescue (CSAR) missions in addition to its inner zone role. HSL operates off frigates, destroyers, and cruisers ("small boy" decks) which require more refined aviation skills to successfully operate in the small deck environment. Both communities would have one believe that the training required to successfully accomplish these missions is so specialized, given the distinct operating environments, as to make it impossible to contemplate combining them. Having spent my formative years in the HS community (HS-1, and HS-9, from April 1979 through July 1982), and my developmental years in the HSL MK III community (HSL-41, HSL-40, and HSL-44, from August 1982 through April 1989), I believe these views are no longer valid in this era of restricted budgets, limited resources, and the advent of a common H-60 airframe to conduct both the HS and HSL MK III missions. Why? Simply put, the technological advances of the H-60 aircraft have voided all the old arguments for keeping the communities apart, especially with the decision to retrofit the SH-60B with a dipping sonar. Let us investigate the arguments from two areas, missions and operating environment. Missions Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW). HS has always claimed preeminence in conducting inner zone ASW while HSL has claimed preeminence in conducting outer zone ASW. It may be submitted that the late 1950's/early 1960's technological limitations of both the H-2 (HSL MK I aircraft) and H-3 caused this unnatural division of the battle group ASW zone. I have always believed that ASW is ASW, whether conducted in the inner or outer zone, or using passive or active sensors. Though this may be a rather simplistic view, on an elementary level, ASW simply involves locating, tracking and ultimately neutralizing hostile submarines. All the techniques involved to accomplish this mission, including the use of both passive and active sensors, are part of the repertoire of all U.S. Navy ASW trained personnel. Therefore, proper application and execution of ASW doctrine in the inner or outer zone is of no geographic consequence. The specific choice to use passive or active sensors is usually a function of the battle group commander's inclination toward the underwater threat, and is reflected in his emission control (EMCON) posture. HS was given the conduct of inner zone defense simply because the H-3 does not have the range, speed, nor navigational equipment to allow it to operate much further than 50-75 miles from the carrier. The H-3 was equipped with a dipping sonar because it was large enough and stable enough to carry the additional weight and successfully employ it in almost all meteorological conditions. HSL was similarly bequeathed the outer zone guardian because that is where their helicopters were located - on "smallboys" in screen posi- tions at a considerable distance (by helicopter standards) from the carrier. The H-2 was equipped with sonobuoys because it had neither the size nor aircraft stability to even marginally employ a dipping sonar. Because the SH-60B was designed to augment the HSL MK I capability, it too was only equipped with sonobuoys as its primary ASW sensor. With the acknowledged change in the ASW threat requiring enhanced active sensor capability to locate and destroy a new generation of markedly quieter submarines, not to mention the growing potential menace of third-world diesel boats, both the SH-60B and SH-60F are programmed to have dipping sonar capability. The SH-60F not only has significantly greater sonobuoy processing capability than the SH-3H, it has the speed, endurance and navigational systems which will allow it to operate at a much greater range from the carrier. With the use of airframes that possess very similar ASW prosecution systems and on station capabilities, where does one now draw the line on which community should conduct inner or outer zone ASW? It is my contention that there really isn't a difference and both communities will be able to conduct ASW equally as well in either the inner or outer zone. Antiship Surveillance and Targeting (ASST). The H-2 provided HSL MK I ships a limited ASST capability with their LN-66 radar. The SH-60B has greatly multiplied the ASST capabilities of the surface fleet with its AN/APS-124 radar and AN/ARQ-45 data link system. This increased capability has resulted in HSL MK III having dual primary missions of ASW and ASST. So far, the SH-60B is uniquely capable to conduct the ASST mission, and I concede this as a point to the HSL MK III community in its argument to remain separate from HS. However, learning how to conduct the ASST mission takes a minimum number of training days/events to ensure proficiency, and can easily be included into a combined Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) syllabus - even for first tour aviators. Search and Rescue (SAR) and Combat SAR (CSAR). These missions have always received greater emphasis in the HS community and the H-3 was better than the H-2 in accomplishing these missions. However, with the advent of the common airframe, neither community has aircraft preeminence. With appropriate FRS and squadron level emphasis and training, both communities can successfully accomplish this mission and the battle group commander will have at least double the normal rescue assets when he sails into harm's way. Operating Environment HSL operates off "smallboys". HSL has always claimed that it was harder to fly on and off a "smallboy" than a carrier, thus they needed (and had) better pilots. While this ma have had some validity with the H-2 airframe, (I do not subscribe to this theory), it is definitely not applicable in the H-60 airframe. Of the 100-150 helicopter pilots who transitioned to HSL MK III from the HC, HS, HM and USMC helicopter communities, none were prevented from pursuing an HSL MK III career because he could not operate the SH-60B on and off the "smallboys". HS operates off carriers. The HS community asserts that operating in a carrier environment takes additional training and expertise. HSL pilots, in general, have never felt comfortable operating in CV airspace. I believe this phenomena is simply a function of familiarity with established procedures and can easily be over come with very few days operating on/off the CV. Therefore, in today's CVBG flying environment, all H-60 pilots are capable of, and should be proficient in, operating, day and night, off any aviation capable ship in the U.S. Navy inventory. What Should The New Structure Look Like? I believe the common H-60 airframe, similarity of assigned missions, and ability of any naval helicopter pilot to operate the H-60 off any aviation capable ship, demands that we combine the HS and HSL MK III communities. This combined squadron structure will decrease our overhead operating costs and increase our operational impact in support of naval aviation's mission. The most difficult question is: How should we do it? The key to combining the HS and HSL MK III communities is realizing that they are all carrier battle group assets and as such, should be part of the carrier air wing (CVW). HSL, since its inception, has considered itself a separate entity and has operated independently from CVW control or direction. Because HSL has been largely neglected by the carrier air wing, battle groups have never made optimum use of all assigned aviation assets. A combined squadron structure will ensure maximum use of limited assets, and the CVBG will achieve a synergistic affect when employing its helicopters. This new squadron structure should be equipped with eight or nine aircraft; three SH-60F's, one HH-60H, and four or five SH-60B's. Two of these squadrons should be attached to each carrier air wing. This will allow us to maintain the standard CV complement of six SH-60F's and two HH-60H's while supporting 4 to 5 one-plane and 2 two-plane detachments in the battle group. This recommendation will probably cause heart palpitations throughout the fleet, especially from our fixed-wing brethren. The most obvious problem with this recommendation is where do we put an extra squadron on the CV? There are precedents set for having two squadrons of the same type aircraft operate off the same carrier. The CV's attack and fighter squadrons currently operate with two squadrons per carrier. It is a given that the CV is a very crowded ship, and extra space for another squadron infrastructure is severely limited. However, the total number of extra personnel assigned to the carrier would be minimal and the details of allocating work spaces, admin spaces, and squadron ready rooms could be worked out once it is realized that the ships we would support with detachments already have designated spaces for personnel, maintenance, and parts/logistic support. Having briefly describing how the new HS_ structure should be integrated into a carrier battle group, let me move on to the two areas where I think naval aviation can benefit from combining the HS and HSL MK III communities; increased operational flexibility and reduced overhead costs. Operational Impact By combining the HS and HSL squadrons into one entity, and placing two squadrons on a CV, the battle group commander will have, for the first time, a real Helicopter Element Coordinator (HEC) embarked. The HSL community has lived and operated for years without the benefit of anyone on the CVBG staff who really knows how to employ them. Historically, HSL Detachments have been tasked by Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) staffs and individual ship commanding officers (CO's). Conversely, HS squadrons have been tasked by the CV and carrier air wing commander (CAG). While this has not resulted in any serious degradation of overall battle group capabilities, it has not resulted in getting the maximum benefit from operating these two airframes in a coordinated/mutually supporting fashion. By having squadron commanders, on the CV, who really know the environment, capabilities, limitations, and personnel involved, real operational benefits will accrue. Increased flexibility. By knowing all the detachment officers-in-charge and ship commanding officers, the HS_ squadron commanders will find it much easier to re-configure the CVBG's ship/helicopter loading for specific mission tasking. CSAR aircraft (HH-60H) can be quickly forward deployed aboard picket ships in support of CV strike missions. SH-60F's can be swapped out for SH-60B's for active sonar sweeps of choke points, far ahead of battle group passage. Multiple combinations of H's, F's, and B's can be detached aboard two-aircraft configured "smallboys" depending on the mission. With enough "smallboy" decks, you could temporarily move the majority of your helicopters off the CV for flex-deck combat operations. The possibilities are limited only by the imagination of the HS_ squadron CO's. The greatest benefit to the CVBG, will be having the right helicopter assets at the right place, operating together to accomplish the assigned mission. Increased availability. The operational availability of the SH-60B, SH-60F, and HH-60H has surpassed all expectations. The aircraft seem to keep flying, no matter how many flight hours we put on them. While we have no reason to believe this will change, we could do even better if all the CVBG aircraft maintenance was being controlled in a central location. For example, detachment aircraft major phase inspections could be scheduled for completion aboard the CV, with a replacement aircraft transferred to the smallboy for continued operations. This type of coordination will ensure having aircraft available for all contingencies. Increased Battle Group Coordination/Understanding. It has been my experience that personnel operating from carriers have very limited knowledge of what the "smallboys" are doing, and vice-versa. By having carrier aviators operating off "smallboys", and "smallboy" aviators operating off carriers, we will increase our fleet wide knowledge of our overall capabilities and limitations. These cross-pollinated aviators would become conduits for developing better procedures, tactics, and operational plans. Reduced Overhead Costs As shown in figure (1), substantial manpower savings can be realized by combining the HS and HSL MK III communities. While the numbers are not exact, and manpower specialists will surely contest the computations used to derive the proposed structure, the potential to reduce 149 officer and 1,056 enlisted billets warrants further study. Additional billet savings would be realized by combining the east coast HS and HSL wings, (COMHSWING ONE and COMSEACONWING THREE) and the separate HS and HSL MK III Click here to view image staff positions throughout COMNAVAIRLANT, COMNAVAIRPAC, COMNAVAIRSYSCOM, and CNO. The two most alluring aspects of figure (1) are the ability to maintain the same operational capability, and maintain the current number of helicopter command opportunities. It must be noted that this increase of command opportunity will remain only so long as naval aviation can hold on to 11 carrier airwings (CVW). With each CVW reduction, two squadrons would be lost. However, the capability to continue deploying the same number of detachments (80) could be maintained by transferring the detachment billets to the remaining HS_ squadrons. This gives the navy increased flexibility even while our numbers continue to decrease. The current training pipeline, with four fleet replacement squadrons (FRS), one on each coast for each community, can easily be reduced. While there will not be a complete two squadrons worth of savings in personnel, aircraft, and equipment, the savings would be substantial. Combining the FRS squadrons on the west coast would be much easier than on the east coast because they are collocated at NAS North Island. The east coast FRS's are located at NAS Mayport (HSL) and NAS Jacksonville (HS). Combining them would cause an initial out lay of funds to move trainers and equipment, however, long term savings would eventually cover the initial costs. Adjustments would have to be made to the different syllabi to include training in the different models of aircraft, and in operating the different sensor systems. However, the commonality of aircraft and systems will not make this as daunting a proposition as it seems. Included in the combining of the FRS's would be the combining of the four separate fleet replacement aviation maintenance personnel (FRAMP) departments. This will result in additional savings in instructors, training devices and buildings required to conduct training. Additionally, with a potential reduction of 1,056 enlisted billets, further savings will be realized with decreased recruitment and entry level training requirements. As seen in the command structure and training pipeline, HS and HSL MK III require two separate infrastructures. This holds true for logistic and maintenance (L&M) support. All higher staffs must provide separate offices and personnel to provide the required L&M support. While a total savings of one-half would not be realized, many of the functional lobs could easily be handled by one person. Additionally, by placing the parts and repairable items in the same location or repair pipeline, significant economies of scale would result. During deployments these savings could be magnified. HSL packup kits (PUK's) and carrier aviation consolidated allowance list (AVCAL) could be loaded to support all the H-60 airframes embarked. This would result in better parts availability, thus aircraft availability, battle group wide. Finally, all the H-60's would be supported by the CV AIMD, this again would result in better aircraft availability. Community Impact What affect will this new command structure have on the HS and HSL MK III helicopter communities? First and foremost, it will place twice as many of our CO's on board the carrier. This will result in increased opportunity for helicopter pilots to command CV's, and ultimately aspire to CVBG command. Throughout the years, helicopter pilots have been told we must get more CO's on board the CV if we ever hope to compete with our TACAIR brethren. This plan will allow us that opportunity. In the area of command opportunity, this plan will ensure we maintain at least two CO positions per carrier air wing. With the decreasing budget, we have no way of knowing how few the number of carrier air wings will be, but at least we will retain our "fair share". And last, but not least, we'll continue to produce naval officers who understand more about how the navy operates than other communities. Naval helicopter pilots like to think they have a firm grasp on the entire spectrum of carrier battle group ops. For those pilots who have not operated in the other community's environment, I submit that you do not know how one-half of the U.S. Navy surface fleet operates. By giving our young pi lots, aircrewmen, and maintenance personnel the opportunity to operate in both environments, we will produce uniquely trained assets for the U.S. Navy. Future Challenges The length of this paper precludes addressing all the issues involved in such a controversial proposal. I have attempted to provide some answers to a few of the questions. At the very least, I hope to have offered a point of departure as to how the helicopter community can assist naval aviation in the efficient accomplishment of its mission. It is imperative that questions such as these get asked, and even more important that solutions be proposed. For sooner or later the economics of the military draw down will force naval aviation into unwelcome and drastic changes, unless we have a better plan. If the HS and HSL MK III communities want to have a say as to what their future structure should be, then contentious issues such as these must be confronted openly and honestly. Parochialism must be left at the door. To actually combine these two communities will take a lot of hard work, and many more answers to questions that have not been posed. For example, I have not addressed the problem of supporting all the HSL MK III ancillary deployments, ie: UNITAS, NORTHERN WEDDING, etc. After doing all the numerical analysis, it may be found that one or two HSL squadrons will have to be maintained in order to meet these additional commitments. I have purposely not addressed how the surface fleet would react to this proposal, as the surface warriors have long been strong proponents for the HSL community and tend to view them as "their" airwing. Though I believe this new structure would be even more responsive to their operations, they will have to be convinced the new structure is in their best interests. Some of the answers I have proposed may be "pipe dreams". Convincing our carrier brethren to make roomon the CV for two helicopter squadrons may be a non-starter. Combining FRS's and the two syllabi may prove to be too complicated. Removing mid-level command structures may prove politically unassailable. However, even considering all the problems involved, I feel that the potential benefits of combining the two communities outweigh the disadvantages, especially in the area of increased operational flexibility and effectiveness. And finally, this new HS_ structure will allow the U.S. Navy helicopter community to continue providing superior support to the fleet well into the 21st century.
