Remain Behind Equipment - A Dilemma In The Rear Of Prepo Ops CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Operations EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Remain Behind Equipment - A Dilemma in the Rear of Prepo Ops Author: Major M. E. Kampsen, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The recent execution of MPF operations in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS) identified Marine Corps-wide deficiencies in the management of Remain Behind Equipment (RBE). To ensure these vital equipment resources are available to satisfy force sustainment requirements in the future, RBE policies and procedures must be modified, supporting computer systems refined, and training expanded. Background: Operations involving forces flying-in to marry-up with prepositioned equipment and supplies (prepo ops) can be expected to play an increasingly critical role in the nation's power projection capabilities. DS/DS provided the Marine Corps a myriad of lessons which must be assimilated into future policy and doctrine. One of the major logistic shortfalls experienced during the execution of MPF operations in support of DS/DS was the management of the equipment and supplies left behind when forces deployed to marry-up with prepositioned assets overseas. Throughout the DS/DS operational period, the amount and condition of RBE within the Marine Corps could not be determined with any degree of accuracy. Much of the equipment was in poor maintenance condition, and efforts to improve both the accountability and maintenance of RBE were hampered by a number of problems. Had RBE been needed quickly to fill sustainment shortfalls, much of it would not have been combat ready. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should reevaluate RBE policies and procedures at both the service and local levels, modify computer systems to better support RBE management, and include RBE management as an integral part of training for prepo ops. REMAIN BEHIND EQUIPMENT - A DILEMMA IN THE REAR OF PREPO OPS OUTLINE Thesis statement: The recent execution of MPF operations in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm identified Marine Corps-wide deficiencies in the management of Remain Behind Equipment (RBE). To ensure these vital equipment resources are available to satisfy force sustainment requirements in the future, RBE policies and procedures must be modified, supporting computer systems refined, and training expanded. I. RBE Background Information A. Definition B. Policy overview II. Management Problems During Desert Shield/Desert Storm A. Degradation During Force Deployment Phase B. Difficulties Subsequent to Deployment C. Hesitancy in Reporting Assets III. Impact of Poor RBE Management on Force Sustainment IV. Underlying Causes of RBE Management Problems A. Compressed Deadlines B. Training Shortfalls 1. Lack of Confidence in MPF Support 2. Rear Echelon RBE Organization and Management C. Inadequate Guidance l. Service-level Policy 2. Local Procedures D. Recurring Equipment Requirements Inhibiting Reporting V. Recommended Actions to Improve Future RBE Management A. Revise Service-level Policy 1. Reporting vs. "Controlling" RBE 2. Establishing Time Limits for Reporting 3. Limiting Force-internal Use of RBE 4. Establishing Criteria for Transfer of RBE Control a. Request from Force Commander b. Recommendation of Independent Analysis Team c. Objective Measures d. Recommendation of COMMARCORLOGBASES 5. Redefining the Roles of Base and Station Activities and the Reserves B. Expand RBE Policy Information into Commonly Referenced Publications C. Publish Detailed Procedural Guidance in Local SOP's D. Include RBE Management in Training Exercises E. Implement Computer System Changes to Assist RBE Management REMAIN BEHIND EQUIPMENT - A DILEMMA IN THE REAR OF PREPO OPS In recent times both the national and military leadership have increasingly come to regard operations involving the use of prepositioned equipment and supplies (prepo ops) as one of the cornerstones of the nation's ability to project power. One need look no further than the President's 1991 report, National Security Strategy of the United States, to verify that the nation's future power projection capabilities will rely less upon forward deployed forces and more upon prepositioned equipment and supplies. In laying out the defense agenda for the 1990's, the President repeatedly addressed equipment prepositioning as a means with which the nation will maintain forward presence and enhance its crisis response capabilities. (17:27-29) In the future, operations involving U.S.-based forces flying overseas to marry-up with equipment prepositioned near a crisis area may well be the norm. The Marine Corps is well-suited to assume a major role in prepo ops. The Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade (NALM) program provides a rapid response capability to the European theater, and the maritime prepositioning force (MPF) program offers employment flexibility and a degree of mobility which cannot be matched by land-based prepositioning. This flexibility was validated during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (DS/DS) as MPF operations provided the theater commander with early combat power ashore. But while significant resources and efforts have been directed toward refining prepo ops during peacetime, the experiences of wartime employment demonstrated that there is still much to learn. DS/DS have provided the Marine Corps a myriad of issues associated with prepo ops. Most of the attention has been directed toward the forward employment aspects of prepo ops. However, one of the most significant logistic problems experienced during the execution of DS/DS prepo ops occurred back within the rear elements. A major shortfall in executing MPF operations was the management of the equipment and supplies left behind when forces deployed to marry-up with prepositioned assets overseas. Remain Behind Equipment (RBE) is defined as "any Fleet Marine Force organic equipment, regardless of class of supply, that remains behind when a force deploys to marry-up with prepositioned equipment." (20:par 13000) Current policy contained in MCO P4400.39F, War Reserve Materiel Policy Manual, assigns the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant)/Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) commanders the responsibility for the identification, accountability, control, and reporting of RBE. It further requires that they publish standard operating procedures (SOP's) for handling RBE. When notified that a prepo op is to be executed, the Force commander wishing to use RBE to satisfy equipment deficiencies within his organization is required to request such authority from Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (HQMC). If approved (silence is consent on such requests), the Force commander may use RBE to satisfy internal Table of Equipment (T/E) deficiencies, provide for augmenting/reinforcing reserve force requirements, fill shortfalls in the 60-day prepositioned war reserve (PWR) requirement for deploying forces, or improve readiness by using RBE to replace maintenance-degraded equipment. The equipment pool remaining after all redistributions are completed is considered excess. Controlled items (principal end items (PEI's) such as trucks and tanks and depot-level secondary repairables) must be reported to the Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases (COMMARCORLOGBASES) for disposition and centralized management. Noncontrolled items such as tool kits and tentage are turned into the local intermediate supply activity. Whenever practical, and particularly in the case of detachments of nondeploying parent units, accountability and custody should be passed to parent commands or higher headquarters as determined by the Force commander. In cases where an entire Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) deploys, supporting base and air station commanders must be prepared to assume RBE custody and reporting responsibilities. The preceding summary illustrates the simplicity and straightforwardness of RBE management policy. However, this policy had never been put to the test prior to DS/DS. When finally tested, both the policy and the manner in which it was executed were found to be lacking. The result was a breakdown in the control, maintenance, and accountability of large amounts of equipment and supplies. The discussion which follows focuses on the issues associated with controlling and managing principal end items of RBE equipment. However, much of what follows is applicable to noncontrolled equipment and supplies as well. The problems experienced during DS/DS began shortly after receipt of the first deployment order. Organic equipment that was to be left behind by deploying forces was not carefully collected, screened, and transferred to another agency for accountability and control, but instead became a source from which to pull extra, unplanned equipment and parts to accompany the deploying forces. Units unsure about the quantity and condition of MPF equipment hedged their bets by padding their fly-in echelon with extra assets. In the hurry and confusion of deployment, these additions were often made without adjusting property records, thereby invalidating accounting records for equipment remaining behind. Cannibalization of equipment was commonplace as units stripped essential parts and components from equipment remaining behind in order to include extra parts in the fly-in echelon. Instead of an orderly turnover of RBE, equipment was often abandoned by departing forces. Accountability records were inaccurate, and much of the equipment required major maintenance in order to return it to serviceable condition. (5:5-7, 6:par 1e, 16) Deficiencies in equipment management practices persisted long after MPF force deployment had concluded. Continuity of effort was difficult to maintain as additional forces were deployed. Efforts focused upon deploying the follow-on forces and responding to support requests from forces already in theater. RBE concerns had difficulty competing for attention and resources against such priorities. Confusion over organizational and procedural issues relative to RBE management further frustrated attempts to regain control over RBE. Rear area organization was in a constant state of flux, and procedural guidance relative to the management of RBE had not been preestablished. As time went on, the rear element continued to diminish in size and capability. More and moire of the expertise necessary to account for and maintain RBE migrated to Southwest Asia (SWA). There were simply not enough people and expertise left in the FMF rear echelons to accomplish RBE management responsibilities without outside assistance. Those initial efforts which were made to establish RBE management accounts were frustrated by supply accounting and maintenance systems which did not support the alternative logistical management structure necessitated by the new situation. (5:8-9, 6:par 1c-1f, 16) In spite of the management problems noted above, there was great reluctance to seek outside assistance or to report excess RBE assets to the COMMARCORLOGBASES for disposition instructions and centralized service-level management. Except for some reserve forces and the local Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Offices (FSMAO's), units outside the force organization were never formally requested by either Force commander to provide assistance. (5:12, 22:par 4b) Base and station activities tasked by policy to assist the Force commander were never tasked. Had they been, their assistance would have been limited because they were fully employed managing the requirements associated with the influx of reserve personnel reporting to their stations of initial assignment. Force commanders, faced with a fluid, ever-changing situation, continued to be confronted with new equipment requirements. Excess RBE stocks became a ready source of equipment to satisfy new requirements as they emerged. This constant "dipping" into RBE assets made accounting and control more difficult as numbers and types of equipment constantly changed. In spite of policy which required that Force commanders request disposition instructions for controlled items from the COMMARCORLOGBASES, no RBE status posture was reported by either Force commander until February of 1991. At that time, FMFLant reported numbers and types of RBE onhand to the COMMARCORLOGBASES. FMFPac, the force which was first to deploy, never did report its RBE for centralized accounting and disposition. (4:par 1a, 5:3) Throughout the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operational period, the amount and condition of RBE within the Marine Corps could not be determined with any degree of accuracy. Much of the equipment was in poor maintenance condition, and efforts to improve both the accountability and maintenance of RBE were hampered by a myriad of problems which could not be overcome to the degree necessary to ensure that RBE was effectively cared for and managed. There is a temptation to discount the problems associated with RBE management as a "cost of doing business" in real-world contingencies. After all, the priority must be rapid deployment of combat forces. RBE assets left behind aren't needed until the forces return. They can be dealt with later when the contingency is over and the forces return. Wrong! There is, in fact, a real cost associated with inefficient RBE management. And the cost of indifference toward RBE management is eventually borne by the deployed combat forces themselves in the form of sustainment deficiencies. While the PWR program's goal is to provide the first 60 days of supply and equipment sustainment to Marine combat forces, fiscal limitations often prohibit acquisition of the full 60 days of sustainment. For many items, PWR levels are actually well below 60 days of supply. (22:par 3) In most cases, neither the reserve equipment on- hand in other Department of Defense logistics agencies nor the industrial war production surge capabilities of the nation could provide assets quickly enough to fill these sustainment gaps. RBE is the logical source to satisfy equipment sustainment deficiencies. But had the need arisen during DS/DS, much of the Marine Corps' RBE would not have been ready to go. COMMARCORLOGBASES, the service-wide source of supply for principal end items of ground equipment, lacked visibility and control over RBE assets in the hands of the Force commanders. To shore up limited quantities of serviceable PWR, COMMARCORLOGBASES directed depot maintenance efforts toward upgrading unserviceable equipment items on-hand in the depots. The comparative efficiency of directing maintenance resources toward equipment requiring extensive maintenance as opposed to concentrating it on the relatively better-conditioned RBE in the possession of the Force commanders was expectedly low. Less efficiency translated into less available sustainment support. From the preceding discussion two points should be clear. First, the Marine Corps experienced significant problems during DS/DS managing RBE. Second, these problems can directly impact the combat capability and sustainability of Marine forces. Before suggesting potential solutions, a closer analysis of the causes behind the RBE management problems is warranted. Why, for example, did deploying units discard peacetime equipment management practices, lose accountability over organic assets, and destructively cannibalize equipment? The answer is based upon two mutually reinforcing factors. First, compressed timelines associated with meeting deployment deadlines created confusion and fostered a willingness to circumvent paperwork and procedures in the name of operational necessity. An attitude of "take what you need and go" became prevalent. Second, a general lack of confidence in the capability of the MPF assets to support brigade operations caused personnel to "beef up" the brigade's fly-in echelon with additional equipment and parts/components stripped from RBE. Availability of assets deemed essential by various brigade personnel was guaranteed by pulling them from remain behind assets and bringing them with the force. (5:5, 15:par 2b(4), 16) The actions of the deploying forces, and the lack of organization and direction of remaining rear elements relative to RBE management, indicate that shortfalls existed in training for prepo ops. Confidence in MPF support capabilities was not as high as it should have been. In addition, the concepts and policies associated with rear echelon RBE consolidation, management, and disposition had not been realistically exercised. As a result, there was limited familiarization with MPF capabilities and the problems associated with RBE management. Shortfalls in practical experience and training were not compensated for by clear, unambiguous policy and detailed procedural guidance. The limited amounts of policy and guidance that were available were located in obscure orders and manuals which were not used by most to manage normal day-to-day peacetime operations. Most logistics personnel ultimately tasked with RBE management were not familiar with the contents of these relatively obscure directives. (5:6) At the service level, policy left fair too many important details open to different interpretations. For example, the policy failed to set specific timeframes within which the Force commander would be expected to complete internal redistribution actions and report excesses to COMMARCORLOGBASES. As a result, Force-directed redistribution actions continued throughout the operations. Further, the policy skirted the issue of when a Force commander must give up direct control of Force-held RBE and request disposition from COMMARCORLOGBASES. At the Force-level and below, little or no detailed procedural guidance had been published prior to DS/DS. No SOP's for RBE management had been published by FMFPac. (15:par 2b(1)) Within FMFLant, RBE guidance was minimal and too broadly written to provide the basis for an adequate program. (7:par 2a) The lack of detailed local procedures relative to the management of RBE meant that every detail had to be worked out through trial and error, a slow and inefficient process. Although the factors noted above help explain RBE management problems, they do not explain why the Force commanders chose to retain accountability and control over RBE and not report excesses to COMMARCORLOGBASES for disposition. The COMMARCORLOGBASES did in fact make an active effort to assume management and control functions. (2:par 2, 3:par 3) Despite offers of assistance and the known internal RBE management difficulties, Force commanders doggedly retained control of their RBE through the end of DS/DS. Force commanders retained control over RBE because it provided them with an internal stockpile of equipment which could be used to respond to new requirements that developed throughout DS/DS. Not all RBE was unserviceable, and usable assets were always in demand. Force commanders were understandably hesitant to give up assets which had not only helped equip deploying organic forces, but also reserve augmentee units who arrived lacking essential equipment and, in the case of FMFPac, residual forces who were redesignated as V MEF and assigned a contingency response mission. In addition, RBE was used by the Force commanders to satisfy requests for additional equipment from their deployed forces. Such requests for principal end items should have been referred to COMMARCORLOGBASES, the designated source of supply. However, command loyalty to committed forces often caused such requests to be satisfied from available Force-held RBE. (5:5) The constant demands for equipment, the perceived need to maintain some residual force capability, and the tasking of new contingency missions reinforced the belief that on hand RBE would be required at some point in the future. It followed, therefore, that control of such assets should not be passed to the COMMARCORLOGBASES. Given the RBE management deficiencies, their potential impact, and their underlying causes, what actions should be taken to improve RBE management? With the myriad of problems and causes, no single action alone can be expected to resolve the RBE dilemma. Instead, a combination of actions designed to attack the underlying causes is required to improve future RBE management. The first step to improving RBE management is to conduct a thorough and critical review of current service-level policy. DS/DS provided this policy its first real-world test, and the lessons learned must be incorporated into revised policy. This policy should provide unambiguous guidance to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the commands responsible for RBE management. During policy review, several issues should be expanded or revisited. One such issue is the differentiation between "reporting" and "controlling" RBE. Since the two are intimately tied together in current policy, there was a hesitancy during DS/DS to report the amounts and condition of RBE on hand for fear that control of these assets would be compromised. In fact, "reporting" and "controlling" are two separate functions. One does not necessarily lead to the other, and this point should be emphasized in policy. RBE reporting by Force commanders provides COMMARCORLOGBASES the total asset visibility picture needed to properly manage service-wide resources. In most cases, COMMARCORLOGBASES would not need to assume direct control over these assets as long as they were properly maintained by the Forces themselves. In addressing the RBE reporting function, it may be beneficial for policy to establish specific time limits within which the Force commander must complete internal redistribution of RBE and report excess assets to COMMARCORLOGBASES. Current policy's omission of specific timeframes for reporting RBE left reporting requirements open to wide interpretation, and contributed to the general breakdown in RBE reporting. Including a specific deadline such as 15 or 30 days after deployment notification would provide a readily identifiable target date for both the Force commander and COMMARCORLOGBASES. Additionally, the wide latitude provided the Force commander in using RBE to satisfy shortfalls across the entire Force should be reexamined. The purpose behind centralizing the management of RBE PEI's under the cognizance of COMMARCORLOGBASES is to ensure they can be directed to the most critical service-wide requirements. Current policy allows one Force commander who may only be deploying a single MPF brigade to use the RBE so generated to improve the readiness of nondeploying organic units. The second Force commander, who may be deploying in whole, lacks the opportunity to use these assets to satisfy critical deficiencies within his deploying units. In essence, he is "fenced out" by current policy and must wait for "leftovers" from the first Force commander. While personal intervention might prevent such a scenario from occurring, current policy does not. Limiting redistribution actions only to those forces earmarked for deployment would ensure that RBE assets which may become critical to the service as a whole remain visible and uncommitted. Turning to the function of transferring RBE control, policy needs to specify the conditions under which control must be passed. Specific conditions or events which would trigger the transfer of RBE control functions must be established and clearly stated in policy. Whatever the triggers, HQMC, as the common higher headquarters, should direct the process and not depend solely on policy interpretations. There are a number of different potential triggering mechanisms which could be used to initiate transfer of RBE control responsibilities. In fact, several different mechanisms might be required to cover the variety of potential situations. The simplest triggering mechanism, one which already exists in present policy, is a request from the Force commander. This triggering point would be reached when the Force commander determines that the extent of deployment is such that he is unable to adequately discharge RBE management functions with remaining personnel. Upon such notification, COMMARCORLOGBASES could initiate actions necessary to assume management control over Force-held RBE. While such a triggering mechanism is simple and straightforward, the experiences of DS/DS indicate that this trigger alone is not sufficient to ensure the timely and efficient turnover of RBE. The point at which RBE management is inadequate is rather subjective, and such a trigger does not consider whether or not critical needs exist elsewhere in the Marine Corps for selected equipment assets contained within the Force-held RBE. Despite these limitations, a trigger controlled by the Force commander is necessary to provide a means for him to seek relief Force commander is necessary to provide a means for him to seek relief when internal resources are insufficient to control RBE. Independent analysis of RBE management by Force-external agencies could also be introduced as a transfer triggering mechanism. A neutral third party such as the local Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office or the Inspector General of the Marine Corps could be tasked to periodically evaluate the capabilities of residual elements of the Force to continue managing RBE. Based upon recommendations received, HQMC could determine if and when transfer of RBE control should occur. Like the previous trigger, this method is based moire upon the effectiveness of RBE management within the Forces and less upon the need to centralize management in order to efficiently direct assets to critical service-wide requirements. However, it does address the subjective nature of evaluating the effectiveness of RBE management by providing a neutral team of analysts to determine whether continued management by the Force is viable. A third potential triggering mechanism is the designation of one or more objective measures which, when met or exceeded, would dictate the transfer of RBE control. For example, transfer might be required whenever 50% or more of a MEF is either deployed or earmarked for deployment. Such a trigger provides a readily identifiable point at which RBE transfer must occur, but carries the weakness of not considering the situationally-dependent need for such a transfer. Whatever triggering mechanism might be necessary to ensure that RBE is properly cared for, it must be combined with some mechanism which will take into account the criticality of specific RBE items in satisfying Marine Corps-wide shortfalls. More likely than not, such a COMMARCORLOGBASES to assume control of all or a portion of Force-held RBE. The responsibility for the centralized management of PEI's within the Marine Corps is assigned to COMMARCORLOGBASES. (19) When actual control of Force-held RBE is necessary to effectively discharge this responsibility, such authority must be clearly provided in policy. Control of RBE need not be an "all or nothing" proposition. COMMARCORLOGBASES could assume control over selected equipment items based upon their service-wide asset and requirements postures. Additionally, assets need not be physically moved from the Force commander's home base in order for control to be assumed by COMMARCORLOGBASES. It may be easier to maintain most equipment at its original base and simply establish a remote storage activity at that site. Whatever methods of control are chosen, COMMARCORLOGBASES must be able to effectively discharge his duties as centralized manager of PEI's within the Marine Corps. Conversely, the methods chosen must consider the ultimate return of deployed units to home bases and ensure that assets required to reconstitute unit capabilities are available to the maximum extent possible. Whatever the triggering mechanisms ultimately decided upon, the specifics of how COMMARCORLOGBASES would assume control of RBE should be coordinated between the Force commanders and COMMARCORLOGBASES and spelled out in the SOP's of all concerned. Service policy should not dictate such procedures, but should require that they be documented. The options presented to this point are predicated upon COMMARCORLOGBASES assuming control of RBE directly from the Force commander. While this need not be the case, direct assumption of control is simplest and most efficient because it avoids repeated transfers of equipment accountability and responsibility. This does not imply, however, that supporting base and station activities as well as reserve forces should not play important roles in RBE management. The added burden of assuming custodial control over RBE assets located at multiple sites cannot be absorbed by COMMARCORLOGBASES without both personnel and facilities augmentation. (18) Policy review should examine and codify the relationships between COMMARCORLOGBASES, bases and stations, and the reserve establishment. Efficiency might be gained by using base and station personnel and facility resources to augment COMMARCORLOGBASES at the appropriate RBE site(s) rather than assigning bases and stations middleman functions in a chain of equipment custody which ultimately reaches COMMARCORLOGBASES. The organizational structure of the reserve establishment should be evaluated to determine whether it is feasible to establish units specifically designated for RBE management augmentation. After all, it's a good bet that any scenario large enough to dictate reserve activation will include prepo ops. Once major policy issues are resolved, it is essential that they not be hidden in seldom-used policy manuals. While it may be appropriate to discuss RBE policy in war reserve manuals, it is no less appropriate to discuss control, accountability, and disposition of such assets in equipment maintenance and accounting manuals used universally in day-to- day operations. Even if such manuals only address RBE management in general terms and refer the reader to the more "exotic" manuals for details, inclusion of such information will promote familiarization within the logistics community and direct personnel to the required information when needed. While critical to laying a foundation for efficient RBE management, service-level policy changes alone cannot resolve all the RBE problems experienced during DS/DS. In conjunction with changes made to service-level policy, clear and detailed procedural guidance must be published in local SOP's. In addition to the procedures associated with the transfer of control between the Forces and COMMARCORLOGBASES, local SOP's should include specific information on such topics as organizational structure for RBE management, accounting tools to be used, reporting responsibilities, storage locations, and maintenance procedures. For example, experience gained during DS/DS demonstrated that combining individual battalion/squadron assets into single RBE accounts at the major command level improved RBE management by pooling limited logistics personnel resources. (5:2-3) Such arrangements should be specified in local procedures. Having established a sound policy and procedural base, it is essential that RBE control and accounting be included in training exercises. As with anything else, proper execution depends upon practice and training. Including RBE management as an integral part of MPF/NALM operational training would help ensure that both forward and rear elements are prepared to assume their roles in prepo ops. Finally, the development and implementation of computer system changes are required to simplify the process of establishing/operating RBE accounting and maintenance files. One of the biggest obstacles during DS/DS relative to RBE management was the inability to transfer maintenance and supply requisition records from one account to another. (5:8-9) Repair parts ordered for equipment left behind followed units to southwest Asia. Additionally, maintenance records could not be transferred from old to new accounts when consolidated RBE accounts were formed. Elimination of mechanized roadblocks to efficient RBE management is essential. With fewer forces deployed overseas, operations involving the use of prepositioned equipment and supplies can be expected to play an increasingly important role in future conflicts involving American forces. DS/DS provided the Marine Corps many valuable lessons that can be used to increase proficiency in future prepo ops. But while most attention has understandably been directed toward the forward element of such operations, valuable lessons were learned within the rear elements as well. The combat power of any force is a combination of its readiness and its ability to sustain combat operations over time. With shrinking defense budgets, the capability to sustain combat forces will depend more and more upon the effective use of all available resources. RBE must be considered an integral part of Marine Corps force sustainment and managed accordingly. The next conflict may not allow for anything less. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Commandant of the Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. Naval message to the Commanding Generals of the Fleet Marine Forces and the Commander of Marine Corps Logistics Bases concerning RBE management, CMC WASHINGTON DC 240107Z Jan 91. 2. Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases, Albany, Ga. Naval message to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, concerning remain behind equipment, COMMARCORLOGBASES ALBANY GA 242010Z Aug 90. 3. Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases, Albany, Ga. Naval message to the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, concerning remain behind equipment, COMMARCORLOGBASES ALBANY GA 232000Z Oct 90. 4. Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases (Code 803), Albany, Ga. Point paper commenting on CG FMFPac's letter 4400 4ad/6D454 undated, December 11, 1991. 5. Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office One. Lessons Learned from the Management Review of Remain Behind Equipment Conducted for the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. Camp Lejeune, N.C., June 25, 1991. 6. Houston, D.C., Officer-in-Charge, Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office Two. Letter to the Commanding General, V Marine Expeditionary Force about remain behind equipment issues, OIC FSMAO-2 4400/2 W04/023, March 8, 1991. 7. Keys, Wm. M., Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. Letter about remain behind equipment and maritime prepositioning forces, CG FMFLant ltr 4000 4:B/RBEMAR, October 1, 1991. 8. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System: #02329-96169 (02356). Remain Behind Equipment (RBE). Submitted by 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, Ca. 9. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System: # 02329-96806 (02358). Remain Behind Equipment. Submitted by 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, Ca. 10. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System: # 12329-90374 (03041). RBE Sustainment. Submitted by II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C. 11. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System: # 12330-61327 (03042). Depth of Remain Behind Logistics Personnel. Submitted by II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C. 12. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System: # 12547-52818 (03147). Table of Organization (T/O) and T/E for Remain Behind Detachment. Submitted by 2d Force Service Support Group, Camp Lejeune, N.C. 13. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System: # 12840-69374 (03208). Cannibalization. Submitted by 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N.C. 14. Marine Corps Lessons Learned System: # 12840-98963 (03209). Lack of Qualified Personnel. Submitted by 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N.C. 15. Moore, Royal N., Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Letter about remain behind equipment and maritime prepositioning equipment, CG FMFPac ltr 4400 4AD/6D454, undated. 16. O'Neil, Michael E., Student, Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Personal interview about RBE management within I MEF as he saw it while serving on the Supply and Maintenance Assistance Team, 1st Marine Division, March 23, 1992. 17. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991. 18. Truba, Roy, HQMC Action Officer responsible for PWR and RBE management policy. Personal interview about RBE policy and lessons learned, February, 1992. 19. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Controlled Item Management Policy Manual, MCO P4400.82F. Washington, D.C., 1985. 20. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. War Reserve Materiel Policy Manual, MCO P4400.39F. Washington, D.C., 1989. 21. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, FMFM 1-2. Quantico, 1991. 22. Winglass, R. J., Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, HQMC. Memorandum about Remain Behind Equipment, January 23, 1992. -END-
