A Historical Comparison Of TACAIR Doctrine Since World War II CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: A Historical Comparison of TACAIR Doctrine Since World War II Author: Major J.R. Keadle, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The intent of this paper is to look into the historical development of TACAIR doctrines, make comparisons between those doctrines, and take an in-depth look at the issues that surfaced during the Korean War, focusing on those that still plague us today. Discussion: Studying the historical development of each of the Service's TACAIR doctrine, assists one to better understand how each Service views the battlefield. Making comparisons of these doctrines helps to understand the issues from a broader perspective. The Korean War became the first time all of the Service's TACAIR doctrines collided on the battlefield, which has produced many inter-service TACAIR issues. The Korean War gives us an opportunity for an in-depth look at those issues from all perspectives. This in-depth perspective helps mold an understanding as to why, some of these same issues, are still debated today. There have been many lessons learned from the TACAIR issues raised during and after the Korean War; however, most of these differences still persist today. Every war or conflict this country has been involved in since the Korean War, with Desert Storm being the latest, has resulted in many of the same issues raised and old lessons having to be relearned again. Today, in-light of the budget cuts and force reductions, there seems to be a greater "jointness" trend among all the Services. Because of this "jointness" trend, the Services finally are making progress toward rectifying the TACAIR issues that have plagued us for the past fifty years. The key for continued progress is for all the Services to set parochialism aside, learn and understand each Service's doctrine, and to make a cooperative effort to settle remaining issues over TACAIR. A HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF TACAIR DOCTRINE SINCE WORLD WAR II OUTLINE Thesis Statement: The intent of this paper is to look into the historical development of TACAIR doctrines, make comparisons between those doctrines, and take an in-depth look at the issues that surfaced during the Korean War, focusing on those that still plague us today. I. A Historical review A. Pre-World War II B. World War II C. Post-World War II II. TACAIR Doctrines A. Army/Air Force Doctrines B. Navy/Marine Corps Doctrine C. Comparisons of the Two Doctrines III. Influences of Korea A. Korean War B. Marines Enter the War C. TACAIR Issues D. Army/Air Force Issues E. Marine Corps/Air Force Issues VI. Lessons Learned A. Issues of Today B. Conclusion A HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF TACAIR DOCTRINE SINCE WORLD WAR II Throughout the past 50 years, United States airpower doctrine has been developed by four different Services: U.S. Army (USA), U.S. Air Force (USAF), U.S. Navy (USN), and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). All have unique doctrines that appear on the surface to be different. Yet a careful study reveals them to be nearly the same. The real differences between the doctrines is actually the level of focus as applied on the battlefield. The Air Force views the battle more on the strategic and operational level, where as the Navy and, in particular, the Marine Corps sees the battle more on the tactical level. Ironically, the doctrines for the use of airpower, specifically in the Air Force and Marine Corps, have grown closer over the past 50 years. However, the same joint issues of command and control in relation to the focus of effort for tactical aviation have not changed. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) in Desert Shield/Storm assisted all the Services in working together in the joint environment. Nevertheless, some of the same joint issues concerning command and control that were raised in the Korean War surfaced once again. In today's environment, with Congress calling for even more large scale cuts in defense spending, the time is right to set parochialism aside and to get serious about working together in the joint environment. Future competition for limited fire support platforms, such as fewer naval gun ships, tactical aircraft, and smaller numbers of ground forces will certainly compel the U.S. Armed Forces to think "joint" in order to accomplish the mission. No longer will it be feasible to "do it alone" as all the Services thought they could in the past. Much has been debated and written over the issue of command and control of tactical aviation (TACAIR). A comparative historical look at the Service's airpower doctrines, and an in-depth look at the Korean War, is necessary in order to understand the issues over TACAIR. The intent of this paper is to look into the historical development of TACAIR doctrines, make comparasions between those doctrines, and take an in-depth look at the issues that surfaced during the Korean War, focusing on those that still plague us today. A HISTORICAL REVIEW During WW I aviation was in such an early stage of development that it had little effect on the outcome of the war, although in future wars airpower would play a significant role. Many theories for the employment of airpower surfaced during the two decades that followed WW I. Some viewed the airplane as just another supporting arm, and should be employed as such by the ground commander. Others saw the strategic value of the airplane, and felt it should be separated from the ground commander. Still others such as Douhet, an Italian general and airpower theorist, saw airpower potentially making ground and naval forces obsolete. In his eyes, future wars would be fought only from the air. The Army wrestled with these issues during the pre WW II years. As early as 1927, there was a move afoot to make the Army Air Corps (AAC) an independent armed service. MAJ GEN "Billy" Mitchell, was actually court-martialed for voicing his views for an independent Air Force. The ground component of the Army vehemently opposed this idea. The ground commanders wanted direct control of the air force to be used as they saw fit on the battlefield. Hence, as the United States entered the Second World War, the AAC had no air doctrine. Each Army corps commander employed his aircraft as he so desired. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, did not experience the same issues, due in a large part to its concentration on small expeditionary operations. The air-ground relationship was much tighter than what the Army/Army Air Corps experienced. The Marine Corps spent the pre-WW II years learning the value of the aircraft as a reconnaissance and weapons platform to support the ground troops in actual combat operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the jungles of Nicaragua. The discovery that the airplane could sink ships posed a serious threat to naval fleets. As a counter, the aircraft carrier was developed, perfected, and employed to protect its fleet from the air menace. In the 1930's, developing a strategy to defeat a potential Japanese threat, Naval Air began to be viewed as more of an offensive weapon. The intent was to use it in large scale naval clashes on the high seas as well as to support the amphibious operations that would become necessary in the taking or retaking of territory owned by the enemy. WW II On December 7th, 1941, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor thrust the United States into WW II and became a "Day of Infamy" in the words of President Roosevelt in a speech in which he declared war on the Axis Powers. The war would be the test bed for the individual Services to put their airpower theories and doctrines into practice. During the 1942-43 land campaign in Northern Africa, doctrine for the use of airpower began to be shaped. Up until the battle for the Kasserine Pass in 1943, the air forces were in direct support of ground commanders who employed them on the battlefield as they chose. Ground commanders, like GEN Patton, were major proponents of having air units in direct support of the ground troops. Army Air Corps commanders complained that the air forces were being piece-mealed into the battle, thereby suffering unnecessary losses to the German Luftwaffe. Additionally, air commanders thought they could do more damage if air superiority could be gained, thus allowing the interdiction of German ground forces before they could get to the close battlefield. Air commanders argued that all of the air forces in theater should be organized in general support rather than direct support to the ground forces, in order to mass at the appropriate place and time. Centralized control would ensure unity of effort. Additionally, the air commander should have coequal status with the ground commander. General Eisenhower's decision, as Theater Commander, to centralize command and control of all theater air assets under one commander, certainly proved to be correct one (5:359). The ability air to concentrate air assets on the Luftwaffe, cutting off the lines of communications while attriting the German reinforcing efforts, was a significant contribution to the Allied victory over Rommel's German forces. As a result of the AAC's success, the foundation for an independent air force was given birth. This foundation would later be the basis for the formation of the Air Force. Because of the lack of close supporting fires from aircraft, many Army commanders became bitterly opposed to the idea of an independent Air Force. What they saw was the loss of airpower for their use on the battlefield. The fact was that this centralized system did protect the ground forces from enemy air attack and, although unobserved by the ground commanders, enemy reinforcements were being systematically destroyed by the AAC. Myopically, the major complaint was the loss of the organic direct air support, once owned by the ground commanders. (After the AAC separated as an independent Air Force, Army doctrine has adapted and compensated to this loss of organic airpower by employing attack helicopters for close-in fire support.) On the other side of the world, the Navy and Marine Corps were developing their own versions of airpower. In my opinion, hind-sight allows us to see that the Japanese did the Navy a favor by sinking most of the United States' battleship fleet. Operations in the Pacific would later prove that the decisive weapon of war on the high seas was the aircraft carrier. The carrier, combined with land-based Marine aircraft, also proved indispensable during the amphibious assaults in the Pacific. During the second battle for Guadalcanal in 1942, the Navy/Marine air-ground team played a significant role. During this campaign carrier platforms were not available to provide dedicated air for the landing force commander because the Navy carriers were busy defending and protecting their own fleet. The "Cactus Air Force," a collage of AAC, displaced Navy carrier aircraft, and predominantly Marine aircraft were flown to Henderson Field. The Cactus Air Force, commanded by aviator Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, possessed centralized command and control of the air assets, worked for and in concert with the Landing Force commander, a ground officer. Combined with the Navy Carrier Air, it proved to be a decisive element for victory on Guadalcanal. (11:5) During the battle for Okinawa, Navy/Marine amphibious doctrine achieved its highest level of perfection, with air and ground units working together better than ever before. Nearly 14,000 support sorties were flown by Marines from Navy carriers, Escort Carriers, and land bases in direct support of the landing force.(16:369) This battle ended the Navy/ Marine air-ground team participation in the war and served as the foundation for current Marine Air Ground Tasks Force (MAGTF) doctrine of today. POST WW II Immediately following WW II, there was much debate amongst the Services over airpower, who should control it, and who should own it. President Truman tried to unify the Services into one department from the existing two; the War Department (Army/Army Air Corps) and the Navy department (Navy/Marine Corps). The Army fully supported this effort. Ground Army officers were still smarting from the sting of the separation over the centralized command of air assets during the North African campaign. Even though the AAC managed to maintain its independence after this campaign, the Army wanted the air back under the control of its ground commanders. The AAC ready to declare its independence from the Army, certainly wanted no part of this unification. The AAC not only wanted its independence, it also wanted to control all aviation assets. For the Navy, loss of its air assets would be disastrous to their power projection role in seapower. Concerned for their aviation assets, the Navy/Marine Corps not only fought the idea of unification but also an independent Air Force. In their opinion, the Army should be able to form an air ground team similar to that of the Navy/Marine Corps without having to form a separate Air Force. The Marine Corps, well aware that President Truman was no ally, simply feared for its very survival. A compromise was agreed upon and the National Security Act of 1947 was signed by President Truman into law on 26 July 1947. What had originally been intended to unify all the Services, ironically created an additional Service, the Air Force. The Act also guaranteed the Navy the right to own its own air force in the execution of its roles and missions, and the Marine Corps itself was made into law, comprised of three ground divisions supported by three aircraft wings. The Army not only lost its bid for a unified service, additionally they lost control of their own air assets. The newly formed Air Force, with lessons freshly learned from the European and North African Theaters of WW II, wanted possession of all United States airpower; in other words, centralized command. The Navy was pleased that it retained the integrity of its own air force, but was wary of this newly formed Air Force. After its near brush with extinction, the Marine Corps now solidified into law, but mistrusted both the Army and Air Force, and kept a distant trust with its Navy brethren. Each of the Services now began to view itself as a self contained fighting force. This inter-Service rivalry over airpower was to be the foundation upon which the services would build for future joint operations. ARMY/AIR FORCE DOCTRINES Because of its experiences in WW II, principally in Allied operations in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe, the Army Air Corps insisted that air warfare had become a distinct and potentially decisive type of combat. The Air Force view was that strategic bombardment became the foundation for this belief and justified the creation of an independent Air Force in 1947. In addition, tactical air force commanders insisted that they, too, needed autonomy for their part of the air war, i.e. a distinct separation from ground commanders. Publication of FM 100-20, "The Command and Employment of Air Power" in July 1943 provided the foundation for today's Air Force doctrine, AFM 1-1, "Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. FM 100-20 first claimed that land and airpower are coequal and interdependent forces; neither is an auxiliary to the other. Command of the air forces rested with an air commander who would only take orders from a theater commander, not a land component commander. Additionally, FM 100-20 spelled out the kind of air warfare American Air Force officers favored: strategic bombardment; air superiority operations, to destroy any enemy offensive air threat; air interdiction operations, to destroy the enemy's units and supply before they reached the battlefield; and close air support (CAS), air strikes against the enemy ground forces on the close battlefield. The CAS mission, unlike all the other air warfare missions, required detailed planning, coordination, and control with ground troops to avoid fratricide, reduce air losses to enemy ground fire, and ensure that air attacks hit intended targets. The missions of strategic bombardment, air superiority, and air interdiction all required very little coordination with the ground commanders. Hence, the air commander could conduct his own air war unimpeded by the ground commander's demands. The Army tried desperately to regain control over tactical aviation, but lost the battle with passage of the 1947 National Security Act. To summarize, the Army did not expect integrated CAS, nor did the Air Force intend to deliver it, except under carefully prescribed conditions. These conditions included a clearly marked target and readily identified friendly troops, positive observed direction from Air Force ground or air controllers, near absolute safety from friendly artillery fire, and employment only against targets that could not be attacked with heavy artillery. (5:351) Concerned over the loss of tactical aviation, the Army provided doctrinal refinements in FM 31-35, "Air-Ground Operations (1946)." This manual would be the foundation the Army and Air Force would build upon to standardize future air-ground operations. The theater air commander retained absolute authority over all tactical air forces, answerable only to the theater commander. A tactical air command or air force would be assigned to support each army group or army. The tactical air force commander would determine air mission priorities, but would cooperate with his ground force counterpart, the army commander. These two commanders would establish a Joint operations Center (JOC), collocated with the Army headquarters, to coordinate air-ground operations. Three things to note: Air Force and Army ground commanders have coequal status, CAS missions require both air and ground approval before they were flown, and the actual conduct of operations remain firmly in the hands of air officers(5:349). The JOC was both an Army air-ground operations section and an instrument of command for the tactical Air Force. The purpose of the JOC was to serve as an air request network for the Army and then to task the Air Force CAS missions to support ground operations. The JOC processed Tactical Air Requests (TAR) and directed tactical air missions through two Air Force agencies, the Combat Operations Section (COS) and Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). Ground commanders were responsible for initiating air requests through the chain of command to the senior ground force headquarters. The senior Army officer of the Air-Ground Operation Section (AGOS), in the JOC, would decide from among the air requests submitted, which mission had the highest priority from the Army commander's perspective. The ground forces were required to provide the communications equipment to support this request network. Once priorities were set, the AGOS would submit the air request to the COS, the Air Force's counterpart to the Army's AGOS inside the JOC. Within the COS, the senior air officer would decide which mission would be flown, guided by the priorities established by his air force commander. Those missions would then be passed to the TACC, the Air Force command and control agency, who would pass the mission requirements down to the squadrons. The control of air attacks remained the responsibility of Air Force personnel. The two different types of close control agencies were the ground Forward Air Controller (FAC) of the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), and an Airborne Tactical Air Coordinator (TAC) flying in a light observation aircraft or a tactical fighter. Doctrinally, the lowest echelon where the TACP could be found was at the Army division level. The TACP consisted of one aviator (the FAC) and a small crew of enlisted communicators. Although the Army chose the TACP as their desired means of controlling air strikes, the Air Force preferred the Airborne TAC during the Korean War. Even after eight major joint tactical air exercises conducted between 1947 and 1950, the JOC system proved to be just too cumbersome and unresponsive. The Air Force and Army created a JOC for all the exercises, but the performance was disheartening for the Army. There were several reasons why this system failed during the exercises. Neither Service could properly man or equip it. The TACPs demonstrated little skill or interest in their mission. Communications capability between the Air Force and the Army was poor. Thus, in the Army's eyes this air request and air control system had major defects and many senior Army officers were resigned to the fact that they would see little or no CAS on the battlefield. Because of the poor performance of the JOC system, the attitude of the "bombline" formed prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. This bombline was an imaginary line on the battlefield where, inside the line, Army artillery would destroy targets. Outside the line, the Air Force would be responsible for the destruction of enemy targets. Very little coordination was required. The Air Force was quite content with this bombline approach. NAVY/MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE Navy and Marine Corps doctrine of airpower as published in PHIB 12/NAVMC 4159 "Amphibious Operations: Air Operations (1948)," viewed tactical air warfare in much the same way as the Air Force. Like the Air Force, the critical aviation mission was air superiority in order to protect the naval fleet and the amphibious landing force. The basic differences was over priority of air interdiction and CAS. Air interdiction was the priority for the Air Force. For the Navy/Marine Corps team, no priority could be seen. CAS, which requires more coordination and control was just as important to the Marine ground troops as air interdiction. Largely due to their experience in amphibious operations against Japan, Navy/Marine Aviators viewed CAS with greater enthusiasm than did their Air Force counterparts.(5:352) The Navy/Marine Corps system for air requests and air strikes stressed rapid response and decentralized management of CAS sorties.(5:370) By centralizing air requests at battalion level TACPs, Marine Aviators and ground officers created a system that would ensure CAS strikes would arrive within minutes. The TACP consisted of two Marine Aviators and eight enlisted communicators, who maintained a communications net that reached directly to the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC). The assumption by intermediate headquarters was that the air-ground liaison at the battalion level had already determined that air was a better source of supporting fire than artillery or naval gunfire. Upon receiving the CAS request, the TACC would review its available aircraft and competing air missions, but assumed the request had to be filled as quickly as possible. Like the Air Force/Army system, the Marine Corps had two strike controlling agencies, the ground FAC and the airborne TAC. The opinion of the Marine Corps was that the ground FAC provided better service for the ground commander's needs for CAS than could the airborne TAC. Navy/Marine Corps aviation doctrine viewed the tactical war much the same as did the Air Force: only centralized command and decentralized control under air officers ensured that aviation units performed the full range of tactical missions with maximum effectiveness. The degree of influence the ground commanders had in achieving air support for ground operations is the significant difference. Ground commanders did not have the authority to allocate more air support sorties for the ground force's use. Such authority rests with the amphibious task force commander or senior aviation commander, for amphibious operations. COMPARISONS OF THE TWO DOCTRINES A summarized comparison of the two systems, Army/Air Force vs Navy/Marine Corps, and Service views, is in order before we proceed. First, both systems stressed that centralized command by an air commander was critical to ensure unity of effort. Second, both viewed air superiority as the number one priority mission. Third, Navy/Marine Corps emphasized CAS while the Air Force prefers air interdiction over CAS. Fourth, communication capability between the Navy/Marine Corps air and ground units was good, but poor between the Air Force/Army units. Fifth, Marine TACPs (2 FAC) were pushed down to the battalion level, where as the Air Force supplied a TACP (1 FAC) only as low as the divisional level. Sixth, Marine TACP's air request from the battalion level went directly to the TACC who assumed the request should be filled as quickly as possible. The Air Force TACP's were only allowed to request air strikes "under special circumstances, ...... in the absence of Army communication." The Army ground commanders were responsible for submitting the air requests, which had to go through several layers of Army headquarters, before entering the AGOS, inside the JOC. Once the request entered the AGOS, the Army would either veto or pass the request over to the Air Force. The COS, which is the Air Force's counterpart, also inside the JOC, would then have final authority as to whether the request would be filled. Last, both possessed two strike control agencies. The Air Force preferred the airborne TAC, however, the Marine Corps' preference was the ground FAC. On the eve of the Korean War, the Navy and Marine Corps' perspective of war was on the tactical and operational level. The Air Force viewed war on the operational and strategic level and had concluded that the Army should be able to deal with any enemy on his tactical front with his organic weapons. Meanwhile, the Army was rapidly realizing it had lost its bid for control of any air on the battlefield. KOREAN WAR The Korean War stands today as the point were the TACAIR doctrines for the U.S. Military Services collided on the battlefield. The Services found themselves not only fighting the North Korean and Communist Chinese war machines, but also each other in attempts to apply their own doctrines and beliefs for the proper employment of TACAIR. While the world focus, in particular the U. S., was on the Soviet threat and another possible war in Europe, the North Korean invasion on 25 June, 1950 came as a complete surprise. At the onset of the war, unprepared South Korean (ROK) and United Nation Forces (UNF) found themselves reeling in retreat. The successful counter-attack by friendly forces (ROK and UNF), nearly achieved the re-unification of the Korean peninsula and the demise of the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA). Communist China's entry into the war in December 1950, forced friendly forces into retreat once again. This new Communist offensive finally stalled near the 38th parallel and the remaining three years of the war turned into a stagnated defensive war of attrition. Early in the war friendly air forces were composed of the following: U.S. Fifth Air Force, comprised of a mixture of heavy bombers, fighter-bombers, and fighter aircraft; the Navy's Seventh Fleet Task Force 77, with five large carriers (each with 4-5 squadrons); the Marine Corps 1st Marine Air Wing, three squadrons which flew from escort carriers or land bases; and non-American aircraft (which comprised only 5% of the overall sorties flown). In all phases of the war, TACAIR played a significant role. The U.S. Far East Air Forces established early air superiority over the Korean peninsula. This in turn lent freedom of action for friendly ground forces and freedom of friendly air forces to concentrate on destroying enemy ground units. The North Korean Army's mechanized and motorized rifle divisions made excel lent targets for air attacks, especially when they were on the move. The logistical trail of convoys carrying supplies to keep the NKPA combat capable, were themselves lucrative targets. By the end of 1950, the Air Force had flown over 41,500 air interdiction and CAS sorties. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft added an additional 13,000 sorties to the TACAIR effort. GEN George E. Stratemeyer, commanding officer of Far East Air Forces, was deeply concerned over the organizational problems that could limit the air war. He desired unity of effort for friendly air forces vice each of the three services conducting their own independent air campaigns. In GEN Stratemeyer's opinion, the Korean air war needed a centralized theater air commander to command and coordinate the entire air war effort, much like what was established during the North African Campaign in 1943. The Navy wholly opposed this centralized theater air commander concept. Both the Navy and Marine Corps preferred to establish Areas of Responsibilities (AOR) for their exclusive use to support the air war. Visions of Naval Air flying in support of the Air Force was repugnant to senior Naval officers. Fear of losing control of its aircraft could put the fleet at risk of a potential submarine threat. In addition, concern of this centralized air commander would reduce the Navy's ability to respond to other crises spots in the Pacific region, namely Formosa. The Marine Corps also opposed GEN Stratemeyer's idea; however, as long as Marine Air could support Marines on the ground, the Marine Corps could live with this centralized air commander. By the end of 1950, the centralized air commander concept would become a "bitter pill" to swallow as Marine ground commanders watched as their primary supporting arm, Marine Air, was taken from their chain of command. A number of events accelerated GEN Stratemeyer's efforts to integrate tactical air operations. With hurried orders from Far East Command Headquarters, the aircraft carrier VALLEY FORGE launched air strikes on targets near Pyongyang, North Korea. Learning of the carrier air strikes, GEN Stratemeyer had to cancel his own air strikes on those same targets. That same day, 4 July 1950, GEN MacArthur, American Theater and United Nations Commander, requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send a Marine brigade with an attached air group for an amphibious landing. The request was approved the next day. GEN Stratemeyer predicted that aerial confusion would soon reign in the air over the Korean peninsula. On 8 July, GEN MacArthur was persuaded to designate GEN Stratemeyer as theater air commander; however, only MacArthur would define the missions for the Navy's Seventh Fleet. GEN Stratemeyer was given operational control over all land based aircraft, including land based Marine Air, and further "coordination control" of carrier aviation in the war zone. The term "coordination control" was vague and controversial throughout the war. In simple terms, it meant GEN Stratemeyer could only veto proposed carrier strikes, if he knew about them. Navy carrier fleets normally maintained radio silence as standard operating procedures. Communication and encryption procedures between the Navy and Air Force were incompatible, which all meant that Stratemeyer would learn of carrier strikes only if the Navy chose to inform him. Ultimately, the Navy grudgingly agreed to dedicate eighty sorties a day for the theater air commander's tasking. Joint operations between the Navy and Air Force remained tenuous throughout the war. The Army, outgunned and outmanned by the North Korean Forces, needed all the supporting arms it could muster. The Army/Air Force doctrinal JOC system was plagued with communication problems and shortages in personnel from both sides of the system. During the initial stages of the war, with friendly ground units in retreat, the Fifth Air Force was instrumental in stalling the North Korean offensive around the Pusan area. The tactical situation was so chaotic that the air request system on the Army side was falling. Fifth Air Force created an ad hoc request system that did not depend on Army personnel in order to be effective. This system helped save the Eighth Army from defeat. Additional TACPs were sent to the Army in order to increase their ability to control air strikes. The TACPs were eager to control, but continually received hostile fire from the communist forces. After two TACPs were killed and nearly all of the others had their communication equipment destroyed, TACPs were ordered no further forward than infantry regimental headquarters. This ultimately resulted in the TACP or FAC serving merely as an air liaison officer because he was now too far to the rear to effectively control air strikes. Because of the problems experienced by the TACPs, the Air Force depended on the airborne TAC to control air strike missions. During the war, the Air Force concentration was on making the airborne TAC more effective, which it did. From the Air Force's viewpoint, this airborne TAC strike controller required less coordination with the ground commander than did the TACP method of control. This lack of coordination with the ground commanders, was the reason the Army preferred the TACP method of control. Because the TACP was operating from the same level as the ground units, the Army felt that this method better served his needs. MARINES ENTER THE WAR By the time the Provisional Marine Brigade moved into the Pusan perimeter defense in August 1950, the Army/Air Force air-ground system had become overwhelmed with communication problems and, therefore, the JOC only exercised nominal control over Marine Air. The Air Force had accepted the argument that Marine Air should support Marines on the ground, at least for the time being. The Marine Brigade was composed of the following: the ground element; a regimental combat team of three infantry battalions, and the Brigade Air Group; composed of three Marine squadrons of F-4U Corsairs, to support the ground element. This Air Group's average Marine pilot had over 1000 hours of flight time, was a WW II combat veteran, and had extensive close air support training. More importantly, combination of the ground FAC, who was assigned to each battalion, and a responsive air request system proved to be the backbone of success for the Marine air-ground team. (5:367) Since WW II, Marines had come to expect air support to respond quickly to the ground commander's needs. Weapons delivery by Marine air was as close as a half mile from friendly lines. Responsiveness of strike air was critical for the ground commander. The difference of fifteen minutes could mean victory or defeat of the immediate close ground battle. Before Stratemeyer took control of Marine Air, the average response time for Navy/Marine Air was five to ten minutes from request to bomb release. For a comparison, the Air Force's average time ranged from one to two hours.(5:381) This kind of air support (Marine's) came as a revelation to Army officers, who watched the Marine Brigade operate during the defense of Pusan. There were several reasons to why the differences in response times. First, Marines employed air alert aircraft, flying close to the battlefield. The Air Force viewed this method as an uneconomic use of air assets. At times these aircraft would orbit for as long as four hours awaiting a CAS mission. Second, Air Force aircraft had to fly from Japanese air bases, while the majority of Navy/Marine Corps aircraft flew from carriers just off the coast of Korea. Therefore, transit time for the Air Force was much longer. Third, the Marine Corps air request system was much simpler, requiring less layers of command to go through. Last, the Navy/Marine Corps, with better communication equipment and compatibility, did not experience the magnitude of communication problems that plagued the JOC system early in the war. Once friendly forces had blunted the North Korean offensive at Pusan, "Gen Douglas MacArthur dreamed of a dramatic blow that would crush the NKPA."(5:485) This blow would be the now famous amphibious assault at Inchon on "...South Korea's western coast that would disrupt the NKPA supply system and demoralize the Communist invaders." (5:485) As an independent task force, X Corps, commanded by GEN Almond, would become the main assault force spearheaded by the 1st Marine Division, under GEN Oliver P. Smith. An Amphibious Area of Responsibility (AOR) was designated around the Inchon Area, precisely the way Navy/ Marine doctrine expected. As long as X Corps remained an independent task force, the Air Force JOC system allowed the Navy and Marine Corps team to implement its form of TACAIR control system inside this AOR. This was precisely the style of operations the Navy/Marine Corps were accustomed to and many Army officers became converts to this doctrinal way of supplying air support to the ground commander. Although the JOC system was improving, Gen Almond of the X Corps wanted no part of it. He wanted to continue to use the Marine Corps air support system. In order to fill a deficiency in his combat capabilities, GEN Almond requested that Fifth Air Force supply him with thirty-six TACPs, which would allow one per battalion like his attached 1st Marine Division had. GEN Stratemeyer allowed the Marine system to support the X Corps; however, his TACPs were undermanned and under-equipped, he pleaded "TACP poverty" and refused to provide any additional TACPs. Concerning the TACP issue, the Air Force was looking from a much larger perspective, namely a potential war with Russia in Europe. Senior Air Force officers knew they could not supply the Army those numbers of TACPS that a European war would require. In the Air Force's eyes, if they were to give into this request a precedence would be set for them to supply more TACPs than was possible.(5:388) Besides, the Air Force favored controlling the air strikes from the airborne TAC rather than by the TACP (ground FAC). Conversely, the ground commander favored the TACP and this same disagreement still exists today. The TACPs became one of the reasons for disgruntlement between Air Force and Army officers. Because the Marine Corps' air support system had surpassed the JOC system in every way, Army officers began to make comparisons. One such comparison was with, the 1st Marine Division who deployed twenty TACPs, meaning each infantry battalion had one party. In contrast, 7th Army Infantry Division of the X Corps had nine TACPs, supplied from both the Fifth Air Force and 1st Marine Division. Early in the Korean War, many critics in the U.S. Congress charged that the Air Force was not supplying adequate air support for the Army. To counter these criticisms, the Air Force conducted a study, with Army support, to determine if FM 31-35, "Army/Air Force Air-Ground Doctrine" was sound. Early in December 1950, the study group concluded that neither the Army or Air Force had supplied the trained staffs, control agencies, and communications equipment to make the doctrine work. The solutions were simple: provide better trained and fully manned staffs, allow for the proper control agencies to function, and acquire compatible and improved communications equipment. Assuming these solutions were taken to heart by Army and Air Force leaders, the FM 31-35 JOC system was determined to be sound. When the study group compared the JOC system with the Marine Corps system, the investigators favored the JOC system. They determined that air alert aircraft (a USN/USMC common practice) were uneconomical. Ground commanders had no need to "control" air strikes nor did they have a need to set a quota for CAS sorties. Additionally, the Air Force could not envision being able to supply the same number of TACPs that served in Marine divisions to an Army large enough to fight a war with the Russia in Europe. In late November of 1950, while the study group was still in the midst of their work, China entered the war. Once again, friendly forces were forced to retreat from the Chinese Army. Supported by the JOC system the Fifth Air Force did its best to cover the Eighth Army's hasty retreat. Without a solid ground control system, the ".. .2d and 25th U.S. Divisions could not coordinate their retrograde with air strikes. The 2d Division particularly suffered..." (5:372) in its retreat below the 38th parallel. On the other hand, the 1st Marine Division broke out intact from the Chosin Reservoir and destroyed seven Chinese divisions in the process. Even given the events of the December retreat, the Air Force still stood by the study group's findings. Once the friendly forces consolidated along a defensive line, X Corps' role as an independent task force ended. The Air Force was determined to make the JOC system work. "On December 11, 1950, Stratemeyer, citing the July 8 agreement on operational control, announced that 1st MAW would henceforth support the entire United Nations Army." (5:373) This marked the end of a Marine Air Wing dedicated to support its Marine ground components during the remainder of the Korean War. Marine ground commanders, as well as the Army GEN Almond, complained bitterly that fewer and less timely air support missions were observed flying in support of the ground troops. The Air Force worked hard trying to make the JOC system produce satisfactory results. However, with the enormous successes of the Marine Corps' system still fresh in the soldiers' and Marines' minds, the JOC system just could not compete. As Marine complaints began to grow louder, the Fifth Air Force commander ".. .insisted that the 1st Marine Division receive no special treatment." (5:379) Both, the Navy and Marine Corps bitterly opposed this JOC, centralized air commander. This centralized air commander issue sparked many inter-Service and parochial debates over TACAIR for the next forty years. The Army began to acquire more artillery to augment its corps in order to increase their supporting arms fire. This increase was partly due to the changing nature of a once fluid war to a stagnate defensive war; also in part, to compensate for the lack of close air support. The "bombline" attitude, discussed earlier, became common thinking by both the Army and Air Force, during the remainder of the war. The Air Force did not plan on attacking enemy targets that could be targeted by Army artillery, nor did the Army expect to see much of CAS from the Air Force. TACAIR ISSUES Was the JOC system a failure? Certainly not! GEN Stratemeyer's concern that the Korean peninsula would reign with aerial confusion unless a centralized air commander was designated, was well founded. The Navy and Marine Corps' desire to geographically divide up Korea's air space, the practice in the Pacific during WW II, just simply would not work. The air space was just too small. The friendly ground fighting forces were outclassed by on the ground and airpower would prove to tip the balance in their favor. In my opinion, GEN Stratemeyer and Air Force doctrine was absolutely correct, a single air commander was required to coordinate the air efforts against a common enemy. The primary issue was over CAS. If aircraft did not fly CAS missions then there was little coordination required between the air and ground forces. The "... Air Force could not afford the wealth of sorties that characterized the Navy-Marine Corps system, which might be necessary for amphibious warfare, but had little value in an extended land campaign." (5:395) The Air Force viewed CAS as unnecessary unless the target was out of range of Army artillery. Even today, the Air Force remains committed that air interdiction is the principle instrument of air war upon enemy forces. Navy and Marine Corps opinion is quite the opposite. In 1952, Admiral Clark, Commander Seventh Fleet, best summed up both the Services' positions by stating, "...at the front, every bullet, every round of artillery, every pound of supplies was twice as expensive to the Reds as it was crossing the Yalu." (5:388) Following the Korean War, in August 1953, an air-ground conference was held by all the Services. The intent was to glean lessons learned and to strike agreements between the services for a unified course of action concerning command and control of TACAIR. All four Services agreed upon several issues. First, the JOC system had become a joint activity, at least better than it was in 1951. Second, flak suppression artillery was essential to aircraft survivability, later to be called suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Third, electronic guidance weapons provide a great potential for all-weather operations, today referred to as" smart weapons." Fourth, aviation/ground personnel needed far greater training in air-ground operations. Fifth, improvements in all types of communications equipment would pay additional dividends. Last, all participants needed to pay more attention to post strike damage assessment, today's bomb damage assessment (BDA).(5:394) Today, these same lessons are being re-learned during joint exercises and actual combat operations such as Desert Storm. The other Services did not challenge the Air Force's doctrinal foundation for air operations, which is to gain air superiority first. Nor did anyone challenge the assumption that air interdiction paid greater dividends than CAS. After three years of war, all the Services agreed with the Air Force that the Korean Theater air operations required a single air commander/manager. However, the conference did produce several issues that are still with us today. The heart of these issues is timely and reliable CAS. ARMY/AIR FORCE ISSUES The Army attacked the Air Force's doctrine, seeking changes in the air request and air control system. First, the JOC should become truly joint and not controlled by the Air Force with just liaison officers supplied by the Army. Second, set numbers of sorties should be allocated for the ground commander's use. Third, Army corps commanders need a predictable time-table of scheduled sorties otherwise, it is impossible to integrate airpower into his scheme of maneuver. Fourth, certain TACAIR wings should be placed under the control of Army division commanders. Fifth, a slower aircraft specifically designed for the CAS mission be developed. Sixth, the air request system had to be decentralized, especially for emergency CAS missions. Last, the number of TACPs should be increased to four per regiment vice the then-current four per division. The Air Force was pleased that its basic doctrine of a centralized theater commander was no longer being challenged as it had been during the Korean campaign. However, these issues raised by the Army were the same ones that had persisted throughout the war. We will take each of the seven Army/Air Force issues and review the Air Force's response. First, the joint/liaison officer issue of the JOC. During President Eisenhower's `New Look' at the military, the Air Force published "Air Force Manual 1-2". This manual supported the JOC in becoming an all Air Force Agency, with the other services providing liaison officers. Today, change JOC to read JFACC and we still have the same issue. The second and third issues over allocation of a set number of sorties on a predictable time table were eventually won by the Army. During the Vietnam Conflict the apportionment and allocation of CAS sorties (similar to the Marine Corps system) was adopted by the Air Force. Today, this same system is in operation, although the Army complains that the Air Force still has too much authority in deciding the percentage of sorties allocated to the Army. The issue that draws the most emotion from Air Force officers is whether or not a TACAIR Wing should be in direct support of an Army unit. This issue diametrically opposes basic Air Force doctrine. Prior to the centralization of the air commander in the North African Campaign, the AAC was piece-mealed in direct support to Army corps commanders. Naturally, the Air Force's position is to never allow this to happen again. To compensate, however, the Army has acquired a sizable attack helicopter force. The Army found in Vietnam that these helicopters provided the type of direct air support it had desired since the Army lost its Air Corps during the North African Campaign in 1943. The Air Force has all but ignored the helicopter issue, but has maintained that the Air Force will provide all TACAIR fixed wing support to the Army. In addition, the Air Force has killed any Army initiatives to acquire its own TACAIR (like the Navy/Marine Corps owns). The issue to design and develop an aircraft specifically for CAS missions is still opposed by senior Air Force leaders. The Vietnam Conflict found the Air Force unprepared for a conventional war because their efforts had been dedicated in building an Air Force for all-out nuclear war. Due to the nature of the Vietnam Conflict, a slower aircraft with greater loiter time was required. Ultimately, during the 1970's the A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft was designed and built specifically for CAS. The Army won this issue; however, no follow on replacement is planned for the A-10,e.g. . .slow, specific CAS aircraft. The sixth issue is decentralization for emergency CAS missions. The real concern was the many different layers of control air requests had to go through in order to acquire a CAS sortie. Time was, and still is, the major factor. During Vietnam, the Air Force's average response time for emergency CAS missions were 15-20 minutes (average for Marine Corps was 5-10 minutes). The Army/Air Force took the JOC system as the foundation, developing and refining it to the current air-ground system in use today. I will dispense wIth explaining the system because ultimately it looks nearly identical to the old JOC system. This current system, when compared to the Marine Corps system, is still plagued with many different command levels an air request must traverse through. However, the system has gotten much faster at processing the request than it had been during the Korean War. The last issue is the number of TACPs assigned to Army units. The Army's persistence that the TACP provided better aIr strike control for the ground commander than the airborne TAC, finally paid off, with the Air Force reluctantly agreeing to increase the numbers of TACPs. Ultimately, TACPs (1FAC) would be supplied down to the battalion level. As a comparison, today the Marine Corps maintains one Air Liaison Officer and two TACPs (2FAC's) per battalion. MARINE CORPS/AIR FORCE ISSUES The Marine Corps fully supports the Army's proposed changes. For the Marine Corps, command of Marine Air was the heart of the issue that surfaced during the Korean War, the Vietnam Conflict, and also during Desert Storm. The Marine Corps felt that its own command and control system was much more effective in meeting the ground commanders needs than the JOC system; however, "work-arounds" could be generated to compensate for delays in the JOC system. For the Marine Corps, Vietnam was just a repeat of the Korean War when TACAIR was centralized in 1968. Once again they lost control of their TACAIR. Unlike the Army, the Marine Corps could not afford to offset its loss of air support by increasing the number of artillery pieces. The amphibious mission and expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps requires that the ground force be lightly armed (in comparison to the Army). To offset this deficiency, the Marine Corps has refined its combined arms concept in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of today. The MAGTF relies on its TACAIR to tip the balance on the battlefield. When GEN Westmoreland, the Theater Commander for South Vietnam in 1968, chose to shift from geographical control of air to a single air manager (like Korea), Marines were worried and upset over his decision. This single air manager meant, from a Marine commander's point of view, "...replacing my aviation commander and control over his assets with one who is not directly under my command; yet may overall operational responsibilities...remain the same." (5:460) Today, this is still a typical Marine reaction when discussing JFACC issues. To summarize the concern Marines have over the loss of organic TACAIR, GEN M.P. Sullivan, USMC, while serving as Director of the MAGTF Warfighting Center, prepared a white letter in which he so eloquently articulated as follows: The Marine Corps considers organic MAGTF aviation as a supporting ARM in operations where the ground battle is paramount. Marine Aviation is organized, trained, and equipped to be the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) of a MAGTF that is immediately responsive to the needs of the Marine Ground Combat Element (GCE) commander. The integrated employment of MAGTF aviation is designed to offset and augment the Marine GCE commander's relatively light organic fire support. The directly available, short response time criteria for aviation employment makes it an acceptable alternative to artillery or Naval gunfire. (19:55) ISSUES OF TODAY During this century, nearly every war or conflict this country has been involved, has required the military services to work together in the joint environment. Each time hostilities ceased, the Services would all revert back and convince themselves that the last conflict was an anomaly and the next time, each individual Services would fight it alone. This joint environment issue, as well as several of the same issues over TACAIR during the Korean War, are still in debate today. During the first three quarters of this century, coordination between the Services was quite minimal. In the past fifteen years the Services have been making great strides forward in this joint environment. Even though the Services were showing signs of improvement, Congress has grown weary of the inter-Service rivalries, parochialisms, each Service `can do it alone' attitude, and all the Services wanting a `piece of the action', vice sending in the best trained and equipped force for that specific mission. Congress has become impatient and dissatisfied with the Services' track record in working together in the joint environment. Therefore, Congress was motivated to enact the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The overall intent of this Act was to enhance the effectiveness of military operations by promoting and stimulating the Services to work closer together in the joint environment. (21:2) Today, a positive `jointness' attitude is beginning to blossom amongst all the Services, one I will discuss is the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). During deliberations in 1986 to approve JCS Pub 26 (now joint Pub 3-01.2) "Joint Doctrine for Theater Counter-Air Operations" the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) developed the concept of the JFACC. The JCS's concerns were that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) needed a command and control system to ensure unity of effort for employing air forces. While at the same time, allowing the various components to use the remaining air relatively unrestrictive to support their own needs. Although the decision rests with the JFC whether a JFACC will be designated, the common assumption in times of conflict one will be designated. A whole myriad of issues between the Services have been generated since the inception of the JFACC. It is not my intent to dissect each of these issues, rather, to highlight the similarities to those created by the AIr Force's JOC system during the Korean War. Like in Korea, the Air Force's interpretation of the JFACC, Is `Operational Control' of all theater TACAIR assets, which poses the same dilemma wrestled before by the Navy and Marine Corps. While the JCS were in deliberation over JCS Pub 26, the JCS also approved a new polIcy for "...command and control of USMC TACAIR in sustained operations ashore...", better known as the `Omnibus Agreement'. (19:50) Besides specifying how Marine TACAIR is to be utilized in sustained operations ashore by the JFACC, more importantly to Marines it also specified that the "...MAGTF commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets."(19:50) During Desert Storm, for the first time this JFACC concept was to be combat tested. After the conclusion of the war, the JFACC (centralized theater air commander) raised similar issues as did the air-ground conference in 1953. First, command of Marine Air troubled Marines again. The MAGTF commander managed to retained command over his ACE, however, throughout Desert Shield/Storm Marines were watchful not to lose control of its TACAIR. Through the air tasking order (ATO) process, the JFACC was able to task all theater air assets, including Marine Air. When the ground war commenced, Marines raised the question as to why Marine aircraft were still flying strategic missions into Iraq when its ground forces were engaged with the enemy. Secondly, the communication compatibility of the Services posed as an obstacle once again. Basic communication was not a real problem; however, for the Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps aircraft to communicate in a `anti-jam' mode of operation became virtually impossible. The Air Force's `Have-Quick' anti-jam system, which is its normal operating procedures, was incompatible to the Navy/MarIne Corps' normal operating procedures during the war (Navy/Marine Corps does not own the `Have-Quick' system). Communication incompatibility not only fell into the voice arena; it was also fell In the electronic data/signal arena. The ability for the Data Link systems of the Air Force and Marine Corps to link-up was good. Conversely, the ability of the Air Force and Navy to link-up virtually did not exist. Thirdly, issues over the importance of air interdiction over CAS (or now the close in battle) were raised once again. The Army voiced its displeasure in the lack of dedicated air support missions flown in support of their scheme of maneuver. The Army accused the Air Force of concentrating too much on the strategic air campaign just prior to and during the ground campaign. Conversely, the Marines were pleased. However, unlike Korea, the Marine Corps retained command of its ACE (who supplied more dedicated sorties than the ground commander could actually use). Still, today the Air Force concentration on the strategic and operational level has not changed. Nor has the Army and Marine Corps ground commander's view changed much above the close battle, at the tactical level of war. Army (attack helo's) and Marine Air main focus is still to support the ground commander. Like the Air Force, their views have not changed since the Korean War. Fourthly, the Services again voiced their displeasure in the Gulf over the lack of `jointness' inside the JFACC. Like the JOC system, the other Services only were allowed to provide liaison officers. Currently, there is a move to "doctrinalize" the JFACC into a truly joint system, vice the one service dominated system with liaison officers from the remaining Services. USCINCLANT's JFACC concept of operations is precisely that, a joint JFACC.(21:16) USCINCPAC is also interested and all indications are they will incorporate this kind of JFACC in future contingency planning. The Air Force senior leaders are reluctantly giving way to this joint JFACC idea and I predict that it will become doctrine in the near future. Lastly, bomb damage assessment (BDA) created problems for intelligence and targeting efforts. Poor BDA resulted in additional sorties attacking targets already destroyed. Even following forty years of technological developments, the air forces still had problems in producing timely BDA's. Again, this issue was addressed after the Korean War. Although the JFACC experienced problems between the Services, the concept proved joint TACAIR could work. The ATO system, not as responsive and flexible as the Navy/Marine Corps would like, did manage to put all TACAIR on the same `sheet of music.' The Navy found itself entering the theater without any computer terminals to receive the ATO and this caused the Navy many problems during the war. Additionally, the Navy discovered its data link systems were incompatible with Air Force air defense systems. Currently, the Navy is rectifying these shortfalls. The single largest concern Marines had was the ".. .belief that once Marine Air was under the control of the JFACC, it would be used for nontraditional/non-Marine task..." (6:34) After the initial strikes against strategic targets in Iraq and northern Kuwait, the majority of Marine Air sorties "...were flown almost exclusively in direct support of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF)." (6:34) Like the Navy, the ATO system also caused some problems for the Marines. Based on a 72 hour cycle, the ATO was just too inflexible for the Navy/Marines, whose system is based on a 24 hour cycle. `Work arounds' were created and the system managed to serve all the Services' needs. Currently, proposals are forward to make the ATO system more responsive and compatible for all the Services. The JFACC, like its JOC brother, experienced grievances amongst the other Services. However, this time all the Services are serious about rectifying discrepancies and working closer together in the joint environment. Electronic, communications, and computer equipment is being procured in order to improve inter-Service capability. Although parochialism still exist, the mood now is one of `jointness'. Especially in light of the defense cutbacks ahead, no one Service believes he can `do it alone' in the future. After forty years, jointness in TACAIR finally seems to be making positive progress. The key for further progress in joint TACAIR, is for each Service to learn and understand each other's doctrine. CONCLUSION Learning the historical development of each of the Services TACAIR doctrine's, assists one to better understand how and why each Service views the battlefield. Making comparisons of the two systems, Army/Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps, helps to understand the issues from a broader perspective. The Korean War magnified the issues over TACAIR, many of which still plague the Services today. Although the growing evolution in the joint TACAIR environment has been painfully slow, Congress helped stimulate its growth with the passage of the Goldwater- Nichols Act of 1986. The JFACC, a derivative of this Act, has been instrumental in bringing the Services to a closer joint working relationship. Certainly, the key for success is for all the Services to set parochialism aside, learn and understand each other's needs, and to make a cooperative effort to settle the remaining issues over TACAIR. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. "Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force", AFM 1-1, 16 March, 1984. 2. Cardwell III, Thomas A., Colonel, USAF, Command Structure for Theater Warfare The Quest for Unity of Command, (Air university Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Sept 1984). 3. 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