Low-Intensity Conflict And The Marine Air-Ground Task Force CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Low-Intensity Conflict and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Author: Major C. E. Kirkley, United States Marine Corps Thesis; The Marine Air-Ground Task Force is ideally suited for employment in "hot Spots" where forces are required quickly, but without excessively intruding politically, economically, or culturally. Background: Low-intensity conflict is anticipated by defense experts as the most prevalent form of warfare that the United States will be faced with in the future. The breakup of the Soviet Union has left a vacuum where regional conflicts will be bloody affairs. This threat, and the insurgencies that are currently on going in a number of countries, leave the world a very dangerous place. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force, forward deployed on naval shipping, provides the National Command Authority a flexible response. In order for Marines to prepare for low-intensity conflict, they must first understand the complexities of the different situations and operations that might be encountered in a low-intensity conflict situation. This paper examines the four activities (peacekeeping, insurgency/ counterinsurgency, terrorism, and peacetime contingency operations) which may be found in a low-intensity conflict. The types of missions, principles, and considerations that will have a significant impact on Marine forces in each activity are explored. Finally, the capabilities of the MAGTF are discussed in regard to the types of missions it may be assigned. Recommendation: That Marine Air-Ground Task Forces continue to enhance their capabilities to engage in low-intensity conflicts through education and thorough, realistic training exercises. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE OUTLINE Thesis Statement. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force is ideally suited for employment in "hot spots" where forces are required quickly, but without excessively intruding politically, economically, or culturally. I. Low-Intensity Conflict Background II. LIC Operations A. Peacekeeping B. Insurgency 1. Description 2. Phases of an Insurgency C. Counterinsurgency D. Terrorism E. Peacetime Contingencies 1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operation 2. Show of Force 3. Strike Operations 4. Humanitarian Assistance III. Peacetime Contingency Operation Principles IV. Stability Operations V. Limited Objective Operations VI. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Capabilities LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE Since World War II and the development of nuclear deterrent, the United States has been successful in averting a major war between what was the superpowers. While deterrence has worked at the higher level of the spectrum of conflict, war and resort to force at the lower level (low-intensity conflict) has not been deterred With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States is the only true superpower. But even this superpower status has its limitations. Although the Soviet Union posed a threat to the free world, it also provided a certain degree of stability. In its absence, a vacuum has been created in which the use of arms in regional conflicts will be commonplace in addition to the insurgent movements that already threaten certain countries. Low-intensity conflict (LIC) is considered by most defense experts to be the most prevalent form of warfare the United States will face in the future. The expeditionary nature of the Fleet Marine Force, embarked aboard naval ships, provides a significant capability to the National Command Authority to respond to LIC situations. Most areas of the Third World where U. S. forces are likely to be deployed for LIC missions are accessible by sea and can be supported from sea-based platforms. Sea-based options can also avoid many of the political, economic, and security problems associated with stationing U. S. forces in country. This makes the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) ideally suited for employment in "hot spots" where forces are required quickly, but without excessively intruding politically, economically, or culturally. LIC is qualitatively different from the kinds of wars for which the United States armed forces have traditionally prepared. LIC calls for intrinsically indirect operations in support of objectives which are political, economic, or psychological in nature. Operations in LIC are likely to be dominated by non-military considerations and will routinely have a heavy political-military focus. Numerous constraints will be faced by decision makers, both civilian and military, as a unique and unpredictable situation unfolds. LIC may be protracted and often undeclared. U. S. military power will be provided, at least initially, through security assistance which can include training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential equipment. Combat units do not play the primary role. The emphasis is placed on combat support and combat service support capabilities such as intelligence, logistics, medical, engineering, and civil affairs. LIC is an umbrella term comprising four often-related activities: peacekeeping operations, insurgency/counterinsurgency, peacetime contingencies, and terrorism counteraction. (5:1-1) To understand where the MAGTF "fits in", we must first understand the types of activities that the MAGTF may be faced with. Peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. There are nine general principles which govern involvement in peacekeeping: (1) Consent. The willingness of the disputing states or the host nation to an international peacekeeping effort. (2) Neutrality. Countries providing peacekeeping forces should be neutral in the crisis for which the force is being created. At the operational level, this principle is exemplified by an attitude and an atmosphere of impartiality. (3) Balance. There must be a geographic political and functional representation in the peacekeeping structure and particularly in the peacekeeping force. (4) Centralized Control. This applies at the interface between the peacekeeping force and the international body authorizing the effort. (5) Concurrent Action. Political activity which closes the disagreement between the two adversaries serves to strengthen the long term objectives. (6) Unqualified Sponsor Support. Once the international body has authorized the action, the peacekeeping structure is permitted to perform-its functions and tasks without undue hindrance. (7) Force Integrity. All elements of the force are important in accomplishing the mission. (8) Freedom of Movement. The entire peacekeeping force and its components should have guaranteed freedom of movement. (9) Self-Defense. Peacekeeping weapons are used only in self- defense. Peacekeeping operations require commanders to position their forces in potentially hostile environments. To be effective and maintain their security, the peacekeeping force must maintain their impartiality. The control of violence in peacekeeping operations requires a combination of observation, surveillance, supervision, patrolling, investigation of complaints, negotiation and mediation, and information gathering. When U. S. forces are deployed to impose peace as part of a multinational force, the operations that are executed are better described as peacemaking. Peacemaking missions differ from peacekeeping in several ways. While the ultimate objective may be to maintain peace, the initial phase in peacemaking is to achieve it. Peacemaking is often unilateral, with possibly some consent from those who would benefit, and is imposed by the peacemaking force. Peacemaking operations are aided significantly by early humanitarian assistance and public information programs aimed at the international community and the belligerents in the conflict. In peacemaking the goal is to make the transition to peacekeeping as rapidly as possible. (5:4-1) Insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. Counterinsurgency consists of those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency. Both insurgency and counterinsurgency are struggles within a society for the support of the people. (15:13) Insurgency is possibly the most "complicated" and least understood of all the possible situations in which Marines may find themselves. Every insurgency is different and unique in its own way. In order to have a general understanding of insurgency, further examination is warranted. Insurgencies owe a great deal to the circumstances in which they are conceived, and as new causes of unrest arise with fresh aspirations for change, revolutionary methods will be developed and tailored to meet the needs of the movement. The main characteristic which distinguishes campaigns of insurgency from other forms of war is that they are primarily concerned with the struggle for men's minds. Circumstances which revolutionaries might manipulate to cause unrest could be nationalism, racial or religious differences, extremes of wealth and poverty, or governmental corruption. The ultimate aim of an insurgent organization is to overthrow a government or force it to do something it does not want to do. The insurgent movement must first have the backing of a proportion of the population. Insurgents rely to a considerable extent on the people for money, shelter, food, and information. Insurgents build a program in which violence is carefully balanced by political, psychological, and economic measures. The population as a whole is likely to be the target than solely the. government. Persuasion or coercion will be commonly used. Insurgencies will normally be protracted. The insurgent leaders recognize that military action will succeed only when the revolution is supported by the people. As a result, revolutionary leaders will promote local political objectives, exploit local grievances, and use propaganda and economic pressures designed to mobilize popular support and direct it against the government. (15:31) Revolutionary war (insurgency) takes place in three distinct phases: Phase I. Pre-Revolutionary Phase/Passive Stage/Strategic Defense Stage or Latent and Incipient Phase. This phase is designed to expand the party organization and establish the infrastructure on which the revolution can develop. Action may at first be covert and take years to accomplish. Phase II. Insurgency Phase/Active Phase/Strategic Stalemated Guerrilla Warfare. The aim throughout this phase is to consolidate popular support, enlarge the areas under rebel control, discredit the government, dishearten its supporters, weaken its forces, and demon- strate that the revolutionary movement is capable of providing an alternative ,and better government. Phase III. Limited War Phase/Counter Offensive Stage/ War of Movement. This final phase starts when the balance has swung in favor of the insurgent forces. Mobile warfare begins in which regular fighting units, which can be as large as regiments and divisions, operate from insurgent controlled areas. In counterinsurgency, there is no such thing as a purely military solution, just as there is no purely political solution. Counter- insurgency, or foreign internal defense, is based on the premise that the host nation is responsible for the development and execution of programs to prevent or defeat an insurgency. A full range of measures must be taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The primary objective is a level of internal security that permits economic, political, and social growth through balanced development programs. (15:143) It is directed towards both the population and the insurgent. There are three elements to a counterinsurgency strategy: social mobilization, balanced development, and neutralization. Social mobilization includes all activities to motivate and organize the population in support of the government; balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through balanced economic. political and social development; and neutralization includes all lawful activities to disrupts disorganize, and defeat an insurgent organization. Although no two insurgencies will be the same, the following principles, when adapted to a particular situation, provide an easily understood basis from which to begin planning: (1) Intelligence. Accurate and timely intelligence in an insurgency is critical. The insurgent may blend in with the local population and nearly impossible to detect. The intelligence effort must be a joint venture involving the military, police, special branches and the government. (2) Collocation of Military and Police Headquarters. To successfully defeat an insurgency, the military and police must together plan and conduct joint operations. (3) Use of Minimum Force. Indiscriminate use of force may alienate the population instead of gaining their support. (4) Adequate Mobile Reserve. In LIC, there are no front lines or rear areas. Therefore, a mobile reserve is critical to countering insurgent strikes in the assigned area of responsibility. (5) Relevant Training. In addition to the standard basic training and military skills training that is received, units must undergo specialized training in LIC and the theater environment prior to deployment. (6) Communications. Good, reliable communications is critical. Not only within the military unit, but also with local police and government officials. (7) Public Relations. Insurgents capitalize on propaganda; therefore, the government and military must have a program established to counter any effects that the insurgents might have in this regard. (8) Areas of Responsibility. Continuity is critical in a counter-insurgency situation. Military forces must be intimately familiar with the people and the terrain in their area to be effective. Insurgency situations are unique and constantly changing. The principles discussed above, when adapted to a particular situation, will allow commanders to apply proper tactics and techniques. "Kill one, frighten ten thousand." This precept from Sun Tzu's teachings, has become one of the most significant threats that nations must deal with on a day-to-day basis. Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. Terrorist groups are generally categorized as nonstate supported, state supported or state directed. Terrorist attacks can be classified by their immediate objective: (1) Recognition (2) Coercion (3) Intimidation (4) Provocation (5) Insurgency support A terrorist group may pursue one or all of these objectives by using the tactic of assassination, bombing, hostage taking, hijacking, kidnaping, raids, sabotage, hoaxes, or the threatened use of chemical or biological weapons. It may be only a short time before terrorists will have access to nuclear weapons, creating a whole new hazard. Terrorists attack targets that are vulnerable, have a high psycho- logical impact, produce significant publicity, and demonstrate the government's inability to protect the population. Terrorism counter- action focuses on intelligence, threat estimation, operations security, personnel security, physical security, military police and interior guard countermeasures, and crisis management counteraction operations. (5:3-0) Peacetime contingency operations are politically sensitive military operations characterized by the short-term, rapid projection or use of forces in conditions short of conventional war. They may include actions such as raids, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), rescue missions, shows of force and demonstrations, or other limited uses of force. (5:5-1) Such operations may be necessary when the security situation in a country has deteriorated to a point where the host government cannot or will not fulfill its responsibility for the safety of U. S. nationals. Contingency operations are conducted across the spectrum of conflict; but, when performed in LIC, the requirement to deal with political or other nonmilitary aspects of the operation increases significantly. Military forces utilized in a peacetime contingency operation do so as an instrument of foreign policy. Accordingly military efforts must be coordinated with diplomatic and economic initiatives to ensure unity of effort. Specifically, military forces may be assigned to conduct the following missions: (1) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. NEOs are conducted to relocate civilian noncombatants in a foreign nation from locations that are threatened by hostile action. Normally U. S. citizens are only evacuated, but host nation and third country personnel may be included. (2) Shows of Force. Forces forward deployed throughout the world show U. S. resolve and commitments. The sustainability of the force is the most critical planning factor. (3) Strike Operations. Strike operations are the most overt use of force in conditions short of war. Operations may be to recover U. S. personnel and property or to conduct a punitive action to support political and diplomatic measures. Intelligence is especially critical in strike operations. (4) Humanitarian Assistance Support. This type of operation is conducted to provide relief to victims of natural disasters normally at the request of the host nation. Logistic support is the primary concern in humanitarian assistance. Peacetime contingency operations are complex and generally unanticipated. Logistical requirements may dominate the mission and can present significant demands on service and joint supported forces. Command relationships are normally more complex because of their unique force requirements and the peculiarities of political-military considerations. Restrictive rules of engagement may hamper the security of the force. The following principles are inherent in all peacetime contingency operations: (1) Military efforts must be coordinated with diplomatic, media, and public relations initiatives. (2) National objectives must translate into clear, concise military objectives. (3) Detailed and flexible planning is critical. Clear lines of command, control and communications must be established. (4) Minimum force is normally applied at the decisive point, although overwhelming force may be necessary at certain times. (5) Planning for logistical support must be comprehensive. (6) All personnel in the unit must be aware of the importance of their mission and the sensitivities involved. Low-intensity conflict is a unique situation. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force is a viable and flexible tool offering varying degrees of force to counter a low-intensity threat. In LIC, MAGTFs can execute stability operations to assist friendly or allied governments to maintain internal stability and to ensure public welfare, and limited objective operations to achieve specific objectives through the application of calculated combinations of military force. Two major differences set these operations apart. In limited objective operations, the use of force is planned from the beginning. (16:16-1) In stability operations, it is a contingent self-defense measure. The mission objective in a limited objective operation usually is clearly expressed in military terms. In a stability operation it often is not. Stability operations may include the following: (1) Presence. Presence includes joint and combined exercises and show of force missions. Operations will consist of exercises that simulate wartime operations and improve the level of joint and combined training. Show of force missions are intended to show American resolve. (2) Humanitarian Assistance. MAGTFs provide humanitarian assist- ance in response to natural disasters, as a product of deliberate bilateral agreement, and as civic action projects. Humanitarian assistance operations provide effective help while learning about the people and preserving good will. (3) Mobile Training Teams. Mobile training teams (MTTs) provide security assistance coordinated through the Department of State. The objective of MTT operations is to provide recipients an organic training capability. (4) Peacekeeping. MAGTFs execute peacekeeping operations in a potentially hostile environment, normally as part of a joint or combined force. The objective is to deter or contain violence. Al- though peacekeeping operations are a type of stability operation, such operations can quickly escalate to open conflict. (5) Security. MAGTFs executing security operations protect U. S. lives and property, protect a friendly government's integrity, preserve treaty rights, and/or provide intelligence and other support to improve host nation capabilities. A joint or combined force normally conducts security operations. (6) Counterinsurgency. MAGTFs conduct counterinsurgency operations to help stabilize and assist in foreign internal defense. MAGTFs counter insurgent threats through a combination of selected combat, intelligence, psychological, and civic action operations designed to destroy the insurgent's grip on the people. The objective is to shift the popular support away from the insurgents and toward the legitimate government. MAGTFs provide support through the local government to improve the environment and deny resources to the insurgents. Counterinsurgency operations may escalate to limited objective operations. (7) Counternarcotics. MAGTFs participate in counternarcotic operations when directed by the National Command Authority (NCA). Support may range from providing individual military skills training to active participation in an interagency task force conducting counternarcotic raids beyond U. S. borders. MAGTFs may also provide operational planning instruction and assistance to interagency task forces, communications, transportation support, and conduct sur- veillance and interdiction operations. MAGTFs engaging in limited objective operations perform peacetime contingency operations and counterterrorist operations. In both operations, the mission, duration, geographic area, and application of force is constrained. Limited objective operations do not include pursuit and exploitation. MAGTFs can perform six types of peacetime contingency operations: raids, seizure of ports and airfields, reinforce, protect or evacuate non-combatants, recover downed air- crews, and hostage rescue. In counterterrorist operations, MAGTFs prevent, deter, and respond to acts of terrorism. MAGTFs embarked aboard ships can be tailored to support joint or combined operations or, in extreme cases, to conduct unilateral counterterrorist opera- tions. The amphibious raid is the cornerstone of the MAGTFs counter- terrorist capability. The MAGTF conducts raids to destroy known terrorist targets, recover hostages or sensitive material or provide a diversion in support of national counterterrorist operations. Current concepts, doctrine, and MAGTF structure are well-suited for the deployment and employment of Marine forces in a LIC environment. Embarked MAGTFs - can precisely tailor forces ashore to the situation and quickly adjust forces as required. - can limit vulnerable and highly visible facilities ashore. - can employ air and surface assets to insert forces into and extract forces from locations with minimal dependence on established shore facilities. - have the organic sustainability and seabased support capable to remain on the scene for an extended period. - once ashore, are prepared to act as either a component of a joint task force or to provide the nucleus for its headquarters. The Navy-Marine Corps team provides great flexibility in responding to low-intensity conflict situations. The strengths of this team are: (1) Self-contained forces. (2) Self-sustaining forces. (3) Combined arms. (4) Centralized command, decentralized command and control. (5) Quick and effective mission accomplishment. As long as the Marine Corps continues to build on these strengths, the MAGTF will be capable of rapid, decisive, and efficient discriminate use of combat power. These capabilities make the MAGTF ideally suited for employment in low-intensity situations where forces are required quickly, but without excessively intruding politically, economically, or culturally. Bibliography 1. Ayers, Charles M. "Low Intensity Conflicts: Operational Considerations ." Washington, DC: Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, 1987. 2. Barnes, Lt. Col. R. C. "Civil Affairs: A LIC Priority." Military Review September 88: 38. 3. Blank, Stephen "Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges." Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1990. 4. Evans, Ernest "Wars without Splendor: The U. S. Military and Low Intensity Conflict." New York: Greenwood Press 1987. 5. Field Manual 100 - 20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Headquarters Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 1990. 6. Fishel, Lt. Col. J. "Civil-Military Operations and the War for Moral Legitimacy in Latin America." Military Review January 88: 66. 7. Fleet Marine Force Manual 8 - 2 Counter-Insurgency Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1980. 8. Furr, William "Low Intensity Conflict: Imperatives for Success." Washington, DC: Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, 1988. 9. Glynn, Francis M. "Security Assistance and Low-Intensity Conflict." Washington, DC: Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, 1987. 10. Kitson, Frank "Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping." New York: Stackpole Books 1971. 11. Klare, Michael T. "LIC: Counterinsurgency, Insurgency, and Counter-Terrorism in the "80s." New York: Pantheon Books 1987. 12. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Master Plan 1992 - 2002. Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1991. 13. Moore, John N. "Low Intensity Conflict and a Strategy of Deterrence." Naval War College Review Jan-Feb 86: 30. 14. Olson, RAdm. P. R. "Low-Intensity Conflict: Myths and Trends." Planning and Policy in Low-Intensity Conflict Conference. Washington, DC: Joint Staff, J - 5, 1988. 15. O'Neill, Bard E. "Insurgency and Terrorism." Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc. 1990. 16. Operational Handbook 6 - 1 Ground Combat Operations. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1988. 17. Rylander, R. Lynn "The Future of Marines in Small Wars." Naval War College Review Autumn 87: 64. 18. Sarkesian, Sam "The New Battlefield: The U. S. and Unconventional Conflicts." New York: Greenwood Press 1986. 19. Shultz, Richard H. "Guerrilla Warfare and Counter-Insurgency: U. S. - Soviet Policy in the Third World." Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books 1989. 20. Zais, Maj. M. M. "LIC: Matching Missions and Forces. Military Review August 86: 79.
