Reevaluating Our Amphibious Doctrine CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy -TEXT- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: REEVALUATING OUR AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE AUTHOR: Major R. J. Johnson, United States Marine Corps THESIS: Although many things were done right in Southwest Asia, we need to reexamine our lessons learned. We need to record those lessons that will serve us well in the future and consider the rest to be an anomaly of the Southwest Asia campaign. BACKGROUND: Even though the Southwest Asia campaign was a huge success. We still need to examine our lessons learned. Most of our success was in the areas of strategy, tactics, and technology. The most disturbing problems existed in the areas of command and control. Since Desert Storm was our first large conflict since Vietnam, we tended to send as many Marines as possible to the theater. Unfortunately, this caused more problems than it did solutions. No where was this more evident than in the amphibious warfare community. Maybe it was because our amphibious doctrine is about as old as the last time we conducted a large scale amphibious assault. No one person or agency is directly to blame. Although, it was very apparent that the Marine Corps is still capable of conducting amphibious warfare. The show stopper in Desert Storm was not the mines, but the lack of understanding that doctrine needed to modified, when the situation dictated. Amphibious operations must be planned and executed in close cooperation with other events happening simultaneously. If amphibious operations is going remain the forte of the Marine Corps, than we must modify our doctrine and match it to our present capability. RECOMMENDATION: The Marine Corps must be instrumental in the development of current amphibious doctrine. REEVALUATING OUR AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE OUTLINE Thesis: Although many things were done right in Southwest Asia, we need to reexamine our lessons learned. We to record those lessons that will serve us well in the future and consider the rest to be an anomaly of the Southwest Asia campaign. I. The MEF as a warfighter A. The loss of the MEB command elements B. The MEF organization C. Liaison teams II. Maneuver from the Sea A. Over the horizon capability B. Historical example III. CATF/CLF Relationships A. Historical development B. Responsibilities of CATF IV. The AOA and the Deep Battle A. The necessity of the AOA B. Control of the Deep Battle Reevaluating our Amphibious Doctrine For the past year, I have been fortunate to attend Command and Staff College which has provided me the time to reflect and analyze on the recent conflict in Southwest Asia. This unique opportunity has allowed me to conduct countless interviews, listen to cassette tapes and review the vast amount of lessons learned. Desert Shield and Desert Storm has proven the Marine Corps' capability to deploy rapidly and readiness to fight, when we arrive. During my studies, I have concentrated principally on the Marine Corps forte of Amphibious Warfare. Many innovative tactics and techniques were developed while the amphibious forces were rehearsing for a possible assault upon the beaches of Kuwait. Our constant pursuit of technological advantages has enhanced our abilities to move rapidly throughout the today's modern battlefield. The Global Positioning System (GPS) was probably the highest regarded piece of technology to come out of Southwest Asia. During the ship to shore movement phase, the assault waves were able to verify their position in the water and navigate to a precise landing point. This was accomplished without the directional aid from the Primary Control Ship (PCS) under emission control (EMCON) conditions and in hours of reduced visibility. However, with all the improved technology and techniques that were developed, several areas of concern arose. Primarily, these dealt with command and control issues. When amphibious doctrine was first written and developed many of the systems that are in existence today were not even imagined then. Doctrine has never been able to keep up with changes in tactics and technology but nowhere is this more evident than in the field of amphibious warfare. During operations in the Gulf many modifications were made to doctrine, whether these served a purpose or not is open to discussion. Our amphibious doctrine is still in many ways very solid. It has been battle tested and offers a foundation in which we can build upon. Although many things were done right in Southwest Asia, we need to reexamine our lessons learned. We need to record those lessons that will serve us well in the future and consider the rest to be an anomaly of the Southwest Asia campaign. Fighting as a MEF During the force structure review, BGen Krulak and his Force Structure Review Board recommended that the MEB command elements be eliminated in an attempt to comply with the force reductions, directed by DOD. By doing so the MEF command elements will now have to provide command elements to brigade size deployments. This is going to force the MEFs to compose a staff from within to operate these MAGTFs. Whether or not these Marines have trained together is a mute point, when we consider that up to one third of MEF staff could be deployed upon amphibious shipping. This might not be a problem if the deployment is short in duration but what happens if is an extended period as was the case in Southwest Asia. This would require the MEF to train additional personnel, to possibly fight the MEF later. JCS Pub 1-02 states that a Marine Expeditionary Force is the largest of the Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) , is normally built around a division/wing team , but can include several divisions and aircraft wings together with an appropriate combat service support organization. The scenario in Southwest Asia has certainly proven that a MEF can operate with more than one division at a time. With the MEF commander designated as a warfighter, he is going to need a staff to fulfill that mission. It was a noted discrepancy that the current standing MEF staff was not sufficient to fight the MEF as it was tailored to and that it required additional augmentation to fulfill a wartime T/O. With the possibility of the MEF being tasked to provide MEB command elements, where will the additional augmentation come from and how long can the MEF operate with some of its key operators deployed afloat. During a critique of the Southwest Asia campaign, BGen Van Riper stated: " ... In short, MEBs should be viewed as a "slice" of a MEF, not permanent organizations that join temporally to form the MEF, or worse yet, stand-alone organizations that operate under the MEF. Looked at in another way, MEBs should routinely be considered as MEF(Forward)." If this is the case what happens if the MEF (FWD) is now deployed on Amphibious shipping and the remainder of the MEF deploys later ashore ? This is a particular concern considering that Marines afloat on Amphibious Shipping according to present doctrine belong to the Naval Force Commander. In the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, chapter 3 discusses MAGTF Crisis Action Modules. It states that "Crisis Action Modules are building blocks which allow the sequential flow of Marine Corps Combat Forces to the Warfighting CINC". These building blocks or deployment pillars are: Strategic Airlift, Amphibious Ready Forces, and Maritime Preposition Force. This deployment plan works very well in describing how forces can deploy to theater but fails to address the point on how to employ the entire force later. If we lose the MEB command elements and still have the responsibility to deploy rapidly, we must find a way coordinate between the forces afloat and ashore. An example of why close coordination is necessary occurred in Southwest Asia. The amphibious assault upon Ash Shuaybah in Kuwait would have required a linkup with I MEF forces coming from the southwest. Although linkup points were designated, no other control measures were given. What was necessary was to have direct communication between the CLF and the supported ground force commander (I MEF) to agree on mutually determined control measures such as restricted fires lines, recognition signals, etc. ... The objective of these communications and control measures are to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the success of the amphibious assault, the safety of the ATF, the safety of the forces on the ground from friendly fires and the continuous, uninterrupted engagement of enemy forces. (9:6) It comes as no surprise that the MEF Cmdr in Southwest Asia had trouble coordinating efforts with the Marine forces afloat. Although the lack of communications capability and equipment between the two forces seemed to be the most dominant factor. It can be argued that a basic misunderstanding of concepts and issues existed between the Naval and Marine components. In an attempt to rectify the situation, MajGen Sheehan was then sent to Admiral Arthur's Naval Force staff as a liaison officer for LtGen. Boomer, the MEF Cmdr ashore. Having MajGen Sheehan on the flagship seem to bridge the gap that had been lacking concerning amphibious issues. It has been suggested that maybe this type of liaison officer become "doctrinal" for future amphibious operations. This in my opinion would be a mistake to add yet another staff in the planning process. Currently each Naval Fleet has a Fleet Marine Officer assigned to the staff. His responsibilities is to recommend and advise the Fleet Cmdr on employment of Marine forces. The actual plan for employment should be between the CLF and the Fleet Cmdr. Although MajGen Sheehan and his staff did an admirably job it seems awful redundant to have a Commander of the Landing Force that could have perform the exact same task. Maneuver From The Sea Over-the-Horizon (OTH) was an operational concept for positioning amphibious forces further offshore in the execution of a ship-to-shore phase of an amphibious operation which is intended to enhance the survival of the amphibious task force. This employment can increase the likelihood of achieving tactical surprise at the point of power projection ashore. (2:16) The title for this concept has changed to maneuver from the sea. I believe that this will better describe the concept that we as Marines are trying to achieve. It provides an understanding that our movement or maneuver to a lightly defended beach or landing zone will provide us that tactical surprise. This is not a new concept. During the Vietnam War, the Seventh Fleet maintained two Special Landing Forces (SLF) for a reinforcing capability. The two Special Landing Forces of the Seventh Fleet were each comprised of a Marine Battalion Landing Team and a Marine helicopter squadron, and provided ComUSMACV/ CG III MAF with a highly-flexible, amphibious striking force for operations along the South Vietnam littoral. During the amphibious operation, operational control of the SLF remained with the Amphibious Task Force Commander designated by Commander, Seventh Fleet. However, this relationship may not have persisted throughout the operation if coordination with forces ashore dictated otherwise. When the Special Landing Force was firmly established ashore, operational control was passed to CG III MAF who,in turn, may shift control to the division to whose area the Special Landing Force was operating. Operational control of the helicopter squadron was then passed to the 1st Maine Aircraft Wing. (7:19) The Special Landing Forces, cruising off the Vietnamese coast, provided two battalions that could very quickly come ashore and add to the to the III MAF inventory. In Southwest Asia, we could have operate in the exact same method as in Vietnam. Both scenarios had Marine forces established ashore, that could have coordinated the necessary control measures needed to conduct operations ashore. The plan in Southwest Asia would have required the 4th MEB to establish a lodgement on the enemy flank and then conduct a link-up with I MEF forces. By having Marine forces operating off the coast, and ready to support Marines ashore makes sense. What we need is to have a command relationship established between those forces in doctrine. We now have the opportunity to reevaluate and restructure our amphibious doctrine to match our present capabilities and changing force structure. The probability of conducting a large scale amphibious assault into a defended beach will continue to be unlikely. First, we will not have the sufficient resources in Marines or amphibious lift to carry out such an operation. Second, the cost of carrying out such an operation would be too high in terms of casualties. This is not to say that we should not train for such an assault, just that we need to focus on our amphibious capabilities, and maximize its potential. By conducting combined operations, utilizing an amphibious assault in conjunction with an already established ground force, we force the enemy to react to us. Maintaining our amphibious capability will allow us to retain our operational and tactical edge. CATF/CLF Relationships The debate over the CATF/CLF relationship has been an on going battle since its inception. During the evolution of amphibious warfare, it was decided that the Naval Commander would have overall command of the landing force. The Tentative Manual of 1938, stressed the particular problems of amphibious warfare in those days. As for command relationships, it assigned overall command of the landing to the Naval Commander, since the landing force was only one element of a complex task force organization designed to protect the landing force from enemy sea and air attacks. Unanswered was the question of transfer of command ashore to the landing force commander once the campaign developed, because the planners were only thinking of short operations to secure the beachhead only. (4:331) Modifications continued to be made throughout the Second World War. After Guadacanal, Commandant Holcomb persuaded Admirals Halsey, Nimitz, and King to accept an important modification of Fleet Training Manual-167, the doctrinal manual for amphibious operations. " Henceforth, the Navy agreed, the landing force commander would subordinate himself only during the movement phase to the objective area and the initial landings. During the planning stages and the land campaign, the Navy and Marine commanders would be co- equal; they would submit their disagreements to the common superior (presumably a Navy theater commander) for resolution. (4:371) This only shows that if doctrine can be modified in the middle of a war, then there is no reason why we can not modify it now. The CLF is responsible for planning and executing the landing plan in coordination with the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force. One has to ask who really was the CATF in Southwest Asia? As set forth by JCS Pub 3-02 the Amphibious Task Force consists of the Transport Groups, Control Groups, Tactical Air Groups, Fire Support Groups, Shore-Based Navy Tactical Air Groups, Support Carrier Groups, Screening Group, Mine Warfare Group, Reconnaissance and underwater Demolition Group, Tactical Deception Group, Inshore Undersea Warfare Group, Close Covering Group, Patrol Plane Group, Air Transport Group, Administrative Group, and Naval Beach Group. Ever since PhibLant/PhibPac were disbanded in 1973 and the functions passed to SurfLant/SurfPac and then further delegated to the PhibGru's, the importance of amphibious warfare has diminished in the Navy. (1:17-18) Unfortunately the PhibGru's in Southwest Asia were unable to perform the task as CATF. Two problems are apparent: (1) He does not have authority over the assets required to support operations of this size, and (2) His primary responsibility and the majority of his efforts centered around the duties as the transport group commander. (1-18) The responsibilities of the CATF are all the functions now listed under control of the Fleet Cmdr. or the Officer in Tactical Control (OTC). When the Composite Warfare Commander concept was introduced it was originally defensive in nature. Although it eventually recognized the strike warfare community it failed to designate an amphibious warfare function. Additionally each separate fleet has interpreted the CWC concept in their own way. The Third Fleet Tac Memo PZ 1010-1-88 recommends that the Amphibious Ready Group be redesignated the Amphibious Warfare Commander. It would also have the CLF as a composite commander as well. This would put the AWC and the CLF on the same command level. This can be interpreted to mean that the need for a CATF no longer exist and the responsibilities for CATF now rely with the OTC. The changes that have occurred in the command and control area have alleviated the need for redundant command systems. The AOA and the Deep Battle We must be cautious of the traditional roles and missions that have existed for so long. For the most part, people in the ATF were resistent to change. Being resistent to change failed them to realize, that the doctrine they were relying on, needed to be modified. One of the biggest problem of the ATF, was on the subject of the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). This was a highly debated issue then and continued way after the hostilities had ended. JCS Pub 1-02 defines the AOA as a "geographic area, for purposes of command and control" providing "sufficient area for conducting necessary sea and land operations." Although it was never determined who in the ATF requested the necessity of the AOA, it was finally assigned by the CINC to be implemented if either plan was executed. There is no reason for such a severe control measure in a well established theater. Especially considering there was absolutely no air or sea threat to speak of, and the fact that CENTAF who was designated the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) and had control of the airspace. All locations of the planned assaults were in a friendly Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) and involved a linkup with I MEF forces within a relatively short period of time after the landing. (1-19) In draft form FMFM-2 has addressed the AOA issue. Its definition basically cover both an austere theater and an established theater: " The three dimensional AOA is necessary for amphibious assaults occurring in areas not in close proximity to concurrent friendly ground or air operations. However, when an amphibious assault is planned in support of and/or in proximity to an already established ground force, which is employing a fully functioning air command and control system, the AOA may be inappropriate. What may be necessary is .. .mutually determined control measures... The discussion of the AOA, relates directly to the fighting of the deep battle. The Marines on both sides had to be careful, if the assault had taken place. The AOA would have prevented anyone from firing into it without prior authorization by CATF\CLF. The deep battle seem to be claimed by both the ground force commander (who's TAOR it belonged) and the ATF. In this case, it would seem obvious that the deep battle belong to the ground force commander. Instead of using a Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL), I would advocate using another TAOR for the forces coming ashore. This would allow a sufficient control measure to prevent one friendly side from engaging another. If sufficient control agencies are established ashore (TACC), then the control of ACE assets that can interdict deep targets should be transferred to the Wing supporting the MEF. Doctrine not only needs to address the AOA issue but the deep battle as well, when entering a friendly TAOR. After completing this study, I believe that the feasibility to maintain two standing amphibious MEBs, needs to be reexamined. Presently, we don't stand to gain any additional lift capability, besides the two MEBs worth that we already have now. This limitation of amphibious shipping alone stresses the need to apply more emphasis into our amphibious capability. The two present MEBs, the 4th and 5th maintain a good working relationship with their counterparts in the Amphibious Ready Groups. It would be a shame to lose that. Although we had a problem with personalities and compositing, I believe that the continuity must remain in the MEBs. If we do disband the MEB command elements and fight as MEFs than our MEF staffs need to increase more than previously reported. We also need to design doctrine so that the MEF Cmdr can more easily talk to his forces afloat. If the CINC determines that the Amphibious Task Force would be better served by landing in the MEF TAOR, than those forces should become supporting forces to the MEF. We must always remember that the Amphibious Task Force is one of the CINC's most valuable assets. This combat multiplier can be an extensive strategic, operational or tactical value to the CINC. If it is to remain that potent than we must improve any chance we get. Bibliography 1. Amphibious Operations in Southwest Asia. Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0001. The Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Quantico, VA: 1992. 2. Goodman, LtCol J. F. "The MAGTF Command Element." Rough Draft FMFM-2, chapter 2. Quantico, VA: 1991. 3. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. JCS Pub 3-02. Washington: November 1986. 4. Millett, A. R. "The History of the United States Marine Corps." New York: Macmillian Publishing, 1980. 5. Pierce, LCDR T. C. "Who's in Charge." Naval Proceedings, August 1991: 32-37. 6. U. S. Marine Corps. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; Marine Corps supplement. FMFRP 0-14. Quantico, VA: 1989. 7. U. S. Marine Corps. History and Museums Division. The Battle of Khe Sanh, Washington, D. C. : 1969. 8. Van Riper, BGen P. K. "Observations during Operation Desert Storm." Marine Corps Gazette. June: 91. 54-56.
