The Time Has Come For The Marine Air Defense (MAD) Battalion And The Hawk Mobility Survivability Enhancement (HMSE) Program CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Time Has Come For The Marine Air Defense (MAD) Battalion And The Hawk Mobility Survivability Enhancement (HMSE) Program Author: Major Jeffrey Josserand, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The equipment and organization of Marine air defense is not sound. Background: The current organization and equipment of ground based air defense assets in the Marine Corps is not sound. The organization does not provide a fully integrated air defense for the entire Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in all phases of an expeditionary operation. nor does the current equipment configuration. To understand the problem it is necessary to look briefly at the changing air threat following the demise of the Soviet Union. history of air defense in the Marine Corps and the deficiencies of the current systems. The conclusion contains an outline of a program of reorganization and equipment changes which if adopted will correct the deficiencies. Recommendation: The HAWK Mobility Survivability Enhancement program and the Marine Air Defense Battalion should be adopted to better prepare the Marine Corps for the future. The Time Has Come For The Marine Air Defense (MAD) Battalion And The Hawk Mobility Survivability Enhancement (HMSE) Program I. Today's air threat A. Anti-Ship Missiles B. Tactical Ballistic Missiles C. Anti-Tank Guided Missiles D. What these threats mean to the Navy and Marine Corps II. The history of air defense in the Marine Corps A. Redeye and Forward Area Air Defense batteries B. Stinger and Low Altitude Air Defense battalions III. The problem IV. The Solution A. The HAWK Mobility Survivability Enhancement Program B. The Marine Air Defense battalion The one-shot-one-kill potential of many airborne weapon systems leaves no room for error in air defense. Even with the demise of the Soviet Union the proliferation of modern weapons technology in the third world leaves few potential trouble spots without a significant air threat. In response to this threat. the United States Marine Corps has embarked on a number of equipment upgrades and organizational changes designed to offset the advantages currently posed by our country's potential adversaries. To fully understand these changes it is necessary to take a brief look at the threat. a history of the current organization. and why the new changes have been adopted. The first need is to recognize the changes in air threat on the modern battlefield and how they may effect amphibious landings in the future. Ships are the largest mobile targets in the world. It is unfortunate that what is true of all ships is more true in the case of amphibious warships. Naval designers have continued to make larger and larger amphibious ships and. consequently. easier and more valuable targets. The requirement for amphibious warships to come very near to the beach in the execution of their mission places these ships at great risk. Reduced radar capability and the air avenues of approach provided ashore combine to severely reduce the effectiveness of the otherwise very effective air defenses of the amphibious task force. Unfortunately. the destructive power of anti-ship missiles launched from land, sea, or air, gives a massive destruction capability to just a few enemy aircraft--even when we have air superiority. The power of an anti-ship missile is not a surprise. On October 21. 1967, the Israeli destroyer Elath gained the dubious distinction of becoming the first warship to be destroyed by an anti-ship missile. The destroyer had been hit in rapid succession by three Styx missiles fired by a small patrol boat. In less than a minute the traditional measures of naval power had been changed by a technological innovation which theoretically allowed a small platform to sink any ship afloat from a distance of 30 miles. The sinking jolted naval staffs all over the world into action to develop similar weapons and countermeasures. In the spring of 1982, the United Kingdom was given a nasty surprise at the hands of the Argentines. The loss of the HMS Sheffield to an Exocet missile placed into question the follow-on amphibious landing. Efforts to develop similar systems throughout the world were greatly reinforced by the success of the Exocet. In the past decade the United States Navy found itself on both the giving and receiving end of anti-ship missiles. The traditional Navy requirement to keep the sea lanes open required the sinking of a number of Libyan vessels with U.S. anti-ship missiles. Later in the decade the threat to the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf saw U.S. ships at risk from a similar threat. The unexpected attack by an Iraqi launched Exocet on the USS Stark. and the heavy loss of life resulting. demonstrated the threat. During Desert Storm, the threat of Iraqi Silkworm and Exocet missiles was widely recognized. Iraq also managed to save nearly three hundred helicopters from destruction while under Allied air supremacy. It should be noted that many of these helicopters were capable of firing anti-ship missiles. The past twenty-five years have not found the United States Navy without action in anti-ship missile defense. Navy doctrine includes an area distant from the task force called the "fighter-engagement" zone. Closer in. and directly over the task force. is the missile engagement zone. Many new and very capable weapons have been added in the past few years to combat anti-ship missiles. The actions of all weapons in these areas are coordinated by numerous radars and a complex communication system. The combined power of this array is impressive: it provides the United States Navy excellent protection on the high seas against aircraft and missiles and has worked well on a number of occasions. What the existing system cannot do is provide the required protection to the ships of the amphibious task force while they are close to the landing beach. During the Gulf War the power of Tactical Ballistic Missiles and how hard they were to destroy prior to launch was clearly demonstrated. Although in the current period of little real military threat they are a real threat for the future. Improved accuracy and/or the addition of a chemical or nuclear warhead will make Tactical Ballestic Missiles a major threat to both the Navy and Marine Corps. Marines ashore and the Navy, to include amphibious ships, currently have no defense against these missiles. It is not difficult to imagine the negative impact that these missiles would have on an amphibious landing. In 1973 the power of the Anti-Tank Guided Missile was first demonstrated. Obviously of little threat to ships the success of these missiles had many predicting for the elimination of Tanks from the battlefield. During the Gulf War coalition forces again demonstrated the devastating power of these missiles when used by helicopter. The increasing range of Anti-Tank Guided Missiles and the ability to fire them day or night has placed everyone on the battlefield at risk. This weapon system has had a huge impact on the forward areas of the battlefield. Recent improvements in the range of these missiles when fired by helicopter have given them a longer reach then the air defense missiles used to defend the forward area. What is consistent with Anti-Ship Missiles, Anti-Tank Guided Missiles and Tactical Ballistic Missiles is that they are all relatively new threats on the modern battlefield. Each threaten the amphibious forced entry capability of this country. Even with the few air assets that an enemy may have, and given that we have air superiority as is required to conduct an amphibious landing, the greatly increased destructive power of these new weapons will place the Navy and Marine Corps team at great risk to an enemy with relatively few assets. The result is that air superiority does not mean what it once did. Therefore, it is necessary to reestablish the circle of air defense around the amphibious task force using ground-based air defense assets quickly moved ashore early in an amphibious landing. These assets must have sensor coverage. command and control. and firepower sufficient to the task. The history of air defense in the Marine Corps is relatively brief. Hand-held air defense missiles were introduced into the Marine Corps in 1966 with the addition of a single Redeye missile platoon to the structure of both United States based Marine divisions: this unit later moved to the Marine Air Wing. A two- or three-platoon strength was maintained up until the early l980s. In 1980-82 the Stinger missile system was introduced to replace the Redeye system. and structure was increased to 20 platoons located in three active and one reserve forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) batteries. In 1986 the FAAD battery was replaced with the Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) battalion which had a slight increase in strength over the old FAAD battery organization. Today there are three active and one reserve LAAD battalion. The result of this slow initial evolution and rapid recent growth is that few officers in the Marine Corps had any real practical experience with hand-held air defense missiles until recently. The Home All the Way to Kill (HAWK) missile system was introduced into the Marine Corps in the early 1960's. The system has been repeatedly modernized over the years to maintain its status as one of the best air defense systems in the world. The HAWK system is located in the Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (LAAM) battalions of the Marine Air Wing. Force reductions caused one LAAM battalion to be deactivated in 1991. leaving two active and one reserve battalion. Criticism of the HAWK system was significant during the 1980s. At the head of this criticism was General Gray. He was a strong proponent of maneuver warfare and expeditionary forces and as such pushed for a lighter more mobile air wing. The HAWK system was used as an example of a system that required too much strategic lift. The lift required placed into question whether the HAWK system would ever be deployed and if this was true why the Marine Corps needed the HAWK system at all. Incredibly, in the face of this presure to reduce the lift requirement. the HAWK system actually grew. In early 1988 the staff officers responsible for the HAWK system recognized that if the Marine Corps ground based air defense system was to retain a medium altitude air defense capability. which they felt was needed. something had to change. The most recent modernization of the HAWK system called Phase III started in 1989. One part of the original program was designed to improve the launcher. Unfortunately the launcher upgrade had not been funded. During the same period another required reduction in structure placed the HAWK system at risk of complete elimination from the Marine Corps inventory. Staff officers from Marine Corps Research Development and Acquisition Command (MCRDAC) and Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), along with the HAWK system contractor, built on the unfunded launcher improvements to make dramatic modifications to the existing system: this effort was later called the HAWK Mobility Survivability Enhancement (HMSE) program. The HMSE, program was designed to fix the deficiencies of the HAWK system and provide the first building block in gaining a defense against Tactical Ballistic Missiles. In early April of 1990 General Gray, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, was briefed on the HSME program. General Gray endorsed the program. He also asked what impact it would have on the two proposed plans then circulating to reorganize ground-based air defense. Neither the 1st MAW or 2d MAW plans had taken these equipment solutions into account. At the conclusion of the meeting. the Commandant directed that the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) propose a plan to take advantage of the HMSE program and build upon the 1st MAW and 2d MAW reorganization plans. On 12 June 1990 the Commandant, assistant Commandant and the Commanding Generals of both the MCCDC and MCRDAC were briefed on the result of the MCCDC effort. During that meeting the Commandant directed that the ground based air defense assets of the Marine Corps be reorganized into Marine Air Defense Battalions. He directed that a test should be conducted in early 1991 to first validate the concept. Key to conducting this test was to gain a sufficient amount of funding to procure the equipment solutions upon which the concept was based. In August 1990 Operation Desert Shield began and was soon followed by operation Desert Storm. The majority of ground based air defense assets in the Marine Corps were deployed in support of the Gulf War. All funding was directed to support Marine forces deployed to combat. Neither funds nor manpower were available to conduct the test of the MAD battalion concept as planned in early 1991. Following the Gulf War many Marines found fault with the MAD battalion concept. The combination of reorganization and the significant equipment changes were for most too great a change to be quickly embraced. During the summer of 1991, a conference was held to look at the structure of the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) as part of another effort to reduce the size of the Marine Corps. The recommendation of the conference was that the current structure of LAAD and LAAM battalions should be maintained and the equipment solutions of HMSE adopted as soon as possible. At the close of this conference. the results were briefed to Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation. He stated that he supported the MAD battalion concept. Later in 1991 the MAD battalion was officially entered into the plan for the future structure of the Marine Corps. The essential central difference between the MAD battalion and the MAW plans was the HMSE program equipment solution and the degree of integration between Stinger and HAWK-equipped organizations. The major issue became whether Stinger and HAWK assets should be mixed and where--if at all. The MCCDC plan had them mixed inside the same battery. The other plans had them mixed inside the battalion. Unfortunately, this argument strayed away from the real issue which was how will ground based air defense assets fight. It is when this question is asked that problems with equipment redundancy and complex command relationships become quickly exposed. It is also important to note the evolution of the organization of air defense in the Marine Corps and the relatively little experience that we have had. In the past, Stinger assets would go ashore early in an amphibious landing while HAWK assets would go ashore much later. The problem with this concept is that HAWK was needed ashore early; Stinger could not handle the threat alone. The sensor coverage, range and altitude of the HAWK system was needed to help defeat the threat to the ships of the amphibious task force, a fact often ignored by Marines. By the time HAWK went ashore, the air threat was long gone, or much reduced. Once it was recognized that HAWK or a weapon system with its capabilities was needed ashore early, a new problem arose. The firepower and radar coverage brought ashore with HAWK needed to be connected with the ships of the ATF through an effective command and control system in order to coordinate activities of air defense assets ashore and afloat. The old voice nets of the early Redeye days were no longer enough. The HMSE program answered these needs. The goal was to provide a truly integrated ground based air defense over the entire MAGTF in deployable building blocks as outlined in figure 1. It would give the MAGTF commander the ability to move medium altitude air defense forward, ashore early in an operation and survive once it was there. This would force enemy aircraft. notably Anti-Tank Guided Missile firing helicopters, below the radar horizon thus denying the enemy the range advantage over that of Stinger fire units. It would also provide a sensor package and a command and control network which could be used by the Stinger-equipped fire units. By moving medium altitude air defense forward, the MAGTF commander could deny the enemy the sanctuary of operating over his own forces. this plan would fully integrate all elements of the ground based air defense system within the MAGTF and with other Joint/Combined forces. Each building block of HMSE would be deployable by the Marines Corps medium lift replacement aircraft (loads less than 10.000 lbs.). The HMSE program and the MAD battalion concept emphasized the stand-alone capability of the individual fire unit first, followed by increasing combat power through layered command and control. Air defense must be organize the way we will fight, capitalizing on full integration while retaining the ability to fight in independent cells. A LAAD section supports an Infantry battalion and therefore is made to stand alone and respond to air defense requirements of the battalion it supports. while at the same time gaining the benefits of integrating with higher command. The battery with both low and medium altitude air defense assets supports an infantry regiment while exploiting a common command and control and sensor capability in support of both HAWK and Stinger fire units while integrating with higher and adjacent units. These building blocks lend themselves to fighting on a nonlinear battlefield as well as during periods of massive counter measures. The equipment modifications of HMSE, when added to the organizational changes of the MAD battalion concept. produces a unit organized the way it would train and fight. Figure 2 depicts an outline of a battery deployed to defend a regiment. Figure 3 depicts an outline of the MAD battalion organization. Of interest is the fact that the MAD battalion, by eliminating redundant functions, allows for better utilization of manpower which significantly increases the ability of ground based air defense. Specifically, where HAWK assets of only one Marine Expeditionary Force are now in the active force, the MAD/HMSE concept in effect doubles with little increase in lift required. The Light Armored Vehicle-Air Defense (LAV-AD) added to the increase in Stinger fire units from MAD/HMSE concept provides each MEF a full capability in LAAD fire units. The future addition of an Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile capability to the MAD battalion will provide the Marine Corps with a viable air defense to meet all threats. The efforts of the Marine Corps within the Strategic Defense Initiative should provide a missile to complement the superb sensor coverage of the ANTPS-59 radar already in the inventory to give the Marine Corps a point defense Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile capability which will complement similar Navy improvements. The Marine Air Defense Battalion and the equipment solutions of the HAWK Mobility Survivability Enhancement program combine to produce an affordable and capable air defense system for the future. The demise of the Soviet Union has had no impact on reducing the threat to amphibious operations from the air in the future. The brief history of air defense paints a picture of a capability in evolution ready for the next step. The deficiencies of the current organization and equipment are obvious. The current plan to evolve to the MAD battalion and take advantage of new equipment is sound and should be followed. Click here to view images
