The USMC Medium--Lift Replacement Dilema CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The USMC Medium--Lift Dilema Author: Major H. C. Jackson, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Due to its age and its limited combat capability, the CH-46E must be replaced by l997 in order to meet force projection mission requirements. Backround: Over the past four years, the Marine Corps has been attempting to replace the fleet of aging CH-46E; heli- copters with the MV-22. Congress and the Secretary of De- fense (SecDef) have been embroiled in a bitter battle over the MV-22. Congress is behind purchasing the MV-22 as the USMC medium--lift replacement (MLR). The SecDef believes that CH-60 and additional CH-53E helicopters or alternative MLR helicopters are adequate. With increasing weapons ranges and lethality, many MLR helicopters are marginally adequate while other alternatives are not ship--board compatible. Recommendation: The MV-22 must be purchased as the MLR and introduced to Fleet Marine Force units by 1997 since no other MLR is truely suitable to meet all mission require- ments and since the CH-46E helicopters are reaching the end of their life cycle. Due to its age and its limited combat capability, the CH-46E must be replaced by 1997 in order to meet force projection missions requirements. I. Current Operational USMC Transport Helicopters A. Types l. UH-1N 2. CH-46E 3. CH-53D 4). CH-53E B. Capabilities/Limitations II. USMC Furture Medium--Lift Requirements A. Sortie Rate B. Survivability C. Maintainability D. Mission Requirements III. Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) Replacement Helicopters A. USMC/ Congress Desires----MV-22 B. SecDef Desires----CH-60 and More CH-53E Helicopters C. Other Available T/M/S Helicopters l. CH-46X 2. Marinized CH-47 3. Boeing Vertol Model 360 4. Eurocopter EH-l0l IV. Desired Solution----MV-22 A. Comparison of the MV-22 vs. Other T/M/S Helicopters B. Reasons for Selecting the MV-22 C. Obstacles to be Overcome to Procure the MV-22 THE USMC MEDIUM-LIFT REPLACEMENT DILEMMA By Major Clay Jackson, USMC For the past four years, Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have been embroiled in a bitter fight concerning which type/model/series (T/M/S) aircraft will be the USMC medium-lift replacement (MLR). The aging but venerable CH-46E was fielded in 1961, but its capabili- ties are now suspect. Due to increasing weapons range and lethality, aircraft launch points must be placed at increas- ingly longer distances from where the aircraft will actual- ly discharge its-cargo. Aircraft systems developed since 1961 have enhanced survivability and mission capability. Although the CH-46E had been upgraded five times, it just has not kept pace with other aircraft capabilities. At the same time, the demand for the CH-46E has increased. Due to its unique aerodynamic qualities, it is the choice for ship- to-ship replenishment. Consequently, due to its age and its limited combat capability, the CH-46E must-be replaced by 1997 in-order to meet force projection mission requirements. The current mix of USMC assault support helicopters in- sures a balanced mix of light, medium and heavy lift assets which allows for-rapid force buildup and sustainment of engaged forces. Assault support helicopters include the UH-lN, CH-46e, CH-53D and CH-53E helicopters. Although the UH-lN is an older helicopter, it is still adequately fulfil- ling a multitude of missions. It is a highly capable command and control, close-in-fire suppression, small-unit transport helicopter. Amittedly, the UH-1N is slower than other as- sault support helicopters and has a limited range, but it still fulfills requirements that it was designed to meet. The CH-46E was designed to replace the H-34 piston-driv- en helicopter. During the l960s and early l970s, it met or exceeded mission requirements. Since the early l970s, weapon standoff distances and lethality has dramatically increased. Additionally, transport requirements have increased which, in turn, require an ability to lift more actual weight per sortie. Due to its limited combat radius, 60 nautical miles (NM), the CH-46E has little or no ability to launch from a standoff base and transport Marines deep into enemy terri- tory. Also, the helicopter lacks adequate navigation equip- ment to transport personnel of equipment over featureless terrain. Of greatest concern is the CH-46E's age. Usually, an aircraft is planned to be functional for 30 years from its initial operational capability (IOC) date until its re- tirement. We are presently exceeding this planning figure concerning the CH-46E. This problem's impact is starting to manifest itself in increasing airframe failure rates. Currently, some of the same problems that exist with the CH-46E exist with the CH-53D. The CH-53D was the heavy- lift helicopter for the USMC until the introduction of the CH-53E. Although it has sufficient range to transport per- sonnel and equipment over a 300 NM radius, it too lacks ade- quate navigation equipment and it is approaching 30 years of service life with no service life upgrades. In fact, the aircraft is less capable today than when it was first pro- duced because of reworked vice new powerplants. Over time, power availability has decreased while power required to lift new weapons has increased. The current heavy-lift helicopter, the CH-53E, is a highly capable aircraft that should see service past the year 2010. It has sufficient range, lift and navigation capabilities to meet or exceed current and projected mission requirements. With planned systems upgrades, such as a for- ward looking infrared radar (FLIR), aircraft armor and a night vision goggle (NVG) heads-up display (HUD), the CH-53E will be as capable as any planned MLR. A future MLR will be required to support a rapid build- up of forces over a long distance and then sustain the en- gaged forces while maintaining a high degree of survivabili- ty against increasingly lethal and sophisiticated weapons. In the past, tactical aircraft pilots have made the comment, "Speed is life." If an assault is launched from the sea to a point 10 NM inland, total round trip distance flown will be approximately 130 NM, assuming that amphibious helicopter transport ships are maintaining a helicopter launch area cut- side of the maximum effective range of threat weapons. Cur- rent MLR helicopters will require a one-hour sortie time per lift for combat buildup ashore. Now, the Marine on the ground may say, "Speed is life!" The MLR must be capable of cutting this sortie time in half if we face a formidable enemy. If it can not decrease sortie time, we will violate the principle of mass and risk an unnecessary defeat. Although sortie rates are of the utmost importance to the supported unit, survivability and maintainability are of the unmost importance to the supporting unit. Surviva- bility and maintainability are the "two-edged sword" that allows for sortie rates to be maintained while assuring air- crew that their aircraft performs safely in a low to medium threat environment. All helicopter assets currently employed by the USMC lack adequate survivability subsystems when em- ployed against modern threat weapons. These subsystems, the AN/ALE-39 countermeasures dispensing set and AN/APR-39 radar warning receiver are marginally effective against threat anti-air weapons, since these weapons-have technologi- cally evolved in order to counter defensive and detection systems. Additionally, detection systems for infrared guided missiles are just now in the process of being fielded. Due to system weight and space required for installation, it is impractible to install this system in UH-lN and CH-46E heli- copters. Helicopter maintainability has always required an in- tense effort since helicopters rely on the interaction of a multitude of dynamic components in order to operate. This intense effort is exacerbated by poor access to dynamic compon- ents. Since the early 1960s, a key component to any system design has been to reduce maintenance man hours required to support an hour of system use. Current maintenance man hours for fielded USMC helicopters are about 30 man hours per flight hour. Although smaller and flying with fewer subsys- tems and dynamic components, the CH-46E requires as much maintenance support as does the larger and more complex CH-53E. Another side to maintainability is battle damage repair. If a CH-46E sustains battle damage, half of the total repair time would be consumed by removing components or semi-fixed structures in order to reach the portion of the airframe to be repaired. By design, newer aircraft have accessability "built in" to the airframe. Many components are integrated; therefore, if a subsystem is rendered useless due to enemy fire, it can quickly be changed. During times of reduced manning and with fewer aircraft available, maintainability will be a key ingredient for maintaining combat sortie rates. Since World War II, aircraft have been designed to meet specific mission requirements. Also, since the early 1980s, aircraft have been designed to meet the requirements of several related missions. The CH-46E was designed as a short-range medium-lift helicopter. More specifically, it was during the Vietnam conflict and still is today, the primary USMC helicopter for loving personnel. By virtue of requirements in Vietnam, its effective radius is about 60 NM. However, since the end of our involvement in Vietnam, indirect fire weapons have increased in range and lethality. In many cases, the CH-46E will not be able to complete its mission unless an intermedeate fuel point is setup. Further- more, large concentrations of helicopters based well forward are a lucrative target, thus helicopter basing should be out of enemy indirect fire range. Another important part of any mission requirement is a high sortie rate while maintaining a high degree of surviva- bility and maintainability. During any type of assault, force buildup and sustainment is key to the basic fundamen- tal principle of mass. Sortie rates support the principle of mass. In order to maintain a high sortie rate, the aircraft must be relatively fast with an ability to arrive at the prescribed point requires accurate navigation equipment. The CH-46E does not possess accurate navigation equipment which would enable it to navigate over large expanses of water or featureless terrain. During Desert Storm, this navigation problem was a significant problem for CH-46E helicopters flying assault support missions. Mission accom- plishment for CH-46E helicopters in Southwest Asia was due to other more cabable aircraft flying as "pathfinder" air- craft in support of CH-46E missions. The other ingredient for meeting mission requirements is survivability. Survivability equates to both aircrew and aircraft. By virtue of slower speeds and limited maneu- verability, helicopters are ver vulnerable to anti-aircraft artillery, anti-helicopter mines and some surface-to-air missiles. Most systems employed against helicopters are quite mobile; therefore, these weapons are difficult to target. The MLR must be faster then the CH-46E and be able to absorb damage and keep flying. Ten years ago, the JVX, a joint National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and U. S. Army venture, flew from its Bell Helicopter plant in Arlington Texas. (l: 23- 24) The JVX design led to the MV-22, a joint production effort between Bell Helicopter and Boeing Vertol. The USMC selected this aircraft as the MLR. By virtue of design, it possesses the characteristics of a helicopter while flying at speeds up to 275 knots. Because of its airplane-like characteristics in forward flight, it is highly maneuverable. To date, it has met all required milestones including ship- board compatibility tests. Considering the age and lack of capability of CH-46E helicopters, the uninformed may ask why we have not bought the MV-22 yet. The answer is that the Honorable Mr. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), has stalled the MV-22 program. Although Congress has appro- priated funding for this program over the last three fiscal years, the SecDef has impounded production funding ever time. The SecDef's position is difficult to understand, given the impressive credentials of the aircraft. The MV-22 airframe is of a revolutionary design in it- self. It is built solely of composite materials except for removable fixtures, longerons, stiffeners and ribs. This type of construction decreases airframe weight and is much stronger than conventional aircraft aluminum. Also, compos- ite materials are resistant to corrosion and are quickly repaired if damaged. Corrosion, for current USMC helicopters, is a monumental problem when helicopters deploy aboard U. S. Navy ships. Corrosion control is a man-hour intensive re- quirement and, at times, major components have to be replaced due to this problem. Airframe repair, due to battle damage or ground mishaps, on the MV-22 is quick and requires mini- mal skills. In fact, tests have proven than repaired por- tions of the airframe are actually stronger than the original airframe. Airframe repairs on current helicopters require significant skill and man hours to complete.(l:25) As a result of intense testing, the MV-22 dynamic com- ponents have been proven to meet or exceed all design speci- fications. Since l958, when the CH-46E helicopter was de- signed, much knowledge has been gained concerning the effect that torque and vibration has on the dynamic components of a helicopter. This knowledge was programmed into the MV-22 so that vibration loads have been decreased while system strength and reliability has been increased. (2: 10) Although the MV-22 is a revolutionary aircraft, it pos- sesses mission subsystems that improves survivability, the ability of the aircrew to accomplish the assigned mission, and increases sortie rate over longer distances. Aircrew survivability was proven when MV-22 number five crashed. Major structural deformation occurred to this aircraft during the mishap, but no structural deformation occurred within the cockpit or cabin area. Additionally, fuel breakaway valves worked as designed which resulted in no fuel-fed fire that is common in most aircraft crashes.(2: 11) Other surviva- bility aspects to be added on production models will include an organic weapon for self-protection, very effective en- gine infrared heat suppressors, and a new and improved gen- eration of the AN/APR-39 and AN/ALE-39. The MV-22 will also be produced with subsystems that increase the probability of mission success while increasing sortie rates. These same subsystems also give the USMC a capability to self-deploy this aircraft anywhere in the world. Production MV-22 aircraft will be equipped with aeri- al refueling probes, on-board oil and hydraulic fluids ser- vicing, a forward looking infrared radar (FLIR) and a truely compatible night vision goggle (NVG) cockpit. The FLIR/NVG systems output will be utilized by the aircrew with the hel- met mounted sight/display system (HMS/DS). Aerial refueling and on-board fluids servicing allow for virtually uninterupt- ed aircraft utilization. The only flight limitation will be planned maintenance inspections. The FLIR/NVG system will contain an imbedded heads-up display (HUD) and the pilot/copilot will be able to utilize whichever system that gives the optimum view for at- mospheric conditions. This equates to having an additional visual means outside the aircraft to rely upon when other visual means are degraded by atmospheric conditions. Other subsystems contributing to the ability of the aircrew to accomplish the mission includes the global positioning system (GPS) and all other navigation systems found on current heli- copters. (3: 13-16) Currently, the SecDef prefers a mexture of CH-60 and CH-53E helicopters. To date, no requirement for proposal (RFP) has been issued for a mission-tailored helicopter from the growing H-60 family. The H-60 has been configured numer- ous ways in order to meet a wide range of missions. The U. S. Army utilizes the UH-60 as a personnel transport heli- copter while the U. S. Navy utilizes the same basic airframe for anti-submarine missions. Three problems currently exist in utilizing a UH-60 for the MLR. First, this airframe has reached its growth potential with the MH-60K variant. This aircraft is as expensive as the MV-22; therefore, the Depart- ment of Defense (DOD) would not save critical procurement dollars during times of austerity. The second problem in- volves lift requirements. A CH-60 can not lift squad-sized elements and is incapable of transporting internal palletized cargo. Lifting squad-sized elements is the cornerstone for most USMC assaults in order to maintain unit integrity. The last problem is due to lack of available funds for MV-22 test and evaluation (T&E) and another MLR research and de- velopment (R&D) concurrently. (4: 39) The second aircraft in the DOD equation, the CH-53E, is a reliable assault support helicopter. It is limited for shipboard use due to a lack of space on amphibious ships. It also is quite expensive at $23 million a copy. All total- led, independent studies have shown that a mix of CH-60 and CH-53E helicopters would cost more over time than would a mix of MV-22 tiltrotors and the current number of CH-53E helicopters projected to be purchased. Other possible MLR helicopters currently exist. Three of these helicopters, the CH-46X, the "marinized" CH-47 and the model 360 advanced technology demonstrator, are built by Boeing Vertol and the other candidate, the EH-l0l, is built by the Eurocopter consortium. Although updated with new, more powerful engines and stronger dynamic components, the CH-46X would still be the same CH-46E the USMC is now flying with regards to surviva- bility and maintainability. Additionally, there is no promise of increased availability or reduced man-hours per flight hour, since maintenance personnel would be working on an air- craft with l958 technology. Currently, there is a shortage of CH-46 series helicopters; thus, to meet mission needs, more CH-46 series helicopters would be required. This equates to one of two choices: (l) either Boeing Vertol would have to retool and produce required additional CH-46X helicopters, at a considerable cost, or (2) the additional helicopters would have to be purchased from Kawasaki Heavy Industries of Japan, with whom the U. S. already has an unfavorable balance of trade.(4: 38-39) A "marinized" CH-47 would not be a very good choice, either. Considerable cost would accrue in treating all sur- faces for salt-water corrosion and shielding all electrical components and wires from high frequency electromagnetic radiation found aboard all ships. This process is called "marinizing" an aircraft. Additionally, considerable cost would be required to redesign the rotorhead for a blade-fold system which is required of all helicopters with more than two rotor blades when deployed aboard U S. Navy ships. The last disadvantage of a "marinized' CH-47 is that its rotor diameter is too large for it to be operated operationally from LPH and LHA class ships. Currently, Boeing Vertol is in the demonstration/evalu- ation (demeval) stage with its model 360 advanced technology demonstrator. This aircraft incorporates a composite air- frame, like the MV-22, and is about the same size of the CH-46 series helicopter. It has a very advanced rotor sys- tem and has demonstrated speeds almost twice that of a CH-46E. It would require a considerable amount of funding for rede- sign to meet all specifications and mission requirements. One redesign requirement would be to remove all honeycombed aluminum from the airframe, since this type of structure promotes corrosion in a salt-water environment, and replace it with suitable material. (4: 39) The last MLR to be considered is the Eurocopter EH-101. This helicopter is solely built in Europe. If purchased, it could contribute to our already unfavorable balance of trade with Europe. The EH-l0l is a very capable aircraft. It can transport 30 combat-equipped troops, vehicles or internal cargo. This helicopter is very agile and was designed to absorb combat damage without mission degradation. Crash survivability is built into this helicopter and it is fully "marinized". The problem is that it is too large and too complex when comparing it with USMC MLR requirements. For instance, its elastomeric rotorhead is too complex for or- ganizational or intermediate maintenance personnel to per- form maintenance on. This same type of rotorhead was fitted to USMC CH-53D helicopters. Although it is designed to re- duce maintenance at all field activities, it can not be worked on at these same activities. Therefore, the EH-101 is not a good choice either. (4: 39) As discussed, the MV-22 is a highly capable, surviv- able and maintainable aircraft. This aircraft offers speed and agility not offered by any current or developmental heli- copter in existence. One MLR helicopter is not shipboard compatible, such-as a "marinized" CH-47, while the EH-l0l is marginally compatible due to its size and complexity. None of the MLR helicopters offer the transport capacity over the ranges as does the MV-22. If ship-based or shore- based, the launch point for any aircraft must be out of in- direct fire range. This fact increases sortie distance; therefore, sortie rate will decrease unless the aircraft is faster that conventional helicopters and unless it can carry adequate fuel--or refuel without stopping. Long sortie times decrease force buildup and sustainment. Potentially, two of the MLR helicopters would contribute to an unfavorable balance of trade. Lastly, one helicopter, the CH-60, is totally unsuitable as the USMC MLR. This helicopter lacks the haul- ing capacity that Marines need. Thus, the reasonable choice for the USNC MLR is the MV-22. Now, we return to an earlier question. Why have we not bought the MV-22? Or, why is this aircraft still waiting to enter full scale production? An interesting sideline to this situation is that this aircraft has unique civil appli- cations. Airports are already overcrowded but this aircraft would ease overcrowding. A European consortium and a Japan ese company are both developing their own version of the tiltrotor in order to reduce airport overcrowding in their respective areas. If we do not develop this aircraft, they will, which will only add to the already growing trade defi- cit the U. S. has with other countries. The reason that production funds have been impounded is due to decision made by the SecDef. It is unknown why he has elected to try to "kill" the MV-22 program. A MLR is needed now to replace an aging aircraft that is marginally survivable on the modern battlefield. None of the MLR heli- copters offer the same capabilities as the MV-22. The MV-22 is also the cost-effective choice over a lone period of time, although its initial cost is greater-than some of its alternatives. Two studies to date have indicated that over a ten-year period, the MV-22 would be cheaper to purchase than its cheapest competitor, the CH-60. We also must not be lulled into a false sense of secur- ity that Desert Storm may have given us. Our next battle may be with an adversary somewhat more tenacious. If that is the case, we need a survivable, maintainable aircraft that will give us the combat power buildup that we will need to win. Assume, for a second, that we need complete some other mission, short of combat, quickly. Take the Mogidishu, Somalia, noncombatent evacuation operation (NEO), for exam- ple. When the situation became tense at the American Em- bassy, two CH-53E helicopters were launched to transport Marine security forces in and NEO evacuees out over a 300 NM distance. The situation remained tense until all evacuees were out of Mogidishu. If the MV-22 would have been avail- able, the evacuation would have been completed in one-quar- ter the time. The last issue to consider is how our country pursues its strategic objectives. In the past, strategic objectives have been achieved through forward deployed units and through forward presence of U. S. armed forces, Due to budget cut- backs, however, many forward deployed units are returning to the continental U. S. (CONUS) to be deactivated. There- fore our strategic objectives will have to be achieved by the forward presence of carrier battle groups (CVBG) and amphib- ious task forces (ATF). It would stand to reason that the units deployed for this purpose would have adequate assets at their disposal in order to meet assigned mission require- ments. It is obvious that the CH-46E is at the end of its life cycle and is only marginally capable of fulfilling mission requirements. This argument is accepted by all parties in- volved in the MLR procurement process. It is also obvious that the MV-22 is the best-suited, most-capable, most-sur- vivable and cost-effective USMC MLR for the next 25 years. Also, if, as it appears, a greater portion of the burden of achieving strategic policy objectives is to fall upon USMC units deployed with the ATF, then these forward-presence units require the "tools" to properly execute assigned mis- sions. Currently, MLR procurement is at a crossroads. The SecDef prefers purchasing the CH-60 and additional CH-53E helicopters. The USMC and Congress prefers purchasing the MV-22. The Marines have always "made do" with what they get. The "meat" of the problem is that, as a greater re- liance is placed on Marines to execute their assigned mis- sion over a greater distance against more lethal weapons, the need for a MLR that will allow assigned forces the capa- bility to successfully complete their missi6n is not a luxury. The CH-60 is inadequate for current and projectad missions and is not even a good "make do" helicopter. The obstacle to overcome is the SecDef's decision not to purchase the MV-22. Congress has mandated that funds appropriated are to be spent and not impounded, as was done in the past. Additionally, as late as on 27 March 1992, the Speaker of the House of Represenatives, Congressman Tom Foley, is questioning why, in deference to the law, the OSD has not spent money appropriated for the fiscal year 1992 MV-22 appropriation. (5: A7) This is only a short-term solution to a long-term problem. This impasse must be bro- ken in order to procure a much-needed MLR now! Without a doubt, the answer to the MLR is the MV-22. FOOTNOTES 1. Frank Colucci, "Graphite Wonder," Defence Helicopter, Dec 89-Jan 90. 2. Frank Colucci, "Tailoring the Tilt-Rotor," Defence Helicopter, Mar-Apr 92. 3. Frank Colucci, "Osprey Eyes," Defence Helicopter, Mar-Apr 92. 4. Frank Colucci, "In Need of a Lift," Defence Helicopter, Jun-Jul 91. 5. Associated Press, "Foley: Pursue Osprey Plan," The Free Lance-Star, Vol. 108, No. 74, March 27, 1992. BIBIOGRAPHY l. Colucci, Frank. "Graphite Wonder." Defence Helicopter December 89- January 90. 2. Frank Colucci, "Tailoring the Tilt-Rotor," Defence Helicopter, March-April 92. 3. Frank Colucci, "Osprey Eyes," Defence Helicopter, March-April 92. 4. Frank Colucci, "In Need of a Lift," Defence Helicopter, June-July 91. 5. Associated Press, "Foley: Pursue Osprey Plan," The Free Lance-Star, Volume 108, Number. 74, March 27, 1992.
