Desert Shield And Desert Storm And Weinberger's Tests For The Uses Of Military Power
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Desert Shield and Desert Storm and Weinberger' s
Tests for the Uses of Military Power
Author: Major Stanley L. Hill, United States Air Force
Thesis: The Bush Administration met the six tests for the
use of military power as outlined by Casper Weinberger,
during the Persian Gulf War.
Background: The United States has had problems using the
military element of national power since World War II. The
problems have been twofold. First, the use of military
force has not been in concert with the other elements of
national power. Second the military has been given tasks
which it is ill-equipped to perform. During the Reagan
Administration, Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger,
refocused our attention to the proper use of military power
in his six tests.
The recent use of military power in Southwest Asia has
received favorable reviews: Our country "feels good" about
itself and our military. This is in stark contrast to the
way we felt post-Vietnam. I believe one of the reasons the
military was used effectively and received wide public
support, is the result of passing the tests defined by
Secretary Weinberger.
While I found no comments by anyone in the Bush
Administration that there was a conscience effort to apply
the Weinberger tests before the use of military force began
the Administration passed all six tests. The support of
this position is documented by review of the information
available in the national media at the time. The use of
military power, in support of government objectives, with
the backing of the American people, helped to make Desert
Shield and Desert Storm an example of how governments should
operate.
DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
AND
WEINBERGER'S TESTS FOR THE USES OF MILITARY POWER
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: The Bush Administration met the six tess for the
use of military power, as outlined by Casper Weinberger, during
the Persian Gulf War.
I. Background leading to Weinberger tests
II. Test one, our vital interests must be at stake
III. Test two, the issues involved are so important for the future of
the United States and our allies that we are prepared to commit
enough forces to win
IV. Test three, we have clearly defined political and military
objectives, which we must secure
V. Test four, we have sized our forces to achieve our objective
VI. Test five, we have some reasonable assurance of the support
of the American people
VII. Test six, U.S. forces are committed to combat only as a
last resort
DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
AND
WEINBERGER'S TESTS FOR THE USES OF MILITARY POWER
"It' s a proud day for Americans. And, by God, we've
kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all." (104:223)
President Bush's statement at the end of the hostilities
against Iraq was a summation most military professionals had
worked their entire career to hear. Since Vietnam, the
military has fought to ensure there would be no more
Vietnams. However, the key is a government which knows how
to use military force effectively. The Reagan
Administration took many steps to prepare the United States
for war. One of the most important steps taken was by
Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, when he focused on
the use of military power. He did this in his remarks to
the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on November 28,
1984.
Our politicians have had difficulty in the use of
military power since World War II. This has been a major
concern, given the fact that the United States had become a
world power. In Korea, we were unprepared. The remarks by
Secretary of State, Acheson, which omitted Korea as an area
of our strategic concern, appeared to be a political
invitation for the use of military force by the North
Koreans. The United States responded by introducing
military forces which achieved early success. However,
changing political and military objectives turned success
into retreat, and eventual stalemate. The ensuing two years
of almost stationary battle, as the politicians talked,
resulted in confusion back home. How could a third world
force stagnate a world power? We were sacrificing
American's most precious commodity, our young men's lives,
and we were not committed to winning the war. The resulting
political, military, and public debates lead to the relief
of one of America's most highly regarded war generals,
Douglas MacArthur, and aided in President Truman's failure
to be re-elected.(33:352) We did not win the war and we did
not win the peace; Korea remains divided over 40 years later
-- not a desired effect from the use of military force.
In Vietnam, politicians once again used military force
poorly and suffered accordingly. President Johnson met the
same fate of President Truman, no re-election; one of the
key reasons, his inability to effectively use military
force.(51:335) Personally, I saw friction in our society
which appears to have been matched only by the Civil War.
It was during the later part of the Vietnam War that I
entered the U.S. Air Force Academy and felt part of
America's frustration being vented on me. I remember
vividly preparing to go to football games and being told to
expect to be spit upon to have my uniform desecrated and to
have students at other higher education institutions want to
start fights with me. I watched our forces return from
combat to be shunned by society, a society for which the
soldier thought he was risking his life. We did not win the
war and we did not win the peace; Vietnam remains under
communist rule -- not a desired effect from the use of
military force.
Vietnam and Korea were the two major uses of military
force since World War II and both failed to use military
force properly to achieve our stated national objectives.
This failure has been a topic of much discussion within our
society. It has been a topic of particular interest to the
military, who initially was the target for most of the
frustration the United States citizens felt. Since the
initial frustration, most citizens now understand the
military was executing the strategy conceived, and directed,
by our government.
It is this key link of political objectives to military
objectives which failed. It is the theory of Carl von
Clausewitz revisited. He states in Book One of "On War, `War
is merely the continuation of Policy by other means.' "(106:87)
Additionally, Clausewitz identifies the critical connection
between the people, the government, and the army.(106:89)
By going back to these basics, Casper Weinberger refocused
the United States on the use of military force. By tying these
early writings of Clausewitz to our society, Weinberger has
given us some excellent guidelines as we view the use of
military force as an element of national power.
A year after Desert Shield and Desert Storm is still
somewhat early to be attempting a critical, unemotional
evaluation of what happen. However, the essence of my
interest is rooted in an emotional issue, the support our
military forces had prior to hostilities and the heroes
welcome they received upon returning home. This stark
contrast to the welcome home for our troops from Vietnam
needs to be a major lesson learned from the Gulf War.
I believe military professionals need to be well-versed
in the understanding of how military power works as an
element of national power. Use of the Weinberger tests not
only aids the politicians, it aids the military. Following
Weinberger' s speech, much was written about his tests, both
pro and con. The Marine Corps Gazette contained an exchange
of views between Major John Otis, USMC, and Captain John
Byron, USN. In his article, Captain Byron wrote:
Military officers should distance themselves from
discussions of the criteria for the use of force,
leaving these debates to the civilian leaders, and
concentrate instead on proficiency and
professionalism as warriors. A more proper stance
for the military is "We are ready now, sir," not
"Let's see if the six tests are met."(17:18)
I agree military professionals should not be debating
whether we will follow orders if all six tests are not
passed. However, the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act
of 1986 makes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the
primary adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the
President on topics concerning the military. While a key
topic is proficiency and readiness, "professionalism"
requires the military advisory to be able to ensure the
politicians are given accurate portraits of what military
force can, and cannot, do. The Weinberger tests help when
considering the use of military force.
It is my contention the Bush administration met the six
tests for the use of military power as outlined by Casper
Weinberger. I have come upon no source in which anyone in
the Administration has said definitively they applied the
tests, yet many of the Administration's actions satisfy the
requirements. I realize there were many factors which
contributed to the attitude of the United States citizens
towards their returning warriors. I am not stating that the
use of the Weinberger tests resulted in the overwhelming
support of our troops. I do believe the tests help the
civilian leaders to focus on a clearer use of military force
in achieving national objectives. This focus results in the
military being given appropriate objectives. This in turn,
allows the public to evaluate the military on its ability to
accomplish the assigned mission. This differs from the
Vietnam era where I was judged based upon a failure of
political, not military, objectives.
The Weinberger tests primarily deal with the conditions
leading up to the use of military force. As such, I will
address the six tests and how I view events which supported
them. Without the years of hindsight, and the many
historians, political and social science experts to put this
in perspective for me, I will examine these events as they
were reported in our national media leading up to, and
through, the swift conclusion of the ground offensive.
TEST ONE
First, the United States should not commit forces
to combat overseas unless the particular engagement
or occasion is deemed vital to our national
interest or that of our allies. That emphatically
does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as
we did with Korea in 1950, that a particular area
is outside our strategic perimeter, (108:441)
The first test, as it pertains to Southwest Asia, is
quite complex. It is complex because there were three
different issues concerning what was vital to our national
interests. The first scenario was the defense of Kuwait.
The second scenario was the defense of Saudi Arabia. The
last scenario dealt with removing Saddam Hussein from power
in Iraq. Before we examine the three cases, let us first
examine the last part of test one, not declaring beforehand
our strategic perimeter.
Soon after the invasion, people in the United States
began asking how Saddam Hussein thought he could get away
with "annexing" Kuwait. In Washington, the question was
whether someone had made the same mistake with Kuwait that
Secretary of State, Acheson, had made with Korea. By the
first week in October, Congress was holding hearings into
that question and much attention was paid to Ambassador
April Glaspie. On July 25 she had met with Saddam Hussein
and forwarded President Bush's message that he "personally
wants to expand and deepen the relationship with Iraq." She
added, "We don't have much to say about Arab-Arab
differences, like your border differences with Kuwait. All
we hope is that you solve those matters quickly."(77:54)
I'm sure this conversation will be analyzed by every author
who writes about the Gulf War. Its role as a catalyst
appears to be insignificant if one considers the many public
statements Saddam made after his invasion of Kuwait. He
never mentioned the U.S. as having any influence on his
decision to invade Kuwait.
Prior to the invasion, the U.S.'s strategic perimeter
had obviously included the Gulf Area. Since President
Roosevelt, no matter which political party held the
Presidency, the Gulf Area was of strategic importance to the
U.S. (102:1216) In 1985 Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Richard Armittage, highlighted the Gulf Area as not only
"vitally important to the U.S., but to the economies of the
entire Free world."(2:7) The focus on the Gulf continued
into the Bush Administration. General Schwarzkopf,
Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, in a May/June
1990 Defense article, cited President Bush's reaffirmed
"commitment to protect its (the U.S.’s) vital regional
interest throughout Southwest Asia. "(83:27) Given we were
concerned with the Gulf Area in general, let us focus
specifically on the events leading up to the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and the subsequent issues.
We had warning time prior to the invasion of Kuwait.
Politically, Saddam had made threats toward his fellow Arab
brothers which provided an indication of what was to
come. (50:47) Militarily, the logistical preparation had
been spotted with a resulting change in the military
estimate of what could happen which provided warning
time. (77:54) We had warning time, but did not use it. Once
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait began, it was completed so
fast, that there was little we could do with conventional
forces to stop it. Kuwait was invaded, the question was,
what do we do now?
During previous situations, the United States had
demonstrated that Kuwait could fall within our strategic
perimeter. When Kuwaiti tankers were threatened by Iran
during the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. used its military forces
to protect the tankers. Secretary of Defense, Weinberger,
stated, "...the free movement of important commerce on
international waters was vital to our security. "(108:402)
Additionally, he stated the U.S. military was not committing
forces to combat, although that may happen. The key point
here is that the U.S. had not defined Kuwait as our
interest, but free movement on international waters. Even
though this appeared to set a precedent, we should remember
Weinberger had also stated "...judgments about vital
interests will sometimes depend on circumstances of the
specific case and trends, as well as intrinsic
values."(109:7) This left the Bush administration free to
define our vital interest during this Persian Gulf Crisis.
President Bush's initial responses to the Iraqi invasion
were mixed; however, when he started to focus, his focus was
on Saudi Arabia. (6:20)
While President Bush may have sent mixed signals about
the invasion of Kuwait, his response concerning Saudi Arabia
was clear. With the Iraqis moving within five miles of the
border with Saudi Arabia, President Bush did not rule out a
counterstrike and warned Saddam that Saudi Arabia was a
"vital interest" of the U.S.(102:1216) Even House Speaker
Thomas Foley warned that an attack on Saudi Arabia "would
call for direct military response by the United States. "(71:22)
With the build-up of Iraqi forces continuing on the Saudi
border, combined with the unpredictability of Saddam Hussein,
the Saudis asked for and received U.S. forces to assist in Saudi
Arabia's defense. Attention now turned to Kuwait.
The determination of our vital interest in Kuwait was
not in the country itself, but to an ideal. Just as in the
Kuwaiti reflagging mission, Kuwait was not the issue, the
ideal was. This time the issue was whether one country can
overrun and annex another. President Bush warned early that
Saddam's aggression would not stand. The U.S. would stand
for an ideal, and Kuwait was the place where we would stand.
As for the remaining issue of removing Saddam Hussein
from power, this objective was widely discussed in the
media, but never endorsed by the Administration. It was
discussed in mid-August as a potential hidden agenda and
editorials continue to this day as to whether the U.S.
failed to complete the job by removing Saddam from
power. (56:22) President Bush repeatedly stated before and
after the war that Saddam's rule in Iraq was an issue for
the Iraqi people, not for the U.S. The President determined
Saddam' s being in power was not vital to our national
interests and Saddam was not a military objective. The
President had determined our national interest based upon
the situation. The first test was passed.
TEST TWO
Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat
troops into a given situation, we should do so
wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of
winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces
or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we
should not commit them at all. Of course if the
particular situation requires only limited force to
win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to
commit forces sided accordingly. When Hitler broke
treaties and remilitarized the Rhineland, small
combat forces then could perhaps have prevented the
holocaust of World War II.(108:441)
The President was committed to the mission from the
start. By mid-August the Administration's strategy was
maturing and President Bush's vow of "This aggression will
not stand" was supported not only at home, but throughout
the world. While support for the Administration's strategy
would fluctuate somewhat throughout operations in the Gulf,
the support of the overriding principle to stop naked
aggression was always strong. When it appeared force would
be needed to accomplish the objectives, the military had the
full support of its Commander in Chief to win the war.
While the President had other issues at home and abroad
that did take his time, his number one topic was the Gulf.
He kept the world's attention focused there. There were 30
issues of Time magazine between August 2, 1990, when the
invasion began, and February 27, 1991, when the President
announced we had met our objectives and ordered the
suspension of offensive military operations. During that
time, 15 cover stories were devoted to the Gulf and all 30
issues contained major articles referring to it.
We used all elements of national power in dealing with
the Persian Gulf Crisis. The focus of diplomatic and
political power was at the U.N. Through the U.N.`s embargo,
the world's economic power was focused against Iraq. As for
military power, the ever-building ability to take military
action against Iraq continued.
The military situation reached a point where political
commitment would be tested early. The test came in two
ways. First, the question of casualties was continually
asked. The lethality of today's battlefield, combined with
what we knew of the Iran-Iraq war, lead to estimates of
causalities which are best exemplified by former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, "a
terrible price."(3:29) Those who tried to estimate the
numbers went up as far as hundreds of thousands. Faced
with these numbers, the Administration held firm to its
commitment.
The second test of political commitment was the
mobilization of our reserve forces. Because of the way our
military is now structured with the Total Force policy, all
branches of the military needed their reserve forces. In
addition, the Air Force needed the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
to accomplish the assigned tasks. The President supported
early activation of the reserves and Civil Reserve Air Fleet
in August. We were committed.
The size of the committed force was based upon the
assigned task. Unlike Weinberger's comparison to Hitler's
forces at the start of World War II, Saddam's forces were
not small to begin with. Saddam had the largest military in
Southwest Asia and the fourth largest in the world. When
the military objectives were to deter Iraqi aggression and
defend Saudi Arabia, our force was structured accordingly.
When the President wanted the option to use military power
to enforce the U.N. resolutions if the economic embargo
failed, we resized our force. The second test was passed.
TEST THREE
Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat
overseas, we should have clearly defined political
and military objectives. And we should know
precisely how our forces can accomplish those
clearly defined objectives. And we should have and
send the forces needed to do just that. As
Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war--or rather,