Redefining Operational Art: Continuing The Reform CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Redefining Operational Art: Continuing the Reform Author: Major Jeff D. Grelson, United States Marine Corps Thesis: To build a whole new way of thinking about and conducting military operations -- in other words continue the reform -- and at the same time counter the effects of the national ethos, we must precisely define the operational art in terms that can be taught, assimilated, and practiced. Background: Americans are amateurs at war; but this may be an advantage. The weakness of the career soldier, bred in the military tradition and trained in his duties through years of service is that he knows when he is whipped. (24:viii) The national ethos has prevented the American military from achieving professional excellence since its' inception over two centuries ago. Because this ethos has been, and remains, negative, as suggested by the above quote, its' effects are also negative. Thus, "American Negativism" is felt not only in reduced budgets, but in more subtle ways -- like our difficulty with change and the inability to develop educational institutions and standards equivalent to, or better than, civilian professions. This paper describes a success story. The Services are coming together, rallying around efforts to improve our professionalism and operational excellence, in spite of the national ethos. An important step was the recognition of the operational art. This term, presently somewhat nebulous, gives our educational efforts focus, allowing us to create effective supporting curricula and combat American Negativism. But, we have a considerable way to go. Recommendation: To build a whole new way of thinking about and conducting military operations, we must first precisely define the operational art to include both the employment and the development of military capability, with three sub-elements: planning, decision making, and staff f action. REDEFINING OPERATIONAL ART: CONTINUING THE REFORM OUTLINE To build a whole new way of thinking about and conducting military operations -- in other words continue the reform -- and at the same time counter the effects of the national ethos, we must precisely define the operational art in terms that can be taught, assimilated, and practiced. I. U.S. Military Thought: The Effects of American Negativism II. Redefining the American Operational Art Appendix: A Brief History of the Term Operational Art REDEFINING OPERATIONAL ART: CONTINUING THE REFORM Changes in the military are affected in many ways. Some changes are formal, mandated by civilian or military leadership. Others are informal, largely evolutionary changes that permit the Services to keep pace with other societal segments. Some occur dramatically, others more subtly. Some changes are required to undergo due process, to be analyzed and tested before a complete committal is made. Others are directed, with no concern for consensus or support, based on the convictions of senior civilian or military leaders. There is a very temporal aspect to major changes: they are considered revolutionary or evolutionary, based not only on their magnitude but on the speed of their proposed implementation. Some changes are dubbed reforms while others are natural solutions to obvious problems; labels which apparently rely almost entirely on the perspective of the labeller. By its very nature, change in the Services is seldom easy. Most people categorize change by the difficulty of its implementation, rather than on the merits of the change itself. The mechanics of change themselves change over the years, often causing a sense of frustration or even futility. The professional military needs to come to grips with its corporate structure, recognizing its characteristics and personality if it is to effectively make changes. And, in order to develop the operational capabilities our nation will need in the 21st century, the Services must, of course, change. The capability development process, used to identify, analyze, and implement operational changes, needs to be firmly established. Every soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine needs to know how he or she can contribute to operational improvements within their respective Services. Change is a complicated and important issue within the Services; one which affects many but only a few understand. Of the many influences on change within the military, one of the least understood, and most important, is the national ethos. Unfortunately, because the national ethos regarding the professional military has been, and remains, negative, its effects are also negative. We must understand how this influences the way we deal with change, and why we often fail to take the full step. Few would argue that in recent years the American military has undertaken a major reform effort, seeking improvements in every area from warfighting to dependent dental care. In the Marine Corps, at the grass-roots level of how we fight, the reform has focused primarily on doctrine, training, education, and the replacement of old warfighting beliefs with new ones. Because of the influence of the national ethos, it has always been easier to change equipment than doctrine, or the training and educational practices necessary to institutionalize new ways of practicing war. This has made improvements in these areas difficult to implement. The personality of some of the reformers has also contributed to the difficulty. In fact, the improvement effort was label led a "reform" more because of the tactics of the reformers than of the magnitude of the changes themselves. But this, too, is a result of the national ethos. In spite of the turbulence, over the last fifteen or so years, and to the great credit of every Marine involved, there has indeed been significant improvement. But now this effort is in danger. This is not the fault of those currently challenged with completing the changeover, but of those who initially began it. They went too far, too fast, not taking into account the affects of the national ethos. Publication of FMFM 1, "Warfighting, in the Summer of I989, was the beginning of a major redesign of Marine doctrine, training, and education. It's purpose was to introduce new thought, raise the level of detailed knowledge about the military profession, and improve the professionalism of officer and Marine alike. If, as a result of detailed analysis from new perspectives, old tactics, techniques, and procedures were found wanting, then new ones were to be developed in their place. Those current practices that were re-validated in light of new perspectives would, of course, be unnecessary to change. This kind of intellectual pursuit is probably not the forte of every officer, however. With "Warfighting" was a package of several other important initiatives intended to re-vitalize doctrinal, educational, and training organizations. Some of these have been acted upon, and the improvements have been almost Immediately felt. Others, however, have not. The heartfelt purpose of the so-called reform was, and still is, to improve the operational excellence of our operating forces. Although the initial reformers chose the rather nebulous term "Maneuver Warfare," I believe "Operational Art" more closely describes the real focus of the reform effort. At present, "Operational Art" is itself a nebulous term, calling to mind ideas and practices that would be only remotely recognized by its first, and greatest, practitioners. But, even in it's current abstract form operational art is useful. Coming as it does near the top of the hierarchial relationship between national policy and military strategy, it is in the perfect conceptual location to drive the development of operational capability. Ambiguous notions, however, seldom yield useable results. To build a whole new way of thinking about and conducting military operations -- in other words continue the reform -- and at the same time counter the effects of the national ethos, we must precisely define the operational art in terms that can be taught understood, and practiced. U.S. MILITARY THOUGHT: THE EFFECTS OF AMERICAN NEGATIVISM How did the ambiguity in our underlying doctrinal principles develop? The answer can be traced to the influence of the national ethos on the professional military. It should not be surprising that the complexion of the American military has been heavily influenced by the country's history and evolving culture, or ethos. As a national institution, the professional military has seldom enjoyed the confidence of the American people. Democratic nations, even ones as militaristic as ours, are always suspicious of the motives, legitimacy, and quality of a professional military. According to Edward M. Coffman, writing in a recent edition of "Military Review," the professional journal of the United States Army, the national ethos is a "traditional prejudice:" In peacetime, the national ethos - the traditional attitudes and customs of a nation - is apt to play a more important role than other factors in establishing the limits and conditions that frame the shape of a military force. This ethos also plays a role during war; but when there is no menace large enough to bring about a sense of emergency, hence urgent need for military power, the army is not the focus of national interest and is more subject to the attitudes and customs of the people it serves. The two aspects of this ethos that have been particularly influential in US history are the traditional prejudice against professional soldiers and a Standing Army generally and the concept that if wars came, civilians, not Regulars, would save the day. (4:50) Most people recognize these suspicions by their effects on the budget and size of the military. Few, however, appreciate the depth to which the national ethos infuses our military system and influences the development of military thought. The most visible way that this ethos, which I term "American Negativism," has influenced the military is the almost constant fight waged since before the Revolutionary War about the need, size, and composition of the American military. One side claims that a large, professional, standing military is unneccesary, in fact outright dangerous for a democratic nation, especially with no enemies sharing its borders. The other side argues that defense of the democracy is too important to trust to anything but a qualified, professional military. But there are other, less visible ways in which American Negativism influences the professional military. According to Mr. Coffman, ". . . [Many people] may not be fully aware of the historical baggage they carry that influences their thinking and actions." (4:50) The American military is, after all, composed of Americans who have grown up exposed to American Negativism. Either consciously or unconsciously, predispositions influence the actions, and especially the thought processes, of all of us who choose a military career. Consequently, the way we view our profession, and the way we develop and implement the various training and educational systems used to expand and perpetuate our profession, are all affected by the national ethos. The American fear of a professional standing military has colored every aspect of how we have evolved. It has influenced how we have organized, trained for, and conducted all of our wars and military operations. The militia-mindset and reduced peace-time budgets have made the professional military in peacetime a care-taker organization, unable to devote sufficient resources to raising the collective professionalism and quality of the professional military. The reliance on mobilization of large numbers of civilians in times of national emergency has required us, even though we may not fully realize it, to reduce tactics, techniques, and procedures to simplified terms for easy assimiliation during short basic training periods. American Negativism influences the institution collectively and individually, often preventing us from even seeing the need for improvements in our doctrine, training, and educational organizations. These organizations, the military equivalent of civilian colleges and universities, are the nurturing grounds of operational improvements in our profession. The national ethos does not excuse our past inability to develop our professionalism, as have many civilian professional communities, but it does explain it. Engineering and medicine are two professions, for example, that have been heightened by the national ethos because of a concern for high standards, safety, public service, and professionalism. Their subjects, complex and detailed, are part science and part art, their education standards are extremely high, and professional certification or licensing is required. Practicing engineers and doctors stay current in their fields, not only because it is required, but because it is professionally lucrative. Both swear to uphold an oath which requires them to perform their duties conscientiously and cost-effectively, with unlimited regard for the safety of human life. The parallels to the military profession are self-evident. Has not war been described as the costliest, and most demanding, of human endeavors? American military officers should understand that, as a result of American Negativism, our efforts, no matter how good, will always be suspect on Capitol Hill. No matter what we do, how forward we think, or how capable we become at managing the delicate balance between preparing for war and promoting the peace, there will always be some who question our motives and our professionalism. There will even be those who base their reputations on the derision of ours, or worse, base their livelihoods on the creation and manipulation of the government's military bureaucracy. Civilian control of the military is essential in our democratic system. It is how the military remains in tune with the needs, and the will, of the American people. But, we should not confuse civilian control with national ethos. Instead, we should understand that the affects of the national ethos influence not only the size of the Services, but their quality as well. The professional military is not entirely blameless in this respect, of course. In spite of the fact that it is only recently that our civilian masters have given us a cogent national strategy upon which to base the development of military capability, we could have done a better job at creating the internal infrastructure necessary to guide military thought. REDEFINING THE AMERICAN "OPERATIONAL ART" Based on the realization that American Negativism has had a significant impact on our warfighting doctrines, and the education systems designed to foster them, some additional changes are necessary to fully implement an educational process focused on the operational art. Good doctrine, while not necessarily prescriptive, is authoritative. It derives much, if not all, of its authority and usefulness through the preciseness of its terms and the collective thought that it produces. For doctrine to be truly useful, it must be reducable to teachable, understandable terms. It must be broad enough to guide thought, yet precise enough to permit development of consistent, reproducable techniques and procedures. Today, in American military doctrine, operational art has evolved a definition heavy on the "art," evoking feelings that I9th century Prussians would recognize, but only remotely. It has come to signify an intangible ingredient in great generalship - that ability to instinctively see through the fog of war - to mix the components of warfare on an ever- changing pallet and apply them in new and enlightened ways. It is an instinct few will have the opportunity to demonstrate and even fewer will ever attain. But, it is one toward which all should strive. The 1986 version of FM 100-5, "Operations," defines Operational Art in vague, somewhat ethereal terms that leave a great deal to interpretation. This is the opposite of what good doctrine is supposed to be: the basis for mutual understanding and harmonious actions. While the words contained in the section entitled "Operational Art" are eloquent and thought-provoking, they provide almost no basis from which to actually teach its mastery. The implication is that practice of the operational art relies on qualities typically considered unteachable like "broad vision," the "ability to anticipate," and "a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends." The remainder of the book essentially neglects the concept, neither referring to it directly nor implying that mastery of the remaining contents yields mastery of the "art" itself. Marine doctrine, in FMFM 1, "Warfighting", doesn't actually address the operational art although the whole manual is obviously based on it. "Warfighting" does, however, have a section entitled, "Art and Science of War," in which it makes the following statements: The science of war stops short of the need for military judgement, the impact of moral forces, the influence of chance, and other similar factors. We thus conclude that the conduct of war is ultimately an art, an activity of human creativity and intuition powered by the strength of the human will. The art of war requires an intuitive ability to grasp the essence of a unique battlefield situation, the creative ability to devise a practical solution, and the strength of purpose to execute the act. (25:14-15) As eloquent and worthwhile as these words are, their meaning really only has relevance for a select few - those who possess the innate qualities to which they refer. It further implies that mastery of the science of war is only secondary, and not really an element of the operational art at all. Rather than contributing to the corporate understanding of war and encouraging Marines to improve their individual professional skills, the interpretive nature of these words, and much of the rest of FMFM 1, has instead encouraged "battles over buzz-words. " Most of FMFM 1 is philosophical. It contains things that needed to be said but impossible to implement. It was intended to establish and guide new patterns of thought, not to be dissected into buzzwords for continual debate. Although things are clearly improving, the Marine Corps doctrine and education systems are not yet fully capable of injesting new concepts and philosophies and converting them into practical supporting doctrines, techniques, and procedures. To improve the operational capabilities of our operating forces, we need something much more definitive and concrete than the current definition of operational art upon which to base continued improvements. For it to become the foundation of our doctrine and military education systems, the first step is to define "Operational Art" in terms that can be handled by our doctrine development and education systems. In this new definition, we must think bigger. We cannot focus on the employment of military capabilities, but on their development as well. Because, without the development infrastructure in place, new employment strategies will rarely achieve their full potential. I propose the following definition -- Operational Art is the effective development and employment of military capability. It has three components: Planning, Decision Making, and Staff Action. This definition is consistent with the definitions of both "capability" and "military capability" in the DOD dictionary (JCS Pub 1-02) and has the added benefit of reducing both AirLand Battle (now AirLand Operations) and Maneuver Warfare to tactical options, which is where the majority of officers already perceive them. The definition is neither nebulous nor complex, and it's components can be readily taught. And finally, the three components support the understanding that art consists of both mechanical (planning and staff action) and creative (decision making) skills. The three components should be expanded according to the broad definitions below. PLANNING. Management is an element of leadership, not it's antithesis. Good leaders understand the importance of management and recognize that it offers tools that help make units more efficient and effective. We frequently assume that potential leaders have an innate understanding of the elements of getting a job done that only needs to be modified to fit the military model. To many people, this feeling is so strong that, to them, the word "planner" is synonomous with "leader." Many also assume that the elements of platoon leadership and high level command are nearly identical: the same fundamentals practiced at increasingly higher levels of authority and responsibility. While there is some truth to this, especially in the sense of leadership experience, the relationship between platoon leader and high level commander is more akin to job foreman and design engineer: similar fields, yes, but hardly interchangeable. Planning, as an element of leadership at every level, is not the same at every level. It should therefore be taught in it's most basic, general form, as a component of job management, mission accomplishment, or whatever, rather than as an element of leadership. This makes it pertinent to both capability employment and development, at any leadership level. Planning is, quite simply, the effective management of resources to achieve a goal. Whether planning a family trip to the zoo or a complex military operation, the same basic planning fundamentals apply. This gives us a much broader appreciation for the importance of planning in all facets of military management and operations. It also puts memory aids like BAMCIS and SMEAC, and deliberate planning processes like the "15 Step Command and Staff Action Process," PPBS, and others into their proper perspectives. Once the basics are understood, these refined, specialized processes become less sacrosanct, and for some, less mind- boggling. Over time, military planning has developed a mystique of its own. It has been the predominant subject at command and staff colleges for generations. A body of opinion exists that separates planning an operation from its execution, probably because nations try to develop warplans well before they are actually needed. Misinterpretation of Moltke's famous saying about the fragile nature of most plans and their ability to survive the first contact probably contributes as well. These convictions lead many to conclude, "Why prepare a plan? It will only be overcome by events, anyway. Let's just pull out the old one and change the dates. The essence of planning is, of course, execution, or implementation. The fact that the physical acts of planning and execution may be separated in time does not mean that each is a separate event. The basic planning cycle, as adopted by almost everyone who manages resources to achieve goals, includes information collection, plan preparation, implementation (or execution) , evaluation, modification (event driven) , and so on in a continuous information collection, planning, execution effort. To separate the components, for example, into campaign planning and campaigning, is therefore erroneous. The basic planning cycle, and consequently curricula designed to teach it, must obviously be modified to make it effectively serve the military's many planning requirements. But, this can easily be done without violating the integrity of the cycle itself. Planning can, of course, be an exercise in drudgery, particularly if convinced that the plan is doomed before it starts. But, when seen as part of a dynamic, contributory process it can also be an exercise in creativity. DECISION MAKING. Decision making, in the military context, is the ability to select an appropriate course of action that is consistent with the initial plan, in the shortest possible time, with the minimum amount of "hard" information. Like planning, it should be taught first in its basic, fundamental form. Decision making is a complex subject, the complexity of which changes depending on many different variables. It is the special privilege, and the heavy responsibility, of the commander alone. It should therefore receive much more attention, as an individual subject, than is currently allotted in most military curricula. Decision making, as a soft skill that relies heavily on individual traits like creativity, accumen, and cognition in general, is a difficult subject to teach. However, its elements can be taught, and continually reinforced through wargames, decision making exercises, and historical case studies. In our system, it has become practice to postpone the decision to the very last minute, in hopes that some last bit of information will appear that removes all uncertainty. While this is clearly appropriate, in fact, essential in deliberate planning circumstances, it is frequently inappropriate, especially in fast moving situations. A comprehensive study of decision making should make this clear. Also, our present system does not recognize the difference between planning and decision making, frequently confusing the two. Studying each separately will improve our understanding of both, and of how they complement each other. STAFF ACTION. As the name implies, staff action is the collective efforts of all subordinates, including subordinate commanders, to develop and implement a plan consistent with the commander's decision. Implied is an absolute attention to detail, focused on providing an accurate, useable product. Of the three elements of the operational art, staff action is the most mechanical. On the surface, it may seem unneccessary to highlight staff action as an integral component of the operational art. However, since it is so basic, and at the same time so essential, it cannot be overlooked. Effective staff action is not a substitute for sound decision making nor is it a panacea for all the ills that can befall a command. It can, however, mean the difference between success and failure and therefore deserves separate attention. The focus should be on attention to detail, communications ability, and staff relationships. The assistance offered by communications, word processing, and computer-assisted planning, and other technologies should not be neglected. It would be difficult to address the subject of staff action without addressing the functions of the commander, particularly with respect to how he uses his staff. (It is interesting to note that FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action, was titled, "Staff Action," in its original 1955 edition. Although the name changed shortly thereafter, the contents of today's manual are almost identical to the original version.) CONCLUSION This new definition of the operational art offers the military tangible, teachable subjects upon which to base curricula meaningful to future military students. It is neither nebulous nor abstract. Nor does it impinge upon or deviate from current commonly held opinions or definitions; it merely refines them. And, it allows room for all of the other subjects essential to the military profession, helping to create a training and education structure in which every subject can contribute to the common goal of improving our operational capabilities. Taken collectively, the three elements of planning, decision making, and staff action comprise the operational art. By concentrating on them, and being ever mindful of the effects of the national ethos, we will indeed achieve professional excellence. Bibliography 1. Anderson, Fl. H. (Editor). Creativity and It's Cultivation. Harper and Row. New York. 1959. 2. Branch, M. C. Planning: Aspects and Applications. John Wiley & Sons. New York. 1966. 3. Bray, C.W. Pyschology and Military Proficiency. Green Wood Press, New York. 1948. 4. Coffman, Edward M. , "The American Army in Peacetime," copyright, 1992, published in the March, 1992, issue of Military Review magazine, pages 49-59. 5. Cohen, Eliot A. and Gooch, John, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. The Free Press. New York. 1990. 6. Dixon, N.F. On The Pyschology of Military Incompetence. Basic Books, Inc. , New York. 1976. 7. Herbert, Major P. H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Combat Studies Institute (Leavenworth Papers #16) , USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 1988. 8. Janowitz, M. The New Military; Changing Patterns of Organization. Russell Sage Foundation. New York. 1964. 9. Laffin, J. Americans in Battle. Crown Publishers, New York. 1973. 10. Luriia, A.R. Cognitive Development; It's Cultural and Social Foundations. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1976. (Publisher unidentified) 11. Meyer, Bradley. "Helmuth von Moltke, Graf Alfred Schlieffen, and the Development of the Operational Art." An unpublished paper provided by the author, prepared for a talk at the annual meeting of the American Military Institute, 23 March, 1991. 12. Meyer, Bradley. Personal interview of 02 April, 1992. Dr. Meyer summarized the German concept of "Feld Herr" for me during this interview. 13. Moskos, C.C. Jr. The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military. Russell Sage Foundation. New York. 1970. 14. Napoleon. The Maxims of Napoleon. Translated from the French by Liet. Gen. Sir G. C. D'Aguilar, C.B. David McKay Publishers. Philadelphia. 15. Olson, R.W. The Art of Creative Thinking. Barnes and Noble Books. New York. 198O. 16. "Pyschology For the Armed Services. An unpublished paper by the N.R.C. 17. Rosinski, Herbert. The German Army. The Infantry Journal. Washington, D.C. 1944. 18. Savkin, V. Ye. The Basic Principle of Operational Art and Tactics (A Soviet View) . Moscow. 1972. Translated and Published under the auspices of the United States Air Force. 19. Taylor, C.W. (Editor). Creativity: Progress and Potential. McGraw-Hill. New York. 1964. 20. Turner, Col F.C. Comments on FM 100-5 From A Soviet Point of View. US Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 1978. 21. "U.S. Working Group report on Human Behavior Under Conditions of Military Service. 22. Weigley, Russell. (Editor). The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society. Addison-Wesley. Reading, Massachusetts. 1969. 23. Weigley, Russell. The American Way of War. The Indiana University Press. Bloomington. 1977. 24. Williams, B.A. (Editor). Amateurs At War: The American Soldier in Action. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston. 1943. MILITARY PUBLICATIONS 25. FMFM 1. Warfighting. USMC. 1989. 26. FM 100-5. Operations. USA. 1976. 27. FM 100-5. Operations. USA. 1982. 28. FM 100-5. Operations. USA. 1986. 29. JCS Pub 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. DOD. 1989. APPENDIX A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TERM "OPERATIONAL ART" The evolution of the American military's interest in the term "operational art" is, I believe, a good example of the effects of American Negativism on our military thought. Our interest in operational art" and the related concept of operational level of war" is relatively recent. There are probably two reasons why these concepts have become important. The first is the result of the introspection that went on within the Services after the series of military failures since World War II, particularly Vietnam. The first big revelation to emerge was the disjointedness of the Department of Defense, a problem compounded by doctrine, training, and equipment ill-suited to employment in modern combat by an all-volunteer force. In the early 1970's, the Services began significant organizational and doctrinal changes, some might say reforms, that continue today. For the Army, the cognizant agency for development of land warfare doctrine, one of the most controversial steps in this "modernization" effort was the publication of General William E. DePuy's 1976 edition of FM 100-5, Operations (26:1). This doctrinal manual introduced one important concept and reinforced another. The new concept, AirLand Battle, was a new approach to the Army's problem of assisting in the defense of western Europe. It was full of new ideas about fighting smarter and winning the first battle against a numerically superior enemy who possessed the initiative. Although the terms operational art and operational level of war do not yet appear, it is obvious that the authors were beginning to see modern combat from-these perspectives. Not so obvious is the evident influence of the German approach to large unit operations, and especially, officer education. The entire reform was considered radical by many Army officers, and was almost directly opposite to the more traditional thinking championed by Major General John Fl. Cushman, the commanding general of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Army's Integrating Center for combined arms doctrine (7:52-58). The 1976 edition also reinforced a relatively new concept within the Army: that operational capabilities should be based on operational requirements that are themselves determined by analysis of most likely missions. The book also helped institutionalize the new combat development organization through which the Army would implement this process, using its various major commands, training centers, and TRADOC to identify and integrate changes to Army combat capabilities (7:28). This process has since come to be known as the Concept Based Requirements System, (CBRS) , the system used to identify and guide changes to operational capabilities within the Army. In this respect, AirLand Battle and the doctrine that would support and embellish it would become the basis for changes to Army equipment and structure, as well as its doctrine. In short, it would become a true warfighting philosophy (13 years later the Marine Corps would follow suit with the publication of its-own new philosophy, Maneuver Warfare, and a Marine Corps version of CBRS). Due to its controversial nature, the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was never fully accepted and quickly superseded by the 1982 version. However, the seeds of reform had been sown. Many of the book's ideas, among them the education versus training issue and AirLand Battle fundamentals, began to receive attention throughout the Army, followed again a few years later by the Marines. By the 1986 edition of FM 100- 5, both "operational art" and "operational level of war" had become part of the American military lexicon. The second reason for the interest in these two terms is the attention paid to them in Soviet doctrine, most notably in the early 1980's. Over time, armies tend to take on many of the characteristics of their principal enemy, and such is she case here. In Soviet doctrine, "operations" translates to operational art (20:6). Operational art is one of the three components of what the Soviets called "military art" - the other two being strategy and tactics. "Operational level of war" apparently doesn't appear in Soviet doctrine, but since Soviet doctrine, especially regarding the operational art, is written for "officers and generals of the Soviet Army," it is a fair assumption that American analysts of Soviet doctrine would agree that the concept does exist. American ideas of these two terms are not literal translations, of course, but it is safer to, say that Soviet reference to them and heightened U.S. Army interest are not just coincidental. Although their derivations are obscure, and definitions and interpretations vary, each term has received official sanction in joint and Service dictionaries and warfighting manuals. Although references to them do exist in the military writings of the 19th and early 20th centuries, neither enjoyed the reverence clearly paid to them today within the American military. Actually, in the historical sense, the two terms are both probably misnomers. To the Germans, the two terms were probably just convenient expressions of military thinking. Undoubtedly, Helmuth von Moltke should receive credit for their quantification as military terms, even though he was certainly not the first to use them to guide military thinking. He was, however, the first to explicitly use the concept of a campaign to guide and link multiple battles (11:1) . As one of the founders of the German General Staff system, Moltke also heavily influenced the educational process in the German Army. While it is unclear whether he actually defined either term, he certainly wrote extensively about them. Most of these writings were about planning, preparing for, and conducting war from the mid-19th century Prussian perspective (although Moltke was actually a Dane). One of the traits that characterized him and distinguishes him even today was an absolute attention to detail and sense of perfectionism. Whether writing about war, planning for war, or actually pursuing it, he would continually edit and re-edit his drafts until absolutely convinced he could make his meaning, or intent, no clearer and his logic no more sound. Evidently, Moltke frequently had difficulty getting subordinates to conform to his plans (11:9). It is certainly possible that his experiences in this regard, as well as his personality, were reflected in the curricula of the Kriegsakademie. Although "operational level of war" was not a part of their lexicon, the Germans felt that the "operational art" at what we call the operational level of war was teachable. And, if the demanding Kriegsakademie curricula is any indication, mastery required absolute attention to detail, preciseness of terms, use of sound tactics and techniques, masterful staff work, and complete adherence to mission and duty. Mastery of the operational art was therefore as much a matter of science as of "art," and possibly more so. This interpretation also corresponds to the burgeoning field of military science in the mid-19th century as well. True, wargames and decision-making games were raised almost to the level of art in Germany, especially within the military, but this is part of the German ethos, and to the pragmatic Germans, focusing on these without mastery of the military science would have made little sense. (The concept of military men applying an "art" was probably-more closely linked to the concept qf "Feld Herr." In the Prusso-German culture, a "Feld Herr" (literally, "field commander-in-chief") was a man with, the innate qualities necessary for inspirational leadership and command at the highest levels. He was gifted with highly advanced capacities for comprehension and decision making. Most historians agree that a few men in German history have displayed the attributes of a Feld Herr, but to many Germans he is an almost mythical figure. (12)) Even though Napoleon was one of the greatest practitioners of the operational art, at any level of war, there is little evidence that the French military, the other great influence on American military thought, even recognized the existence of the term. This appears especially evident in view of their performances in the wars of this century. However, in the immediate reverie after World War I, Francophilia was still a popular phenomenon and the American military, which had always modelled itself after the French Army, continued to do so throughout the interwar years. Many more American officers were posted to French military schools than to the German Kriegsakademie. This was no doubt partly responsible for the little concern paid to the opinions of the American military attache in Germany during the mid-1930's, who wrote about the philosophical differences between the Powers. The American military's understanding of operational art is thus an interesting mix of ideas, techniques, and procedures borrowed from previous allies and enemies. Like almost all of our important principles, it is apparently a compromise. As currently defined, some of it's elements quite possibly do fit in the American military vocabulary. However, lacking the infrastructure to fully develop the current definition into useable doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures clearly hampers its utility. Unless refined, it must, by default, remain as something of an inspirational goal, rather than a clearly obtainable one. And, if it was hard to comprehend and even more difficult to achieve in the eyes of its most avid pupils, the Germans, what hope for the military of a democratic nation unless it is clearly and narrowly defined?
