Protection of SFS 2000 Against PGMS
SUBJECT AREA General
Title: Protection of SFS 2000 against PGMs
Author: Lt Col. Gunnarsson, Goran, Royal Swedish Navy
Thesis: "Lessons learned", how PGMs were used in Operation Desert
Storm together with indications on future developments will give us a
good foundation to decide in what areas we have to conduct further
studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new Swedish coastal defense
system, sufficient protection against PGMs.
Background: Parts of today's coastal artillery guns are planned to be
replaced in the late 1990. Studies and developments have, so far, not
taken "lessons learned" from Operation Desert Storm into
consideration. During Operation Desert Storm, PGMs were used to an
extent that surpassed all previous wars. Many of them were used
against armoured vehicles and fortifications. Those types of targets
are very similar to guns and fortifications within SFS 2000. There are
methods/equipment to be found which, if implemented right, would
enhance the protection of SFS 2000 against PGMs.
Recommendation: Before further developments of the gun and
fortifications for SFS 2000 are conducted, studies of different methods
to enhance the protection of the system against PGMs ought to be
made. Such studies should mainly be focused on options to reduce the
"target area" of the gun and the fortifications in different spectrums.
Furthermore, possible methods found in those studies should be
evaluated together to find out the most effective "overall" protection
system for SFS 2000.
PROTECTION OF SFS 2000 AGAINST PGMS
Thesis: "Lessons learned", how PGMs were used in Operation Desert
Storm together with indications on future developments will give us a
good foundation to decide in what areas we have to conduct further
studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new Swedish coastal defense
system sufficient protection against PGMs.
II. Description of the SFS 2000
A. Tactical environment and organization
III. The air campaign during Operation Desert Storm
A. The over-all campaign
B. Used PGMs
IV. Air attack on SFS 2000
A. General tactics
B. Different scenarios
V. Future improvements of PGMs
VI. Threats to SF5 2000 from future PGMs
VII. Proposed studies to enhance protection of SFS 2000
A. Limitations with means planned
B. Studies to enhance protection of the fire guidance system
C. Studies to enhance protection of the gun system
D. Studies to enhance protection of the fortifications
PRODUCTION OF SFS 2000 AGAINST PGMs
An integral part of the Swedish coastal defense system is older
artillery units. These units are to be replaced by new units in tile late
nineties. A study of different alternatives for a new system (SFS
2000) has just been finished. The results from this study will define
the requirements for development of a prototype system.
Before establishing the requirements for the prototype system, it is
important to consider "lessons learned" from Operation Desert Storm.
These will highlight areas where improvements must be made
Although an amphibious assault did not occur, the air campaign to
"shape the battlefield" was vast. Officers who planned and executed
this operation have experience that is important for us to consider
when preparing to be able to meet a future aggressor.
An aggressor wilt have to defeat SFS 2000 if he intend to conduct an
amphibious assault against the Swedish coastline; in other words in
order to "shape his battlefield".
Today's state-of-the-art precision guided missiles had been of limited
use in war when the study was undertaken. Because of this, it is clear
that criteria used for the evaluations within the study are likely built
upon theoretical discussions and peacetime experiments. This
condition using theoretical discussions and results from peacetime
experiments instead of experience gained in war, leads to a general
weakness of the study.
"Lessons learned," how PGMs were used in Operation Desert
Storm together with indications on future developments will
give us a good foundation to decide in what areas we have to
conduct further studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new
Swedish coastal defense system, sufficient protection against
DESCRIPTION OF SFS 2000
Tactical environment and organization
SFS 2000 will be an integrated part of the "area-bound" coast artillery
defense. The unit will be an organic part of the barrage battalion
whose mission is to counter amphibious assaults. SFS 2000 will be
the most important unit within the battalion because it will destroy
enemy assault ships with fire.
According to the study SFS 2000 will comprise the following main
- Four mobile artillery pieces
- Two fire-control stations (one fixed and one mobile)
For protection, infantry units, mortar units, surface-to-air missile
units and ground combat units will be found as organic parts of SFS
2000. In addition, there will be passive systems to enhance protection,
such as decoys and camouflage nets.
SFS 2000 will be deployed and held in alert in fortified "garages".
When fighting amphibious assault ships, the SFS 2000 (artillery pieces
and the mobile fire-control station) will move from the "garages" to
their separate battle stations. From a battle station, artillery fire will
be directed against the enemy as long as possible or until the targets
are defeated. If the aggressor's fire makes this inadvisable or
impossible, the firing units and movable fire control stations will
regroup at other battle stations. Established in a "new" battle
stations, SFS 2000 will, if needed, resume firing.
THE AIR CAMPAIGN DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM
The overall campaign
The air-campaign during Operation Desert Storm was divided into four
sequential phases.(5 :8-9) During the first phase the objective was to
"open" the Iraqi air defence, defeat the Iraqi Air Force, and destroy
Scud missiles. During phase two, the air campaign focused on the
destruction of air defenses around Kuwait. Phase three was aimed at
cutting off the ground forces in Kuwait.
Phase four was close air support for the ground war.
To measure the success of the allied air campaign, or Iraqi failure to
counter the allied air campaign, one need only view the allied air-craft
loss rates. US and allied aircraft flew about 116,000 sorties, and only
37 air craft and 5 helicopters were lost in combat. These coalition
losses were caused by SAMs and AAA.(8: 8-11)
The effectivness of the Iraqi air-defence system must therefore be
considered as negligible. There are two main reasons for this. First,
when the bulk of the Iraqi Air Force "fled" to Iran, the allied forces
could attack fixed targets deep within !raq without fighter opposition
of any significance.(17: 738-740) More than a hundred modern Iraqi
combat aircraft fled to Iran just after the allies initiated the air
campaign.(6; 8-9) According to participating Air Force units, heavy
fire from Iraqi SAM and AAA was encountered during the first days
of the campaign.(11: 108) Second, without the threat from Iraqi
fighters, the allied aircraft could avoid ground-based air-defense
systems by conducting their raids from higher altitudes where they
were immune to Iraqi SAMs and AAA. Jamming the AA defense C2
system also facilitated the air campaign.
PGMs used in Operation Desert Storm
There is no doubt about the importance of PGMs in the success of the
air campaign . For example, 95% of the primary targets in Baghdad
were destroyed by the laser-guided bomb GBU-27.(9. 57-60) Initial
estimates were that 90% of the laser-guided bombs hit their
targets.(1: 48-53) Attacks with PGMs were normally combined with
EW operations, such as jamming, in order to "blind" the enemy and
protect strike aircraft. However, despite the overall favourable
weather conditions for the operation, the weather became a limiting
factor for use of PGMs during parts of the air campaign.(6: 36-41)
"High-tech" weapons have decisively contributed to success in war
before. The Israeli victory in Lebanon's Beksa valley in 1982 was a
notable example of a highly trained force using advanced weapons to
destroy numbers of a superior enemy. Since this battle, new and even
more capable PGMs have been developed. Many different types of
"state-of-the-art". PGMs were used during Operation Desert Storm.
Some of the equipment used was not fully developed and evaluated
before entering combat.
PGM guidance systems can be more or less intelligent. Some must be
monitored and handled by the aircrew while others are "fire and
forget". PGMs homing systems can be divided into following major
- Cruise missiles (computer guide)
- Laser guided
- IR passive
- IIR (Imaging infrared)
The following discussion presents capabilities of the most common
PGMs used against Iraq, some of which could be used against SFS
The Tomahawk is a computer-guided cruise missile with a 1,000
pound warhead. Once launched, the missile attacks the target that is
"designated" in its computer. If the target has moved to another
area the missile will still attack the place "designated" in the
computer. This makes the Tomahawk unsuited for attack against
mobile targets. The Tomahawk was used initially to "weaken" Iraqi
air-defenses, and later against well-defended strategic targets housing
chemical weapons and supporting nuclear research. No Tomahawks
were fired after February 1st because it was perceived as more cost
effective to use manned aircraft(14: 8-11).
The French Air Force used their AS3OL rocket-propelled laser guided
missile to attach bunkers and aircraft shelters, with a stand-off range
of 10 kilometers.(10) It uses the principle of "lock on after launch".
The missile is launched in the target's general direction, then a
designater is used to illuminate the target and thus guide the weapon.
The manufacturer claims the 525 pound warhead can penetrate two
meters of concrete before exploding.(3)
U.S. aircraft used the GBU-27 against hardened targets. GBU-27 is a
2,000 pound laser-guided bomb(3) capable of penetrating 5 meters of
concrete walls.(13) Other laser-guided missiles used by the U.S. forces
were the AGM 65 and the Hellfire. A-10s and AH-64s armed with these
were used to attack and destroy tanks.
The stand-off Land-Attack Missile (SLAM), AGM-84-E, was a high-
profile PGM that saw action for the first time during Operation Desert
Storm. SLAM, an air launched missile, has a passive targeting
capability. The infrared seeker transmits a video image to the control
aircraft and, once the target is recognized, a specific aimpoint on the
target is picked. To avoid enemy jamming, the datalink is not
activated until the missile is within close range of the target. Despite
its 100 kilometer range its accuracy is within six inches of a precisely
defined target. To make this accuracy possible, a Global Positioning
Satellite Receiver/Processor is integrated in the missile.(3)
One of the most commonly used precision-guided weapons was the
Maverick. Different versions of this missile have been developed using
three main guidance systems: television, laser, and infrared. The
warhead can be either 125 pounds or 300 pounds. The infrared-
guided missile was mainly used to attack dug-in tanks.(6)
The AGM-I3O is a TV-guided glide bomb, which was used to destroy
the pumping stations in Kuwait (in order to prevent the Iraq is from
pumping oil into the sea). If launched from high altitude, its range is
The ALARM ( Air-Launched Anti-Radar Missile), used by the Royal
Air Force must be considered one of the most advanced anti-radiation
missiles operational today. It has a range of 20 kilometers. Anti-
radiation missiles, like the ALARM, were often used together with
jammers. The threat from missiles like ALARM forced the Iraqis to
limited use of all types of radar. Because of this, most of their AAA
and SAMs, to a high degree, were fired without guidance.
PGMs are often used together with other systems that provide
designation. The reason being it is cheaper to implement some of the
"smartness" as an organic part of the aircraft, instead of building it
into every missile. For example, to be able to conduct 24-hour all-
weather operations, the Royal Air Force used the TIALD ( Thermal
Imaging/Airborne laser Designator) in combination with PGMs. The
TIALD gives the aircraft the capability of designating targets without
any external support. Another laser designator used was the ATLIS
used in conjunction with the AS30. ATLIS is capable of locking on and
holding a target at ranges up to 10 kilometers.
Despite their success in Operation Desert Storm, the use of
precision guided weapons was hampered in certain situations due to
limitations of the sensors in bad weather.(13: 177-181) Another limiting
factor is that the most effective, current sensor systems have a range greater
than that of the weapon. This results in the "weapon carrier" going
closer to the target than what the sensor requires.
Up to now I have outlined the capabilities of current PGMs, now
I will turn to their possible use against and effect on SFS 2000.
AIR ATTACK ON SFS 2000(12)
An air campaign against Swedish defenses with the objective to
"shaping the battlefield" before an amphibious assault, would require
the use of different types of PGMs by our enemy. In such an air
campaign, the coastal defense would be a necessary target to defeat.
SFS 2000 will be a "high value" target within the coastal defense
Two different scenarios, of how an attack on SFS 2000 to destroy
the system might be designed, are enclosed in Appendix A and Appendix B.
Both scenarios are based on the same tactics, and weapons that
were used during Operation Desert Storm. The amount of aircraft used
are representative of a MEB-like unit given the mission to conduct an
amphibious assault on a defended coastline. In such an operation, the
air assets within the MEB, must attack and destroy the coastal
defense, gain and maintain air superiority (10: V-17), conduct deep
strikes inland to isolate the area and provide CAS (close air support).
Only about 20% of sorties available can be expected to attack SFS 2000
and other coastal artillery units in the specific area.
In scenario A, the positions of the guns and decoys are known as
well as which battle stations are without guns or decoys. Due to the
intelligence information available, it is not possible for the enemy to
decide whether it is a gun or a decoy deployed in a given battlestation.
In the enemy's execution, highest target priority would be given to the
actual guns and decoys. Secondary targets would be "empty" battle
stations. If no gun/decoy or empty battle station is left tertiary
targets would be the garage. We will assume the intellegence
information available to the enemy is extremly good. The
attack can be conducted without any unnecessary" attacks.
In scenario A, battle stations with guns/decoys are initially attacked
with IRR/Laser guided missiles, while the other targets, battle stations
without guns/decoys etc., are attacked with TV-guided missiles. Two
restrikes are conducted against all targets. TV-guided missiles are
used for the restrikes.
In scenario B, the positions of the battle stations are known, but
it is not known in which of these the guns are deployed or even if the guns
are still in the garages. In the enemy's execution, battle stations and
garages are given the highest priority. Here we consider the enemy's
available intelligence information as limited. Since it is not known in
which battle stations the guns/decoys are deployed, or if they
are deployed, all battle stations and garages have to be attacked.
In scenario B, all battle stations and garages are initially attacked
with IRR/Laser guided missiles. Two restrikes are conducted against all
targets. IRR/Laser guided missiles and TV guided missiles are used for
In all attacks in scenario A and scenario B, the pilot or the missile
must be able to "see" the target. To do so the target must be visible in
the IR or visible light spectra. A decoy with the same radiation
signature and form as the real target will be attacked as a real target.
This is true not only for guns/decoys but for fortifications as well. All
initial attacks must be followed by bomb damage assessment and restrikes.
In addition to the attacks outlined in scenario A and B, two aircraft,
capable of jamming or attacking any fire control radar or radar SAM, fly escort
as part of the attacks.
FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS OF PGMs
Since the military needs conventional stand-off weapons to hit the
target from beyond the range of point and area defense systems,
many companies are looking at extending the reach of weapons in
their inventories.(15: 390-391) Worldwide there are as many as 17
known air-to-surface missile (ASM) program designers for range
capabilities exceeding 100 kilomtres.(15: 390-391) They include
numerous guidance systems, ranges and warheads
The success of the Maverick during Operation Desert Storm may
lead to the development of a Maverick ER (extended range: 70 km) version.
The guidance system will be based on a millimeter microwave seeker.
This would turn the missile into a 24-hour, all-weather weapon.(6)
This missile will also be given the capability to lock on after launch,
allowing the pilot to "fire and forget."
It is not just the range of the PGMs that will be enhanced.
The capability of the sensors is also an area to which developers pay a
lot of attention. No matter what their sensor specialty, developers are
striving to include "lock-on after launch" in their systems.(7: 525-528)
Infrared seekers offer very good image resolution by day or night.
Although all scanning problems have been solved, IR seekers still
have a limited capability in fog, dust and smoke. Used as sensors,
microwave radars offers a number of advantages, not the least being
very good performance in bad weather conditions.
To capitalize on the advantages offered by the two different
technologies and overcome their individual weakness the latest
development combines the two sensors into one.(2: 16-22) The
development of an Advanced Precision Guided Missile (APGM), with a
combined microwave and infra-red sensor has temporarily been
canceled due to fiscal constraints. Despite this, development will
probably be re-started as a result of the lessons learned in the Gulf
There are other important developments going on today. The
Advanced Interaction Weapon System (AIWS) is such a project. The
missile is intended to be successor to Maverick Skipper, Walleye and
Paveway.(4: 387-389) This missile will be equipped with an advanced
sensor package as well as an advanced warhead. The warhead will be
unitary which gives the missile the capability to engage a wide range
of targets.(11) Full scale development is not planned to start until FY
96.(11) Together with today's fiscal constraints, this makes it unlikely
the missile will be operational before 2015. Because of this, there is no
reason to consider the missile a threat to SFS 2000.
THREATS TO SFS 2000 FROM FUTURE PGMs
The system operational requirements of SFS 2000 state that it
should be able to counter the threats that could be posed by a modern-
equipped aggressor through the year 2015. While some of the PGMs
used during Operation Desert Storm were not fully developed and
evaluated before entering combat, it is logical to assume that they
will, after minor adjustment based upon combat experiences, be used
extensively at least for the next twenty years. Before 2015, it is also
logical to assume that some of thee will have been modernized.
As mentioned earlier, in two areas important improvements are
to be expected between now and 2015. The range of the missiles will
increase and make it possible for an aggressor to launch weapons far
beyond the range of other AA systems organic to SFS 2000.
Furthermore, guidance systems will include multicapable sensors.
These sensors will at least include an infra-red image sensor totally
integrated with a micro-wave sensor.
Today's state-of-the-art missiles, given an extended range and
multicapable sensor, are the most probable PGM threats that SFS 2000
must be able to counter. These threats can be categorized along the
-Laser-guided: AS3OL rocket-propelled, laser guided missile deployed
together with ATLIS laser designator, which can lock-on and acquire
a target at ranges up to 10 kilometers.
-IIR (Imaging infrared)
Stand-off Land-Attack Missile AGM-84-E (SLAM)
The AGM-l30 (TV-guided glide bomb)
The ALARM ( Air-Launched Anti-Radar Missile)
The "PGM 2015" missile is not developed today. But, by using known
technology, it would be possible to develop a missile with an IRR
sensor like AGM-84-E and a microwave sensor giving it an all-
weather capability. Furthermore, this missile could easily be given
a range exceeding 20-30km. The missile may be equipped with
different warheads which makes it possible to use the missile
against hardened as well as "soft" targets.
PROPOSED STUDIES TO ENHANCE PROTECTION OF SFS 2000
Limitations with means planned
The threat posed to SFS 2000 from PGMs can be described as a
two dimensional threat. One dimension is the technological level of the
attacking missiles, while the other is mass or tile number of missiles
launched per target. Today's PGMs are so accurate that one missile
launched against a target is almost surely considered one hit.
Furthermore, the warhead is so efficient that a hit almost always-
result in a kill. This enables the attacker to limit his attack to one
missile per target. Because of this, it is mainly the technological level
of the threat that must dictate the capabilities of our counter systems.
In the feasibility study, it states that SFS 2000 will be protected
against threats from the air through active as well as passive means.
Analyzing the ATOs given in the scenarios, together with the
capabilities of future PGMs described above, there are threats posed
to SFS 2000 that have been considered sufficiently in the study. At
the same time, there are threats that must be dealt with further
before establishing accurate operational requirements upon the
SFS 2000's active defenses, mainly AAA and SAM systems, will
counter the threat posed from attacking aircraft, provided the aircraft
operate within range of our systems. The idea is to defeat the aircraft
before they launch their missiles. But if an aircraft launches a missile
while out of range of these AA systems, there is nothing active
systems can do to counter the attack. Neither the AAA nor SAM
systems (technological level similar to Stinger) has the ability to
defeat an attacking PGM, with an acceptable Pkill. Engaging an
attacking aircraft within the range of our AA systems assumes that
our surveillance and fire- guidance systems are capable of finding the
targets and directing the AA systems. The enemy will probably, as
was done during Operation Desert Storm, rely heavily upon EW for
self-protection. He will try to jam our systems and use his anti-
radiation missiles to destroy our surveillance systems and fire-
Studies to enhance protection of the fire guidance system
For us to be successful, surveillance- and fire guidance systems within
the air defense system, must be able to counter threats from missiles
like ALARM and HARM. The Iraqi forces had some very modern
equipment. Despite this, they were jammed and not able to direct the
fire of their AAA and SAMs. Studies must be done to see whether it is
possible by tactics or technical means to counter this threat. This
study must deal with radar as well as IR technologies. It is important
to consider using the different technologies in concert with each other
or separately. Two or more radar emitters that work in concert with
each other, or a so called bistatic radar, could be one part of the
solution, while using low powered radar emitters could be another.
This must be compared with passive systems like IR or semi passive
systems like IR with laser range-finder. The aim should be to
maximize the redundancy in our C2 system for our AA weapons.
The enemy will probably deal with our sea-surveillance and fire
guidance systems for the antiship guns in the same way. He will try to
jam them, and/or defeat them with anti-radiation missiles. In other
words, it is important to include those surveillance and fire-guidance
systems in the study as well.
Studies to enhance protection of the gun system
Since it is possible to use "manual" direction of the fire from antiship
guns, it is not enough to destroy the fire guidance system alone. The
guns have to be destroyed also if an enemy wants to use the SLOCs.
PGMs pose a threat to guns as well.
This threat is biggest when the gun is moving, when it is easier to
detect. But, there is also a direct threat posed to the gun while in the
battle station. This threat is present whether the gun is firing or not.
According to the SFS 2000 study, this part of the threat is planned to
be countered mainly by camouflage nets and smoke. But camouflage
nets and smoke alone will not give the gun sufficient protection while
in the battle station. When moving from the garage to the battle
station, this type of protection will be even more insufficient.
The challenge in protecting the gun in this environment is to a
large degree similar to the problem of protecting tanks. Mobility low
profile, and smoke are means used today to protect tanks. During
Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqis tried to protect their tanks by
digging them into the sand. The allied forces managed to find and
destroy such tanks by using PGMs together with IRR laser
The future will provide even better means of finding vehicles. In
addition to IIR sensors, it will be possible to find them by using a
microwave radar sensor. This sensor will make it possible not just to
find the vehicle, but to determine which type of vehicle it is. The IIR
sensor and microwave sensor as mentioned earlier, will probably be
used in concert with each other.
Even though today's tank production is rapidly decreasing, the
development of tanks for the "battlefield of the future" is ongoing.
(3: 48-53) To give those tanks sufficient protection different technologies
and developments are under consideration. There are already
examples of new technology being incorporated into tanks, as
well as other combat vehicles in order to enhance the protection
against PGMs(16: 530-531). There are methods available to reduce the
"profile" of the vehicle by adjusting the configuration, and means to
create artificial decoys and "shields." The study needed to be done can
be divided into two parts, one part dealing with the systems physical
configuration and another dealing with expendable systems such as
artificial decoys and IR smoke.
While studying the configuration, the focus ought to be on possible
methods to reduce/suppress the gun's radar signature, as well as the
gun's IR signature. Experience attained from the development of the
stealth surface attack-ship "Smyge" should be applied and
used in this study. This is important because the sensor technology
used in antiship missiles, to a large degree, is the same as the
technology used in sensors for PGMs . Such a study will also give us
valuable data that we can apply when we have to replace or modify
Army combat vehicles.
Even if there are methods to reduce or suppress the gun's signature,
this is not enough. Compare this to a ship. A ship is constructed in a
certain way to minimize its target area but, at the same time, it is
equipped with expandable systems. This could be a method to further
enhance the protection of the gun. There are several studies and
developments on-going dealing with this problem. These include laser
warning systems, as well as multi-spectral aerosols offering high
reflection values for radar infrared and visible light radiation.(8: 35-41)
There are likely enough different systems available that there is no
need to develop new ones. The question then becomes which of the
already developed systems should be used and how should they work
together to give maximum protection.
Studies to enhance protection of the fortifications
Part of the passive protection for SFS 2000 includes (traditionally)
heavy fortifications. Two fortification types are considered in the SFS
2000 study. One is a "garage" for the gun when not at a battle station
or on its way to a battle station; the other is a structure to contain and
protect one of the fire-guidance stations. The most important lessons
learned from Operation Desert Storm about fortifications is even
heavy fortifications can be destroyed by PGMs. As mentioned earlier
today's PGMs can penetrate and destroy a bunker protected with
more than 5 meters of concrete. Modern bunkers, such as the
proposed "garages", used to protect Iraqi air craft were easily
destroyed by PGMs.
To direct PGMs against fortifications, the attacker must be able
to detect them in some way. If the pilot can see them, either with his
own eyes or via a data link from a missile's TV camera he can direct a
PGM to attack the fortifications. Other methods to "see" include IRR
sensors, provided the fortifications differ in temperature from their
surroundings. However, if they can not be detected, they cannot be hit
with PGMs. Therefore, various means of camouflaging the "garages"
should he more cost effective than protection by fortification. Maybe a
combination of "hiding" and fortifying is the best solution. Considering
this, it is important to study different options to protect the guns
including "camouflage" in concert with a "light" garage designed to just
To do this, different methods to reduce the "image" of the garage
through all spectrums must be explored. Were such methods found, it
might permit less hardening of the fortification. If so, the cost for that
part of the project could be reduced significantly. A lower unit cost
could make it possible to build more garages. That would give us the
opportunity to shuttle four guns between perhaps six or eight
different garages. Thus we force the enemy to find and destroy more
targets which would complicate his planning as well as his execution.
In the studies suggested above, several different methods to enhance
the protection of SFS 2000 against PGMs surely will be found. But,
more interesting than a single protective method, is the synergy
combined methods would provide for an overall enhanced protection.
All studies suggested above must be integrated and evaluated as part
of a total "protection system" for SFS 2000. It is important that this
study also include the different systems already stated as
requirements to make the overall system balanced. The end result
should be a comprehensive and integrated protection system, because,
as Desert Storm unveiled, this is the only one that stands a chance of
Cick here to view images
1. "Armor Looks to Laser Warning for Enhanced Survivability."
Journal of Electronic Defense, October 91 48-53.
2. Biass, Eric H. "European Smart Ammunition: What's Up?" ARMADA
Feb/March 91, 16-22.
3. Bolte', Philip L. "The Shrinking Tank Market." MILTECH. Issue10 91,
4. "Case for a new priority" Jane's Defense Weekly. 16 March 91,
5. "Desert Storm Air Battle." Air Defense Artillery. March-April 91,
6. Eshel, Tamir "The most Successful Air Campaign Ever?" Military
Technology. Vol XV, Issue 4 91, 36-41.
7. "Figures that add up to success." Jane's Defense Weekly. 6 April 91,
8. Geisenheyer, Stefan "Threat Warning and Decoy Technologies." ARMADA.
Dec-Jan 90/91, 35-41.
9. Grimes, Vincent "Slam,Bam, Saddain." Defense & Diplomacy. Vol No. 9,
Jul-Aug 91, 57-60.
10. JCS Pub. 3-02.1 (Test) Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations.
Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 1989.
11. Lenorovitz, Jeffrey "French AS3OL Laser Missiles Scored High Hit
Rate in Air-Ground Attacks." Aviation Week and Space
Technology, April 22 91, 108.
12. Olsson, Mj Jeffrey L. USMC served as "Target officer" in
USCENTCOM during Operation Desert Storm.
13. "On Target." Air International. Vol 41, No4, 177-181.
14. "Smart Weapons For a Desert War." Defence & Diplomacy. vol 9,
No. 3-4, March/April 91, 8-11.
15. "Stand-off delivery comes of age." Jane's Defence Weekly. 16
March 91, 390-391.
16. "Success from the air." Jane's Defense Weekly. 6 April 91, 530-531.
17. Wratten, Air Vice Marshal Bill RAF commander in the Gulf "Air
war doctrine affirmed." Jane's Defense Weekly. 4 May 91,
|Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list|