Protection of SFS 2000 Against PGMS
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA General
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Protection of SFS 2000 against PGMs
Author: Lt Col. Gunnarsson, Goran, Royal Swedish Navy
Thesis: "Lessons learned", how PGMs were used in Operation Desert
Storm together with indications on future developments will give us a
good foundation to decide in what areas we have to conduct further
studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new Swedish coastal defense
system, sufficient protection against PGMs.
Background: Parts of today's coastal artillery guns are planned to be
replaced in the late 1990. Studies and developments have, so far, not
taken "lessons learned" from Operation Desert Storm into
consideration. During Operation Desert Storm, PGMs were used to an
extent that surpassed all previous wars. Many of them were used
against armoured vehicles and fortifications. Those types of targets
are very similar to guns and fortifications within SFS 2000. There are
methods/equipment to be found which, if implemented right, would
enhance the protection of SFS 2000 against PGMs.
Recommendation: Before further developments of the gun and
fortifications for SFS 2000 are conducted, studies of different methods
to enhance the protection of the system against PGMs ought to be
made. Such studies should mainly be focused on options to reduce the
"target area" of the gun and the fortifications in different spectrums.
Furthermore, possible methods found in those studies should be
evaluated together to find out the most effective "overall" protection
system for SFS 2000.
PROTECTION OF SFS 2000 AGAINST PGMS
OUTLINE
Thesis: "Lessons learned", how PGMs were used in Operation Desert
Storm together with indications on future developments will give us a
good foundation to decide in what areas we have to conduct further
studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new Swedish coastal defense
system sufficient protection against PGMs.
I. Introduction
A. Background
B. Thesis
II. Description of the SFS 2000
A. Tactical environment and organization
B. Tactics
III. The air campaign during Operation Desert Storm
A. The over-all campaign
B. Used PGMs
IV. Air attack on SFS 2000
A. General tactics
B. Different scenarios
V. Future improvements of PGMs
VI. Threats to SF5 2000 from future PGMs
VII. Proposed studies to enhance protection of SFS 2000
A. Limitations with means planned
B. Studies to enhance protection of the fire guidance system
C. Studies to enhance protection of the gun system
D. Studies to enhance protection of the fortifications
VIII Summary
PRODUCTION OF SFS 2000 AGAINST PGMs
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
An integral part of the Swedish coastal defense system is older
artillery units. These units are to be replaced by new units in tile late
nineties. A study of different alternatives for a new system (SFS
2000) has just been finished. The results from this study will define
the requirements for development of a prototype system.
Before establishing the requirements for the prototype system, it is
important to consider "lessons learned" from Operation Desert Storm.
These will highlight areas where improvements must be made
Although an amphibious assault did not occur, the air campaign to
"shape the battlefield" was vast. Officers who planned and executed
this operation have experience that is important for us to consider
when preparing to be able to meet a future aggressor.
An aggressor wilt have to defeat SFS 2000 if he intend to conduct an
amphibious assault against the Swedish coastline; in other words in
order to "shape his battlefield".
Today's state-of-the-art precision guided missiles had been of limited
use in war when the study was undertaken. Because of this, it is clear
that criteria used for the evaluations within the study are likely built
upon theoretical discussions and peacetime experiments. This
condition using theoretical discussions and results from peacetime
experiments instead of experience gained in war, leads to a general
weakness of the study.
THESIS
"Lessons learned," how PGMs were used in Operation Desert
Storm together with indications on future developments will
give us a good foundation to decide in what areas we have to
conduct further studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new
Swedish coastal defense system, sufficient protection against
PGMs.
DESCRIPTION OF SFS 2000
Tactical environment and organization
SFS 2000 will be an integrated part of the "area-bound" coast artillery
defense. The unit will be an organic part of the barrage battalion
whose mission is to counter amphibious assaults. SFS 2000 will be
the most important unit within the battalion because it will destroy
enemy assault ships with fire.
According to the study SFS 2000 will comprise the following main
parts:
- Four mobile artillery pieces
- Two fire-control stations (one fixed and one mobile)
For protection, infantry units, mortar units, surface-to-air missile
units and ground combat units will be found as organic parts of SFS
2000. In addition, there will be passive systems to enhance protection,
such as decoys and camouflage nets.
Tactics
SFS 2000 will be deployed and held in alert in fortified "garages".
When fighting amphibious assault ships, the SFS 2000 (artillery pieces
and the mobile fire-control station) will move from the "garages" to
their separate battle stations. From a battle station, artillery fire will
be directed against the enemy as long as possible or until the targets
are defeated. If the aggressor's fire makes this inadvisable or
impossible, the firing units and movable fire control stations will
regroup at other battle stations. Established in a "new" battle
stations, SFS 2000 will, if needed, resume firing.
THE AIR CAMPAIGN DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM
The overall campaign
The air-campaign during Operation Desert Storm was divided into four
sequential phases.(5 :8-9) During the first phase the objective was to
"open" the Iraqi air defence, defeat the Iraqi Air Force, and destroy
Scud missiles. During phase two, the air campaign focused on the
destruction of air defenses around Kuwait. Phase three was aimed at
cutting off the ground forces in Kuwait.
Phase four was close air support for the ground war.
To measure the success of the allied air campaign, or Iraqi failure to
counter the allied air campaign, one need only view the allied air-craft
loss rates. US and allied aircraft flew about 116,000 sorties, and only
37 air craft and 5 helicopters were lost in combat. These coalition
losses were caused by SAMs and AAA.(8: 8-11)
The effectivness of the Iraqi air-defence system must therefore be
considered as negligible. There are two main reasons for this. First,
when the bulk of the Iraqi Air Force "fled" to Iran, the allied forces
could attack fixed targets deep within !raq without fighter opposition
of any significance.(17: 738-740) More than a hundred modern Iraqi
combat aircraft fled to Iran just after the allies initiated the air
campaign.(6; 8-9) According to participating Air Force units, heavy
fire from Iraqi SAM and AAA was encountered during the first days
of the campaign.(11: 108) Second, without the threat from Iraqi
fighters, the allied aircraft could avoid ground-based air-defense
systems by conducting their raids from higher altitudes where they
were immune to Iraqi SAMs and AAA. Jamming the AA defense C2
system also facilitated the air campaign.
PGMs used in Operation Desert Storm
There is no doubt about the importance of PGMs in the success of the
air campaign . For example, 95% of the primary targets in Baghdad
were destroyed by the laser-guided bomb GBU-27.(9. 57-60) Initial
estimates were that 90% of the laser-guided bombs hit their
targets.(1: 48-53) Attacks with PGMs were normally combined with
EW operations, such as jamming, in order to "blind" the enemy and
protect strike aircraft. However, despite the overall favourable
weather conditions for the operation, the weather became a limiting
factor for use of PGMs during parts of the air campaign.(6: 36-41)
"High-tech" weapons have decisively contributed to success in war
before. The Israeli victory in Lebanon's Beksa valley in 1982 was a
notable example of a highly trained force using advanced weapons to
destroy numbers of a superior enemy. Since this battle, new and even
more capable PGMs have been developed. Many different types of
"state-of-the-art". PGMs were used during Operation Desert Storm.
Some of the equipment used was not fully developed and evaluated
before entering combat.
PGM guidance systems can be more or less intelligent. Some must be
monitored and handled by the aircrew while others are "fire and
forget". PGMs homing systems can be divided into following major
types:
- Cruise missiles (computer guide)
- Laser guided
- IR passive
- IIR (Imaging infrared)
- TV-guided
- Anti-radiation
The following discussion presents capabilities of the most common
PGMs used against Iraq, some of which could be used against SFS
2000.
The Tomahawk is a computer-guided cruise missile with a 1,000
pound warhead. Once launched, the missile attacks the target that is
"designated" in its computer. If the target has moved to another
area the missile will still attack the place "designated" in the
computer. This makes the Tomahawk unsuited for attack against
mobile targets. The Tomahawk was used initially to "weaken" Iraqi
air-defenses, and later against well-defended strategic targets housing
chemical weapons and supporting nuclear research. No Tomahawks
were fired after February 1st because it was perceived as more cost
effective to use manned aircraft(14: 8-11).
The French Air Force used their AS3OL rocket-propelled laser guided
missile to attach bunkers and aircraft shelters, with a stand-off range
of 10 kilometers.(10) It uses the principle of "lock on after launch".
The missile is launched in the target's general direction, then a
designater is used to illuminate the target and thus guide the weapon.
The manufacturer claims the 525 pound warhead can penetrate two
meters of concrete before exploding.(3)
U.S. aircraft used the GBU-27 against hardened targets. GBU-27 is a
2,000 pound laser-guided bomb(3) capable of penetrating 5 meters of
concrete walls.(13) Other laser-guided missiles used by the U.S. forces
were the AGM 65 and the Hellfire. A-10s and AH-64s armed with these
were used to attack and destroy tanks.
The stand-off Land-Attack Missile (SLAM), AGM-84-E, was a high-
profile PGM that saw action for the first time during Operation Desert
Storm. SLAM, an air launched missile, has a passive targeting
capability. The infrared seeker transmits a video image to the control
aircraft and, once the target is recognized, a specific aimpoint on the
target is picked. To avoid enemy jamming, the datalink is not
activated until the missile is within close range of the target. Despite
its 100 kilometer range its accuracy is within six inches of a precisely
defined target. To make this accuracy possible, a Global Positioning
Satellite Receiver/Processor is integrated in the missile.(3)
One of the most commonly used precision-guided weapons was the
Maverick. Different versions of this missile have been developed using
three main guidance systems: television, laser, and infrared. The
warhead can be either 125 pounds or 300 pounds. The infrared-
guided missile was mainly used to attack dug-in tanks.(6)
The AGM-I3O is a TV-guided glide bomb, which was used to destroy
the pumping stations in Kuwait (in order to prevent the Iraq is from
pumping oil into the sea). If launched from high altitude, its range is
80 kilometers.
The ALARM ( Air-Launched Anti-Radar Missile), used by the Royal
Air Force must be considered one of the most advanced anti-radiation
missiles operational today. It has a range of 20 kilometers. Anti-
radiation missiles, like the ALARM, were often used together with
jammers. The threat from missiles like ALARM forced the Iraqis to
limited use of all types of radar. Because of this, most of their AAA
and SAMs, to a high degree, were fired without guidance.
PGMs are often used together with other systems that provide
designation. The reason being it is cheaper to implement some of the
"smartness" as an organic part of the aircraft, instead of building it
into every missile. For example, to be able to conduct 24-hour all-
weather operations, the Royal Air Force used the TIALD ( Thermal
Imaging/Airborne laser Designator) in combination with PGMs. The
TIALD gives the aircraft the capability of designating targets without
any external support. Another laser designator used was the ATLIS
used in conjunction with the AS30. ATLIS is capable of locking on and
holding a target at ranges up to 10 kilometers.
Despite their success in Operation Desert Storm, the use of
precision guided weapons was hampered in certain situations due to
limitations of the sensors in bad weather.(13: 177-181) Another limiting
factor is that the most effective, current sensor systems have a range greater
than that of the weapon. This results in the "weapon carrier" going
closer to the target than what the sensor requires.
Up to now I have outlined the capabilities of current PGMs, now
I will turn to their possible use against and effect on SFS 2000.
AIR ATTACK ON SFS 2000(12)
General Tactics
An air campaign against Swedish defenses with the objective to
"shaping the battlefield" before an amphibious assault, would require
the use of different types of PGMs by our enemy. In such an air
campaign, the coastal defense would be a necessary target to defeat.
SFS 2000 will be a "high value" target within the coastal defense
system.
Different scenarios
Two different scenarios, of how an attack on SFS 2000 to destroy
the system might be designed, are enclosed in Appendix A and Appendix B.
Both scenarios are based on the same tactics, and weapons that
were used during Operation Desert Storm. The amount of aircraft used
are representative of a MEB-like unit given the mission to conduct an
amphibious assault on a defended coastline. In such an operation, the
air assets within the MEB, must attack and destroy the coastal
defense, gain and maintain air superiority (10: V-17), conduct deep
strikes inland to isolate the area and provide CAS (close air support).
Only about 20% of sorties available can be expected to attack SFS 2000
and other coastal artillery units in the specific area.
In scenario A, the positions of the guns and decoys are known as
well as which battle stations are without guns or decoys. Due to the
intelligence information available, it is not possible for the enemy to
decide whether it is a gun or a decoy deployed in a given battlestation.
In the enemy's execution, highest target priority would be given to the
actual guns and decoys. Secondary targets would be "empty" battle
stations. If no gun/decoy or empty battle station is left tertiary
targets would be the garage. We will assume the intellegence
information available to the enemy is extremly good. The
attack can be conducted without any unnecessary" attacks.
In scenario A, battle stations with guns/decoys are initially attacked
with IRR/Laser guided missiles, while the other targets, battle stations
without guns/decoys etc., are attacked with TV-guided missiles. Two
restrikes are conducted against all targets. TV-guided missiles are
used for the restrikes.
In scenario B, the positions of the battle stations are known, but
it is not known in which of these the guns are deployed or even if the guns
are still in the garages. In the enemy's execution, battle stations and
garages are given the highest priority. Here we consider the enemy's
available intelligence information as limited. Since it is not known in
which battle stations the guns/decoys are deployed, or if they
are deployed, all battle stations and garages have to be attacked.
In scenario B, all battle stations and garages are initially attacked
with IRR/Laser guided missiles. Two restrikes are conducted against all
targets. IRR/Laser guided missiles and TV guided missiles are used for
the restrikes.
In all attacks in scenario A and scenario B, the pilot or the missile
must be able to "see" the target. To do so the target must be visible in
the IR or visible light spectra. A decoy with the same radiation
signature and form as the real target will be attacked as a real target.
This is true not only for guns/decoys but for fortifications as well. All
initial attacks must be followed by bomb damage assessment and restrikes.
In addition to the attacks outlined in scenario A and B, two aircraft,
capable of jamming or attacking any fire control radar or radar SAM, fly escort
as part of the attacks.
FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS OF PGMs
Since the military needs conventional stand-off weapons to hit the
target from beyond the range of point and area defense systems,
many companies are looking at extending the reach of weapons in
their inventories.(15: 390-391) Worldwide there are as many as 17
known air-to-surface missile (ASM) program designers for range
capabilities exceeding 100 kilomtres.(15: 390-391) They include
numerous guidance systems, ranges and warheads
The success of the Maverick during Operation Desert Storm may
lead to the development of a Maverick ER (extended range: 70 km) version.
The guidance system will be based on a millimeter microwave seeker.
This would turn the missile into a 24-hour, all-weather weapon.(6)
This missile will also be given the capability to lock on after launch,
allowing the pilot to "fire and forget."
It is not just the range of the PGMs that will be enhanced.
The capability of the sensors is also an area to which developers pay a
lot of attention. No matter what their sensor specialty, developers are
striving to include "lock-on after launch" in their systems.(7: 525-528)
Infrared seekers offer very good image resolution by day or night.
Although all scanning problems have been solved, IR seekers still
have a limited capability in fog, dust and smoke. Used as sensors,
microwave radars offers a number of advantages, not the least being
very good performance in bad weather conditions.
To capitalize on the advantages offered by the two different
technologies and overcome their individual weakness the latest
development combines the two sensors into one.(2: 16-22) The
development of an Advanced Precision Guided Missile (APGM), with a
combined microwave and infra-red sensor has temporarily been
canceled due to fiscal constraints. Despite this, development will
probably be re-started as a result of the lessons learned in the Gulf
War.(3: 34-35)
There are other important developments going on today. The
Advanced Interaction Weapon System (AIWS) is such a project. The
missile is intended to be successor to Maverick Skipper, Walleye and
Paveway.(4: 387-389) This missile will be equipped with an advanced
sensor package as well as an advanced warhead. The warhead will be
unitary which gives the missile the capability to engage a wide range
of targets.(11) Full scale development is not planned to start until FY
96.(11) Together with today's fiscal constraints, this makes it unlikely
the missile will be operational before 2015. Because of this, there is no
reason to consider the missile a threat to SFS 2000.
THREATS TO SFS 2000 FROM FUTURE PGMs
The system operational requirements of SFS 2000 state that it
should be able to counter the threats that could be posed by a modern-
equipped aggressor through the year 2015. While some of the PGMs
used during Operation Desert Storm were not fully developed and
evaluated before entering combat, it is logical to assume that they
will, after minor adjustment based upon combat experiences, be used
extensively at least for the next twenty years. Before 2015, it is also
logical to assume that some of thee will have been modernized.
As mentioned earlier, in two areas important improvements are
to be expected between now and 2015. The range of the missiles will
increase and make it possible for an aggressor to launch weapons far
beyond the range of other AA systems organic to SFS 2000.
Furthermore, guidance systems will include multicapable sensors.