Military





Protection of SFS 2000 Against PGMS

Protection of SFS 2000 Against PGMS

 

CSC 1992

 

SUBJECT AREA General

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: Protection of SFS 2000 against PGMs

 

Author: Lt Col. Gunnarsson, Goran, Royal Swedish Navy

 

Thesis: "Lessons learned", how PGMs were used in Operation Desert

Storm together with indications on future developments will give us a

good foundation to decide in what areas we have to conduct further

studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new Swedish coastal defense

system, sufficient protection against PGMs.

 

Background: Parts of today's coastal artillery guns are planned to be

replaced in the late 1990. Studies and developments have, so far, not

taken "lessons learned" from Operation Desert Storm into

consideration. During Operation Desert Storm, PGMs were used to an

extent that surpassed all previous wars. Many of them were used

against armoured vehicles and fortifications. Those types of targets

are very similar to guns and fortifications within SFS 2000. There are

methods/equipment to be found which, if implemented right, would

enhance the protection of SFS 2000 against PGMs.

 

Recommendation: Before further developments of the gun and

fortifications for SFS 2000 are conducted, studies of different methods

to enhance the protection of the system against PGMs ought to be

made. Such studies should mainly be focused on options to reduce the

"target area" of the gun and the fortifications in different spectrums.

Furthermore, possible methods found in those studies should be

evaluated together to find out the most effective "overall" protection

system for SFS 2000.

 

PROTECTION OF SFS 2000 AGAINST PGMS

 

OUTLINE

 

Thesis: "Lessons learned", how PGMs were used in Operation Desert

Storm together with indications on future developments will give us a

good foundation to decide in what areas we have to conduct further

studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new Swedish coastal defense

system sufficient protection against PGMs.

 

I. Introduction

A. Background

B. Thesis

 

II. Description of the SFS 2000

A. Tactical environment and organization

B. Tactics

 

III. The air campaign during Operation Desert Storm

A. The over-all campaign

B. Used PGMs

 

IV. Air attack on SFS 2000

A. General tactics

B. Different scenarios

 

V. Future improvements of PGMs

 

VI. Threats to SF5 2000 from future PGMs

 

VII. Proposed studies to enhance protection of SFS 2000

A. Limitations with means planned

B. Studies to enhance protection of the fire guidance system

C. Studies to enhance protection of the gun system

D. Studies to enhance protection of the fortifications

 

VIII Summary

 

PRODUCTION OF SFS 2000 AGAINST PGMs

 

INTRODUCTION

 

BACKGROUND

 

An integral part of the Swedish coastal defense system is older

 

artillery units. These units are to be replaced by new units in tile late

 

nineties. A study of different alternatives for a new system (SFS

 

2000) has just been finished. The results from this study will define

 

the requirements for development of a prototype system.

 

 

Before establishing the requirements for the prototype system, it is

 

important to consider "lessons learned" from Operation Desert Storm.

 

These will highlight areas where improvements must be made

 

Although an amphibious assault did not occur, the air campaign to

 

"shape the battlefield" was vast. Officers who planned and executed

 

this operation have experience that is important for us to consider

 

when preparing to be able to meet a future aggressor.

 

 

An aggressor wilt have to defeat SFS 2000 if he intend to conduct an

 

amphibious assault against the Swedish coastline; in other words in

 

order to "shape his battlefield".

 

 

Today's state-of-the-art precision guided missiles had been of limited

 

use in war when the study was undertaken. Because of this, it is clear

 

that criteria used for the evaluations within the study are likely built

 

upon theoretical discussions and peacetime experiments. This

 

condition using theoretical discussions and results from peacetime

 

experiments instead of experience gained in war, leads to a general

 

weakness of the study.

 

 

THESIS

 

"Lessons learned," how PGMs were used in Operation Desert

Storm together with indications on future developments will

give us a good foundation to decide in what areas we have to

conduct further studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new

Swedish coastal defense system, sufficient protection against

PGMs.

 

DESCRIPTION OF SFS 2000

 

Tactical environment and organization

 

SFS 2000 will be an integrated part of the "area-bound" coast artillery

 

defense. The unit will be an organic part of the barrage battalion

 

whose mission is to counter amphibious assaults. SFS 2000 will be

 

the most important unit within the battalion because it will destroy

 

enemy assault ships with fire.

 

 

According to the study SFS 2000 will comprise the following main

 

parts:

 

- Four mobile artillery pieces

 

- Two fire-control stations (one fixed and one mobile)

 

For protection, infantry units, mortar units, surface-to-air missile

 

units and ground combat units will be found as organic parts of SFS

 

2000. In addition, there will be passive systems to enhance protection,

 

such as decoys and camouflage nets.

 

 

Tactics

 

SFS 2000 will be deployed and held in alert in fortified "garages".

 

When fighting amphibious assault ships, the SFS 2000 (artillery pieces

 

and the mobile fire-control station) will move from the "garages" to

 

their separate battle stations. From a battle station, artillery fire will

 

be directed against the enemy as long as possible or until the targets

 

are defeated. If the aggressor's fire makes this inadvisable or

 

impossible, the firing units and movable fire control stations will

 

regroup at other battle stations. Established in a "new" battle

 

stations, SFS 2000 will, if needed, resume firing.

 

 

THE AIR CAMPAIGN DURING OPERATION DESERT STORM

 

The overall campaign

 

The air-campaign during Operation Desert Storm was divided into four

 

sequential phases.(5 :8-9) During the first phase the objective was to

 

"open" the Iraqi air defence, defeat the Iraqi Air Force, and destroy

 

Scud missiles. During phase two, the air campaign focused on the

 

destruction of air defenses around Kuwait. Phase three was aimed at

 

cutting off the ground forces in Kuwait.

 

 

Phase four was close air support for the ground war.

 

 

To measure the success of the allied air campaign, or Iraqi failure to

 

counter the allied air campaign, one need only view the allied air-craft

 

loss rates. US and allied aircraft flew about 116,000 sorties, and only

 

37 air craft and 5 helicopters were lost in combat. These coalition

 

losses were caused by SAMs and AAA.(8: 8-11)

 

 

The effectivness of the Iraqi air-defence system must therefore be

 

considered as negligible. There are two main reasons for this. First,

 

when the bulk of the Iraqi Air Force "fled" to Iran, the allied forces

 

could attack fixed targets deep within !raq without fighter opposition

 

of any significance.(17: 738-740) More than a hundred modern Iraqi

 

combat aircraft fled to Iran just after the allies initiated the air

 

campaign.(6; 8-9) According to participating Air Force units, heavy

 

fire from Iraqi SAM and AAA was encountered during the first days

 

of the campaign.(11: 108) Second, without the threat from Iraqi

 

fighters, the allied aircraft could avoid ground-based air-defense

 

systems by conducting their raids from higher altitudes where they

 

were immune to Iraqi SAMs and AAA. Jamming the AA defense C2

 

system also facilitated the air campaign.

 

 

PGMs used in Operation Desert Storm

 

There is no doubt about the importance of PGMs in the success of the

 

air campaign . For example, 95% of the primary targets in Baghdad

 

were destroyed by the laser-guided bomb GBU-27.(9. 57-60) Initial

 

estimates were that 90% of the laser-guided bombs hit their

 

targets.(1: 48-53) Attacks with PGMs were normally combined with

 

EW operations, such as jamming, in order to "blind" the enemy and

 

protect strike aircraft. However, despite the overall favourable

 

weather conditions for the operation, the weather became a limiting

 

factor for use of PGMs during parts of the air campaign.(6: 36-41)

 

 

"High-tech" weapons have decisively contributed to success in war

 

before. The Israeli victory in Lebanon's Beksa valley in 1982 was a

 

notable example of a highly trained force using advanced weapons to

 

destroy numbers of a superior enemy. Since this battle, new and even

 

more capable PGMs have been developed. Many different types of

 

"state-of-the-art". PGMs were used during Operation Desert Storm.

 

Some of the equipment used was not fully developed and evaluated

 

before entering combat.

 

 

PGM guidance systems can be more or less intelligent. Some must be

 

monitored and handled by the aircrew while others are "fire and

 

forget". PGMs homing systems can be divided into following major

 

types:

 

- Cruise missiles (computer guide)

 

- Laser guided

 

- IR passive

 

- IIR (Imaging infrared)

 

- TV-guided

 

- Anti-radiation

 

The following discussion presents capabilities of the most common

 

PGMs used against Iraq, some of which could be used against SFS

 

2000.

 

 

The Tomahawk is a computer-guided cruise missile with a 1,000

 

pound warhead. Once launched, the missile attacks the target that is

 

"designated" in its computer. If the target has moved to another

 

area the missile will still attack the place "designated" in the

 

computer. This makes the Tomahawk unsuited for attack against

 

mobile targets. The Tomahawk was used initially to "weaken" Iraqi

 

air-defenses, and later against well-defended strategic targets housing

 

chemical weapons and supporting nuclear research. No Tomahawks

 

were fired after February 1st because it was perceived as more cost

 

effective to use manned aircraft(14: 8-11).

 

 

The French Air Force used their AS3OL rocket-propelled laser guided

 

missile to attach bunkers and aircraft shelters, with a stand-off range

 

of 10 kilometers.(10) It uses the principle of "lock on after launch".

 

The missile is launched in the target's general direction, then a

 

designater is used to illuminate the target and thus guide the weapon.

 

The manufacturer claims the 525 pound warhead can penetrate two

 

meters of concrete before exploding.(3)

 

 

U.S. aircraft used the GBU-27 against hardened targets. GBU-27 is a

 

2,000 pound laser-guided bomb(3) capable of penetrating 5 meters of

 

concrete walls.(13) Other laser-guided missiles used by the U.S. forces

 

were the AGM 65 and the Hellfire. A-10s and AH-64s armed with these

 

were used to attack and destroy tanks.

 

 

The stand-off Land-Attack Missile (SLAM), AGM-84-E, was a high-

 

profile PGM that saw action for the first time during Operation Desert

 

Storm. SLAM, an air launched missile, has a passive targeting

 

capability. The infrared seeker transmits a video image to the control

 

aircraft and, once the target is recognized, a specific aimpoint on the

 

target is picked. To avoid enemy jamming, the datalink is not

 

activated until the missile is within close range of the target. Despite

 

its 100 kilometer range its accuracy is within six inches of a precisely

 

defined target. To make this accuracy possible, a Global Positioning

 

Satellite Receiver/Processor is integrated in the missile.(3)

 

 

One of the most commonly used precision-guided weapons was the

 

Maverick. Different versions of this missile have been developed using

 

three main guidance systems: television, laser, and infrared. The

 

warhead can be either 125 pounds or 300 pounds. The infrared-

 

guided missile was mainly used to attack dug-in tanks.(6)

 

 

The AGM-I3O is a TV-guided glide bomb, which was used to destroy

 

the pumping stations in Kuwait (in order to prevent the Iraq is from

 

pumping oil into the sea). If launched from high altitude, its range is

 

80 kilometers.

 

The ALARM ( Air-Launched Anti-Radar Missile), used by the Royal

 

Air Force must be considered one of the most advanced anti-radiation

 

missiles operational today. It has a range of 20 kilometers. Anti-

 

radiation missiles, like the ALARM, were often used together with

 

jammers. The threat from missiles like ALARM forced the Iraqis to

 

limited use of all types of radar. Because of this, most of their AAA

 

and SAMs, to a high degree, were fired without guidance.

 

PGMs are often used together with other systems that provide

 

designation. The reason being it is cheaper to implement some of the

 

"smartness" as an organic part of the aircraft, instead of building it

 

into every missile. For example, to be able to conduct 24-hour all-

 

weather operations, the Royal Air Force used the TIALD ( Thermal

 

Imaging/Airborne laser Designator) in combination with PGMs. The

 

TIALD gives the aircraft the capability of designating targets without

 

any external support. Another laser designator used was the ATLIS

 

used in conjunction with the AS30. ATLIS is capable of locking on and

 

holding a target at ranges up to 10 kilometers.

 

Despite their success in Operation Desert Storm, the use of

 

precision guided weapons was hampered in certain situations due to

 

limitations of the sensors in bad weather.(13: 177-181) Another limiting

 

factor is that the most effective, current sensor systems have a range greater

 

than that of the weapon. This results in the "weapon carrier" going

 

closer to the target than what the sensor requires.

 

Up to now I have outlined the capabilities of current PGMs, now

 

I will turn to their possible use against and effect on SFS 2000.

 

AIR ATTACK ON SFS 2000(12)

 

General Tactics

 

An air campaign against Swedish defenses with the objective to

 

"shaping the battlefield" before an amphibious assault, would require

 

the use of different types of PGMs by our enemy. In such an air

 

campaign, the coastal defense would be a necessary target to defeat.

 

SFS 2000 will be a "high value" target within the coastal defense

 

system.

 

 

Different scenarios

 

Two different scenarios, of how an attack on SFS 2000 to destroy

 

the system might be designed, are enclosed in Appendix A and Appendix B.

 

Both scenarios are based on the same tactics, and weapons that

 

were used during Operation Desert Storm. The amount of aircraft used

 

are representative of a MEB-like unit given the mission to conduct an

 

amphibious assault on a defended coastline. In such an operation, the

 

air assets within the MEB, must attack and destroy the coastal

 

defense, gain and maintain air superiority (10: V-17), conduct deep

 

strikes inland to isolate the area and provide CAS (close air support).

 

Only about 20% of sorties available can be expected to attack SFS 2000

 

and other coastal artillery units in the specific area.

 

In scenario A, the positions of the guns and decoys are known as

 

well as which battle stations are without guns or decoys. Due to the

 

intelligence information available, it is not possible for the enemy to

 

decide whether it is a gun or a decoy deployed in a given battlestation.

 

In the enemy's execution, highest target priority would be given to the

 

actual guns and decoys. Secondary targets would be "empty" battle

 

stations. If no gun/decoy or empty battle station is left tertiary

 

targets would be the garage. We will assume the intellegence

 

information available to the enemy is extremly good. The

 

attack can be conducted without any unnecessary" attacks.

 

 

In scenario A, battle stations with guns/decoys are initially attacked

 

with IRR/Laser guided missiles, while the other targets, battle stations

 

without guns/decoys etc., are attacked with TV-guided missiles. Two

 

restrikes are conducted against all targets. TV-guided missiles are

 

used for the restrikes.

 

In scenario B, the positions of the battle stations are known, but

 

it is not known in which of these the guns are deployed or even if the guns

 

are still in the garages. In the enemy's execution, battle stations and

 

garages are given the highest priority. Here we consider the enemy's

 

available intelligence information as limited. Since it is not known in

 

which battle stations the guns/decoys are deployed, or if they

 

are deployed, all battle stations and garages have to be attacked.

 

In scenario B, all battle stations and garages are initially attacked

 

with IRR/Laser guided missiles. Two restrikes are conducted against all

 

targets. IRR/Laser guided missiles and TV guided missiles are used for

 

the restrikes.

 

In all attacks in scenario A and scenario B, the pilot or the missile

 

must be able to "see" the target. To do so the target must be visible in

 

the IR or visible light spectra. A decoy with the same radiation

 

signature and form as the real target will be attacked as a real target.

 

This is true not only for guns/decoys but for fortifications as well. All

 

initial attacks must be followed by bomb damage assessment and restrikes.

 

In addition to the attacks outlined in scenario A and B, two aircraft,

 

capable of jamming or attacking any fire control radar or radar SAM, fly escort

 

as part of the attacks.

 

FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS OF PGMs

 

Since the military needs conventional stand-off weapons to hit the

 

target from beyond the range of point and area defense systems,

 

many companies are looking at extending the reach of weapons in

 

their inventories.(15: 390-391) Worldwide there are as many as 17

 

known air-to-surface missile (ASM) program designers for range

 

capabilities exceeding 100 kilomtres.(15: 390-391) They include

 

numerous guidance systems, ranges and warheads

 

 

The success of the Maverick during Operation Desert Storm may

 

lead to the development of a Maverick ER (extended range: 70 km) version.

 

The guidance system will be based on a millimeter microwave seeker.

 

This would turn the missile into a 24-hour, all-weather weapon.(6)

 

This missile will also be given the capability to lock on after launch,

 

allowing the pilot to "fire and forget."

 

It is not just the range of the PGMs that will be enhanced.

 

The capability of the sensors is also an area to which developers pay a

 

lot of attention. No matter what their sensor specialty, developers are

 

striving to include "lock-on after launch" in their systems.(7: 525-528)

 

Infrared seekers offer very good image resolution by day or night.

 

Although all scanning problems have been solved, IR seekers still

 

have a limited capability in fog, dust and smoke. Used as sensors,

 

microwave radars offers a number of advantages, not the least being

 

very good performance in bad weather conditions.

 

To capitalize on the advantages offered by the two different

 

technologies and overcome their individual weakness the latest

 

development combines the two sensors into one.(2: 16-22) The

 

development of an Advanced Precision Guided Missile (APGM), with a

 

combined microwave and infra-red sensor has temporarily been

 

canceled due to fiscal constraints. Despite this, development will

 

probably be re-started as a result of the lessons learned in the Gulf

 

War.(3: 34-35)

 

There are other important developments going on today. The

 

Advanced Interaction Weapon System (AIWS) is such a project. The

 

missile is intended to be successor to Maverick Skipper, Walleye and

 

Paveway.(4: 387-389) This missile will be equipped with an advanced

 

sensor package as well as an advanced warhead. The warhead will be

 

unitary which gives the missile the capability to engage a wide range

 

of targets.(11) Full scale development is not planned to start until FY

 

96.(11) Together with today's fiscal constraints, this makes it unlikely

 

the missile will be operational before 2015. Because of this, there is no

 

reason to consider the missile a threat to SFS 2000.

 

THREATS TO SFS 2000 FROM FUTURE PGMs

 

The system operational requirements of SFS 2000 state that it

 

should be able to counter the threats that could be posed by a modern-

 

equipped aggressor through the year 2015. While some of the PGMs

 

used during Operation Desert Storm were not fully developed and

 

evaluated before entering combat, it is logical to assume that they

 

will, after minor adjustment based upon combat experiences, be used

 

extensively at least for the next twenty years. Before 2015, it is also

 

logical to assume that some of thee will have been modernized.

 

As mentioned earlier, in two areas important improvements are

 

to be expected between now and 2015. The range of the missiles will

 

increase and make it possible for an aggressor to launch weapons far

 

beyond the range of other AA systems organic to SFS 2000.

 

Furthermore, guidance systems will include multicapable sensors.

 

These sensors will at least include an infra-red image sensor totally

 

integrated with a micro-wave sensor.

 

Today's state-of-the-art missiles, given an extended range and

 

multicapable sensor, are the most probable PGM threats that SFS 2000

 

must be able to counter. These threats can be categorized along the

 

following lines:

 

-Laser-guided: AS3OL rocket-propelled, laser guided missile deployed

 

together with ATLIS laser designator, which can lock-on and acquire

 

a target at ranges up to 10 kilometers.

 

-IIR (Imaging infrared)

Stand-off Land-Attack Missile AGM-84-E (SLAM)

 

-TV-guided

 

The AGM-l30 (TV-guided glide bomb)

 

-Anti-radiation

 

The ALARM ( Air-Launched Anti-Radar Missile)

 

-IRR/Micro wave

 

The "PGM 2015" missile is not developed today. But, by using known

 

technology, it would be possible to develop a missile with an IRR

 

sensor like AGM-84-E and a microwave sensor giving it an all-

 

weather capability. Furthermore, this missile could easily be given

 

a range exceeding 20-30km. The missile may be equipped with

 

different warheads which makes it possible to use the missile

 

against hardened as well as "soft" targets.

 

PROPOSED STUDIES TO ENHANCE PROTECTION OF SFS 2000

 

Limitations with means planned

 

The threat posed to SFS 2000 from PGMs can be described as a

 

two dimensional threat. One dimension is the technological level of the

 

attacking missiles, while the other is mass or tile number of missiles

 

launched per target. Today's PGMs are so accurate that one missile

 

launched against a target is almost surely considered one hit.

 

Furthermore, the warhead is so efficient that a hit almost always-

 

result in a kill. This enables the attacker to limit his attack to one

 

missile per target. Because of this, it is mainly the technological level

 

of the threat that must dictate the capabilities of our counter systems.

 

In the feasibility study, it states that SFS 2000 will be protected

 

against threats from the air through active as well as passive means.

 

Analyzing the ATOs given in the scenarios, together with the

 

capabilities of future PGMs described above, there are threats posed

 

to SFS 2000 that have been considered sufficiently in the study. At

 

the same time, there are threats that must be dealt with further

 

before establishing accurate operational requirements upon the

 

overall system.

 

SFS 2000's active defenses, mainly AAA and SAM systems, will

 

counter the threat posed from attacking aircraft, provided the aircraft

 

operate within range of our systems. The idea is to defeat the aircraft

 

before they launch their missiles. But if an aircraft launches a missile

 

while out of range of these AA systems, there is nothing active

 

systems can do to counter the attack. Neither the AAA nor SAM

 

systems (technological level similar to Stinger) has the ability to

 

defeat an attacking PGM, with an acceptable Pkill. Engaging an

 

attacking aircraft within the range of our AA systems assumes that

 

our surveillance and fire- guidance systems are capable of finding the

 

targets and directing the AA systems. The enemy will probably, as

 

was done during Operation Desert Storm, rely heavily upon EW for

 

self-protection. He will try to jam our systems and use his anti-

 

radiation missiles to destroy our surveillance systems and fire-

 

guidance systems.

 

 

Studies to enhance protection of the fire guidance system

 

For us to be successful, surveillance- and fire guidance systems within

 

the air defense system, must be able to counter threats from missiles

 

like ALARM and HARM. The Iraqi forces had some very modern

 

equipment. Despite this, they were jammed and not able to direct the

 

fire of their AAA and SAMs. Studies must be done to see whether it is

 

possible by tactics or technical means to counter this threat. This

 

study must deal with radar as well as IR technologies. It is important

 

to consider using the different technologies in concert with each other

 

or separately. Two or more radar emitters that work in concert with

 

each other, or a so called bistatic radar, could be one part of the

 

solution, while using low powered radar emitters could be another.

 

This must be compared with passive systems like IR or semi passive

 

systems like IR with laser range-finder. The aim should be to

 

maximize the redundancy in our C2 system for our AA weapons.

 

The enemy will probably deal with our sea-surveillance and fire

 

guidance systems for the antiship guns in the same way. He will try to

 

jam them, and/or defeat them with anti-radiation missiles. In other

 

words, it is important to include those surveillance and fire-guidance

 

systems in the study as well.

 

 

Studies to enhance protection of the gun system

 

Since it is possible to use "manual" direction of the fire from antiship

 

guns, it is not enough to destroy the fire guidance system alone. The

 

guns have to be destroyed also if an enemy wants to use the SLOCs.

 

PGMs pose a threat to guns as well.

 

This threat is biggest when the gun is moving, when it is easier to

 

detect. But, there is also a direct threat posed to the gun while in the

 

battle station. This threat is present whether the gun is firing or not.

 

According to the SFS 2000 study, this part of the threat is planned to

 

be countered mainly by camouflage nets and smoke. But camouflage

 

nets and smoke alone will not give the gun sufficient protection while

 

in the battle station. When moving from the garage to the battle

 

station, this type of protection will be even more insufficient.

 

The challenge in protecting the gun in this environment is to a

 

large degree similar to the problem of protecting tanks. Mobility low

 

profile, and smoke are means used today to protect tanks. During

 

Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqis tried to protect their tanks by

 

digging them into the sand. The allied forces managed to find and

 

destroy such tanks by using PGMs together with IRR laser

 

designators.

 

The future will provide even better means of finding vehicles. In

 

addition to IIR sensors, it will be possible to find them by using a

 

microwave radar sensor. This sensor will make it possible not just to

 

find the vehicle, but to determine which type of vehicle it is. The IIR

 

sensor and microwave sensor as mentioned earlier, will probably be

 

used in concert with each other.

 

Even though today's tank production is rapidly decreasing, the

 

development of tanks for the "battlefield of the future" is ongoing.

 

(3: 48-53) To give those tanks sufficient protection different technologies

 

and developments are under consideration. There are already

 

examples of new technology being incorporated into tanks, as

 

well as other combat vehicles in order to enhance the protection

 

against PGMs(16: 530-531). There are methods available to reduce the

 

"profile" of the vehicle by adjusting the configuration, and means to

 

create artificial decoys and "shields." The study needed to be done can

 

be divided into two parts, one part dealing with the systems physical

 

configuration and another dealing with expendable systems such as

 

artificial decoys and IR smoke.

 

While studying the configuration, the focus ought to be on possible

 

methods to reduce/suppress the gun's radar signature, as well as the

 

gun's IR signature. Experience attained from the development of the

 

stealth surface attack-ship "Smyge" should be applied and

 

used in this study. This is important because the sensor technology

 

used in antiship missiles, to a large degree, is the same as the

 

technology used in sensors for PGMs . Such a study will also give us

 

valuable data that we can apply when we have to replace or modify

 

Army combat vehicles.

 

Even if there are methods to reduce or suppress the gun's signature,

 

this is not enough. Compare this to a ship. A ship is constructed in a

 

certain way to minimize its target area but, at the same time, it is

 

equipped with expandable systems. This could be a method to further

 

enhance the protection of the gun. There are several studies and

 

developments on-going dealing with this problem. These include laser

 

warning systems, as well as multi-spectral aerosols offering high

 

reflection values for radar infrared and visible light radiation.(8: 35-41)

 

There are likely enough different systems available that there is no

 

need to develop new ones. The question then becomes which of the

 

already developed systems should be used and how should they work

 

together to give maximum protection.

 

 

Studies to enhance protection of the fortifications

 

Part of the passive protection for SFS 2000 includes (traditionally)

 

heavy fortifications. Two fortification types are considered in the SFS

 

2000 study. One is a "garage" for the gun when not at a battle station

 

or on its way to a battle station; the other is a structure to contain and

 

protect one of the fire-guidance stations. The most important lessons

 

learned from Operation Desert Storm about fortifications is even

 

heavy fortifications can be destroyed by PGMs. As mentioned earlier

 

today's PGMs can penetrate and destroy a bunker protected with

 

more than 5 meters of concrete. Modern bunkers, such as the

 

proposed "garages", used to protect Iraqi air craft were easily

 

destroyed by PGMs.

 

To direct PGMs against fortifications, the attacker must be able

 

to detect them in some way. If the pilot can see them, either with his

 

own eyes or via a data link from a missile's TV camera he can direct a

 

PGM to attack the fortifications. Other methods to "see" include IRR

 

sensors, provided the fortifications differ in temperature from their

 

surroundings. However, if they can not be detected, they cannot be hit

 

with PGMs. Therefore, various means of camouflaging the "garages"

 

should he more cost effective than protection by fortification. Maybe a

 

combination of "hiding" and fortifying is the best solution. Considering

 

this, it is important to study different options to protect the guns

 

including "camouflage" in concert with a "light" garage designed to just

 

prevent sabotage.

 

To do this, different methods to reduce the "image" of the garage

 

through all spectrums must be explored. Were such methods found, it

 

might permit less hardening of the fortification. If so, the cost for that

 

part of the project could be reduced significantly. A lower unit cost

 

could make it possible to build more garages. That would give us the

 

opportunity to shuttle four guns between perhaps six or eight

 

different garages. Thus we force the enemy to find and destroy more

 

targets which would complicate his planning as well as his execution.

 

 

SUMMARY

 

In the studies suggested above, several different methods to enhance

 

the protection of SFS 2000 against PGMs surely will be found. But,

 

more interesting than a single protective method, is the synergy

 

combined methods would provide for an overall enhanced protection.

 

All studies suggested above must be integrated and evaluated as part

 

of a total "protection system" for SFS 2000. It is important that this

 

study also include the different systems already stated as

 

requirements to make the overall system balanced. The end result

 

should be a comprehensive and integrated protection system, because,

 

as Desert Storm unveiled, this is the only one that stands a chance of

 

surviving.

 

APPENDIX

 

 

Cick here to view images

 

 

BIBILIOGRAPHY

 

1. "Armor Looks to Laser Warning for Enhanced Survivability."

Journal of Electronic Defense, October 91 48-53.

 

2. Biass, Eric H. "European Smart Ammunition: What's Up?" ARMADA

Feb/March 91, 16-22.

 

3. Bolte', Philip L. "The Shrinking Tank Market." MILTECH. Issue10 91,

34-45.

 

4. "Case for a new priority" Jane's Defense Weekly. 16 March 91,

387-389.

 

5. "Desert Storm Air Battle." Air Defense Artillery. March-April 91,

8-9.

 

6. Eshel, Tamir "The most Successful Air Campaign Ever?" Military

Technology. Vol XV, Issue 4 91, 36-41.

 

7. "Figures that add up to success." Jane's Defense Weekly. 6 April 91,

525-528.

 

8. Geisenheyer, Stefan "Threat Warning and Decoy Technologies." ARMADA.

Dec-Jan 90/91, 35-41.

 

9. Grimes, Vincent "Slam,Bam, Saddain." Defense & Diplomacy. Vol No. 9,

Jul-Aug 91, 57-60.

 

10. JCS Pub. 3-02.1 (Test) Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations.

Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 1989.

 

11. Lenorovitz, Jeffrey "French AS3OL Laser Missiles Scored High Hit

Rate in Air-Ground Attacks." Aviation Week and Space

Technology, April 22 91, 108.

 

12. Olsson, Mj Jeffrey L. USMC served as "Target officer" in

USCENTCOM during Operation Desert Storm.

 

13. "On Target." Air International. Vol 41, No4, 177-181.

 

14. "Smart Weapons For a Desert War." Defence & Diplomacy. vol 9,

No. 3-4, March/April 91, 8-11.

 

15. "Stand-off delivery comes of age." Jane's Defence Weekly. 16

March 91, 390-391.

 

16. "Success from the air." Jane's Defense Weekly. 6 April 91, 530-531.

 

17. Wratten, Air Vice Marshal Bill RAF commander in the Gulf "Air

war doctrine affirmed." Jane's Defense Weekly. 4 May 91,

738-740.



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list