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Protection of SFS 2000 Against PGMS

Protection of SFS 2000 Against PGMS


CSC 1992








Title: Protection of SFS 2000 against PGMs


Author: Lt Col. Gunnarsson, Goran, Royal Swedish Navy


Thesis: "Lessons learned", how PGMs were used in Operation Desert

Storm together with indications on future developments will give us a

good foundation to decide in what areas we have to conduct further

studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new Swedish coastal defense

system, sufficient protection against PGMs.


Background: Parts of today's coastal artillery guns are planned to be

replaced in the late 1990. Studies and developments have, so far, not

taken "lessons learned" from Operation Desert Storm into

consideration. During Operation Desert Storm, PGMs were used to an

extent that surpassed all previous wars. Many of them were used

against armoured vehicles and fortifications. Those types of targets

are very similar to guns and fortifications within SFS 2000. There are

methods/equipment to be found which, if implemented right, would

enhance the protection of SFS 2000 against PGMs.


Recommendation: Before further developments of the gun and

fortifications for SFS 2000 are conducted, studies of different methods

to enhance the protection of the system against PGMs ought to be

made. Such studies should mainly be focused on options to reduce the

"target area" of the gun and the fortifications in different spectrums.

Furthermore, possible methods found in those studies should be

evaluated together to find out the most effective "overall" protection

system for SFS 2000.






Thesis: "Lessons learned", how PGMs were used in Operation Desert

Storm together with indications on future developments will give us a

good foundation to decide in what areas we have to conduct further

studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new Swedish coastal defense

system sufficient protection against PGMs.


I. Introduction

A. Background

B. Thesis


II. Description of the SFS 2000

A. Tactical environment and organization

B. Tactics


III. The air campaign during Operation Desert Storm

A. The over-all campaign

B. Used PGMs


IV. Air attack on SFS 2000

A. General tactics

B. Different scenarios


V. Future improvements of PGMs


VI. Threats to SF5 2000 from future PGMs


VII. Proposed studies to enhance protection of SFS 2000

A. Limitations with means planned

B. Studies to enhance protection of the fire guidance system

C. Studies to enhance protection of the gun system

D. Studies to enhance protection of the fortifications


VIII Summary








An integral part of the Swedish coastal defense system is older


artillery units. These units are to be replaced by new units in tile late


nineties. A study of different alternatives for a new system (SFS


2000) has just been finished. The results from this study will define


the requirements for development of a prototype system.



Before establishing the requirements for the prototype system, it is


important to consider "lessons learned" from Operation Desert Storm.


These will highlight areas where improvements must be made


Although an amphibious assault did not occur, the air campaign to


"shape the battlefield" was vast. Officers who planned and executed


this operation have experience that is important for us to consider


when preparing to be able to meet a future aggressor.



An aggressor wilt have to defeat SFS 2000 if he intend to conduct an


amphibious assault against the Swedish coastline; in other words in


order to "shape his battlefield".



Today's state-of-the-art precision guided missiles had been of limited


use in war when the study was undertaken. Because of this, it is clear


that criteria used for the evaluations within the study are likely built


upon theoretical discussions and peacetime experiments. This


condition using theoretical discussions and results from peacetime


experiments instead of experience gained in war, leads to a general


weakness of the study.





"Lessons learned," how PGMs were used in Operation Desert

Storm together with indications on future developments will

give us a good foundation to decide in what areas we have to

conduct further studies in order to give SFS 2000, a new

Swedish coastal defense system, sufficient protection against





Tactical environment and organization


SFS 2000 will be an integrated part of the "area-bound" coast artillery


defense. The unit will be an organic part of the barrage battalion


whose mission is to counter amphibious assaults. SFS 2000 will be


the most important unit within the battalion because it will destroy


enemy assault ships with fire.



According to the study SFS 2000 will comprise the following main




- Four mobile artillery pieces


- Two fire-control stations (one fixed and one mobile)


For protection, infantry units, mortar units, surface-to-air missile


units and ground combat units will be found as organic parts of SFS


2000. In addition, there will be passive systems to enhance protection,


such as decoys and camouflage nets.





SFS 2000 will be deployed and held in alert in fortified "garages".


When fighting amphibious assault ships, the SFS 2000 (artillery pieces


and the mobile fire-control station) will move from the "garages" to


their separate battle stations. From a battle station, artillery fire will


be directed against the enemy as long as possible or until the targets


are defeated. If the aggressor's fire makes this inadvisable or


impossible, the firing units and movable fire control stations will


regroup at other battle stations. Established in a "new" battle


stations, SFS 2000 will, if needed, resume firing.





The overall campaign


The air-campaign during Operation Desert Storm was divided into four


sequential phases.(5 :8-9) During the first phase the objective was to


"open" the Iraqi air defence, defeat the Iraqi Air Force, and destroy


Scud missiles. During phase two, the air campaign focused on the


destruction of air defenses around Kuwait. Phase three was aimed at


cutting off the ground forces in Kuwait.



Phase four was close air support for the ground war.



To measure the success of the allied air campaign, or Iraqi failure to


counter the allied air campaign, one need only view the allied air-craft


loss rates. US and allied aircraft flew about 116,000 sorties, and only


37 air craft and 5 helicopters were lost in combat. These coalition


losses were caused by SAMs and AAA.(8: 8-11)



The effectivness of the Iraqi air-defence system must therefore be


considered as negligible. There are two main reasons for this. First,


when the bulk of the Iraqi Air Force "fled" to Iran, the allied forces


could attack fixed targets deep within !raq without fighter opposition


of any significance.(17: 738-740) More than a hundred modern Iraqi


combat aircraft fled to Iran just after the allies initiated the air


campaign.(6; 8-9) According to participating Air Force units, heavy


fire from Iraqi SAM and AAA was encountered during the first days


of the campaign.(11: 108) Second, without the threat from Iraqi


fighters, the allied aircraft could avoid ground-based air-defense


systems by conducting their raids from higher altitudes where they


were immune to Iraqi SAMs and AAA. Jamming the AA defense C2


system also facilitated the air campaign.



PGMs used in Operation Desert Storm


There is no doubt about the importance of PGMs in the success of the


air campaign . For example, 95% of the primary targets in Baghdad


were destroyed by the laser-guided bomb GBU-27.(9. 57-60) Initial


estimates were that 90% of the laser-guided bombs hit their


targets.(1: 48-53) Attacks with PGMs were normally combined with


EW operations, such as jamming, in order to "blind" the enemy and


protect strike aircraft. However, despite the overall favourable


weather conditions for the operation, the weather became a limiting


factor for use of PGMs during parts of the air campaign.(6: 36-41)



"High-tech" weapons have decisively contributed to success in war


before. The Israeli victory in Lebanon's Beksa valley in 1982 was a


notable example of a highly trained force using advanced weapons to


destroy numbers of a superior enemy. Since this battle, new and even


more capable PGMs have been developed. Many different types of


"state-of-the-art". PGMs were used during Operation Desert Storm.


Some of the equipment used was not fully developed and evaluated


before entering combat.



PGM guidance systems can be more or less intelligent. Some must be


monitored and handled by the aircrew while others are "fire and


forget". PGMs homing systems can be divided into following major




- Cruise missiles (computer guide)


- Laser guided


- IR passive


- IIR (Imaging infrared)


- TV-guided


- Anti-radiation


The following discussion presents capabilities of the most common


PGMs used against Iraq, some of which could be used against SFS





The Tomahawk is a computer-guided cruise missile with a 1,000


pound warhead. Once launched, the missile attacks the target that is


"designated" in its computer. If the target has moved to another


area the missile will still attack the place "designated" in the


computer. This makes the Tomahawk unsuited for attack against


mobile targets. The Tomahawk was used initially to "weaken" Iraqi


air-defenses, and later against well-defended strategic targets housing


chemical weapons and supporting nuclear research. No Tomahawks


were fired after February 1st because it was perceived as more cost


effective to use manned aircraft(14: 8-11).



The French Air Force used their AS3OL rocket-propelled laser guided


missile to attach bunkers and aircraft shelters, with a stand-off range


of 10 kilometers.(10) It uses the principle of "lock on after launch".


The missile is launched in the target's general direction, then a


designater is used to illuminate the target and thus guide the weapon.


The manufacturer claims the 525 pound warhead can penetrate two


meters of concrete before exploding.(3)



U.S. aircraft used the GBU-27 against hardened targets. GBU-27 is a


2,000 pound laser-guided bomb(3) capable of penetrating 5 meters of


concrete walls.(13) Other laser-guided missiles used by the U.S. forces


were the AGM 65 and the Hellfire. A-10s and AH-64s armed with these


were used to attack and destroy tanks.



The stand-off Land-Attack Missile (SLAM), AGM-84-E, was a high-


profile PGM that saw action for the first time during Operation Desert


Storm. SLAM, an air launched missile, has a passive targeting


capability. The infrared seeker transmits a video image to the control


aircraft and, once the target is recognized, a specific aimpoint on the


target is picked. To avoid enemy jamming, the datalink is not


activated until the missile is within close range of the target. Despite


its 100 kilometer range its accuracy is within six inches of a precisely


defined target. To make this accuracy possible, a Global Positioning


Satellite Receiver/Processor is integrated in the missile.(3)



One of the most commonly used precision-guided weapons was the


Maverick. Different versions of this missile have been developed using


three main guidance systems: television, laser, and infrared. The


warhead can be either 125 pounds or 300 pounds. The infrared-


guided missile was mainly used to attack dug-in tanks.(6)



The AGM-I3O is a TV-guided glide bomb, which was used to destroy


the pumping stations in Kuwait (in order to prevent the Iraq is from


pumping oil into the sea). If launched from high altitude, its range is


80 kilometers.


The ALARM ( Air-Launched Anti-Radar Missile), used by the Royal


Air Force must be considered one of the most advanced anti-radiation


missiles operational today. It has a range of 20 kilometers. Anti-


radiation missiles, like the ALARM, were often used together with


jammers. The threat from missiles like ALARM forced the Iraqis to


limited use of all types of radar. Because of this, most of their AAA


and SAMs, to a high degree, were fired without guidance.


PGMs are often used together with other systems that provide


designation. The reason being it is cheaper to implement some of the


"smartness" as an organic part of the aircraft, instead of building it


into every missile. For example, to be able to conduct 24-hour all-


weather operations, the Royal Air Force used the TIALD ( Thermal


Imaging/Airborne laser Designator) in combination with PGMs. The


TIALD gives the aircraft the capability of designating targets without


any external support. Another laser designator used was the ATLIS


used in conjunction with the AS30. ATLIS is capable of locking on and


holding a target at ranges up to 10 kilometers.


Despite their success in Operation Desert Storm, the use of


precision guided weapons was hampered in certain situations due to


limitations of the sensors in bad weather.(13: 177-181) Another limiting


factor is that the most effective, current sensor systems have a range greater


than that of the weapon. This results in the "weapon carrier" going


closer to the target than what the sensor requires.


Up to now I have outlined the capabilities of current PGMs, now


I will turn to their possible use against and effect on SFS 2000.




General Tactics


An air campaign against Swedish defenses with the objective to


"shaping the battlefield" before an amphibious assault, would require


the use of different types of PGMs by our enemy. In such an air


campaign, the coastal defense would be a necessary target to defeat.


SFS 2000 will be a "high value" target within the coastal defense





Different scenarios


Two different scenarios, of how an attack on SFS 2000 to destroy


the system might be designed, are enclosed in Appendix A and Appendix B.


Both scenarios are based on the same tactics, and weapons that


were used during Operation Desert Storm. The amount of aircraft used


are representative of a MEB-like unit given the mission to conduct an


amphibious assault on a defended coastline. In such an operation, the


air assets within the MEB, must attack and destroy the coastal


defense, gain and maintain air superiority (10: V-17), conduct deep


strikes inland to isolate the area and provide CAS (close air support).


Only about 20% of sorties available can be expected to attack SFS 2000


and other coastal artillery units in the specific area.


In scenario A, the positions of the guns and decoys are known as


well as which battle stations are without guns or decoys. Due to the


intelligence information available, it is not possible for the enemy to


decide whether it is a gun or a decoy deployed in a given battlestation.


In the enemy's execution, highest target priority would be given to the


actual guns and decoys. Secondary targets would be "empty" battle


stations. If no gun/decoy or empty battle station is left tertiary


targets would be the garage. We will assume the intellegence


information available to the enemy is extremly good. The


attack can be conducted without any unnecessary" attacks.



In scenario A, battle stations with guns/decoys are initially attacked


with IRR/Laser guided missiles, while the other targets, battle stations


without guns/decoys etc., are attacked with TV-guided missiles. Two


restrikes are conducted against all targets. TV-guided missiles are


used for the restrikes.


In scenario B, the positions of the battle stations are known, but


it is not known in which of these the guns are deployed or even if the guns


are still in the garages. In the enemy's execution, battle stations and


garages are given the highest priority. Here we consider the enemy's


available intelligence information as limited. Since it is not known in


which battle stations the guns/decoys are deployed, or if they


are deployed, all battle stations and garages have to be attacked.


In scenario B, all battle stations and garages are initially attacked


with IRR/Laser guided missiles. Two restrikes are conducted against all


targets. IRR/Laser guided missiles and TV guided missiles are used for


the restrikes.


In all attacks in scenario A and scenario B, the pilot or the missile


must be able to "see" the target. To do so the target must be visible in


the IR or visible light spectra. A decoy with the same radiation


signature and form as the real target will be attacked as a real target.


This is true not only for guns/decoys but for fortifications as well. All


initial attacks must be followed by bomb damage assessment and restrikes.


In addition to the attacks outlined in scenario A and B, two aircraft,


capable of jamming or attacking any fire control radar or radar SAM, fly escort


as part of the attacks.




Since the military needs conventional stand-off weapons to hit the


target from beyond the range of point and area defense systems,


many companies are looking at extending the reach of weapons in


their inventories.(15: 390-391) Worldwide there are as many as 17


known air-to-surface missile (ASM) program designers for range


capabilities exceeding 100 kilomtres.(15: 390-391) They include


numerous guidance systems, ranges and warheads



The success of the Maverick during Operation Desert Storm may


lead to the development of a Maverick ER (extended range: 70 km) version.


The guidance system will be based on a millimeter microwave seeker.


This would turn the missile into a 24-hour, all-weather weapon.(6)


This missile will also be given the capability to lock on after launch,


allowing the pilot to "fire and forget."


It is not just the range of the PGMs that will be enhanced.


The capability of the sensors is also an area to which developers pay a


lot of attention. No matter what their sensor specialty, developers are


striving to include "lock-on after launch" in their systems.(7: 525-528)


Infrared seekers offer very good image resolution by day or night.


Although all scanning problems have been solved, IR seekers still


have a limited capability in fog, dust and smoke. Used as sensors,


microwave radars offers a number of advantages, not the least being


very good performance in bad weather conditions.


To capitalize on the advantages offered by the two different


technologies and overcome their individual weakness the latest


development combines the two sensors into one.(2: 16-22) The


development of an Advanced Precision Guided Missile (APGM), with a


combined microwave and infra-red sensor has temporarily been


canceled due to fiscal constraints. Despite this, development will


probably be re-started as a result of the lessons learned in the Gulf


War.(3: 34-35)


There are other important developments going on today. The


Advanced Interaction Weapon System (AIWS) is such a project. The


missile is intended to be successor to Maverick Skipper, Walleye and


Paveway.(4: 387-389) This missile will be equipped with an advanced


sensor package as well as an advanced warhead. The warhead will be


unitary which gives the missile the capability to engage a wide range


of targets.(11) Full scale development is not planned to start until FY


96.(11) Together with today's fiscal constraints, this makes it unlikely


the missile will be operational before 2015. Because of this, there is no


reason to consider the missile a threat to SFS 2000.




The system operational requirements of SFS 2000 state that it


should be able to counter the threats that could be posed by a modern-


equipped aggressor through the year 2015. While some of the PGMs


used during Operation Desert Storm were not fully developed and


evaluated before entering combat, it is logical to assume that they


will, after minor adjustment based upon combat experiences, be used


extensively at least for the next twenty years. Before 2015, it is also


logical to assume that some of thee will have been modernized.


As mentioned earlier, in two areas important improvements are


to be expected between now and 2015. The range of the missiles will


increase and make it possible for an aggressor to launch weapons far


beyond the range of other AA systems organic to SFS 2000.


Furthermore, guidance systems will include multicapable sensors.


These sensors will at least include an infra-red image sensor totally


integrated with a micro-wave sensor.


Today's state-of-the-art missiles, given an extended range and


multicapable sensor, are the most probable PGM threats that SFS 2000


must be able to counter. These threats can be categorized along the


following lines:


-Laser-guided: AS3OL rocket-propelled, laser guided missile deployed


together with ATLIS laser designator, which can lock-on and acquire


a target at ranges up to 10 kilometers.


-IIR (Imaging infrared)

Stand-off Land-Attack Missile AGM-84-E (SLAM)




The AGM-l30 (TV-guided glide bomb)




The ALARM ( Air-Launched Anti-Radar Missile)


-IRR/Micro wave


The "PGM 2015" missile is not developed today. But, by using known


technology, it would be possible to develop a missile with an IRR


sensor like AGM-84-E and a microwave sensor giving it an all-


weather capability. Furthermore, this missile could easily be given


a range exceeding 20-30km. The missile may be equipped with


different warheads which makes it possible to use the missile


against hardened as well as "soft" targets.




Limitations with means planned


The threat posed to SFS 2000 from PGMs can be described as a


two dimensional threat. One dimension is the technological level of the


attacking missiles, while the other is mass or tile number of missiles


launched per target. Today's PGMs are so accurate that one missile


launched against a target is almost surely considered one hit.


Furthermore, the warhead is so efficient that a hit almost always-


result in a kill. This enables the attacker to limit his attack to one


missile per target. Because of this, it is mainly the technological level


of the threat that must dictate the capabilities of our counter systems.


In the feasibility study, it states that SFS 2000 will be protected


against threats from the air through active as well as passive means.


Analyzing the ATOs given in the scenarios, together with the


capabilities of future PGMs described above, there are threats posed


to SFS 2000 that have been considered sufficiently in the study. At


the same time, there are threats that must be dealt with further


before establishing accurate operational requirements upon the


overall system.


SFS 2000's active defenses, mainly AAA and SAM systems, will


counter the threat posed from attacking aircraft, provided the aircraft


operate within range of our systems. The idea is to defeat the aircraft


before they launch their missiles. But if an aircraft launches a missile


while out of range of these AA systems, there is nothing active


systems can do to counter the attack. Neither the AAA nor SAM


systems (technological level similar to Stinger) has the ability to


defeat an attacking PGM, with an acceptable Pkill. Engaging an


attacking aircraft within the range of our AA systems assumes that


our surveillance and fire- guidance systems are capable of finding the


targets and directing the AA systems. The enemy will probably, as


was done during Operation Desert Storm, rely heavily upon EW for


self-protection. He will try to jam our systems and use his anti-


radiation missiles to destroy our surveillance systems and fire-


guidance systems.



Studies to enhance protection of the fire guidance system


For us to be successful, surveillance- and fire guidance systems within


the air defense system, must be able to counter threats from missiles


like ALARM and HARM. The Iraqi forces had some very modern


equipment. Despite this, they were jammed and not able to direct the


fire of their AAA and SAMs. Studies must be done to see whether it is


possible by tactics or technical means to counter this threat. This


study must deal with radar as well as IR technologies. It is important


to consider using the different technologies in concert with each other


or separately. Two or more radar emitters that work in concert with


each other, or a so called bistatic radar, could be one part of the


solution, while using low powered radar emitters could be another.


This must be compared with passive systems like IR or semi passive


systems like IR with laser range-finder. The aim should be to


maximize the redundancy in our C2 system for our AA weapons.


The enemy will probably deal with our sea-surveillance and fire


guidance systems for the antiship guns in the same way. He will try to


jam them, and/or defeat them with anti-radiation missiles. In other


words, it is important to include those surveillance and fire-guidance


systems in the study as well.



Studies to enhance protection of the gun system


Since it is possible to use "manual" direction of the fire from antiship


guns, it is not enough to destroy the fire guidance system alone. The


guns have to be destroyed also if an enemy wants to use the SLOCs.


PGMs pose a threat to guns as well.


This threat is biggest when the gun is moving, when it is easier to


detect. But, there is also a direct threat posed to the gun while in the


battle station. This threat is present whether the gun is firing or not.


According to the SFS 2000 study, this part of the threat is planned to


be countered mainly by camouflage nets and smoke. But camouflage


nets and smoke alone will not give the gun sufficient protection while


in the battle station. When moving from the garage to the battle


station, this type of protection will be even more insufficient.


The challenge in protecting the gun in this environment is to a


large degree similar to the problem of protecting tanks. Mobility low


profile, and smoke are means used today to protect tanks. During


Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqis tried to protect their tanks by


digging them into the sand. The allied forces managed to find and


destroy such tanks by using PGMs together with IRR laser




The future will provide even better means of finding vehicles. In


addition to IIR sensors, it will be possible to find them by using a


microwave radar sensor. This sensor will make it possible not just to


find the vehicle, but to determine which type of vehicle it is. The IIR


sensor and microwave sensor as mentioned earlier, will probably be


used in concert with each other.


Even though today's tank production is rapidly decreasing, the


development of tanks for the "battlefield of the future" is ongoing.


(3: 48-53) To give those tanks sufficient protection different technologies


and developments are under consideration. There are already


examples of new technology being incorporated into tanks, as


well as other combat vehicles in order to enhance the protection


against PGMs(16: 530-531). There are methods available to reduce the


"profile" of the vehicle by adjusting the configuration, and means to


create artificial decoys and "shields." The study needed to be done can


be divided into two parts, one part dealing with the systems physical


configuration and another dealing with expendable systems such as


artificial decoys and IR smoke.


While studying the configuration, the focus ought to be on possible


methods to reduce/suppress the gun's radar signature, as well as the


gun's IR signature. Experience attained from the development of the


stealth surface attack-ship "Smyge" should be applied and


used in this study. This is important because the sensor technology


used in antiship missiles, to a large degree, is the same as the


technology used in sensors for PGMs . Such a study will also give us


valuable data that we can apply when we have to replace or modify


Army combat vehicles.


Even if there are methods to reduce or suppress the gun's signature,


this is not enough. Compare this to a ship. A ship is constructed in a


certain way to minimize its target area but, at the same time, it is


equipped with expandable systems. This could be a method to further


enhance the protection of the gun. There are several studies and


developments on-going dealing with this problem. These include laser


warning systems, as well as multi-spectral aerosols offering high


reflection values for radar infrared and visible light radiation.(8: 35-41)


There are likely enough different systems available that there is no


need to develop new ones. The question then becomes which of the


already developed systems should be used and how should they work


together to give maximum protection.



Studies to enhance protection of the fortifications


Part of the passive protection for SFS 2000 includes (traditionally)


heavy fortifications. Two fortification types are considered in the SFS


2000 study. One is a "garage" for the gun when not at a battle station


or on its way to a battle station; the other is a structure to contain and


protect one of the fire-guidance stations. The most important lessons


learned from Operation Desert Storm about fortifications is even


heavy fortifications can be destroyed by PGMs. As mentioned earlier


today's PGMs can penetrate and destroy a bunker protected with


more than 5 meters of concrete. Modern bunkers, such as the


proposed "garages", used to protect Iraqi air craft were easily


destroyed by PGMs.


To direct PGMs against fortifications, the attacker must be able


to detect them in some way. If the pilot can see them, either with his


own eyes or via a data link from a missile's TV camera he can direct a


PGM to attack the fortifications. Other methods to "see" include IRR


sensors, provided the fortifications differ in temperature from their


surroundings. However, if they can not be detected, they cannot be hit


with PGMs. Therefore, various means of camouflaging the "garages"


should he more cost effective than protection by fortification. Maybe a


combination of "hiding" and fortifying is the best solution. Considering


this, it is important to study different options to protect the guns


including "camouflage" in concert with a "light" garage designed to just


prevent sabotage.


To do this, different methods to reduce the "image" of the garage


through all spectrums must be explored. Were such methods found, it


might permit less hardening of the fortification. If so, the cost for that


part of the project could be reduced significantly. A lower unit cost


could make it possible to build more garages. That would give us the


opportunity to shuttle four guns between perhaps six or eight


different garages. Thus we force the enemy to find and destroy more


targets which would complicate his planning as well as his execution.





In the studies suggested above, several different methods to enhance


the protection of SFS 2000 against PGMs surely will be found. But,


more interesting than a single protective method, is the synergy


combined methods would provide for an overall enhanced protection.


All studies suggested above must be integrated and evaluated as part


of a total "protection system" for SFS 2000. It is important that this


study also include the different systems already stated as


requirements to make the overall system balanced. The end result


should be a comprehensive and integrated protection system, because,


as Desert Storm unveiled, this is the only one that stands a chance of







Cick here to view images





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