The Need For A Greater Expeditionary Capability In The United States Air

The Need For A Greater Expeditionary Capability In The United States Air Force

CSC 1992

SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The need for a Greater Expeditionary Capability in the

United States Air Force

Author: Major Richard A. Fryer Jr., USAF

Thesis: The changing world scene implies the USAF must be an

expeditionary force to be able to project significant power in

all contingencies.

Background: The Chief of Staff of the Air Forces sees a major

challenge for the USAF as the need to move toward a more

expeditionary Air Force. An expeditionary capability requires

the right organizations, logistics network, and, perhaps most

importantly in the near term, hardware. World events bear this

out as the U.S. either voluntarily or involuntarily falls back

from its overseas basing network; a network the USAF is heavily

dependent upon to project significant combat overseas. But, what

constitutes an expeditionary air force is not clear. The author

presents his view of the "ideal" expeditionary capabilities of an

air force which include low reliance on developed basing

structure, various necessary support organizations, and the

logistically infrastructure which best supports expeditionary

operations. When this "ideal" is compared to present USAF

capabilities the most glaring limitation to Air Force expeditionary

operations would appear to be the operational limitations of its

primary fighter aircraft. More specifically, the.lack of

capability of present USAF aircraft to operate from the austere

bases. Follow-on aircraft such as the ATF, and perhaps the

A-X, appear to be capable of overcoming this limitation. In the

meantime, the USAF should consider means of overcoming these

limitations.

Recommendation: The USAF should study means of overcoming the

limitations of its present fighter aircraft to operate from

austere airfields.

THE NEED FOR A GREATER EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY

IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Outline

Thesis: The changing world scene implies the USAF must be an

expeditionary force to be able to project significant

power in all contingencies.

I. World political scene is changing

A. Gone is the major conventional/nuclear war threat

B. Political pressures to pull back from overseas bases

C. Not restricted to Europe, Pacific as well

II. Impact of world changes upon the USAF

A. USAF is dependent upon oveseas basing to project

significant comabt power

B. Coalition warfare provides attractive solution

C. Coalition warfare does not cover all eventualities

D. U.S. must be prepared to go it alone

III. Capabilities of an ideal expeditionary air force

A. In a scenario where we have no regional allies

1. USAF can not fight until bases available

2. But basing choices limited by USAF aircraft needs

B. Ideal expeditionary Air Force:

1. Has aerial refueling and airlift capabilities

2. Can use just about any available airfield

3. Viable support organizations

4. Pre-packaged contingency sets

C. These same capabilities enhance coalition warfare and

low intensity conflict

IV. Expeditionary characteristics the USAF possesses today

A. Airlift and aerial refueling

B. Largely viable support organizations

C. Pre-packaged contingency sets

V. The critical limitation to an expeditionary USAF

A. Aircraft limitations

1. Most fighter aircraft are not austere capable

2. Future aircraft (ATF and A-X) should be austere capable

B. Air Force must address this limitation to be a truely expeditionary force

THE NEED FOR A GREATER EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY

IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Major Richard A. Fryer Jr.

INTRODUCTION

The world political scene is in transition; this is not

new news. Nor is it new that no one can predict the future

world political steady-state with absolute certainty

(assuming such a "steady-state world" lies in store for us).

In this paper, I will not discuss possible outcomes of this

transition, but instead will discuss a major implication of

this "new world order" for the United States Air Force (USAF).

This implication is what General Merrill A. McPeak,

Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, sees as one of

two larger challenges facing the Air Force. One involves a

blurring of the distinction between tactical and strategic

"air forces" resulting in the need for what he calls

"composite structures." The other challenge is. the need to

move toward a more expeditionary Air Force, one "that moves

quickly from a CONUS [continental United States] location to

a forward position and is ready to fight immediately when it

gets there."(7:4) The former challenge is presently being

addressed in a major, USAF-wide re-organization. However, it

is the latter, more difficult challenge the USAF must

overcome if it is to remain the premiere air force of the

United States and, consequently, the world. An expeditionary

capability requires the right organizations, logistics net-

work, and, most importantly in the near term, aircraft.

It is this latter challenge to which I turn my attention

in this paper. The intent of this paper is to examine in

broad terms the capabilities the USAF needs to be expedition-

ary. Specifically, I intend to discuss the changing global

political scene and how it implies the need for a more

expeditionary Air Force. Then, I will present the capabil-

ities of an "ideal" expeditionary Air Force and determine

which expeditionary capabilities the USAF presently

possesses. Finally, I will discuss what I see as the critical

limiting factor the Air Force must overcome to fulfill

General McPeak's challenge, the limits of our aircraft.

WORLD POLITICAL SCENE IS CHANGING

The world political scene is in transition. The

Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Lieutenant General George Butler, put it this way,

[T]he global arena in which these aims [fundamental U.S.

security objectives] find their context is undergoing

such a profound transformation that virtually all of the

givens that have shaped our national strategy for four

decades have been called into question.(3:1)

However, this is not to say that this new "context" means an

end to threats to U.S. security. "These changes do not

promise a tranquil world nor an end to threats to American

interests around the globe."(11:2) Yet, the apparent death

of the Soviet Union with the resultant lessening of tensions

for a major conventional/nuclear conflict fought on the

European continent has brought questions about national

defense postures in European countries as well as in the

United States. Cut-backs are planned in most NATO (North

Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries and are already

underway in the United States. Politicians, both at home and

in Europe, are questioning the need for a continued U.S.

presence overseas. (9)

The same questioning of U.S. presence is on-going in the

Pacific despite the continued existence of major regional

threats such as North Korea. In one area, the pull-out has

begun as we depart from major, long-held installations in the

Phillipines. In another area, the Republic of Korea (ROK),

the U.S. has unilaterally removed its nuclear weapons.

Moreover, slight reductions of U.S. forces in the ROK have

been proposed. However, these reductions could conceivably

mirror that of the Phillipines should further reconciliation

occur between North" and South Korea. Additionally, with

increased trade tension between the United States and Japan,

it is not inconceivable that Japan could limit our presence

or operations at any point in the future in retaliation for

trade disagreements.

IMPACT OF WORLD CHANGES ON THE USAF

The overarching effect of these world events upon the

USAF is the potential loss of overseas bases critically

needed to carry out its missions. An inescapable fact of

airpower is that it must to come back to the surface for

refueling, maintenance, rearming, crew-changing, and

redirecting. Effectively, an air force is tethered to the

airbases from which it is launched, whether they be land-

based or sea-based.

The USAF is especially vulnerable in this regards due to

its need for in-theater bases with long, well-paved surfaces

for its fighter aircraft. As the Secretary of the Air Force

put it, "typically, land-based fighter forces require forward

basing to sustain power projection options."(10:9) The Air

Force does the nation a disservice if it cannot "get" to a

war due to an inability to use existing, austere in-theater

bases. To be an effective force capable of what the

Secretary of the Air Force calls "global reach/global power,"

the USAF must have this capability.

Additionally, the USAF needs expeditionary capabilities

to free itself from being a "hostage" of overseas basing

agreements. I refer to the ability of other nations to

deny or constrain our operations overseas. A fairly recent

example of this dependency was demonstrated during Operation

El Dorado Canyon (the 1986 Libyan Air Raid) when striking F-

111s were required to fly a long, indirect route from the

United Kingdom to Libya because Spain denied basing and

France denied overflight.

An answer to this dilemma, put forth by some, would

seemingly be that the United States will not fight further

regional conflicts without partners (i.e. coalition warfare

such as we saw in Desert Storm).(8) Clearly, under such a

philosophy, the U.S. would always expect to have access to

regional basing rights in any theater of operations where we

would fight. In other words, "when the interests of our

allies are threatened, basing will normally be made avail-

able."(10:9) Indeed, some prominent leaders in America

believe the U.S. will not go to war again without partners.

Yet, there are potentialities unaccounted for in the

answer presented above. Specifically, it ignores circum-

stances where only our vital interests are threatened and

where, consequently, others would have no national self-

interest in assisting us. Additionally, it ignores circum-

stances where others may have a self-interest, or where

others are threatened as "well, but they choose to deny us

bases and access for reasons of fear, for cultural reasons,

or for some other reason valid to that government.

In the National Security Strategy of the the United

States, President Bush delineates the nation's strategy for

regional conflicts as one that always seeks allied support,

while still retaining a credible U.S. capability for global

reach and power projection (hence, the ability to "go it

alone" if necessary).(2) Clearly, the armed forces of the

U.S., including the USAF, must be prepared to respond to any

eventuality. As stated in Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the

US Armed Forces,

The strategic context confronting the United States is

unique, and our friends, allies, and interests are

worldwide. Accordingly, the arena of our potential

operations is the entire planet.(6:2)

The U.S. must be prepared to go it alone, anywhere on

the globe to defend our vital interests. For the USAF, this

means being able to project airpower beyond our shrinking

overseas basing ring. To do this, the USAF must have the

capability for expeditionary operations.

CAPABILITIES OF AN IDEAL EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE

At this point, I will examine the operations, and

necessary capabilities, of an ideal expeditionary Air Force.

To do this, I will present what I believe to be the worst

case scenario for employment of the Air Force: a conflict in

a remote part of the world without in-theater friends or

allies (and thus without basing). Then, I will present what

1 believe are the capabilities the USAF requires to operate

ideally in such unfavorable circumstances. Finally, I will

review these expeditionary capabilities and their possible

effect in other types of conflicts including a coalition air

effort similar to that of Desert Storm.

The scenario I present involves the need to conduct

combat in an area remote from the United States and its

overseas bases. To add to this, the scenario will assume no

regional country will allow our forces to operate from or

through their territory. In sum, these are the worst case

conditions for a conventional war from the USAF viewpoint.

Admittedly, it is possible to apply some USAF combat airpower

independently in the form of unescorted bomber strikes

launched from the U.S. or U.S. territories. However, over-

whelming combat airpower can not be brought to bear until

aircraft can be brought into the theater and operate out of

seized territory.

Clearly, the first step to Air Force operations in such

a scenario would involve the seizing of territory containing

airfields by ground troops. Then, support forces would be

introduced to secure the base (security police), repair and

expand critical airfield surfaces to the minimum necessary

for preliminary operations (engineers), and establish the

initial logistics infrastructure (logisticians). Next,

fighter forces would be introduced into thee seized territory

with an initially constrained tempo of operations due to

logistics and support limitations. Delivery and build-up of

logistics and the development of the infrastructure necessary

for sustained high-level operations would be an on-going

priority operation, heavily dependent upon available sea- and

air-lift reception facilities (ports and airfields). Initial

flight operations would likely center on combat air patrol

(CAP) and limited offensive counter-air missions as these

require the least mass of munitions (although fuel require-

ments are still sizable). As the logistical infrastructure

grows, operations could shift to a full-scale air superiority

campaign to include CAP and offensive counter-air operations

against enemy airfields, command and control, air defenses,

and communications. Once most forces were in place, full

logistics support available, and the air superiority campaign

essentially won; air operations could shift priority of

effort to "strategic" targets, air interdiction, battlefield

isolation, and/or close air support at the choice of the

joint task force (JTF) commander. Clearly, all this hinges

on that first step, seizing ground somewhere in theater for

the introduction of Air Force airpower.

But, to make this task practical, there must be air-

field(s) suitable for the introduction of the Air Force.

That is to say the Air Force hardware must be expeditionary

itself to a certain degree or there would be no place

available in-theater for ground forces to secure capable of

sustaining USAF air operations. For instance, if all USAF

aircraft could only operate from 7,000 foot runways and only

3,000 foot runways existed in theater, the USAF would be

unable to contribute its airpower to the conflict until

adequate airfields were constructed (which takes considerable

time and resources). However, the problem would still not be

solved even if there were one or two airfields with the

necessary facilities. An opponent would know our needs and

would, accordingly, concentrate his defensive and denial

efforts on those particular airfields. Clearly, the more

expeditionary the capabilities of the USAF, the greater

flexibility ground forces have in securing adequate

facilities. Moreover, the chance of success will be greater

due to the enemy's greatly increased defensive problem.

I believe the "ideal" expeditionary Air Force is

one that could deploy from the United States, fly to any

point on the globe and conduct combat operations out of a

small pocket of captured enemy territory. Obviously, the

first capability needed is aerial refueling; both long-range

aircraft with the capability to refuel and others with the

capability to be refueled. Next, the expeditionary Air Force

operating out of hostile territory must be flexible in its

basing needs to allow for operations off of any available,

long, straight strip of pavement (to interject a note of

practicality, say longer than 2,000 feet). Thus, either the

Air Force's aircraft must be capable of operating unassisted

off such a surface or systems must be provided to assist them

in doing so (such as barriers and catapults). Additionally,

the expeditionary Air Force needs its own organic maintenance

and support organizations capable of supporting it in any

environment and requiring the minimum of people, equipment,

and supplies. Amongst the support organizations must be

security, services, logistics, and engineering. The latter

must be capable of infrastructure development to include

runway and parking repair and expansion as well as facility

and utility repair and expansion. In that line, the expedi-

tionary Air Force should require minimal facilities beyond

pavements and packaged airbase kits. These kits containing

personnel shelters, generators, field kitchens, and such

equipment could be transported with other bulky items such as

equipment, spares, fuel, and munitions. However, adequate

airlift would unlikely be available to bring in anything but

the most urgently needed bulk items. Thus, the ideal

expeditionary Air Force would use pre-packed maritime pre-

positioning to save time transporting bulk requirements.

Having identified what I see as ideal capabilities of

the expeditionary Air Force, a review of these capabilities

as applied in other types of conflicts indicates no incompat-

ibility. In a coalition theater war such as Desert Storm,

all the capabilities above would only serve to enhance the

Air Force's effectiveness. For instance, systems that allow

for operations off of austere airfields would allow for

greater basing flexibility and enhance force protection by

allowing greater dispersion. Additionally, maritime pre-

positioning enhances rapid build-up of bulk logistics and

equipment, thereby, enabling sustained, high-tempo combat

operations earlier. These capabilities are-not limited to

enhancing just maid- and high-intensity conflict.

Low-intensity conflict can occur in remote locations

with no secure rear area. With adequate security forces and

the ability to operate out of austere facilities, the

flexibility is available to choose the most secure option (if

that is the important factor) from a wider variety of

options. Moreover, the flexibility inherent in expeditionary

engineering and medical forces can provide added "forces" to

fight a low-intensity conflict through civic action.

EXPEDITIONARY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE USAF POSSESSES TODAY

The USAF has made great strides preparing for high tempo

combat, improving its supportability, and, to a certain

extent, improving its expeditionary capabilities. An example

of the first is provided by the close integration of assets

we have achieved to fight and survive in today's more

sophisticated combat environment. Airborne warning and con-

trol, fighter escort, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance

are routinely orchestrated and synchronized in conjunction

with air strikes.

Moreover, the USAF has championed airlift and aerial

refueling to provide all U.S. forces with the mobility to

reach any area on the globe.(5) The Air Force has not

ignored the need to update its strategic lift as exemplified

by its commitment of resources and focus to the replacement

for the C-141. This aircraft, the C-17, will incorporate

expeditionary features such as "survivability, ability to