The FSCL. Is It Still Valid Today? CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Warfighting The FSCL, Is It Still Valid Today? Major Robert D. Dozier Conference Group 8 6 April 1992 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The FSCL. Is It Still Valid Today? Author: Major Robert D. Dozier, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The FSCL has essentially become a restrictive boundary to the Air Force while still being seen as a permissive fire support coordination measure by the Marine Corps, Army, and Navy. The FSCL is supposed to be a tool to help the battle run smoothly; however, it is a source of argument between the U.S. services to determine exactly what the FSCL will do. Background: Fire support coordination measures are essential tools of the fire support coordinator and fire support coordination center in the effective coordination and control of the commander's fire support assets. They provide a means by which the commander may ensure troop safety, integrate his fire support with tactical operations, and expedite the attack on targets. To be effective, fire support coordination measures need to be known, understood, and adhered to. With the advances of modern weapons and subsequent changes in the roles of the combatants, questions about the validity of some of the fire support coordination measures have surfaced. The fire support coordination line (FSCL) is in the forefront of the controversy. The FSCL is a permissive fire support coordination measure that was intended to allow the rapid engagement of targets by permitting all fire support assets, air and ground, to engage targets beyond it without coordination. Previously placed at a range beyond most ground forces supportive arms, air assets felt safe from the effects of friendly fires. Now, because ground-support assets have a greater range and lethality, air forces want the FSCL to be restrictive, requiring the ground-support assets to coordinate with air assets prior to their engaging targets. As a result, ground forces with the capability to shoot beyond the FSCL are significantly delayed or stopped from engaging deep targets. This was the case during the recent war in Southwest Asia, Desert Storm. The functions of the FSCL have been debated for over 10 years; it is time to decide its actual role. Recommendation: All U.S. military forces need to meet and decide what they want from the FSCL as a fire support control measure. The FSCL still has potential as a coordination measure and should not be changed. It is a tool to be used in the appropriate situation. If the FSCL is not the most appropriate measure, then other more appropriate measures should be used or developed if one does not exist. The keys to solving this dilemma are to know, understand, and adhere to the fire support coordination measure, once it is defined. The FSCL, Is It Still Valid Today? Outline Thesis: The FSCL has essentially become a restrictive boundary to the Air Force while still being seen as a permissive fire support coordination measure by the Marine Corps, Army, and Navy. The FSCL is supposed to be a tool to help the battle run smoothly; however, it is a source of argument between the U.S. services to determine exactly what the FSCL will do. I. Types of fire support coordination measures A. Boundaries as fire support coordination measures B. Permissive fire support coordination measures C. Restrictive fire support coordination measures II. Statement on problem A. How fire support coordination measures are seen B. The FSCL losing the clarity of its definition C. The FSCL as a different meaning to the services III. Effect of differing meaning to the FSCL in SWA A. Field artillery units missions delayed B. Air Force see FSCL as restrictive measure C. FSCL as a restrictive measure D. Use of RIPL with FSCL IV. Weapons systems - Air Force concern over role of FSCL V. Possible Solutions A. Clearly define FSCL and use B. Use of RIPL with FSCL C. Change the meaning of FSCL D. Use boundary in place of FSCL VI. Conclusion The FSCL, Is It Still Valid Today? The era of man against man in raw hand-to-hand combat has long ago passed into the archives of history. Since those days man has looked for and invented weapons, each more deadly than the last, to defeat his enemy in battle. The desire and necessity to best an opponent in battle has led to newer more deadly weapons capable of reaching great distances. In turn, these powerful weapons have led to newer and more complex forms of battle. So it is that today the modern battlefield has become so complex that close coordination is required to both fight the battle and prevent adverse effects on friendly forces. The responsibility far molding the battlefield and integrating fire support rests with the commander. To advise and assist the commander with integrating his fire support, the commander has a Fire Support Coordinator (FSC) and a Fire Support coordination Center (FSCC). The FSCC is staffed with representatives from the various supporting arms, primarily air, artillery, and naval gunfire and has the basic mission of planning, coordinating, and controlling all the supportive arms on the battlefield. To accomplish this, the FSC uses fire support coordination measures. These measures provide, via common procedures and terms, for the rapid engagement of targets while simultaneously furnishing a reasonable margin of safety for friendly forces. Fire support coordination measures fall under three basic categories: boundaries, permissive measures, and restrictive measures. Boundaries, a key element in fire support coordination, define the geographic limits of the zone of action of a unit. Inside the boundary, a commander controls the fires and maneuver of his unit as he sees fit, unless restricted by a higher headquarters fire support coordination measure inside the boundary. All units outside the boundary must coordinate with the unit owning the area within the boundary before shooting into, across, or allowing the effects of their fires to fall into the area designated by the boundary. Most often a boundary is depicted in a linear fashion, but it may be, as the tactical situation may dictate, depicted non-linearly. Permissive fire support coordination measures -- the coordinated fire line (CFL), the fire support coordinated line (FSCL), and the free fire area (FFA) -- allow the engagement of targets beyond a line or into an area without further coordination. The purpose of permissive fire support coordination measures is to facilitate the attack of targets. (9:2-11) Restrictive fire support coordination measures -- the restrictive fire line (RFL), the airspace coordination area (ACA), the no-fire area (NFA), and the restrictive fire area (RFA) -- impose certain requirements for specific coordination prior to the engagement of those targets affected by the measure. The primary purpose of restrictive measures is to provide safeguards for friendly forces. (9:2- 12) Fire support coordination measures, once established, must be disseminated up and down the chain of command and across to adjacent units so that appropriate coordination may be affected and a smooth progression of the battle may occur. Fire support coordination measures, though defined basically the same way in various military manuals, are not always interpreted the same, nor are they always expected to be what they were designed to be. The result is a hindrance to the coordination process that causes wasted time and effort. To be effective, fire support coordination measures need to be known, clearly understood, and adhered to at all levels and by all forces using them. A fire support coordination measure that is losing the clarity of its definition is the fire support coordination line (FSCL). A permissive fire support coordination measure, it is a line beyond which any target may be engaged by any weapons system without the requirement for coordination prior to the engagement. It has instead become a line of "deconfliction", between ground forces' fires beyond the FSCL to "prevent duplication of effort and fratricide of friendly air forces" and a line that "facilitates the deconfliction of Army and Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) requirements for airspace". (2:2-15) It is also more often being designated as the hand-off point between the deep battle and the close battle. (17:4) So what's the problem? The problem is that the FSCL has essentially become a restrictive boundary to the Air Force while still being seen as a permissive fire support coordination measure by the Marine Corps, Army, and Navy. The FSCL is supposed to be a tool to held the battle run smoothly; however, it is a source of argument between the U.S. services to determine exactly what the FSCL will do. This particular disagreement surfaced in the recent hostilities during Operation Desert Storm in Southwest Asia. The air force elements and the ground force elements of the coalition were in disagreement about the coordination required to fire surface-to-surface and ground related weapons beyond the fire support coordination line. For example, the Army's 1-27 Field Artillery, 42d Field Artillery Brigade, firing in support of its 3d Armored Division, was on several occasions "laid and ready" to fire on Iraqi targets beyond the FSCL. Those missions ended without firing because of problems of coordinating, clearing missions with the Air Force. (13:33) The Air Force insisted that coordination was required and that it must be done before ground forces were permitted to engage targets beyond the FSCL. This was the standing operating procedure insisted on by coalition air forces. On the other hand, ground forces did not feel that coordination was a strict requirement before targets beyond the FSCL could be engaged. According to the actual definition of the FSCL, the ground forces were more correct. The definition, as contained in JCS Pub 1-02, states: A line established by the appropriate ground commander to insure coordination of fire not under his control but which may affect current tactical operations. The fire support coordination line is used to coordinate fires of air, ground or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The fire support coordination line should follow well defined terrain features. The establishment of the fire support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the fire support coordination line, without prior coordination with the ground force commander, provided the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of the line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate ground force commander. This definition is standard and established for use by all Department of Defense (DOD) components and member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (14:144) Although this definition states that any supporting element may fire past the FSCL, the FSCL was, in the past, placed too far out to be reached by surface fire means. Thus, there was no threat that the effects of friendly fires would accidently hit friendly aircraft working beyond the FSCL. The multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), particularly the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the Marine Corps and Army's attack helicopters, which usually work with the ground combat element, change the situation. ATACMS is capable of firing up to 150 kilometers and attack helicopters are capable of moving great distances at great speeds enabling them to go to the FSCL and engage targets beyond it. Added to this now are technological advances, such as the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), which allow the acquisition of targets much sooner and further away than in the past. The result is that the likelihood for the ground forces to want to engage targets beyond the FSCL to better mold the battlefield and accomplish its mission now increases. In some DOD publications, it is stated that if targets beyond the FSCL can be reached by surface fire means, prior notification to the air component is recommended before engaging the targets. This is to lessen the possible hazards of flying projectiles striking an aircraft. It is stressed, however, that if prior aircraft notification cannot be effected, ground forces can still engage targets beyond the FSCL. Rapid engagement of targets is considered an acceptable trade-off to the amount of risk the aircraft incurs. The requirement for coordinating with the air component prior to the establishment of the FSCL implies that once it is established the air component is aware of the risks. The trade-off of acceptable risks for rapid engagement was not acceptable to the air forces of Desert Storm. The MLRS and ATACMS forced the air forces to reconsider the risks in operating beyond the FSCL. This led to the early requirement for ground forces to effect positive coordination with the air forces prior to engaging targets beyond the FSCL. This, in effect, restricted the fires of the ground forces. The purpose of the FSCL was thwarted because ground forces were not allowed to rapidly engage targets beyond the FSCL without going through the coordination process. The restriction for positive coordination, in effect, established an informal airspace coordination area (ACA). An ACA is a restrictive fire support coordination measure where "friendly aircraft are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires." (9:2-14) Informal ACA's can be accomplished by separating surface fires by time, usually controlled by a forward air controller or artillery forward observer, "or by a terrain feature (e.g., surface fire south of the river, aircraft remain north of the river)." (19:3- 19) Either way, the purpose of the FSCL is lost. A later effort to solve the argument of what the function of a FSCL was during Desert Storm, was the employment of a European NATO procedure called the reconnaissance and interdiction phase line (RIPL). The RIPL is known in Korea as the deep battle synchronization line (DBSL) and more informally in various sites throughout the Army as the air deconfliction line (ADL), reconnaissance deconfliction line (RDL), or just phase line "___ ." The RIPL, "normally 80-100 kilometers beyond the FSCL," (11:522) is a line placed beyond the FSCL to allow the FSCL to function as it is supposed to by doctrine, and a point beyond which ground forces cannot shoot without coordination. That is, ground forces may employ their weapons systems beyond the FSCL without coordination with air forces, but they must coordinate to shoot beyond the RIPL if they have the capability. Figure 1 below is provided to help visualize these procedures. Click here to view image For this situation, the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) has an area of responsibility (AOR), and he has given the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) an area of operations to conduct his portion of the CINC's battle plan. The CINC is fighting his deep battle with air controlled by the JFACC. As depicted, the 2nd Marine Division operating inside the MEF area may engage target 1 without coordinating; it's within the 2d Marine Division boundary. The 1st Marine Division may engage target 1 only after it has coordinated with 2nd Marine Division; it is across a boundary which requires coordination to shoot. Both divisions may engage target 2 without coordinating with anyone; it is beyond the FSCL. In order to shoot target 3, both divisions are required to coordinate with JFACC; it is beyond the RIPL. Previously this area, according to the definition of the FSCL, would normally not require coordination to be engaged. Both divisions are required to coordinate to shoot target 4; it is across a boundary. The RIPL as a coordination measure, though in use for many years, was not known to everyone and as previously mentioned is known by, several different terms. This is another point of confusion and argument when employing the FSCL. The first step that must be taken in order to correct the problems associated with using the FSCL is to clearly define the FSCL. This definition must be agreed to, understood, and adhered to by all U.S. forces and their allies. As it is currently defined, the commander in deciding whether or not to establish a FSCL, should look at what advantages a FSCL would add toward the successful completion of the operation. The advantages should be compared to the risks. If the advantages outweigh the risks and the FSCL is established, then the FSCL should be allowed to function as it was designed. As a permissive measure, it is a useful tool in rapidly engaging deeper targets, allowing the commander to mold the battlefield with his ground-related assets as well as his aviation assets. If the risks outweigh the advantages, then other more restrictive fire support coordination measures should be considered. The use of the RIPL beyond the FSCL offers a potential solution. It must, however, be clearly defined and given one title, not five, and disseminated to all U.S. forces and its allies. If this measure is established, once effected on the battlefield, it will allow the area beyond the FSCL to be engaged by any weapons system to include aviation assets. Air forces, however, must understand that there is inherent risk involved when operating inside of this area and should not try to change the meaning or intent of this system once employed in the theater. The area beyond the RIPL would be a zone where ground forces would have to coordinate with air forces prior to engaging a target. This would guarantee aircraft working in this area a margin of safety, at least from friendly ground force fires. Another possibility to be considered would be to change the definition and intent of the FSCL from a positive fire support coordination measure to a restrictive one for ground forces' fires and a permissive one for air forces fighting the deep battle. Basically the FSCL would become a line beyond which any ground forces' weapons systems would be allowed to fire only after coordination with the air forces, and air forces fighting the deep battle could engage any target without prior coordination. This situation is a reverse of the existing coordinated fire line, a line beyond which ground forces may engage targets at any time without prior coordination, as long as it is within their boundary. Air forces may engage targets within this area only after coordinating with the ground force that is operating within the boundary. (See target 5 in the Figure 1) The use of a boundary in place of the FSCL offers a solution. Since no one may fire across a boundary without first coordinating with the owners of the area on the other side of the boundary, by placing operating forces inside a completed boundary they are forced to coordinate when engaging a target outside of their boundary. In figure 2, according to present doctrine, target 1 may be engaged by both divisions of the MEF without coordination because it is beyond the FSCL, but within the MEF boundary or area of operations. Target 2 can only be engaged after coordination is made with the CINC because it is beyond a designated boundary. This situation is very restrictive. Click here to view image A key element to any solution rests with the proper functioning of the elements of the fire support coordination center at all levels. By doctrine, coordination is effected at the lowest echelon possible and constant communication and evaluation of the tactical and strategic situation is a must in order for the tools of fire support coordination to be effective. (9:4-15) In today's highly mobile and fast-paced battlefield, rapid engagement of targets deep in the battlefield, utilizing all available firepower, could mean the difference between success and failure. The fire support coordination line when known, clearly understood, and adhered to, is a tool which provides for the rapid and orchestrated engagement of targets. Changes to its intent can lead to confusion, wasted time, and loss of opportunity. 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