Coalition Warfare In Latin America CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Coalition Warfare In Latin America Author: Major R. A. Colbert, United States Air Force Thesis: Coalition warfare problems in Latin America would be different from those of the recent Gulf War because the Gulf War was high-intensity and conflict in Latin America would be low-intensity. Background: Coalition warfare has been a winning way of war since the anti-Napoleon coalition of 1813-1814 Desert Storm and the alliance against Napoleon involved conventional conflict. The problems associated with low-intensity coalition warfare include those associated with conventional coalition warfare as well as many others not common to conventional or high-intensity coalition warfare. In Latin America, before any successful low-intensity coalition warfare principles can be addressed or developed, significant socioeconomic, political, as well as military issues must be reformed. Historically, the majority of U.S. involvement in Latin America has been military. Latin Americans feel the U.S. should provide more than military support. There must also be social and economic help. Recommendation: U.S. follow through with National Security Strategy for the 1990's. Provide a full range of political social economic, and military support. COALITION WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA Thesis: Coalition warfare problems in Latin America would be different from those of the recent Gulf War because the Gulf War was high-intensity and conflict in Latin America would be low-intensity. I. Problems of coalition warfare A. Successful coalition warfare B. Problems of coalition warfare in conventional conflict C. Problems of coalition warfare in low-intensity conflict II. Future conflict in Latin America A. Poverty the main reason B. Changes in societies C. Past repressions D. Foreign debt and drug trade III. U.S. intervnetion in Latin America A. Past U.S. intervention B. Latin American attitudes toward U.S. intervention C. Future U.S. intervention COALITION WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA by Major Ronald A. Colbert United States Air Force In 1991, during Desert Storm, the allied efforts of the United States (U.S.) and thirty-eight other countries that decisively ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait provided a successful blueprint for future U.S. conflict. This successful blueprint of coalition warfare is woven into U.S. policy for building the new world order. The stable foundation or our security will continue to be a common effort with peoples with whom we share fundamental moral and political values and security interests. Increasingly we may find ourselves in situations in which our interests are congruent with those of nations not tied to us by formal treaties. As in the Gulf, we may be acting in hybrid coalitions that include not only traditional allies but also nations with whom we do not have a mature history of diplomatic and military cooperation or, indeed, even a common political or moral outlook. (12:13) Although highly successful, the Desert Storm coalition did experience some problems that are inherent to coalition warfare. History (besides Desert Storm) provides us with examples of coalition warfare as well as some of the associated problems. By most accounts, Desert Storm was considered a con- ventional war which categorizes its associated coalition warfare problems as problems of conventional coalition warfare. Since portions of U.S. fighting Vietnam were conventional and unconventional or low-intensity we may be able to identify some coalition warfare problems associated with low-intensity conflict. By considering coalition warfare problems associated with high and low-intensity con- flict, we are provided an appropriate background to better pursue the thesis of this paper. Coalition warfare problems in Latin America would be different from those of the recent Gulf War because the Gulf War was high-intensity and con- flict in Latin America would be low-intensity. High-intensity coalition warfare problems can be catego- rized as "technical" or "perception" problems. The "technical" problems are the obvious kind of problems one would expect when two different units or nations attempt to work together to achieve a common goal. If they speak different languages then communications will be a problem. If these units or nations have different organizational structures then they must ensure organizatinal compati - bility. This is true for command relationships, procedures and equipment, cultural differences, or for any task the coalition members accomplish together. The "perception" problems occur in a coalition when one member attempts to infuence another as result of political or personal desire. Usually these "perception" problems evolve from the higher political or military levels of the coalition. For example, if one member of a coalition is significantly stronger than another militarily, economically, technologically or otherwise, the weaker member of a coalition may perceive that the stronger member will dominate or control the coalition. Or the stronger member may perceive the weaker member is incapable of performing a particular task for some unfounded reason. (2) Since the military alliance against Napoleon (1813- 1814) , coalition warfare has become a winning way of war. According to Dr. Gordon A. Craig, author of Problems of Coalition Warfare, the military alliance or coalition against Napoleon had problems establishing an effective command strucute, reaching agreement on war aims, exercising operational efficiency, and problems caused by improper government control over commanders in the field. (3) The problems with command structure, war aims, and their effects on operational effiency are somewhat predicta- ble owing to different national policies and interests of the anti-Napoleon alliance. These are the "technical" type problems. However, the problems involving improper govern- ment control require further review. The members of the anti-Napoleonic alliance included Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Austria. Since the Austrian force was the largest single contingent, Austria would have the decisive voice to determine the supreme commander of the coalition. Nevertheless, the Russian Tsar attempted to influence the section of the supreme commander to increase Russian influence at the Supreme Headquarters. The Austrian ruler perceived the Russian attempt to politicize the coalition military leadership and acted to prevent it. Although a complete historical analysis of lessons learned for Desert Storm is currently not available, the Marine Corps Lessons Learned (MCLLS) Data base does present some coalition warfare situations that contribute to this effort. For combined operations (coalition warfare), MCLLS recommends liaison officers are needed to address differences in language, doctrine, tactics, symbology, capabilities, organization and structure. (6) For Desert Storm (the thirty-nine member allied coa- lition), MCLLS indicates at least fifty liaison officers were required for the Marine Expeditionary Force. We don't know how many liaison officers were required for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. But, using the Marine Corps liaison requirment for Desert Storm (fifty) as a guage, the total number of liaison officers for the U.S. Army, Navy, and air Force was considerably more than fifty. Again, the liaison officers would resolve "technical" problems. A high level US Marine Corps source perceived two possible problems with operational security during Desert Storm. One problem involved all coalition troops tele- phoning relatives at home. The concern was that troops could inadvertantly reveal some detail (s) of military oper- ational plans for Desert Storm. The other problem involved some coalition members' communications equipment. The con- cern was whether the enemy could compromise the equipment in question and discover coalition plans. These were "perception" problems. Before we look at coalition problems associated with low-intensity conflict, defining low-intensity conflict should prove helpful . Low -intensity conflict encompasses such a broad range of activity or combinations of events and circumstances that an attempt at definition is only possible through a broad framework. According to Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict: Low--intensity conflict is a political-military con- frontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global implications. (5:1-1) Although the war in Vietnam protrayed high and low- intensity conflict we want to consider the low-intensity portion. In Vietnam the coalition comprised the Republic of South Vietnam and the U.S. Coalition warfare problems were language/communications, cultural differences, some Vietnamese perceptions of U.S. forces (particularly some U.S. advisors to South Vietnamese military units), difficulty identifying friend or foe due to the lack of distinguishable uniforms, unpopular and corrupt government, and masses in poverty. Before the war escalated to increased high-intensity, the U.S. Marine Corps advisors helped organize and train South Vietnamese Marines according to U.S. Marine Corps organizational structures and equipment procedures. Due to poor economic conditions, the U. S. sub- sidized the South Vietnamese military. (10) What is apparent from the review of problems associated with low-intensity conflict in Vietnam is that the "technical " and "perceived" high-intensity coalition warfare problems are common to low-intensity coalition warfare as well. But in the low-intensity, third world or developing nation context, there are the additional coalition warfare problems that do not usually exist in high-intensity warfare. A developing nation is one which has advanced beyond a traditional society and is struggling toward becoming an economically and socially advanced nation with an efficient, popularly supported government. In order to achieve these goals, a nation must over- come the handicaps which are characteristic of an underdeveloped society. These are: a static economy, limited technology, immobile social structure, and rule by custom and traditional process. (11:1) These coalition warfare problems which are only peculiar to low-intensity conflict are the ones which must be dealt with before those coalition warfare problems common to low and high-intensity coalition warfare can be addressed. According to Dr. Lewis B. Ware of Low-Intensity Conflict In The Third World, "Latin America possesses certain inherent and acquired characteristics associated with the development and proliferation of low-intensity con- flict " (12:81) "Professor Lars Schoultz, director of the University of North Carolina Institute of Latin America Studies, affirms that there is widespread agreement that poverty underlies instability in the region [Latin America]. But he rhetorically questions why peasants, who have suffered in silence, poverty and political repression for centuries, have now suddenly decided to rise up in insurrection. He tions' spurred by structural changes of the Latin American societies, particularly changes in transportation and communication. " (4:4.4) The increasing awareness and political mobilization of the peasants to improve their circumstances, too often in the past was met with unwillingness by the governing elite to make the social and economic changes. This unwillingness often came in the form of brutal repression which drove many peasants to become radicals and to join insurgencies. One also has to factor into the socioeconomic situation the impact of hopelessness resulting from staggering foreign debt and the perpetuation of government corrupting encour- aged by the drug trade. These factors contribute to a significant likelihood for conflict in Latin America. The hope for decreasing the possibilities of conflict in Latin America rests, in part, with . . . such reform-minded leaders as Argentina's Carlos Menem, Brazil`s Fernando Collor de Mello, Peru's Alberto Fujimori, Mexico's Carlos Salina de Gotari and Venezuela's Carlos Andres Perez have spent the past several years trying to halt inflation, cut government spending, sell money- losing state enterprises and generally remake their' nations' economies. (8:24) Although these and other Latin American leaders are making noteworthy progress, it is very difficult to determine if the general public attitudes of distrust and lack of confi- dence regarding the governments persist or are changing. The reason these attitudes are so difficult to change is: Attitudes the first colonists here [Latin America] bought from Span, such as acceptance of centralized authority and established procedures, a certain fatalism in the face of obstacles and such love of slathering official papers with seals and stamps that even the simplest of documents . . . end up looking like a petition to the royal court in Madrid. (8:24) Even the tendency for military coups is traced to the pro- pensity to look for easy, one-shot solutions to difficult problems. Historically it would appear that U.S. involvement in Latin America has been of a one-sided, military nature. From the Spanish-American War of 1812 to the Panama invasion, history indicates that U.S. intervention in Latin America was either direct military or military related involvement. but during this same period, the U.S. attempted to promote democracy and economic reform and discourage corrupt government. Latin American believe most U.S. officials consider force the appropriate response to Latin American problems. Major Eduardo Aldunate of the Chilean army says: Many U.S. observers, especially military professionals, believe that the problems of subversion and drug trafficking in Latin America have military solutions or that using force should be the primary means of dealing with these problems. Also, it seems that the leaders of more developed countries think they can `advise' the military of developing countries within the framework of an established doctrine of low- intensity conflict. This idea apparently is based on the conviction that the military institutions of these countries are not doing their job well and that little advice could help solve the region's enormous problems (1:80) Three prominent Honduran Interviewed during U. S. involve- ment with the Nicaraguan Contras support U.S. military intervention the region but, they also say U.S. support for political, social, economic and judicial reforms are necessary for regional stability in Latin America. (9:31,54) political , socioeconomic, military as well as efforts to understand Latin American culture by the international community will ensure successful reform in the region. The U.S. recognizes Latin American efforts at reform with the resurgence of democracy--Nicaragua, Haiti, Panama, and the desire to build strong economic markets in the region. This recognition of reform is reflected in current U.S. policy for Latin America. In terms of military support, the U.S. will continue to promote professionalism, civilian rule over military rule, and respect for human rights. A major effort to support both democratic and economic reforms is the new Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. This initiative ... sets out a vision of hemispheric prosperity achieved through expanded trade, increased investment, reduced debt burdens and important support for protection of the hemishpere's vital national heritage. In addition ... [the U.S.] proposed a specific trade preference system to help Andean countries break out of their dependence on illegal drug crops. (13:8) Naturally these assistance programs require the coordination and support of regional organizations like the Organization Of American States (OAS). (The OAS is the oldest interna- tional regional organization in the world. It provides a forum for political , economic, social , and cultural coopera- tion among the member states of the Western Hemisphere. (7) By encouraging and supporting reform in Latin America, the U.S. efforts go a long way toward deepening the sense of partnership, common interest and trust. These ingredients help eliminate the factors and conditions that prevent the establishment and growth of alliances, and provide for successful coalitions like the United Nations coalition of Desert Storm and the alliance against Napoleon. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Aldunate, Major Eduardo. "Observations On The Theory of Low-Intensity Conflict and Violence In Latin America." Military Review June 91:80. 2. Colbert, Ronald A., Major, United States Air Force, Quantico, Virginia. Paper about problems of coalition warfare, November 25, 1991. 3. Craig, Gordon A. Problems of Coalition Warfare. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,1988. 4. Gosnell, Colonel Wayne P. "A Time To Build: U.S. Policy For Latin America and The Caribbean." Military Review June 91:44. 5. Headquarters Departments of The Army And The Air Force. "Military Operations In Low-Intensity Conflict." Washington, D.C., 1990. 6. Marine Corps Lessons Learned Data Base. Information about coalition warfare. Quantico, Virginia. 7. Organization of American States, Washington, D.C. Letter about the Organization of American States, March 3, 1992. 8. Robinson, Eugene "The Battle For The Soul of Latin America," Washington Post, November 3, 1991, Section A.,p. 24. 9. Rondfeldt, David. U.S. Involvement In Central America Three Views From Honduras. Santa Monica, California: National Defense Research Institute, 1989. 10. U.S. Advisors To The Vietnamese Marine Corps During The Easter Offensive- COVANS. Personal interviews about relations with Vietnamese Marines. Quantico, Virginia, March 27, 1992. 11. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Schools. Marine Corps Educational Center. Counterinsurgency Operations FMFM 8-2. Quantico, 1980. 12. Ware, Lewis B. Low-Intensity Conflict In The Third World. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press,1988. 13. White House. National Security Strategy of The United States, August 1991.
