U.S. Expeditionary Force Alternatives CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: U.S. Expeditionary Force Alternatives Author: Major R. A. Christie, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Given current world uncertainties, the United States' future military strategy may place an even greater emphasis on ground forces and the amphibious ships needed to transport them. Background: Based on requirements of the regional stability strategy endorsed by the National Command Authorities, the United States needs a rapid force projection capability to protect areas vital to U.S. interests. This strategy calls for multiple operational capabilities including amphibious, contingency, and follow-on forces. The dramatic downsizing of the military is prompting a new look at existing forces capable of contributing to such a strategy. This paper compares three alternative force mixes to determine which is best suited to provide the capability required to execute a regional stability strategy. It examines the expeditionary utility of the Marine Corps' current three amphibious Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) and three Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF) MEBs (3x3), a proposal to add a fourth MPF MEB and maintain only two amphibious MEBs (4x2), and the Army's proposal to use the 18th Airborne Corps in an expeditionary role. The utility of each force mix has been evaluated by comparing the capabilities required in a crisis response regional security strategy: expeditionary capability, forcible-entry capability, sustainability, balance, responsiveness, readiness, and flexibility. The 3x3 mix provides the greatest expeditionary capability of the three alternatives. The 4x2 mix provides an additional MPS set, but does so at the expense of amphibious ships and significantly decreases forcible-entry capability. Using the 18th Airborne Corps in an expeditionary role overlooks their lack of tactical mobility and sustainability, and confuses contingency capability with expeditionary capability. Furthermore, this proposal would dramatically increase the requirement for fast sealift. Conclusion: The current force mix of three amphibious MEBs and three MPF MEBs comes closest to providing the capability necessary to implement the future national military strategy. U.S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ALTERNATIVES Outline Thesis Statement. Given current world uncertainties, the United States' future military strategy may place an even greater emphasis on ground forces and the amphibious ships needed to transport them. I. Problem A. New world order 1. National strategy 2. Military strategy B. Diminishing forward bases C. Base Force Concept D. Operational requirements of regional stability strategy 1. Amphibious forces 2. Contingency forces 3. Follow-on forces E. Maritime prepositioning ships (MPS) - service perspectives 1. Congress 2. Navy 3. Army 4. Air Force 5. Marine Corps II. Alternatives A. Force mission focus B. Evaluation criteria 1. Expeditionary capability 2. Forcible-entry capability 3. Sustainability 4. Balance 5. Responsiveness 6. Readiness 7. Flexibility III. Comparison A. Amphibious Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) B. Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) MEB C. Army contingency forces D. Fiscal considerations E. Evaluation summary IV. Conclusion U.S. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ALTERNATIVES The U.S. national containment strategy has driven the current military force structure for the past forty years. In light of the startling events of the past 18 months, a review of the nation's economic, political, and security objectives indicates the containment strategy is no longer appropriate. The United States needs a new national strategy to efficiently and effectively achieve national interests. The demise of the WARSAW Pact and collapse of the Soviet Union give reason to hope for a new era of peace. However, these historic events are set against a backdrop of unrest in Eastern Europe and increased regional tension in the developing world as more nations seek to exert greater influence over their political and commercial futures. Furthermore, the rise in nationalism and ethnic assertion will continue to provide the seeds of conflict and unrest in many areas of U.S. interest. A new regional stability strategy may be more appropriate. Such a strategy would promote economic growth, individual rights, and democratic institutions in Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the developing world. As the only remaining superpower, the United States must lead world efforts to help Eastern Europe, the CIS, and Third World nations modernize their agricultural methods, water purification systems, industrial base, and telecommunications and transportation infrastructures. Plagued by inadequate health care, burgeoning populations, environmental destruction, governmental inefficiencies and a disproportionate distribution of wealth, the Third World and former communist states in Europe will remain unstable throughout the next decade. These countries need more managerial, technical, and financial assistance to create viable market-based economies to foster economic and political stability. Concurrently, the U.S. must develop a complementary military strategy designed to protect national interests and achieve national objectives while these regions emerge from decades of neglect and waste. The new military strategy should focus less on countering the spread of Soviet-sponsored communism and more on maintaining regional stability through assistance programs, forward presence, nuclear deterrence, and ultimately the timely intervention of military forces in support of friendly governments.1 While the United States will continue to focus strategic nuclear deterrent forces on "the four states of the Commonwealth of Independent States where nuclear forces remain -- Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan,"2 volatility in the Third World demands greater attention on conventional expeditionary forces to counter regional instability. For this reason, the U.S. must have the capability to rapidly respond to simultaneous regional crises to protect allied territorial integrity and further U.S. interests. DIMINISHING FORWARD BASES The U.S. containment strategy has been based on nuclear and conventional deterrence, collective security, and forward basing and deployment. The last of these is of particular concern. The continuing decline in the number of foreign basing agreements and overflight rights will complicate future military operations. Losing bases in Spain, the Philippines and Panama will impact on the United State's ability to rapidly and effectively respond to regional crises. The loss of these forward bases will inevitably result in a greater reliance on power projection/rapid reinforcement from the continental United States. Additionally, removing forces from these regions may be misinterpreted as an absence of U.S. resolve and commitment to allies and friends. Adding to these concerns is the increased closure time for contingency forces inherent in the military's withdraw from the Pacific Rim, Europe and Central America. Operation DESERT SHIELD is an excellent example of the tremendous effort required to transport and supply an expeditionary force half-way around the globe. The inability to rapidly bring sufficient force to bear may ultimately require deploying significantly greater forces to achieve the same objective. BASE FORCE CONCEPT The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Base Force concept describes a force structure below which he feels the U.S. cannot fall and still remain a superpower. It envisions a military organized into four forces: Strategic Force, Atlantic Force, Pacific Force, and a Contingency Force. The Strategic Force will incorporate the nuclear triad. The Atlantic Force will consist of heavy ground forces and be oriented towards high intensity conflict. The Pacific Force will be comprised primarily of light ground forces and focus on regional stability. The Contingency Force will be composed of a mix of heavy and light forces capable of crisis response in any level of conflict, and have a global focus.3 But critics fear the Base Force Concept derives more from programmatic than strategic realities. The Atlantic, Pacific or Contingency Forces are all likely to provide expeditionary forces. As the world moves into an era of instability and regional strife, highly mobile, self-sustaining expeditionary forces will be at a premium. The U.S. must therefore tailor its future expeditionary forces to compensate for the changing threat and likely loss of forward bases. In a climate of reduced defense expenditures; and escalating weapons, training, and manpower costs, it is imperative to efficiently use each Service's strengths to achieve a synergistic force. The Contingency Force developed under the CJCS must be capable of rapid global response to a variety of crises throughout the spectrum of conflict. Implicit in this crisis response capability is the requirement to seize sufficient terrain and facilities to allow the introduction of follow-on forces. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS Operational requirements are those military capabilities necessary to accomplish the objectives defined in the national security strategy. These operational requirements link means and ends. A regional stability strategy requires multiple operational capabilities including amphibious forces, contingency forces, and follow- on forces. These forces should be capable of conducting crisis response to two regional crises simultaneously. The ground component of the contingency forces -- five Army divisions, a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and Special Operations Forces -- are clearly identified within the base force concept. However, contingency forces lacking the ability to conduct forcible-entry may prove insufficient in many circumstances. Given the current uncertainty in the world, the U.S. future military strategy may place an even greater emphasis on amphibious capability -- ground forces and the amphibious ships needed to transport them. Amphibious capability provides Marine expeditionary forces the means to seize defended areas, enhancing rapid combat power buildup with follow-on forces. The requirement to seize advanced base facilities to allow contingency and follow-on forces to respond to a crisis should be apparent. Therefore, the existing strategic operational requirement for amphibious assault capability is unlikely to diminish in any future military strategy. Unfortunately, amphibious capability has not been a high priority within the Department of Navy for many years. It lacks the proponency enjoyed by the aviation, submarine, and surface line communities. Accordingly, the Department of the Navy has established a programmatic goal of sufficient amphibious ships to deliver the assault echelons (AE) of 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).4 However, even this modest goal may be fiscally unobtainable in the current military downsizing. Programmatic decisions determining strategy should evoke cries of heresy; nevertheless, this occurs all too frequently. MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS (MPS)- SERVICE PERSPECTIVES Naval forces comprised of Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) and Marine Expeditionary Units, Special Operations Capable (MEU[SOC]) maintain continuous deployments in both the Atlantic and Pacific. These forces spearhead larger Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) and supporting carrier battle forces (CBFs). Although CVBGs and MEUs often operate independently, they unite when a crisis occurs. Together, they provide a flexible and credible forcible-entry capability for the National Command Authorities (NCA). The amphibious ships necessary to conduct a regional stability strategy are augmented by MPS, a capability successfully demonstrated during the critical early days of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Thirteen ships, organized into three squadrons, (each providing the ground equipment for a MEB of approximately 16,500 men), are continuously forward deployed -- two in the Pacific and one in the Atlantic. These MPS squadrons are combined with the fly-in echelon of a brigade-sized Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) and a Naval Support Element (NSE) to create a balanced, sustainable, credible MAGTF. MPFs are designed to complement the amphibious forcible-entry capability, not replace it. The demonstrated utility of maritime prepositioning during the war with Iraq, coupled with a growing impetus for a smaller military has given rise to a broadened interest in this deployment option. This should come as no surprise as MPS appears to hold something for just about everyone. Congress, recognizing the shortfall in our nation's strategic sealift, has recently increased appropriations for fast sealift and maritime prepositioning ships. Strategic sealift is not only a less expensive alternative than strategic airlift, it assists the country's ailing ship building industry. The Navy views an increase in prepositioning squadrons as a less costly alternative to maintaining and operating existing amphibious ships or buying fast sealift. But this position may be shortsighted. As the 600-ship Navy sails even further over the horizon, the Navy appears determined to protect CVBGs, the core of their power projection capability, at the expense of amphibious lift. Unfortunately, this decision comes just as the majority of the existing fleet of amphibious ships are projected to reach the end of their useful life (between FY96 and FY08). However, since MAGTFs typically rely on CVBGs to provide air support, the Navy would better serve the nation by supporting the need to maintain a robust and capable amphibious fleet capable of executing a reinforcing/power projection strategy. This operationally supports and protects these very same carrier battle groups the Navy wants to retain. The Army must contend with a dramatic increase in lift requirements as they increase the mobility and firepower of their forces. The redistribution of corps truck assets and assault helicopters to the division level will certainly increase the shipping required to transport Army contingency forces. The Army views maritime prepositioning as an opportunity to forward deploy at least one Armored- Mechanized Brigade outside of Europe. But they prefer fast sealift for the remainder of their contingency forces. The Air Force would probably support an increase in maritime prepositioning over fast sealift for the Army, if they perceive they would garner a larger share of the strategic lift budget. The enormous cost of the C-17 transport program demands that the Air Force aggressively pursue the maximum in strategic lift funding. Simultaneously, they are likely to support alternative programs (such as maritime prepositioning) that do not directly compete with strategic airlift funding. The Service one might expect to be the most ardent backer of an increase in MPS -- the Marine Corps -- is actually the least enthusiastic. The reason for this is simple. As the nation's premier expeditionary force-in- readiness, the Marine Corps has long championed a global forcible-entry capability (i.e., amphibious ships) and views any attempt to reduce this capability as contrary to U.S. national interests. Amphibious ships and MPS ships both provide sealift, but only amphibious ships and trained amphibious forces can provide a forcible-entry option to the NCA. Unlike fast sealift ships assigned to transport heavy Army units, MPS squadrons require no port facility. And for this reason the superb performance of the three MPS squadrons during the Gulf War must be viewed in context. Prior to the crisis, the U.S. spent ten years negotiating host nation support agreements. Billions of dollars were spent building airfield and port facilities in the Persian Gulf. The foresight-and determination to improve the infrastructure in the Gulf Region considerably enhanced the Marines' ability to off-load equipment and organize for combat. Similar supporting infrastructure may be unavailable during the next conflict. ALTERNATIVES What, then, is the best expeditionary force mix to meet the operational requirements of two simultaneous, regional crises? First, let's examine the current Marine expeditionary capability of three MPF MEBs and three amphibious MEBs (3x3 mix). Next, we'll evaluate the expeditionary utility of four MPF MEBs and two amphibious MEBs (4x2 mix). Finally, we'll look at the Army's proposal to use in an expeditionary role the 18th Airborne Corps (comprised of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Air- Assault Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Mechanized Division and either the 10th Mountain Division or 7th Infantry Division). The ability of these various alternatives to successfully execute the crisis response mission in the emerging strategic environment bears closer examination. FORCE MISSION FOCUS Let's briefly review deployment and employment focus of the three alternatives before evaluating their utility to contribute to the national military capability. Before we begin, one note of explanation. The use of MEBs as a basis for comparison is primarily for understanding and clarity. Although the Marine Corps has begun embedding its MEB headquarters into the MEF headquarters at the recommendation of a recent Force Structure Planning Group, the MEB is still a logical and convenient unit of measure for comparison. The amphibious MEB trains with, organizes for, and deploys primarily via amphibious shipping. It is a fully sustainable, forcible entry MAGTF with full aviation and logistics packages capable of fighting across the spectrum of conflict. When accompanied by a CVBG, it requires no basing or overflight support/rights in the initial stages of a campaign. The MPF MEB combines forward deployed ships containing equipment and supplies with the rapid airlift of associated forces. These two elements need a tactically secure location to marry up and organize for combat. Once completely constituted, MPF MEBs are fully sustainable, mechanized-oriented MAGTFs with full aviation and logistics packages capable of fighting at all intensity levels. Army contingency forces deploy initially by strategic airlift with limited tactical mobility and minimal mechanized capability. The focus is on light infantry and limited rotary aviation capability. With only limited logistical assets, they are designed to operate independently for only a very short time. While their initial focus is low level conflict, they are capable of fighting in mid- and high intensity environments with follow-on heavy combat, combat support, and combat service support. Army contingency forces are designed to fight as elements of an Army corps with fixed-wing Air Force tactical fighter support. Individual divisions are not equipped to operate independently from the corps headquarters and Corps Support Command (COSCOM) for extended periods of time. EVALUATION CRITERIA The utility of the each force mix can best be evaluated by comparing the capabilities required in a crisis response regional stability strategy. Those criteria not defined in JCS PUB 1-02 are my own. In order of precedence the capabilities and characteristics I deem most critical are: * Expeditionary Capability --- Ability to rapidly task organize and deploy the required force mix necessary to accomplish the mission and provide the base for follow-on forces. * Forcible-entry Capability --- Ability to land in the face of resistance. * Sustainability --- The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. * Balance --- Capability to fight across the full spectrum of conflict. * Responsiveness --- Ability to achieve rapid closure to a crisis area. * Readiness --- The ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to deploy or employ without unacceptable delays). * Flexibility --- Capability to respond to changing missions or threats enroute to or at the final objective .5 COMPARISON Amphibious MEB. The amphibious MEB provides the greatest level of expeditionary capability. Task organized with elements forward-deployed, amphibious MEBs possess a full range of combat capability and are doctrinally designed to provide the base for larger follow-on forces. They have the necessary command and control capability to interface with the NCA, joint, or allied commands. Amphibious MEBs are fully capable of forcible-entry. The mobility inherent in an amphibious task force, combined with over-the-horizon tactics and deception operations, allows the operational commander to choose the most advantageous place to attack. Organic fixed-wing attack aircraft, along with accompanying carrier battle and surface action groups, provide significant mobile, sea-based air combat power. Amphibious MEBs deploy with a full 30 days of all classes of supply. Organic combat service support can provide all six functions of logistics. This built-in sustainability can be further augmented by resupply from fleet, host nation, or other sources within the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). Amphibious MEBs are trained and equipped to fight at all levels of conflict. They possess limited special operations capability and are frequently the only forces available in a rapidly developing crisis. Additionally, they can provide disaster relief and nation-building services such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Iraq or Operation SEA ANGEL in the Philippines. Amphibious MEBs are tactically loaded and combat capable upon embarkation. MAGTF elements are spread-loaded throughout the task force to enhance survivability and promote cohesiveness. Extensive integrated pre-deployment work-ups ensure capabilities are practiced and certified. The continuous forward deployment of amphibious MAGTFs (normally MEUs) reduces transit time to a crisis area. The quick arrival of U.S. forces was demonstrated during Operation EASTERN EXIT (Somalia 1991) when noncombatant evacuation was completed in only three days.6 Closure of the entire MEB is dependent on the speed of the amphibious ready group (ARG) and transit distance to the AOA. Marine Expeditionary Brigades designated to deploy aboard amphibious ships maintain a high level of readiness and proficiency. Specialized training packages include amphibious, jungle, mountain, desert, and military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). Elements of the brigade not already forward deployed are maintained on a 24-hour alert with the remainder of the MEB available in 72 hours. The inherent flexibility of amphibious MEBs is never more apparent than in a rapidly developing crisis. As more information becomes available, operational staffs modify and discard various options under consideration, even while forces are enroute to the crisis area. The requirement to shift the objective or location of the attack or coordinate with allied forces can be accommodated by an amphibious task force. Also, the unique ability of amphibious ships to loiter in the vicinity of a crisis and provide tangible evidence of U.S. resolve can wholly avert the need for force or allow additional time to achieve coalition or national consensus. MPF MEB. The MPF MEB is also expeditionary, incorporates the ability to receive follow-on forces, and can be task-organized by using Deterrent Force Modules and Crisis Action Modules. These modules are tailored for different contingencies and force levels. Therefore, the entire MEB's complement of equipment need not be off-loaded -- only the portion required immediately. MPF MEBs have no forcible-entry capability and must rely upon other forces to secure or establish a protected area in which to off-load and prepare for combat. Security of the MPS, strategic airlift resources, tactical aircraft, and areas within and surrounding the arrival and assembly area are crucial for this strategic deployment option.7 The MPF MEB is identical to an amphibious MEB in its sustainability -- it also carries 30 days of supply. However, one additional consideration is the sustainability of the MPS vessels themselves. The extended operating schedule of the three MPS squadrons requires extensive in- port maintenance for the ships. In fact, when the squadron at Diego Garcia was activated for Operation DESERT SHIELD, two of the ships were initially unavailable because they were enroute to or in port for maintenance. MPF MEBs are similar to their amphibious counterparts in their ability to fight across the spectrum of conflict after prepositioning ships and air lifted forces join. However, they are slightly larger than amphibious MEBs and normally possess more armor capability. Additionally, MPF MEBs are ideally suited for disaster relief or nation building operations. Currently, three MPS squadrons are forward deployed to reduce closure time to likely employment areas. Assuming adequate Military Airlift Command (MAC) support, MPF MEBs can be operationally ready within ten days of MPS squadron arrival. (During Operation DESERT SHIELD, the first MPF MEB was combat capable in even less time.) Like their amphibious counterparts, MEBs associated with MPS squadrons maintain a high level of readiness and proficiency. Specialized training packages include amphibious, jungle, mountain, desert, and MOUT. In addition, MPF MEBs train with their assigned MPS squadron to practice off-loading equipment and supplies while simultaneously maintaining and replacing selected equipment. Like amphibious MEBs, MPF MEBs maintain air contingency MAGTFs on a 24-hour alert. MPS squadrons also have some inherent flexibility in diverting to higher priority missions, moving closer to intended operating areas while refining employment options, or entering safer ports of debarkation as the situation develops. Army Contingency Forces. Army contingency forces are able to rapidly deploy task-organized light forces using strategic airlift and sealift. The lead elements of these contingency forces -- airborne and air-assault divisions -- possess limited combined arms capability and are best suited to low level conflicts. The 82nd Airborne Division and 101st Air-Assault Division normally deploy using strategic airlift and may arrive much sooner than the heavy corps elements. However, the lead elements of the Army's contingency forces have been described as "light enough to get there quickly and light enough to get in trouble".8 Airborne and air-assault units and other Army contingency forces have virtually no forcible-entry capability. Airborne forces must find secure drop zones or lightly defended areas or risk heavy casualties. Many Army casualties in Grenada resulted from airborne forces being exposed to ground fire in and around the primary drop zones. The 82nd and 101st Divisions normally deploy with approximately three days of supply. However, consumption rates will vary depending on geography, climate and combat intensity. The initial deployment to Saudi Arabia of the 82nd and 101st Divisions during Operation DESERT SHIELD is a recent example of the pitfalls of introducing light Army contingency forces into a hostile environment far from their supply source. These units were almost immediately dependent upon host nation and U.S. Marine support for water and other basics. Their resupply requirements were approximately 44 metric tons per day, or 20 C-141 aircraft sorties, at a time when strategic lift aircraft were needed elsewhere to move reinforcing or follow-on forces. Army contingency forces are capable of fighting throughout the spectrum of conflict. Light elements are well suited for low intensity conflict or crisis response. However, they lack the ability to defeat the mechanized and armored forces likely in mid- and high level combat operations, without the corps' heavy divisions. The rapid proliferation of armor, mechanized, and tactical air forces in the Third World increases the danger to light crisis response forces. Army contingency forces have varying degrees of responsiveness. The light forces capable of deploying primarily by strategic airlift can react to a crisis within days. But heavy elements of the corps, deploying primarily by fast sealift, normally take weeks. The gap in arrival times between the light and heavy elements of the corps poses a dilemma for U.S. planners and an opportunity for opponents. Army contingency forces also have varying degrees of readiness and proficiency. The 82nd and 101st Divisions maintain a ready brigade on 18-hour alert. The 10th Mountain Division or 7th Infantry Division are combat capable within six days of initial tasking, given adequate MAC availability. Heavy units such as the 24th Mechanized, 1st Cavalry, and 18th COSCOM presently do not maintain elements in an alert status and would require more time to begin deploying. Army contingency forces conduct training in MOUT, jungle, mountain and desert warfare. Additionally, the 82nd Airborne Division is parachute qualified. Although the Army conducts amphibious training, they are not organized or equipped for an amphibious mission. Nor is there a maritime prepositioning ethos associated with the Army. Army contingency forces deploying by strategic airlift lack the flexibility inherent in the amphibious deployment option. They have little or no flexibility to divert, loiter or provide presence in a crisis situation. Additionally, they are ill-suited for demonstrating U.S. resolve short of their actual introduction on foreign soil. FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS New programs are certain to be closely scrutinized in this era of fiscal constraint. Any proposal to add an additional MPS set, modernize or replace our amphibious ships, or buy additional fast sealift must be evaluated against future threats and required military capabilities. While the cost of adding a fourth MPF squadron and associated equipment brings fiscal perspective, a detailed fiscal analysis of each alternative is beyond the scope of this paper. Modifications to the current expeditionary force mix would have substantial financial costs. For example, start-up costs in FY84 for a four-ship MPS squadron were $1.2 billion. This includes an average of $175 million per ship for construction and activation under long-term charter, and approximately $465 million for equipment and supplies. Annual operating costs in FY90 were approximately $175 million. Operation and maintenance (O&M,N) was $24 million per ship, and (O&M,MC) for maintenance cycles, exercises, etc., was $79 million per MPS squadron. Many ground systems (tanks, assault amphibian vehicles, light armored vehicles, etc.) have been enhanced or replaced since they where purchased for the first three MPS squadrons. Therefore, the cost to obtain equipment and supplies to load a fourth MPS set would be significantly higher without accounting for inflation. In addition, as the nation's shipyards decline, construction costs for U.S.- built ships continue to outpace inflation. Cost escalator calculations suggest a four-ship MPS set loaded with the most recent equipment and supplies would cost approximately $1.9 billion dollars today.9 The cost to maintain and modernize our existing amphibious capability will also be considerable. However, forward deployments, presence, and when necessary, forcible- entry expeditionary forces provide tangible evidence of U.S. deterrence and resolve. Neither maritime prepositioning nor fast sealift can fulfill this integral part of our national military strategy. The cost to restructure the Army's contingency forces to make them tactically mobile, sustainable, combined arms forces would be enormous and the requirement for fast sealift would still remain. EVALUATION SUMMARY The current Marine Corps configuration of three amphibious MEBs and three MPF MEBs (3x3 mix) comes closest to meeting the strategic requirement of a two-ocean regional response capability. The three amphibious MEBs provide the essential element of forcible-entry lacking in the other alternatives. Though falling short of current operational requirements, it provides the greatest offensive power projection capability. The three MPS squadrons provide a rapid, sustainable, and global response capability while significantly reducing strategic lift requirements. The MPS portion of the 3x3 configuration was validated during Operation DESERT SHIELD by providing the first heavy, sustainable, ground combat units in theater. The 4x2 alternative provides an additional MPS set at the expense of amphibious ships, but significantly decreases forcible-entry crisis response capability. If the decline in amphibious ship building continues at the current pace, estimates suggest the Marine Corps will rely on MPS for 60% of its lift capability by the end of the decade. This estimate does not include a fourth MPS set! The loss of 1/3 of the nation's forcible-entry capability seems costly when measured against the gain in prepositioning capability. Any decrement in amphibious assault lift would be imprudent in an era of rising regional instability and declining forward basing. The Army's contingency forces provide the lowest level of expeditionary capability of the three alternatives. Although capable of crisis response, Army contingency forces lack a substantial forcible-entry capability. Additionally, the light divisions lack the firepower, mobility, and sustainability for many situations in which the entire corps is not required. Finally, Army contingency forces lack the close, intermediate, and deep air support MAGTFs possess with their organic aviation assets. Army contingency forces require Air Force tactical air support in almost any crisis scenario. CONCLUSION The current force mix of three amphibious MEBs and three MPF MEBs (3x3 mix) comes closest to providing the capability necessary to implement the future national military strategy. It provides a global, sustainable, sea-based, forcible-entry capability. Adding an additional MPS set at the expense of amphibious lift would reduce flexibility, responsiveness, and ultimately deterrence. In fact, the requirement for a modern and sufficient amphibious capability is clearly increasing. Restructuring Army contingency forces to increase their tactical mobility, sustainability, and expeditionary capability, would duplicate an existing capability (MAGTFs) and overlook their contribution as part of the nation's heavy land force. Additionally, the requirement to dramatically increase fast sealift capability would remain. Airlifted Army contingency forces are not capable of forcible-entry and have little or no flexibility to divert, loiter or provide presence in a crisis situation. They lack sustainability and tactical mobility, and are vulnerable without their heavy follow-on forces. The heavy Army contingency forces take weeks to deploy and require a large percentage of the nation's strategic sealift. Finally, they are ill-suited for demonstrating U.S. resolve short of their actual introduction on foreign soil. To execute a stability strategy, the United States needs forces capable of global crisis response. The unpredictability of where, when, and against whom U.S. forces may be used demands a balanced capability. The operational requirements of this strategy dictate the military possess a combination of amphibious forces, contingency forces, and follow-on forces. As Maritime Prepositioning Ship capability complements amphibious capability -- amphibious forces complement contingency forces. The U.S. must, therefore, continue to modernize and replace amphibious ships to achieve the strategic operational requirement of lifting the assault echelon of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades. The United States must preserve the ability to influence world events affecting its vital interests. A credible amphibious capability is an integral aspect of that ability. ENDNOTES 1. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992, p. vii. 2. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992, p. 3. 3. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992, pp. 70-71. 4. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and Conqress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992, p. 77. 5. Colin Powell, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1989, p. 228. 6. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992, p. 120. 7. OH 1-5, Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations, MCCDC Quantico, 1990, p. 7 8. Major General John Sheehan, USMC, Washington Post Interview, May 12, 1989. 9. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Gerlaugh, USMC, Plans, Policy, and Operations Department, HQMC. Interview with Major Richard Christie April 10, 1990. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Cheney, Dick. Annual Report to the Congress February 1992. 2. Gerlaugh, Lt. Col. Robert. Interview With Maj. R. Christie April 1990. 3. OH 1-5, Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations, MCCDC Quantico, VA 1990. 4. Powell, Gen. Colin. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms December 1989.
