Drug Epidemic Not War CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy EXCUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Drug Epidemic Not War Author: Major William L. Burnham, United States Army Thesis: The Drug war is not a war as we know it; it is a human tragedy based on greed, vice and poverty that is not open to military solution. The ever-increasing pressure for the military to do more in the drug war is a recipe for disaster. Background: The drug problem continues to be an emotional and political issue, but not a true first priority for this administration. In spite of this, the pressures for increased direct military involvement are growing. In frustration the military may get thrown headlong into the problem, yet the nature of the drug problem does not lend itself to a military solution. On the contrary, the military can only provide a limited supporting role in any realistic solution to the drug epidemic. The current strategy has emphasized supply reduction, and it has failed. The global economic nature of drug production ensures that, short of world mobilization against drug production, supply reduction strategy is doomed to continued failure. An overwhelming number of countries are in desperate need of capital to feed and house their people. These countries are searching for any way to make money. This creates overwhelming geographic and operational security problems for any military solution. Conclusion: The military can be successful in selected in selected supporting roles. This will only be possible after the required emphasis is given to the problem by the current Administration. Drug Epidemic Not War "Outline" The problem is the "Drug War" is not a war as we know it; it is a human tragedy based on greed, vice and poverty that is not open to military solution. I. Global complex economic based problem A. Basis for majority of violent crime B. Profit ideology C. World economies are desperate 1. Venezuela 2. Peru 3. Colombia II. Global production base expansion A. Trade barriers and open markets B. International consortium III. Corrupt or ineffective bureaucratic governments A. Colombia B. Suriname C. Mexico IV. Doomed military strategy A. Operational security b. Untargetable features C. Nonmilitary nature D. Supply and demand Drug Epidemic Not War by Major William L. Burnham, United States Army "The first, the greatest and most critical decision upon which the Statesman and the General have to exercise their judgment is to determine the nature of the war, to be sure they do not mistake it for something nor seek to make of it something which from its inherent conditions it can never be." -General Carl Von Clausewitz The "Drug War" is a misnomer that could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The current Administration and Congress are continuing to increase their rhetoric on military solutions to a nonmilitary problem. Everyone wants the military to do more in the "Drug War." The problem is the "Drug War" is not a war as we know it; it is a human tragedy based on greed, vice and poverty that is not open to military solution. As the quotation from Clausewitz points out, the most important question that must be answered, before settling on military solutions, is what is the nature of the conflict? Clausewitz's warning is clear: do not attempt to impose a military solution on a nonmilitary problem! This is still a current and valid caution, as our experience in Vietnam showed. The Administration's frustration, and a political need to show progress in the drug war, is again putting pressure on the military to get involved in an arena that is clearly beyond its scope. It is understandable why there is so much pressure to find anything that will help with the drug problem. Depending on which set of statistics we care to use, seventy-five to eighty-five percent of violent crime in the United States is either directly or indirectly related to drugs. Gangs are on the rise and directly tied to the drug trade. According to The Congressional Quarterly, only ten U.S. cities had serious gang problems a decade ago, but gangs now operate in 125 cities. The crime, violence and human suffering associated with drugs is appalling. There is good reason to be concerned about drugs as a National Security Issue; however, that doesn't mean incremental increases of everything is a good idea. The very fact that the drug problem is such an emotional issue is cause for caution. The frustration and fear created by the drug problem produce pressures to strike back in whatever manner we can. We must, however, carefully consider the effects of U.S. Military involvement both at home and abroad before we act. The drug problem is not like any war we have been involved in. The drug problem is not a conflict of state against state, communist ideology, or classical insurgency. The drug problem is a problem of crime, and crime is not a problem that can be dealt with adequately, or even substantially, by a conventional military. The drug cartels do not profess an ideology per se, let alone one that is vulnerable to military operations. If there is an ideology, it is one of pure profit. The Cartel's success is driven by greed, corruption, addiction and survival. The amount of money involved is staggering. The low estimates for the world drug trade is $500 billion dollars a year. That is substantially more than the GNP of most nation states. In 1989 the total gross national product for Colombia was only $40 Billion dollars, and Colombia is one of the wealthiest countries in all of Central and South America. This is a good indication of the type of political power and influence the Cartel can wield. This kind of criminal activity is not militarily vulnerable, especially when it injects wealth into a poverty ridden country. What we are talking about is a criminal enterprise that, provides the only means of survival for a whole section of the globe that is living in absolute poverty. What chance do we have to influence a campesino who cannot make enough from growing a legal crop to feed his family? The situation is not getting better. Major portions of the globe are in economic dispair. In Peru wages have dropped by over 60% since 1987. Inflation has been running 7,500%. 80% of the population is underemployed and 22 million people are living in absolute poverty.(22) The Peruvian Government--even with American aid--has been unable to come up with any viable crop substitution plan for tens of thousands of peasant growers, currently growing coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Counter drug operations have been so unsuccessful that coca cultivation is expanding into the Apurimac and Ene River Valleys, despite all the rhetoric about counter-drug successes. (21) Venezuela has been one of Latin America's most stable and wealthy countries; however, its government has just been subjected to a rash of Coup attempts. There has been a 100% rise in food prices and the inflation rate is running at 89%. Compared with Peru, Venezuela is an icon of economic stability, but by US standards it is in serious trouble. Several of Venezuela's more prominent leaders are under investigation for corruption and possible links to the Drug Cartel. The Cartel appears to be taking advantage of the deteriorating situation by expanding its operations into Venezuela. (6) As the quality of life drops to the point of a survival issue, it is not hard to find willing participants for any enterprise that will put food on the table or buy medicine for a sick child. In Colombia the unemployment rate in some areas is 60%, and there is no prospect on the horizon for any improvement. In areas like Medellin, daily life is a true struggle for survival of the fittest and most ruthless. Medellin, a modern-looking city with a population of 1.8 million, experiences an average of 23 murders a day, more than 7,500 a year.(7) That is an average of 416 homicides per 100,000. The US average is 12 homicides per 100,000 population. The Washington, D.C., (Murder Capital of the U.S.) homicide rate averages 80 per 100,000 for a total of 483 homicides last year.(11) When we compare the two, Medellin makes Washington, D.C., look like Mayberry RFD. The normal life situation of the average citizen in the less developed countries of the world--which are the majority of the countries of the world--is difficult for the average US citizen to comprehend. The majority of the U.S. population is not in a survival situation and we have social support mechanisms, limited as they are, for those who are. This is not the ease for the average citizen of the more prominent drug-producing countries. Most barely survive day to day. They have few options and less hope. Add to this situation the fact that the Cali Cartel is estimated to send $50,000,000 dollars a month home to Colombia, from its dealings in New York City alone, and it is not hard to understand why there are no shortage of volunteers for the ranks of the Cartel, regardless of how dangerous it gets.(14) As long as there is a demand, and a profit can be made, there will be recruits, because there is no alternate employer. Even if we could apply enough pressure in one area, the process would just move to the next impoverished area. Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Bolivia are just a few of the prominent drug producing countries in Central and South America. The list is as long and distinguished from Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The probable trouble spots are anywhere the economy is in trouble and the standard of living is dropping. That pretty much covers the Globe, and there is no evidence the drug sphere of influence is getting any smaller. Revelations disclosed during the Manual Noriega trail point to a huge worldwide organized drug consortium of cartels that may be the biggest crime organization in history. The trial has brought to light links between the Drug Cartel and $10,000,000 payments to Nicaragua; deals with Raul Castro, Cuban Defense Minister and brother of Fidel, to allow shipments through Cuba; the use of Costa Rican ranchers and ranches to ship drugs, and on and on.(17) When we add to this thriving international drug market the current economic pressures to expand legal markets, the situation can only get worse. The pressure the U.S. Government is exerting on Latin American Nations to open up their markets is only one example. Colombian officials are saying that their compliance with the US request to open up their commercial markets has made it easier for the Drug Cartel to internationalize and bring their profits home to Colombia.(10). The opening of the legal barriers to trade has made it easier for the Cartel to react to pressure and shift its efforts to other areas of Colombia or to other South American countries. According to "Washington Post" articles, the Drug Cartel is currently making inroads in Suriname (GNP 200 million) and Venezuela (GNP 62 Billion). The articles indicate that there has been no slowing of the Cartel by international antidrug efforts. In fact, it appears the Cartel is currently expanding internationally into the heroin trade, and members are also receiving training from British and Israeli mercenaries. (9) The international expansion appears to be taking place in every market. In June 1991, 1285 pounds of high grade "China White" heroin was seized in California. It was being smuggled by a "legitimate" corporation owned by Tiawanese nationals. This has prompted a wave of new concerns about a large Chinese heroin trade blossoming. (16) The sheer magnitude of the environment that drug production can flourish in should make a military solution suspect. We cannot occupy every Latin American, Asian, Middle Eastern or African Country. We certainly cannot solve their economic problems, considering the difficulty we have with our own. It is unrealistic to expect the U.S. Military to cope with such a monetarily driven global problem. Even if the problem could somehow be isolated into a reasonable size, the foreign bureaucracies that would be involved in combined operations would make success doubtful. Military operations overseas, unless the U.S. is willing to act unilaterally (highly unlikely with today's politics), require the complete coordination and cooperation of the host nation. In the case of Latin American Governments, most are very rigid, extremely territorial and much more bureaucratic than our own. Graft is often an accepted way of life. This makes it virtually impossible to guarantee operational security. The U.S. press is never short of articles about U.S. Law Enforcement Officials who are under investigation for corruption in drug-related cases. If we cannot guarantee our own officials' honesty, what chance do we have in monitoring foreign officials in their own country? As was pointed out earlier, the amount of money the cartel can wield, the limited options available to most people for legitimate wealth, and the chaotic international environment for criminal investigation make a powerful force for corruption. This is an extremely dangerous environment for military operations that require operational security as a paramount ingredient for survival and success. It is impossible to be sure who or what we are dealing with. There are no shortage of cases which illuminate the danger. Tn Suriname, Lt. Col. Deis Bouterse, a former sergeant until he seized power during a coup in 1980, is reportedly allowing his country to become a major narcotics center. He appears to be allowing large-scale permanent cocaine laboratories to be established in Suriname. He is also reportedly providing safe haven and army protection for Cartel members.(8) In Peru, during September 1991, Peruvian Government Soldiers, supposedly protecting drug traffickers, fired on DEA helicopters in the Upper Huallaga Valley. (21) On 7 November, 1991, at an airstrip in Vera Cruz Mexico, Mexican Army Soldiers shot dead seven Mexican Counter Narcotics Agents, but allowed the drug traffickers the agents were following to escape. The smugglers had landed a few minutes before the plane carrying the Agents. The drug smugglers escaped without being fired upon even though the army reported it had been waiting in ambush for airplanes to land. The airplanes landed at approximately 6:50 a.m. with the Agents being taken under fire shortly thereafter. The gents reportedly weren't killed until after General Alfredo Moran arrived on the scene, at approximately 8:30 a.m., and ordered his men to sweep the area. The General reportedly ordered this sweep after he had been notified--three times by the Mexican Attorney General's Office--he was engaging Mexican Drug Agents. The General is reportedly under investgation by Mexican Authorities. (3) Don Pedro Orozco, a very well-to-do Mexican businessman and rancher, was gunned down by men firing M-60 machine guns near his horse ranch. Don Orozco was a prominent figure, well known for making frequent political contributions. He numbered among his friends the Governor, Mayor, State Police Chiefk and leaders of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. It turns out that after his death, Orozco was identified as Manuel Salcido Uzueta, known as El Cochiloco (The Mad Pig), one of the most notorious Mexican kingpins in the Mexican drug trade. (3) Dancleny Munoy was arrested in the U.S. for carrying false immigration paperwork. In Colombia he is believed to be the top hit-man for Pablo Escobar. He is reportedly responsible for the assassination of over 40 Colombian Police Officers and two bombings. One of the bombs destroyed an Avionca Jet and killed 107 people, the other was a car bomb that killed 65 people. He has escaped from Colombian jails twice. He escaped once by using a helicopter, and the other time by bribing his guards with a reported $800,000 (U.S.) dollars. Even though the U.S. Government is able to hold him only on minor immigration charges, the Colombians reprotedly don't want him back--they say they can't hold him! (13) The President of Colombia himself, Cesar Gavirea, is coming under pressure for failure to launch an investigation into charges that the drug barons are bribing members of the Colombian Congress. Gavirea has reportedly been in possession, for quite some time, of a video that shows a lawyer for Pablo Escobar bribing a Congressman to vote to ban the Extradition of drug barons to the U.S. He has taken no action to date; however, and this has cast suspicion over the President and the Congressional Assembly. It also calls into serious question the reasons behind the Assembly calling for General Elections three years ahead of schedule. In the meantime the Assembly took advantage of this period to re-write the Colombian Constitution to ban the extradition of drug barons to the U.S., among other things. (5) Jose Cabrera, a jailed leader of the Medellin Cartel, testified during the Noriega case that the Cartel contributes heavily to the Colombian Presidential Campaigns and to Colombian Congressional leaders. (5) Carlos Lehder, another jailed Cartel member, also testified that the Cartel had not trouble getting detailed information on DEA agents and counter-drug operations. The most notable supplier of this information was Noriega himself, who reportedly supplied the Cartel with the names and pictures of all the DEA agents working in Panama. (18) These episodes are just the tip of the iceberg, but they are enough to form a clear picture. They point to the almost impossible job of providing operational security for combined counter-drug operations. It is apparent that the nature of the drug problem is enormous and complex. The factors affecting the drug trade would seem to not lend themselves to a military solution, even if we could all agree to pursue one. The drug problem is simply not a militarily solvable conflict. There is no sovereignty dispute to act on. There are no overt military forces taking the field of battle. The main enemy force wears business suits and lives in the major cities. It is impossible to identify a "narco-soldier" from a friendly citizen without someone pointing him out and, as previously discussed, we would do well to evaluate the motives of the person doing the pointing. The drug problem also does not fit the normal framework of an insurgency. The drug lords do not seek to overthrow the civil government; they seek to control it. The drug lords buy the influence they need. They use their money to support candidates, bribe officials and lobby to change constitutional laws to their advantage. The Drug Lords purposely refrain from any overt threat to the sovereignty of the host nation. Their method is insidious and, therefore, not vulnerable to military counter measures. It is obvious that drugs are a world problem and any successful effort must take a multidimensional, coordinated world view. Unfortunately, that is not the way things are proceeding. So far, most of the effort has been directed at counter-supply operations. For the most part, it appears to be uncoordinated at the strategic and operational level. Most agencies are pretty much independent in their planning and operational execution. Even the Commanders In Chief (CINCs) of the Unified and Specified Commands are coming up with their own Counter Drug Campaign Plans."(23) Since there is no overall strategy, these campaigns will amount to tactical engagements at best. There is a definite need for a single "Department," at the National Security Counsel level, to take "command" of the total strategy. Although the "Drug Czar" position was created to do this, it has proven ineffective. The "Drug Czar" concept has proven to be lacking in both domestic and international expertise and the political clout to deal with the drug problem. The resignation of the first "Drug Czar," and the latest statistics showing an increase in US drug use, demonstrate this failure. The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) shows a 15% increase in cocaine-related incidents and a 13% increase in heroin-related incidents. In the beginning, when the figures were favorable, the Administration used to proudly point to the DAWN statistics as a measure of success. However, now that the statistics have turned around, showing an anti-drug policy failure, no one in the Administration is citing them.(19) A State Department report, cited in the Washington Post, reports that Opium Production is up by eight%. The same report reveals that our successful poppy eradication effort in Mexico has pushed poppy production into Guatemala were it has doubled. The article also quotes Mark Kleiman, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, as saying, "So much in so many places makes crop control irrelevant." (20) This same State Department report indicates that there has been no noticeable difference in the volume of money laundering or drug trans-shipments in Panama since the Noriega Government was replaced over a year ago. It further cites this as proof that the Drug Cartel is well financed and able to adapt to whatever pressures we manage to produce. Another "Washington Post" article quotes Stanley E. Morris, 1989-1991 Deputy Director Supply Reduction, White House Office of National Drug Control Policy as saying,"There is no indication that there is less cocaine coming out of South America. Indeed there is such a surplus that they are pursuing new markets in Europe because they have saturated the U.S. market . . . We have only managed to push the market around a little." The increase in production is attributed to the Cartel's ability to adapt and move facilities into Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and Central America. White House estimates put cocaine production last year at 900 metric tons. That is twice the 1988 estimate. A European estimate due out from the European Community puts the estimate at 1100 metric tons. (12) Another reason cited for the production increase is the advances in high technology that the Cartel has made. The Cartel has developed the technology to eliminate a step in the process of making cocaine: it is no longer necessary to turn the coca leaf into a gooey paste before converting it into coca base, This has eliminated the need for large labs. The Cartel has also developed a technique to store the coca base as a liquid solution, known as "agua rica," making it much easier to hide and extending its shelf life to two years. Unfortunately, along with the increased efficiency, this also makes the job of interdiction much harder. (12) All this is pointing at the failure of the current policy and the premise that the current policy was built on. That premise is that both supply and demand reduction could be effective. I think it is clear that supply reduction is an insurmountable task. As long as there are so many poor and exploitable countries, and the demand remains, there will be more than ample drug production. This would appear to make "demand reduction" the only logical solution, however, demand reduction has gotten none of the emphasis it deserves. The current Director of National Drug Control Policy (Drug Czar) has very little statutory authority to ensure support of the Drug Strategy. (23) What is needed is a Drug War "CINC" who has the power to direct the domestic reforms associated with demand reduction as well as all the national elements of power associated with supply reduction. We need a commander capable of directing and coordinating the full spectrum of resources from behavioral science to domestic and international economics. The CINC for the Drug War needs to be a politically powerful cabinet level member of the National Security Council. This is the minimum power level at which the political, economic, psychological, law enforcement and military elements of power can be orchestrated. All these elements of power are required to wage a domestic and international anti-drug campaign. The strategy and the campaign plan must emphasize the behavioral and environmental modifications required to change the personal mores of the drug consumer. This is the only sure way to stop the demand cycle, and I believe it is clear, the demand cycle is the center of gravity of the Drug War. As long as there is a demand for drugs it is unrealistic to assume the production of drugs can be stopped. The majority of the world is underdeveloped and impoverished, which provides fertile ground for illicit drug production. There is no realistic possibility that we can stop the production of drugs across such a vast area of the globe. Consequently, the only answer is to stop the demand at home. To stop the demand requires us to change the values, social mores and life conditions of the user. This is a tall order. As the Soviets can attest, the only way to permanently change a person's behavior through the application of military power is to either maintain a constant military force in the streets or permanently eliminate the offender. Neither of these options would be acceptable to the American public. Our own experience with prohibition leads to the same conclusion on forced human morals. Lethal force is the only way the military can permanently change a drug-user's mores. Clearly, education, social services, human development, and economic forces must take the lead. In light of the complex and immense nature of the drug problem, the first step this country must take is to get serious about solving the problem. Nothing short of making the drug problem the number-one priority will even come close to making the required assets available. The next step is to pick the correct man to lead. As stated before, he must be able to mobilize the country. He must be able to manage and direct all the required elements of national power. In addition, he must have the appropriate stature and authority to direct compliance with the National Strategy. Given the stature required and the nation-building nature of both the domestic and international problem, our only chance for success rests with the President himself. He is the only one with the required statutory power to direct the vast organizations required to do the job. He is the only one who can direct all the required agencies to support one strategy in detail. As in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, he is the only individual in our system who can energize the country and direct a unified strategy. Until the President is willing to personally take the reins and make the drug problem a true priority, we will continue with disjointed, ineffective measures. Like Desert Shield/Storm, the President doesn't need to personally run the organizations involved; that would be a mistake. He does, however, need to captain the ship of state toward the drug problem with the same vigor and intensity he showed during the Gulf War. If he would do that, the other elements/agencies of power could then be coordinated and directed by an appropriate level of command. The majority of the military's supporting role could be most effective, and least controversial, in noncombative U.S.-based functions. With the proper legislative changes, the military could provide increased intelligence support, US Border surveillance/control and customs inspection support. Currently, over 50% of all illegal drugs come through the 2,000-mile U.S. Southern Border. (22) At current manning levels, we have approximately the same number of New York City police riding the subway at any given time as we do covering this 2,000- mile border area. Currently Customs Agents can only inspect about 14% of the containers entering this country from cocaine-source countries, and a U.S. Customs Officer only has about seven seconds to decide whether or not to search a vehicle at a border crossing. (23) With legislative changes, the military could certainly be of assistance in these areas, as well as in intelligence gathering. If we are truly serious about a solution, the military could also help alleviate the overcrowding of jails. The services can provide trained personnel to set up and run confinement facilities for drug offenders. The CINCs could also provide tactical level military operations, as needed, in support of the overall nonmilitary strategic and operational - level campaign plans. These may seem like drastic and unusually serious steps toward a solution, but the point is, drugs are a drastic and unusually dangerous problem. If a solution is truly sought, this country must be willing to address it as such and take the appropriate harsh steps. Until the President is willing to make it a true number-one agenda item, instead of a "political" agenda, there is little the military can do. Unless the country is mobilized for a true drug war, military involvement will send us down the familiar and dangerous road of unclear goals and incrementalism. If we have learned anything from Vietnam, it should be that misidentifing the nature of a conflict, coupled with unclear national goals and military incrementaiism is a formula for disaster. The oft repeated, but seldom heeded, words are still true, "those who will not learn from history are destined to repeat it.." BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Brown, Dale E Maj. "Drugs on the Border," Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, XXI No. 4(Winter 1991-92), 50-59. 2. Cody, Edward. "Mexican Army Blamed For Drug Agents' Death," The Washington Post, December 7, 1991, Section A., p. 22. 3. Cody, Edward. "Mexican's Violent Death Exposes Double Life," The Washington Post, November 6, 1991, Section A., p. 33. 4. Dewar, Helen. "Crime Bill Bogged Down Amid Partisan Bickering," The Washington Post, October 6, 1991,Section A., p. 1. 5. Farah, Douglas. "Colombian Political Campaign Focuses on Drug Cartels," The Washington Post, October 26, 1991, Section A., p.18. 6. Farah, Douglas. "Austerity Plan, Economic Woes Spark Violent Protests in Venezuela, "The Washington Post, November 30, 1991,Section A., p.20. 7. Farah, Douglas. "Vigilantes Retake Slums of Medellin," The Washington Post, December 7, 1991, Section A., p.17. 8. Farah, Douglas. "Drug Traffic Shifting to Suriname," The Washington Post," November 4, 1991, Section A., p. 1. 9. Farah, Douglas. "Rival Colombian Groups Battle Over Heroin Trade," The Washington Post," January 18, 1992, Section A., p. 14. 10. Farah, Douglas. "U.S. and Colombia Target Drug Traffickers' Finances, " The Washington Post," December 31, 1991, Section A., p.1. 11. Farah, Douglas. "Violence in a District in Colombia," The Washington Post, December 9, 1991, Section A., p. 14. 12. Farah, Douglas. "Drug Summit To Convene as Supply Surges," The Washington Post, February 25, 1992, Section A. p. 1. 13. Goodstein, Laurie. "Reputed Colombian Hitman Convicted on Lesser Charges, " The Washington Post, November 27, 1991, Section A., p. 8. 14. Isikoff, Michael. "Drug Raid Nets a U.S. Leader of Cali Cartel," The Washington Post, December 7, 1991, Section A., p. 22. 15. Isikoff, Michael. "Noriega Trial Witness Says Cartel Met With Raul Castro," The Washjngtnn Post, November 27, 1991, Section A., p. 2. 18. Isikoff, Michael. "Justice Dept. Subpoenas Unaired NBC Tapes of Drug Seizure," The Washington Post, January 18, 1991, Section A. p. 3. 17. Isikoff, Michael. "Drug Cartel Gave Contras $10 Million," The Washington Post, November 26, 1991, Section A., p. 1. 18. Isikoff, Michael. "Government Gambled in Turning to Cartel Figure in Noriega Case," The Washington Post, November 24, 1991, Section A., p. 23. 19. Isikoff, Michael. "Reversing Course, Cocaine Use Indicator Is Rising," The Washington Post, October 15, 1991, Section A., p. 22. 20. Isikoff, Michael. "International Opium Production Up 8% Last Year," The Washington Post, March 1, 1992, Section A., p. 4. 21. Robinson, Eugene. "U.S. Drug Fighting Program in Peru Enormously Delayed," The Washington Post, November 24, 1991, Section A., p. 28. 22. Robinson, Eugene. "Peru's Guerrillas Pose New Threat," The Washington Post, February 16, 1992, Section A. p. 51. 23. U.S. Army. Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College. "Campaign Planning and the Drug War." Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, February 1991. 24. U.S. Army. Center For Lessons Learned. "Counterdrug Operations. "Newsletter No. 91-4, November 1991.
