Can We Afford A Marine Corps? CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA National Security EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Can We Afford A Marine Corps? Author: Major J. T. Boggs, Jr., United States Marine Corps Thesis: Do we need a Marine Corps? Can we afford a Marine Corps? Background: With the end of the Cold War and the quick victory in the Gulf War, the nation is turning its attention to a troubling economic picture. Specifically, in the area of defense the nation wonders--what is needed, and what can be afforded? In this respect, the thesis question must be asked and answered. A study of the elements of military strategy indicates a need for a force which is capable of responding to various missions ranging from combat to humanitarian. A study of the Federal Budget, and its complementary Historical Tables, indicates that the Marine Corps, to include its air wing, does not exceed 4% of the Defense Budget (the Defense Budget being 20% of the Federal Budget). Finally, a limited review of the public opinion of Marines indicates the people of the United States are in favor of keeping a Marine Corps. Recommendation: The nation can ill-afford to be without a force with the Marine Corps' capabilities at the Marine Corps' price. CAN WE AFFORD A MARINE CORPS? Outline Thesis: Do we need a Marine Corps? Can we afford a Marine Corps? I. Elements of military strategy A. Employment B. Development C. Deployment D. Employment II. The Federal Budget A. Congressional Budget Office forecast B. Gramm-Rudman impact C. National Defense Budget III. Defense on the cheap A. How much does the Corps cost? B. How does the Corps spend its allocated monies? IV. Public opinion A. Does the public want a Marine Corps? CAN WE AFFORD A MARINE CORPS? Peace in our time! With the end of the Cold War and the quick victory in the Gulf, that old cliche seems real. And so, our nation turns its eyes to more pressing matters at home, matters such as the recession, the unemployment rate and balancing the budget. The Balanced Budget Act, commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (enacted in 1988), requires a deficit of no more than $64 billion in 1991 and a balanced budget in 1993. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been directed by Congress to cut spending by $19 billion. Recognizing the requirement to cut its spending, the DOD, as well as the Marine Corps, is faced with serious decisions which will have both long and short term impact. To date, the most notable decision has been to cut current end strength numbers. (The Marine Corps spends approximately 70% of its budget on manpower, according to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991.) The Congress, according to almost daily news accounts, is not satisfied with the current levels of savings the DOD has been tasked with producing. Congress and the people of the United States are questioning DOD expenditures. What do we need? What can we afford? Two other inevitable, hard questions have yet to be asked, but need to be answered. Do we need a Marine Corps? Can we afford a Marine Corps? By examining the elements of military strategy, the federal budget, the actual expenditures of the Marine Corps and public opinion, the answers becomes readily apparent. ELEMENTS OF MILITARY STRATEGY The elements of military strategy drive the need for a specific force. They take into account the expected employment, development, deployment and coordination of the force. Employment considers where and against whom our U.S. armed forces will be expected to fight. Admittedly, the threat of heavily mechanized Soviet forces attacking on the plains and flanks of Europe no longer exists. Further, the peripheral threat of North Korea attacking South Korea, without the backing of a strong Soviet Union, is unlikely. However, peace is far from real in the Middle East (civil war), West Africa (civil war), and Haiti (coup), and quite possibly, peace is only temporary in Southwest Asia. The power vacuum created by the collapse of Soviet communism has given rise to ethnic violence on the southern flank of Europe. Our allies on the northern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Northern Europe have real concerns about their security. Strategically, they control the Soviets' Northern and Baltic Fleets access to the North Atlantic. Additionally, the never ending flow of illicit drugs from Central America, South America and the Far East is a direct assault against the United States. Clearly, our need to fight a mechanized, European-style war has changed; however, the need for the ability to react to a multitude of unrelated crises around the world remains. Development of military force considers what needs to be done and where it needs to be done. Certainly, the continued development of a large, heavily mechanized force, without the Soviet threat to Europe, is unwarranted. In view of the nation's economic troubles and the directed budget cuts, the armed forces can ill-afford the luxury of redundancy. To be sure, the Army's light infantry battalions are capable of crisis response. This, of course, would indicate that the U.S. can cut down on the end strength of the Marine Corps, or do away with the Marine Corps, cutting redundancy. However, what needs to be done and where it needs to be done may range from evacuating non-combatants, in both a permissive and non-permissive environment in West Africa, to assisting in reestablishing the lawful democratic government in Haiti, to showing the flag on NATO's northern flank. The Marine Corps is already well-suited for carrying out each of these missions. Its ability to arrive quickly, execute immediately, and depart quickly via amphibious shipping is time proven. Further, the Marine Corps' capability for forced entry, coupled with the ability to leave an area under pressure, may prove invaluable. Although Army light infantry battalions are capable of forced entry, according to Army FM 71-100, Division Operations, they are developed to be employed in conjunction with heavy forces, and by design not capable of quick departure. Deployment is driven by employment. It considers move- ment of the force, the design of the force (size, equipment characteristics, lift capability), time required, vulnerability and flexibility. Critics of current U.S. force structure have argued that forward based, integrated ground, air, naval, and amphibious units (ashore or afloat) are no longer required as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union. In light of the Balanced Budget Act, the decision to close overseas military installations seems wise. The capability of the Army's light infantry battalions to respond to crises rapidly via air assets offers an additional savings by allowing cuts to Marine manpower and the need for amphibious lift. However, the deployment of Army light infantry does not allow for flexibility nor sustainability. As seen in the Gulf War, the Combat Service Support (CSS) required to give the Army's light infantry sufficient staying power took weeks to get in country. Heavy-lift air assets, as well as very expensive commercial shipping, were required to accomplish the CSS buildup. On the other hand, the Marines' initial units came complete with their Table of Organization, its corresponding Table of Equipment and its CSS from the sea (Navy amphibious shipping). Coordination considers a balance of the previously discussed elements of military strategy as applied to the worst-case scenario versus most likely case scenario. Indeed, the worst case, war with the Soviet Union, is unlikely. The most likely case is crisis response within the Third World, e.g., Middle East or West Africa. Logically, the need for a large, heavily mechanized armed force, needing close coordination of its employment, development and deployment, is no longer required. The Marine Corps, however, gives the nation the ability to employ and deploy a viable fighting organization capable of various missions anywhere in the world. And so, the question of "need" is addressed, but can we afford a Marine Corps? THE BUDGET In order to fully understand the cost of the Marine Corps we need to have some understanding of the budget. Next to the daily new briefs on the Iraqi nuclear shell game, the most news worthy item in the mass media has been the national debt. Specifically, reducing it! The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasted that the economy will grow by almost two percent in 1990* and slightly faster this year, avoiding a recession without boosting inflation over this period.1 *CBO estimated that the Federal Budget would fall from $152 billion in fiscal year 1989 to $138 billion in 1990. Over the next few years, no further progress in reducing the deficit can be expected under current budgetary policies. The Balanced Budget Act, commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman- Hollings Act, requires a deficit of $64 billion in 1991 and a balanced budget in 1993. Without spending cuts or tax increases, the deficit in 1993 is likely to remain as high as it currently is. In 1990, the government was projected to spend $1,205 billion, an increase of about 5 1/2 percent over the previous year. Under current policies outlays continue growing at about the same rate. Outlays are projected to reach $1,555 billion in 1995. Total outlays are growing faster than inflation, but less rapidly than the gross national product. 2 * Interestingly, the CBO figures are still estimates vice actual cost at the time of this writing. Federal spending (our tax dollars) is outlayed in five major categories: 3 1989 1990 1991 National Defense 304 297 307 Non-Defense Discretionary Spending 191 205 219 Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending 544 584 624 Net Interest 169 180 185 Offsetting Receipts -64 -60 -60 TOTAL 1143 1205 1275 * All figures are billions of dollars National Defense accounts for 20% of the Federal Budget. It is dominated by activities of the Department of Defense, but also includes defense-related functions of agencies not within the Department of Defense. Two examples are the Department of Energy's Nuclear Weapons Programs and the intelligence agencies. The total budget authority for defense programs in 1990 was about $302 billion and outlays were about $297 billion. 4 The defense budget covers the myriad of activities reflected in the 1990 Department of Defense Appropriation Bill. Of the $302 billion authorized in the bill, the largest amounts were, and still are, for military personnel (manpower), approximately $79 billion; operation and maintenance (O&M), approximately $87 billion, and procurement, approximately $83 billion. Another $37 billion is for research and development. 5 Recognizing the requirements to cut spending to balance the budget, the Department of Defense (DOD), as well as the Marine Corps, is faced with serious long and short term issues. Most notable, what will be the end strength numbers for the year 2000? How will DOD meet its mandated $19 billion cut in funding (to date, DOD has cut 1 billion)? What programs/installations will be cut? How much foreign aid and to whom? Can we afford duplication of effort amongst the services? Can we afford a Marine Corps? DEFENSE ON THE CHEAP In answering the question, "can we afford a Marine Corps," we need to recall that our DOD budget is $302 billion. Of that $302 billion, the Marine Corps costs the taxpayer $9 billion or 3 percent of the DOD budget in 1990. 6 Further, over the past ten years, while the Marine Corps has cost as little as $7.28 billion in 1980, and as much as 10.65 billion in 1983, it has never significantly exceeding the three percent of the total DOD authorization. The Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1990, budgeted for the Marine Corps to expend approximately $14 billion on manpower alone. The Corps spent $5.9 billion. 7 On the surface, the easy answer to the relatively inexpensiveness of the Corps is its size. After all, it is approximately one-third the size of the Army. This does account for a lack of "overhead" spending, fewer barracks, fewer facilities, etc. Particularly noteworthy is the Corps' freedom from funding maintenance and operations of medical facilities and medical manpower issues, such as incentive pay for nurse anesthetists which all other services face. 8 Most notable is the money saved on research and development (R&D). The Corps saves hundred of thousands of dollars in this area by sharing the expense of R&D on numerous new developments with sister services, e.g., the Advanced Anti-tank Weapons System-Medium and the Pedestal Mounted Stinger, were both developed in conjunction with the U.S. Army. The few items under R&D where costs are not shared by a sister service are unique to the amphibious nature of the Corps, e.g., the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle and the V-22 Osprey, Tilt Rotor Air Plane, each of which provides the Corps the ability to enhance its ship-to- shore movement. 9 The most significant factor in the low cost of the Marine Corps is its ability to stay focused on its mission. The Corps makes no effort to become another Army or Air Force. The Table of Organization and its corresponding Table of Equipment revolves solely on its ability to come from the sea. Simply put, if it doesn't fit on ship it, doesn't go! Carried further, if it doesn't fit on ship, it isn't purchased. During an interview with Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Herkenham the Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD), Parris Island (PI) Comptroller, he pointed out that the Marine Corps treats its budget dollars as a family would treat its personal finances. The Corps does this, he points out, by "keeping things simple, buying only what is needed, maintaining Spartan standards wherever possible (as seen in any Marine Officers Club), and playing by the rules." The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps in a recent address to the Corps' Comptrollers said: "The solutions to meeting what needs to be done does not include: Give us more money." In Lieutenant General Krulak's book "First to Fight", a story from the 1930 era of the Corps finds the Army and Navy issuing enlisted men underdrawers with three buttons, the Marines' version manufactured at their Quartermaster Depot in Philadelphia, had only two because it was said to be a penny cheaper. The Marine Corps has demonstrated its ability to do it on the cheap. But, the question remains-what of public opinion? PUBLIC OPINION DO WE NEED A MARINE CORPS? The United States does not need a Marine Corps mainly because she has a fine modern Army and a vigorous Air Force. Her Army fights on the ground--on any kind of ground--and does it well. Her Air Force fights in the air and does it well too. Marines are designed to fight on the ground and in the air just like the Army and Air Force, and have no corner on skill in either place. The Marines claim to have a mystical competence in landing operations, but they really don't. There are thousands of soldiers who have been carefully trained and thoroughly drilled in amphibious matters too, and they can do anything Marines can do. And Marines aviators have no corner on tactical air operations in support of the infantry either. Our Air Force has done a lot of it, and can do it again. 10 The above comment is an excerpt from a letter of Lieutenant General Victor B. Krulak in response to the question from then Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph McC. Pate. The question? Why does the United States need a Marine Corps? Technically, Lieutenant General Krulak proves clearly that the United States does not need a Marine Corps. Technically, it can probably be proven that the country does not need a U.S. Senate. After all, there are over 400 some odd Representatives ready, willing and able to do all the legislating needed. Technically, it can probably be proven that we don't need women's suffrage. The elective processes would produce the same results whether women voted or not. These things, paraphrased from General Krulak's fine work, exist because the people of the United States want it that way. The people of this nation do not understand Maritime Prepositioning or the organization of Marine Air Ground Task Forces. But what they do understand and believe about the Marine Corps is eminently more important than technical "things." Lieutenant General Krulak points out three basic beliefs the tax paying public has about its Marine Corps. First, that when trouble comes to our country, there will be Marines, somewhere, who, through hard work, have made and kept themselves ready to do something useful about it, and do it at once. They picture Marines as "individual components of a lean, serious and professional organization." During a Gulf War television interview of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the interviewer posed a question to a ground deployed member of each of the services: What do you need? The soldier responded that it was very hot, uncomfortable and that he could use some air conditioning. The airman questioned, responded similarly and added that he could use some cold sodas. The Marine questioned said he needed nothing! The interviewer in amazement posed the question again and again received a nothing needed response. A look of concern then entered the Marine eyes. He looked up and said, "Well, I could use an extra magazine! They only issued me six and I could use an extra magazine to carry more ammo!" How else would a Marine answer. Second, the American people believe that when the Marines go to war, they invariably turn in a performance that is dramatically and decisively successful, not most of the time, but always. News headlines during the Desert War such as "Marines Outrun Obstacles" and "US Says Marines Are Ready" are testimony of the public's convictions in this regard. 11 The mere association of the word "MARINES" with a crisis is an automatic source of encouragement and confidence. Third, the American people believe that the Marine Corps as an institution is good for the manhood of our country. Further, that the Marines are masters of a form of unfailing alchemy which converts unoriented youths into proud, self-reliant, stable citizens, citizens into whose hands the nation's affairs may safely be entrusted. 12 The people of the United States want a Marine Corps. During the Desert War alone literally thousands of newspaper articles and briefs were generated expressing appreciation and testifying to the need for a continued force in readiness. 13 CONCLUSION A short two years ago the threat to our national security came from the Soviet Union and its bloc of Eastern European nations. The military strategy to counter this threat focused on containing those nations emphasizing a heavily mechanized continental force deployed to conduct a massive air-land battle over the plains of Central Europe. This mission, of course, fell on the capable shoulders of the U.S. Army and Air Force. As this paper is being written, peace continues to break out all over Central Europe. Further, a new and considerably more dangerous threat is coming from Third World nations. The varied nature of the problems in the Middle East, West Africa and South America reinforce the need for a Marine Corps. Unlike its sister services, the Marine Corps can continue to meet threats to U.S. interests with little change in its basic way of doing business. The result is a cost effective, fighting organization capable of accomplishing a myriad of taskings anywhere in the world. Do we need a Marine Corps? Yes. Can we afford a Marine Corps? We cannot afford to be without a Marine Corps. ENDNOTES 1. Headquarters Marine Corps, "Reducing the Deficit", p. 2. 2. Ibid., p. 4. 3. Ibid., p. 7. 4. Ibid. 5.Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1992. 6.Interview with LtCol Herkenham, USMC Comptroller, MCRD, PI. 7.Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1990 Calendar No. 242, p. 14. 8.National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991. 9.United States Marine Corps, Concepts and Issues, 1992, pp. 3-4 and 3-5. 10.Krulak, Victor H., "First To Fight", (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p. XIV. 11.Headquarters Marine Corps, "Desert Storm From the Battlefield to the Newsroom" pp. 217 and 273. 12.Krulak, p. XV. 13.Headquarters Marine Corps, "Desert Storm From the Battlefield to the Newsroom", pp. 1-615. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1990. 2. Budget of the United States, Historical Tables Fiscal Year 1992. 3. Congress, 101st, 1st Session, Senate, "Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1990", 14 Sep 1989. 4. Congress, 101st, 2nd Session, Senate, "National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year, 1991", 20 July 1990. 5. Krulak, Victor H. "First To Fight", Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 6. United States Army FM 71-100, "Division Operation" 7. United States Marine Corps, "Concepts and Issues, 1991". 8. United State Marine Corps, "Reducing the Deficit: An Overview", 1990.
