Will The Next War Be Like The Last One? CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: WILL THE NEXT WAR BE LIKE THE LAST ONE? Author: Major Drew A. Bennett, United States Marine Corps Thesis: There are several unique aspects of the Gulf campaign that may not hold true for the next conflict, and if we base our doctrine on these unique aspects we will be making incorrect assumptions and learning the wrong things, the false lessons. Background: The lessons of Desert Shield and Desert Storm will be used to develop our tactics, design our eguipment, structure our organization and shape our strategy. However, we must not make the mistake of fighting the last war. The lessons of the Gulf campaign must apply to our fighting capability in general and not only in a Desert Storm scenario. Six areas are examined: allies, preparation time, conflict duration, casualties, air superiority, and power projection. Each area is evaluated in the context of the Southwest Asian campaign and then in terms of how the situation may be different in a future conflict. Historical data and information concerning budget cuts and proposed force structure are used in the evaluations. In the next war we can not assume that we will be surrounded by allies, have six months preparation time to project our power ashore under ideal conditions and with the same amount of military assets. There is no guarantee that we will be able to fight a short conflict with limited casualties while controlling the skies. Our future enemies are also learning from Desert Shield and Desert Storm and they will surely work to shape the battlefield into one that favors them, not us. Recommendation: Four recommendations are offered to assist in evaluating lessons learned for future conflicts. First, don't fight the last battle. We must stress innovation and initiative. Second, evaluate possible conflicts in terms of the most likely and the most dangerous. We must be prepared for both. Third, concentrate on facts not perceptions. We must focus on our true strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, and needs. We must have a doctrine that fights and wins with what we have, not with what we have had in the past, nor with what we would like to have. The final recommendation is that when planning future conflicts we should expect the unexpected. WILL THE NEXT WAR BE LIKE THE LAST ONE? OUTLINE Thesis Statement: There are several unique aspects of the Gulf campaign that may not hold true for the next conflict, and if we base our doctrine on these unique aspects we will be making incorrect assumptions and learning the wrong things, the false lessons. I. False lesson # 1 -- We will always have allies A. US allies in the Gulf War B. Lack of US allies in recent conflicts C. US can not always depend on allies II. False lesson # 2 -- We can act without preparation time A. Lack of US readiness B. Preparation time needed for Panama C. Need to consider preparation requirement III. False lesson # 3 -- Wars are going to be short A. Historical miscalculations B. Possibility of lengthy conflict C. Factors indicating the US is not ready for a lengthy conflict IV. False lesson # 4 -- We can always keep casualties down A. Low casualty numbers in Desert Storm B. Consequences of overly optimistic casualty estimates C. Historical casualty numbers V. False lesson # 5 -- We will have air superiority A. Factors concerning air superiority in Desert Storm B. Characteristics of a successful air campaign C. Factors concerning air superiority in the future VI. False lesson # 6 -- This war proved our power projection ability A. Power projection in Desert Shield B. Favorable conditions experienced C. Combat power vs. troops on the ground D. Erosion of power projection ability VII. Conclusions A. Military performance during Desert Storm B. There will be many lessons from Desert Storm C. Our enemies will learn from Desert Storm VIII. Recommendations A. Don't fight the last battle B. Evaluate conflicts in terms of the most likely and the most dangerous C. Concentrate on facts not perceptions D. Expect the unexpected WILL THE NEXT WAR BE LIKE THE LAST ONE? "It is not often that nations learn from the past, even rarer that they draw the correct conclusions from it." -- Henry Kissinger (20:127) After action reports containing lessons learned are designed to keep us from making the same mistakes twice. They concentrate on fighting in the future. We will use lessons learned from the Gulf War to develop our tactics, design our equipment, structure our organization, and shape our strategy for the next war. However, how many times have military and political leaders fought the last war instead of the conflict at hand? What happens if the next war is completely different from the Gulf War? There are several unique aspects of the Gulf campaign that may not hold true for the next conflict, and if we base our doctrine on these unique aspects we will be making incorrect assumptions and learning the wrong things, the false lessons. The following analysis focuses on what could easily become the false lessons of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and then offers some recommendations for evaluating lessons learned. FALSE LESSON # 1 -- WE WILL ALWAYS HAVE ALLIES When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 he threatened the entire world's oil supply, uniting the world against him. The United Nations Security Council voted 14 to 0, with only Yemen abstaining, to condemn him. (9:567) Subsequently, during the build up numerous countries promised economic aid totaling 54.5 billion dollars. (10:183) Combat aircraft or troops were sent to Southwest Asia by 18 different countries. (5:22-24) Saddam Hussein's political miscalculations and mishandling of the media continued to alienate Iraq from the rest of the world and helped to consolidate the coalition forces aligned against him. Saddam Hussein was compared with Adolph Hitler as a world menace. (15:23) Yet, even Germany had major allies and sympathizers in World War II while almost no one wanted to be associated with Iraq during the Gulf War. During the next conflict can the United States expect to have the same level of support that existed in the Gulf War? A look at some of our other recent conflicts indicates the answer is a definite NO. Operation Urgent Fury, Grenada, October 1983: British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher deplores the violation of Grenada's sovereignty; the United Nations General Assembly votes 108 to 9 to denounce the United States' move. (13:22, 18:829) Operation El Dorado Canyon, Libya, April 1986: the French and Spanish governments prohibit the United States from flying over their air space; anti-American demonstrations are held at United States bases in Great Britain. (19:290) Operation Just Cause, Panama, December 1989: the United Nations General Assembly votes 75 to 20, with 39 abstentions, to strongly deplore the invasion by the United States; the American Organization of States, consisting of 32 countries, condemns the actions of the United States. (8:961) The interests of the United States will not always coincide with world interests and the United Nations will not always support our actions. The united effort of many countries against a common foe is the exception, not the rule. While Desert Shield and Desert Storm helped promote a certain harmony among the participants, let us not assume that we will be surrounded by friends in the next war. Even today many "friendly" nations are hesitant to allow the United States to launch attacks against terrorism from within their borders, are reluctant to fight drug exportation from their countries, are moving to force the United States to close bases in their countries, and are continuing to deny the United States port access with nuclear capable ships. FALSE LESSON # 2 -- WE CAN REACT WITHOUT PREPARATION TIME In record time the United States moved an enormous amount of combat power half way around the world. The perception is that we can do it; the question is, can we really? How much preparation time do we need? How much preparation time will we have? In early August 1990 Saddam Hussein had 140,000 men and several tank divisions poised inside Kuwait. (22:33) What would have happened if he had not given the United States six months to get ready? Initial units arrived in Saudi Arabia without tactical level maps or the call signs, frequencies, and control measures needed to call in close air support. It took the United States military 45 days and three C-5 Galaxy aircraft to put into effect the Joint Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions (Joint CEOI), the communications plan crucial to our command and control. (17:10) Some units of the American forces were described as being neither "logistically mature" nor "offensively capable" during the fifth month of the build up. At that time Lieutenant General Calvin Waller, the Deputy Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command, emphatically stated that enough troops were not combat ready to justify postponement of any January offensive. (1:27) Part of our tendency to dismiss the need for preparatory time comes from some of our recent military actions where the United States reacted on seemingly short notice. Our most recent example is the invasion of Panama. Yet, even our lightning move into Panama belied the use of preparatory time. Panama housed permanent United States bases where 8,500 American troops were stationed. The bases in Panama possessed an established command and control structure. Additionally, we needed months of military build up to add important equipment and 4,500 more troops. (14:24) This reinforcement was easy because of the relatively short and well established lines of logistics and communications between the United States and Panama. We must not let the successes of the Desert Shield build up prevent us from addressing the important issues concerning the preparatory time needed for military operations. We need to continue our efforts in rapid planning. The Marine Corps is fairly skilled at deploying as a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and fighting at the low-intensity end of the conflict spectrum. However, deploying as a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) or a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and fighting at the high- intensity end of the spectrum of conflict is more difficult. The larger the forces and the higher the level of conflict, the more time needed. We should take another look at how long we, as Marines, need to be able to operate independently before a credible combat force can relieve us. FALSE LESSON # 3 -- WARS ARE GOING TO BE SHORT The Gulf War has become known as the 100 hour war. This is consistent with the desire of the American people to keep the horrors of war to a minimum and our belief that we can do so. A general tendency in America is to believe that because of our might, strength of will, or technology we can determine where and when we will fight and push any military issue to a quick conclusion. Although this perception is false, it exists at the highest levels. At the start of the Civil War President Abraham Lincoln enlisted an army for six weeks to fight a war that, far beyond his expectations, lasted four years. In 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech in which he said there were no interests of strategic importance to the United States worth fighting for in Korea; yet, six months later we were fighting a "police action" in Korea that would last three years. After Korea many senior military and political officials believed we would never fight another lengthy ground campaign in Asia: yet, we fought a very costly conflict in Viet Nam for almost a decade. What would have happened if the Republican Guard had escaped the flanking maneuver now popularly referred to as the "Hail Mary/End Run" and the Iraqi forces had fought to the last man instead of surrendering by the tens of thousands? Would the war have been extended if the Iraqi people, along with the Palestinian populace in Kuwait, fought a partisan campaign? The potential for a lengthy military conflict definitely existed. The United States can not count on a short war but must be prepared for the long haul. Are we ready or focused for a protracted conflict? Consider the following three issues: reduction of the United States military, reduction of the United States industrial capability, and reduction of the United States economic capability. Additionally, consider the extended length of time necessary to produce major, complex weapon systems. During World War II the United States produced 15,485 P-47 Thunderbolt fighter aircraft, an average of over 250 a month. (11:7.4) Today we produce seven F/A-18 Hornets per month, each one taking close to a year to complete. (4:-) However, unlike before World War II, we have a severely limited ability to expand production. Finally, are we mentally prepared for a long war or emotionally tied to a short action? Our current doctrine calls for a short, violent, decisive action. Obviously winning this way is preferred over a long war, but is it always possible? Can we win a guerrilla war this way? Operation Desert Storm reinforces the trend established during military operations in Grenada and Panama. However, a trend is not a guarantee. FALSE LESSON # 4 -- WE CAN ALWAYS KEEP CASUALTIES DOWN While the loss of even one service member is a tragedy, the United States' casualties during the Gulf War were miraculously light. Experts predicted far more deaths than the 148 Americans killed in combat. (23:376, 3:53) Although military and political leaders made an effort to prepare the American people for high numbers of casualties, this is not what many will remember about Desert Storm. Many Americans, possibly including some political and military leaders, will only remember the fact that the military was able to defeat the fourth largest army in the world with an extremely limited loss of coalition military personnel. This perception can have disastrous results on manning levels, replacement plans, estimations of needed medical facilities, command and control capabilities, and force ratios. An overly optimistic estimate of potential casualties can adversely influence the decision to commit forces. Decision makers will always question whether the ends justify the means. However, they must understand the true potential cost of those means. Beirut is an excellent example of a failure to accurately estimate potential cost when evaluating the ends and means. Some senior leaders falsely believed the Marine's peace keeping mission would not result in substantial casualties. Consider the approximate numbers of United States deaths for the following wars: World War II -- 400,000, Korea -- 50,000, Viet Nam -- 60,000. (12:756) America is grateful numbers like these were not repeated during the Gulf War. However, we must not allow Desert Storm to cloud our judgment in evaluating potential future conflicts where large casualty numbers like these could be repeated. FALSE LESSON # 5 -- WE WILL HAVE AIR SUPERIORITY From the first day of Desert Storm we believed that the United States had taken control of the skies. This is misleading for two reasons. First, control of the sky was not taken, it was given to us. Out of 1,800 aircraft the United States had only 33 combat losses, all due to ground fire. (3:56) For the most part, Iraq's air forces, out numbered by more than 3 to 1, chose to sit on the ground or flee to Iran and never really contested our air, ground, or naval forces. (6:16) Second, almost one third of the aircraft in theater opposing Iraq came from our allies. (4:23) The assumption is that had the Iraqi air forces fought in earnest, and even with one third less aircraft, we would have shot them down before they inflicted any serious damage. Maybe, maybe not, and certainly maybe not in the future. The air war favors the side that strikes first against an unsuspecting foe. The Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the Israeli attack of Egyptian airfields in 1967 are classic examples. While Iraq may have suspected an attack, it certainly underestimated the coalition effort which took and kept the initiative. What about next time? The assumption that the United States will immediately achieve and maIntain air superiority is erroneous and dangerous. Future adversaries in the air may be stronger and more capable than those of Iraq. They may strike first before United States military forces can build up, consolidate, coordinate, and rehearse. The conflict may take place in an area that does not provide us with numerous airfields and support facilities. Finally, we may not have a vast number of aircraft immediately available in theater. FALSE LESSON # 6 -- THIS WAR PROVED OUR POWER PROJECTION ABILITY As we move into the 21st century, military power projection is key to successful implementation of a stability strategy. Many people think that moving over half a million troops 7,000 miles during Desert Shield validates our power projection capability, and that our current capability will remain strong for some time to come. This view fails to consider the favorable conditions encountered during Desert Shield, to understand the difference between troops on the ground and combat power, and to realize the rapid erosion of our power projection capability in the near future. Desert Shield was executed under almost ideal conditions. During the operation troops and equipment moved unopposed by the enemy and aided by our allies. We used modern port and airfield facilities with the complete support of a secure host nation. The major problem encountered was not knowing how much time Saddam Hussein would give the United States. Because of this an enormous effort took place to move forces as quickly as possible. While power projection does not have to be an amphibious assault across an opposed beach, it would not demean the effort of those involved to say that the Desert Shield build up was more toward the logistical end of the spectrum. Conditions will not always be this favorable. Power projection requires the correct balance between forces that are light enough to move expeditiously, heavy enough to win upon arrival, and logistically self-sufficient enough to hold until follow-on forces arrive. Marine Air- Ground Task Forces are specifically designed for this. Airborne units, however, are neither heavy enough nor logistically self sufficient. Lieutenant Colonel Hayden discusses this topic in a recent issue of the Marine Corps Gazette. (7:47-49) Initial airborne units deployed to Saudi Arabia were extremely limited in combat power and quickly ran short of supplies becoming dependent on the host nation for a significant amount of their support. Finally, our current ability to project power is diminishing. The Navy plans to retire 24 amphibious ships over the next six years. (16:77) Most of the amphibious Tank Landing Ships (LST's) will reach the end of their service life in the next decade. Production of amphibious ships is not keeping up with losses. A similar situation exists with the mine sweepers. A related problem is the rapidly approaching end of the service life of the Marine Corps' medium assault transport helicopter, the CH-46 Sea Knight. The Department of Defense has not decided on a replacement aircraft, and even if the decision were made today, a replacement aircraft could not be fielded for several years. Compounding this issue is the closure of overseas bases. In the future we will have to project power further using fewer assets. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS After the war President George Bush said: "This is not a time of euphoria, certainly not a time to gloat. But it is a time of pride. . ." (2:86) The military and especially the Marine Corps can be proud of their performance during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The professionalism and courage of America's uniformed personnel led to the victory in Southwest Asia. We did many, many things right during the Persian Gulf War, and we will capitalize on them and learn from them. We did some things wrong during the war, and we must search for solutions for those problems and learn from them as well. However, Brigadier General Paul Van Riper, who served in Southwest Asia and published his observations on the Gulf War, said, "we must avoid a race to conclusions." (6:54) The Gulf War was a unique conflict and the lessons we learn must apply to our fighting capability in general and not only in a Desert Storm scenario. We must realize that our enemies are also studying the lessons of Desert Storm. Future adversaries will surely attempt to use their elements of power to shape the next conflict Into one that favors them, not us. Next time we may not be surrounded by allies, have six months preparation time to project our power ashore under ideal conditions, and then fight a short conflict with limited casualties while controlling the skies. There are a few things we can do to protect us from the false lessons of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. First, don't fight the last battle. It is only human nature to draw from our experience, therefore one must avoid the temptation to use only what is comfortable. Be open minded and forward looking. We must continue to stress innovation and, as stated in FMFM-1, "exploit human traits such as boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, and imagination." (21:62) Second, evaluate possible conflicts in terms of the most likely and the most dangerous. Desert Storm was a mid- to high-intensity conflict fought with air and armor. Yet, for the Marine Corps, our most likely scenario for future conflicts is probably a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) or actions in the low-intensity end of the spectrum. However, one of our most dangerous missions would be to conduct an opposed amphibious landing. We must be prepared for both. Third, concentrate on facts not perceptions. It is folly to believe that the Marine Corps will be able to fight the same way or have the same capabilities if some of the proposed budget cuts are passed. We stand to lose significant amounts of personnel and equipment, as well as much needed improvements to systems which are rapidly becoming obsolete. 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