Increase The Size Of The FSSG: An Evolutionary Idea CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA Logistics EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Increase the size of the FSSG: An Evolutionary Idea Author: Major William S. Aitken, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Even though the emphasis on mobile and rapid warfare demands that the Marine Corps have a logistics capability that is rapidly deployable and capable of supporting sustained, large-scale, combat operations, at this time Marine Corps logistics doctrine and organization does not fully support this concept. Background: The Marine Corps is entering a period of serious troop reductions. As currently planned, all elements of the Marine Corps will be reduced; the ground combat element, the aviation combat element, and the combat service support element. With the present reliance on task-organizing for deployments and contingencies, the FSSG finds itself severely limited during periods of large-scale or long-term commitments. Current plans for the draw-down envision combining many of the battalions within the FSSG. By mixing the functions of combat service support, the FSSG will have trouble rapidly responding to contingencies. Lessons learned from Desert Storm noted the accomplishments of the FSSG, but failed to mention the stress experienced by the units of the FSSG. Downsizing will increase the problem of organizing for large-scale commitments, while affecting combat-readiness. With all of the doctrinal and organizational changes taking place, the Marine Corps needs to examine and change the way that the FSSG is designed for deployment. Recommendation: The Marine Corps should not draw down the size of the current FSSG. It should increase the number of personnel and establish permanent organizations that are specifically designed to respond to large-scale contingencies and prepared to provide quality combat service support. INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE FSSG: AN EVOLUTIONARY IDEA "OUTLINE" Thesis: Even though the emphasis on mobile and rapid warfare demands that the Marine Corps have a logistics capability that is rapidly deployable and capable of supporting sustained, large-scale, combat operations, at this time Marine Corps logistics doctrine and organization does not fully support this concept. I. Evolution of current logistics doctrine A. Need for responsive logistics B. Historical examples of logistics C. Logistics and long-term conflict II. Reasons for needing change A. Defining the threat B. Marine philosophy on readiness C. Task-organizing today D. Drawbacks to task-organizing III. Changing current doctrine A. Forming permanent CSSD's B. Training benefits C. Mobility benefits D. Contingency planning IV. Advantages to doctrinal change A. Role of entire FSSG B. Problems in Saudi Arabia C. Improved combat-readiness D. Improved support to combat element INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE FSSG: AN EVOLUTIONARY IDEA "I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE HELL THIS "LOGISTICS" IS THAT MARSHALL IS ALWAYS TALKING ABOUT, BUT I WANT SOME OF IT." ADMIRAL E. J. KING: to a staff officer, 1942 (1:175) Admiral King and General Marshall certainly knew the value of a well organized and effective logistics organization and the accomplishments of all the services during World War II have stood as premier examples for all military leaders since that time. Today, the Marine Corps is in a unique position to remember the past and to make changes that will provide for responsive combat service support whenever and wherever Marines deploy. Even though the emphasis on mobile and rapid warfare demands that the Marine Corps have a logistics capability that is rapidly deployable and capable of supporting sustained, large-scale, combat operations, at this time Marine Corps logistics doctrine and organization does not fully support this concept. Improving the Marine Corps organization for sustained combat service support will ultimately improve the Marine Corps' ability to sustain the nation's force-in-readiness during large-scale contingencies. The Marine Corps publication, "CAMPAIGNING", makes it clear that logistics planners must be flexible and able to provide support that does not interfere with operational freedom: Forces able to operate on a shoestring are less vulnerable to attacks against their logistical tails, are less dependent on a continuous high-volume logistical flow, and can operate on lines which would not support a large logistical apparatus.(5:81) For the Marine Corps, any time that a division is called for deployment it means that the commitment is large-scale. Therefore, the Marine Corps must also be prepared to provide large-scale combat service support. The Marine Corps is in a unique position to improve upon an organization that has been recently combat tested. Even with the success achieved by Marines in Operation Desert Storm, now is not the time to settle down and think that the current doctrine and organization of Marine Corps logistics organizations is adequate for future large scale operations. A brief review of military history shows that the science of logistics is evolutionary in nature and that changes are continuous. Marine Corps logistics and combat service support has also seen changes through many years, An overview of some significant logistics history lessons will help to reinforce the notion of the evolutionary process while showing how the nature of warfare is intertwined with the science of logistics. Throughout history, the belief that logistics planning has taken a back seat to operational planning is actually incorrect. Military history provides many examples of great campaigns being planned with tremendous thought given to logistics support. Napoleon went to great lengths to plan for the support of his campaigns, particularly his Russian campaign, by establishing formal lines of communication and an organized transport service. During the American Civil War the railroad came to be recognized for the contributions that could be made in logistics planning - great stores of supplies were moved all over the eastern United States. In Germany, in the second half of the nineteenth century, General Moltke, the great German strategist, devised a system of deployment and re-supply based heavily on the use of railroads. Both World Wars saw the birth of huge organizations solely responsible for theater logistics. During World War II, the planning that went into the logistics support for the assault on France after the Normandy breakthrough became legendary. England was turned into one giant storage lot for the Allies. In Vietnam, the Marines established large support bases that supported the troops with large truck convoys and aviation support. The supply bases were never required to move, even though they would occasionally come under enemy attack. These support bases remained in their same locations throughout the entire time the Americans were involved in the war. However, the concept of mobile combat service support became standard as Marine aviation assets flew supplies all over the country, allowing for greater operational mobility by the combat element. All of these examples have a common historical thread. These campaigns and wars were long-term events requiring sustained support to the combat elements. There was ample time to plan and adjust the logistic support as the operational situation dictated. The logistics support became more mobile and campaign planners learned the importance of including logistics in the planning process. In today's world, with the demise of the Soviet Union, that known threat to the United States has all but vanished, while the rest of the world has become a more difficult place in which to plan for expected contingencies. It is an environment where American military forces will go to war as they are configured and equipped at the time, and not always as they would like. It means that units will need to be prepared and organized for deployment in a manner that lends to rapid mission accomplishment. There will not be time for reshuffling of staffs and troops and commands. Task- organizing will be viewed as something that must be kept to a minimum. Logistics organizations will be required to be prepared to deploy without a great deal of reorganizing and to be prepared to accompany the combat elements without delay. These organizations will deploy with the equipment and materiel on hand and will not always have the luxury of time to perfect the desired combat service support. The Marine Corps' philosophy on combat readiness is made very clear in the Marine Corps publication FMFM 1, "WARFIGHTING," with this statement: During times of peace the most important task of any military is to prepare for war. As the nation's rapid-response force, the Marine Corps must maintain itself ready for immediate em- ployment in any clime and place and in any type of conflict. All peacetime activities should focus on achieving combat readiness. This implies a high level of training, flexibility in organization and equipment, qualified professional leadership, and a cohesive doctrine.(4:41) The Marine Corps must continuously strive to achieve the best balance of assets and capability with the realities of the budget process to ensure that Marines are prepared for war. Properly organizing logistics organizations will provide the capability to provide any sustainment needed by Marine forces. Periodically the Marine Corps overhauls itself and improves its combat capabilities. During this century Marine leaders saw the wisdom of the amphibious assault and organized the Fleet Marine Forces to support that doctrine. After the drawdown of World War II, the Marine Corps once again re-organized, with Congressional mandates, thus streamlining the organization. Following the Vietnam conflict the Marines reorganized the combat service support units into more responsive Force Service Support Groups (FSSG) . Now, after the Desert Storm experience, the Marine Corps is once again looking at organizations and doctrine. It is a perfect time to examine the effectiveness of current combat service support doctrine, and to examine and fix problems that occurred in the desert, paying particular attention to the organization of the FSSG. Except for the recent Gulf War and small unit, short duration operations, such as embassy evacuations, non- combatant evacuation operations, and humanitarian assistance, the Marine Corps has usually been involved with long-term conflicts that lend themselves to large deployments of logistics support capabilities that were usually stationary in nature. These large depots were not envisioned to be expeditionary at all. Today the Marine Corps is responsible for responding to problems throughout the world. The logistics that sustains such operations must be mobile and light, with the ability to operate without a large logistical tail. Supporting small operations is relatively easy, but when the Marine Corps becomes involved in large operations, the logistical organization becomes overwhelmed. At this time the Marine Corps' FSSG's are not efficiently designed for sustained support to elements involved in long-term, large-scale combat. They are, however, well organized to provide short-term, intensive, combat service support to small contingency forces. Current doctrine dictates that the FSSG will task organize a combat service support element (CSSE) to support whatever the contingency and the combat elements require. FMFM 4-1 (DRAFT) "Combat Service Support Operations," defines the concept of a task organized CSSE: A task organized CSS element is a unit tailored to meet specific support requirements. Task organization is a quantitative and qualitative process used by commanders to best structure their assets to support the mission and concept of operations. The CSSE commander uses task organization, together with mission assignments and command relationships, as his primary tools for allocation and control of his capabilities.(6:2-4) This concept works well with small deployments and short-term contingencies, but severely strains the entire FSSG during large deployments and long-term commitments. However, Marine doctrine states that when an entire Marine division deploys for combat, the entire FSSG will also deploy to provide combat service support. While this has been proven to be an excellent doctrine, it has also been demonstrated that the current reliance on task-organizing for large combat operations does not work well with the current structure of the FSSG, resulting in a dispersion of combat service support capability during a period when it is most needed. The most serious problems which are experienced are the lack of personnel and equipment. This occurs because the FSSG is required to form combat service support detachments (CSSD) from within its own organization, which cuts back on the number of personnel available to the supporting FSSG battalions. The CSSD's actually join with the combat elements of the division to provide combat service support. The FSSG that remains works to provide the CSSD's with needed supplies and performs other missions as assigned. With personnel and equipment from the supporting battalions of the FSSG being used within the CSSD's, the remaining FSSG forces become severely strained in their ability to accomplish assigned missions. The ability to adequately draft and execute plans is hampered by a lack of personnel. Planning becomes more of a crisis response drill, with the FSSG acting in a reactionary mode instead of being able to anticipate and plan for future events. As can be expected, this decreases the effectiveness of the FSSG. Another problem encountered with the process of task- organizing is necessary preparation time. The time factors involved in task-organization hamper the rapid deployment of the FSSG. It is important that the Marine Corps look at the organization of the FSSG to make evolutionary changes which will enhance the capability of the FSSG in providing large- scale and ,if needed, long-term combat service support to elements involved with large-scale, long-term contingencies. This reorganization can be accomplished so that there is a minimal impact upon the personnel of the FSSG when task- organizing becomes necessary. One solution to the problem of draining personnel and assets from within the FSSG is to establish full-time combat service support detachments that are equipped and ready to operate, having the capability and needed mobility to support mechanized combat forces. As a precedent for having pre- established combat service support detachments, the FSSG already has full-time organizations that support the six month Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployments, called the the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) . These MSSG's have their own tables of organization and equipment, and conduct extensive training with the unit they support well in advance of the deployment. This allows for the various commanders to work together and identify any problems or shortcomings before the deployment. The FSSG should have a similar arrangement with the CSSD's. During peacetime the commanders of the CSSD's could work with the commanders of the division's maneuver elements, usually the regiments, and provide combat service support during training. While the likelihood of the Division and the FSSG deploying on a large scale, as in the Desert Shield/Storm scenario, is remote, the likelihood of deploying a single infantry regiment with all of the required combat service support is quite possible, considering the desire to present overwhelming firepower to possible opponents. Having established CSSD's would cut down on the hustle and confusion normally associated with the rapid assembling of task-organized units. With permanent organizations, contingencies can be planned for, as much as possible, and an expeditionary environment can be maintained. The equipment needed for each CSSD would be in place, minimizing the impact upon the battalions of the FSSG. Yet, the most important aspect of having permanent CSSD's would be in the relationships between the supporting and supported units - commanders of the units would know each other. A good example of how doctrinal task-organizing impacts upon the FSSG is reflected in the formation of a Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment (MCSSD) . This unit requires a commanding officer, staff, and the various troops to accomplish the functions of combat service support. The equipment used to equip a MCSSD varies with the mission of the supported combat element, but always requires the loan of numerous trucks from within the FSSG to provide the MCSSD with the required mobility. Considering that an MCSSD is provided to each maneuver element of the Marine Division, the establishment of two or three MCSSD's from within one FSSG is a possibility. Since each of the MCSSD's must be staffed and equipped from the assets of the FSSG, it becomes apparent that task-organizing drains the effectiveness of the eight battalions. In a time of shrinking military budgets and the reducing of forces, the proposition that the Force Service Support Group should expand might seem unworthy of review. Yet it should be remembered that aside from the CSSD's, the FSSG and its battalions are kept quite busy performing the functions of combat service support in a variety of situations not directly related to the support of CSSD's. Constructing Combat Service Support Areas and running extensive computer centers, or maintaining huge supply warehouses, are just a few of the functions that must be accomplished in any theater of war. Reducing the size of the current FSSG to incorporate new permanent CSSD's would only reduce the existing capabilities of the FSSG. The goal is not to reduce any capability, but to increase the combat- readiness of the FSSG by eliminating turmoil during preparations for combat. However, there is the argument that by increasing the number of permanent units that belong to the FSSG the overhead in headquarters personnel will be increased. Having temporary organizations reduces this overhead. One serious problem that was encountered by the two FSSG's that deployed to Saudi Arabia was that they did not have enough officers of the required grade to command and staff the newly invented detachments. Consequently, the FSSG's had to go outside their own organization to recruit officers for positions. Understandably, this is not an ideal situation for any deployment. Officers taking over newly formed units that have not come from within the FSSG are not always knowledgeable of the command structure and may not be comfortable with the leaders and staff of the FSSG. Conversely, the leaders of the forming FSSG's may discover that they are uncomfortable with the personnel that they have recruited from outside their command. Obviously, personality conflicts could be detected and detoured with advance preparation. By having full-time CSSD's the FSSG's can quickly task-organize from within, utilizing personnel already on hand, eliminating the need to go outside the command, and reducing friction between personalities. At this time the Marine Corps is examining it's warfighting doctrine and expanding the role of the Marine Expeditionary Force commander and staff in future scenarios. It is an evolutionary process that naturally follows on the heels of a large Marine combat campaign. The concept of the warfighting capability of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) has once again been proven. The Marine Corps is also looking at ways to improve the speed of the deployment of the MAGTF and is in the process of developing doctrine that streamlines the command and control of the MAGTF. With the wisdom of joint campaigning demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, the Marine Corps must maintain the capability to deliver effective combat power when needed. In concert with this philosophy is the need for prepared combat service support organizations. The Marine Corps will not always have the luxury of extensive host nation support, enjoyed in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the Marine Corps must be prepared to take care of itself, independent of other services or other nations, even in a joint-service environment. This requires a well organized and capable logistics organization that is trained and ready for combat. Another significant advantage to having permanently established CSSD's is that these units will be "plugged in" to the various logistics systems used by the Marine Corps to provide combat service support. This will not only save time in having to install these units into the various systems, but will also have the advantage of having trained personnel familiar with these systems. During peacetime the CSSD's will be able to order supplies and repair parts and will receive the supply status reports received by all other permanent units, along with the ability to track their combat readiness. The suggestion of implementing new, permanent, organizations in no way seeks to downplay the effectiveness of task-organized and temporary units. That concept has proven quite responsive for many years. The problem appears when the FSSG is required to support large-scale commitments. The effectiveness of the entire organization is reduced because of the various detachments that must be formed. This impacts on the remaining FSSG units, degrading their capabilities. Having permanent CSSD organizations can serve to speed the process of task-organization. Again, FMFM 1 serves to point out the Marine Corps philosophy with regard to preparations for combat: To the greatest extent possible, Fleet Marine Forces must be organized for warfighting and then adapted for peacetime rather than vice versa. Tables of organization of Fleet Marine Force units should reflect the two central requirements of deployability and the ability to task-organize according to specific situations. (4:43) The Marine Corps faces an interesting problem in dealing with its recent logistical success. Senior Officers returned from Desert Storm glowing about the incredible tasks that were performed by Marine Logisticians. The fact is that these feats were performed with a great deal of effort. Many young Marines and Sailors were worn out by the constant long hours and lack of relief. Part of the problem was due to the shortage of personnel experienced by the remaining battalions of the two FSSG's that were in Saudi Arabia. Many of their personnel were attached to the temporary CSSD's and were not able to be replaced within the home organization. This should be a major concern in the future when the issue of personnel within the FSSG is raised. No unit can accomplish assigned missions when its personnel are worn out. Another advantage to having permanent CSSD's is the simple concept of continuity. People will get to know each other, and when they deploy, they will know each other. Such is not the case with temporary organizations Having people familiar with each other is recognized as an important combat multiplier. Because the formulation of military doctrine and organization is an evolutionary process, the Marine Corps is looking long and hard at the current functions of the FSSG. During this period of cutbacks the easiest, but unwanted, solution is to curtail the logistical capabilities of the FSSG. If Desert Storm proved anything to Marines, it proved that good logistics is critical to the success of the combat element. Establishing new organizations during a period of downsizing may appear unnecessary, but keeping the concept of expeditionary forces-in-readiness as the cornerstone of thought shows that the better prepared the FSSG is for large-scale deployments, the better the logistics capability that can be provided. Desert Storm also demonstrated that unthinkable and unpredictable events can happen that cause the large-scale deployment of exceptionally large units. Too many Marines had become comfortable with the concept of small-scale deployments and had come to discount the possibility of an entire FSSG deploying. With the Gulf War, most of two FSSG's were required to provide combat service support to Marine forces. This was a situation that was never really thought about. While the deployment worked, in the future there is no need to have Marines go through the same mistakes and annoyances that were encountered with the Gulf deployment. The simple solution is to prepare for the worst case. Trying to envision a situation where the Marine Corps will again experience such a large deployment is difficult, yet the Marine Corps must be ready, and it must have the organizations in place that are capable of responding to any crisis. The Marine Corps must not be overzealous in the desire to reduce numbers when doing so will cut into the enormous capabilities of the Force Service Support Group, thus impacting upon the combat element's ability to close with and successfully destroy any enemy of the future. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Heinl, Colonel Robert D., Jr.(USMC Retired). "Dictionary Of Military And Naval Quotations. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute,1966 2. Millett, Allan R. "SEMPER FIDELIS: The History Of The United States Marine Corps. New York: Macmillan,1980 3. Peppers, Jerome G. "History Of United States Military Logistics: 1935-1985." Huntsville: Logistics Education Foundation, 1988 4. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine Corps "FMFM 1: Warfighting." Washington, D.C.,1989 5. U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters United States Marine Corps "FMFM 1-1: Campaigning." Washington, D.C.,1990 6. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command "FMFM 4-1: Combat Service Support Operations (Coordinating Draft) ." Quantico,1990 7. Van Creveld, Martin. "Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein To Patton." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977
