"Maneuver Warfare" And The MAGTF AUTHOR Major Thomas F. Western, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting Executive Summary TITLE: "MANEUVER WARFARE" AND THE MAGTF I. Purpose. To discuss the validity of "Manuever Warfare" and B. H. Liddell Hart's indirect approach, as it applies to the MAGTF. II. Problem. Despite the publication of FMFM-1, "Maneuver Warfare" doctrine has not been completely accepted by the Marine Corps. This is a result of a misunderstanding of the concepts, and a reluctance to change. III. Discussion. Two ideas proposed by Liddell Hart are especially instructive. Liddell Hart's indirect approach, especially the concepts of the line of natural expectation and the expanding torrent, amplify existing "Maneuver Warfare" doctrine and are especially applicable to MAGTF doctrine. The MAGTF possesses all the elements required for modern combat, under one commander. The GCE and ACE combination facilitates rapid action, that allows the MAGTF commander to steal the initiative from an adversary, and never relinquish it. The members of a MAGTF all wear the same uniform, have attended the same schools and have the same heritage. This has the potential to reduce internal friction and concentrate combat power. IV. Conclusions. The MAGTF must become the driving force and orchestrate the subordinate elements, guided by "Maneuver Warfare" doctrine, to work together and accomplish the MAGTF's mission. The CSSE must work to push forward logistics support before it is requested. The ACE should be used as a maneuver element or a reserve to facilitate the MAGTF commander getting inside the enemy commander's OODA loop. The dominance of the GCE must be tamed. The GCE must exploit enemy weaknesses and protect it's limited combat support assets "Maneuver Warfare," and the MAGTF Outline Thesis Statement. The doctrine of "Maneuver Warfare", as expounded in FMFM-l and expanded by B. H. Liddell Hart's indirect approach, establishes the foundation for future operations. Acceptance of these concepts and application of them to our MAGTF doctrine is essential for continued success. I. "Maneuver Warfare" A. Where the Marine Corps is Today B. Where the Marine Corps needs to go. II. "Manuever Warfare," B. H. Liddell Hart's indirect approach. A. The natural line of expectation. B. The expanding torrent. III. "Maneuver Warfare" and the MAGTF. A. The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). B. The Air Combat Element (ACE) C. The Ground Combat Element (GCE) D. The Command Element "MANEUVER WARFARE" AND THE MAGTF For more than a decade, the Marine Corps has been anguishing over adopting and accepting the doctrine of "Maneuver Warfare." The Corps has been the target of scathing attacks by civilian academics bent on achieving their ideas of military reform, usually along the lines of the German General Staff model. In response to these attacks and the consequent unpleasant limelight, Marines have alternately counterattacked, ignored the reformers, and finally accepted "Maneuver Warfare" to varying degrees. However, even with the publication of FMFM-1, acceptance is not complete. Why... because the reformers abandoned the principles that they espouse and frontally attacked a surface. B. H. Liddell Hart presents an interesting perspective and provides sound advice, when he says In all such cases, the direct assault of new ideas provokes a stubborn resistance, thus intensifying the difficulty of producing a change of outlook. Conversion is achieved more easily and rapidly by unsuspected infiltration of a different idea or by an argument that turns the flank of instinctive opposition. (6:xx) The doctrine of "Maneuver Warfare," as expounded in FMFM-1 and expanded by B.H Liddell Hart's indirect approach, establishes the foundation for future operations. Acceptance of these concepts and application of them to our MAGTF doctrine is essential for continued success. With the publication of FMFM-1 the Marine Corps has officially adopted "Maneuver Warfare" as doctrine. As a result, some visible changes have been effected. "Maneuver Warfare" concepts have begun to infiltrate doctrinal manuals and educational institutions. In OH 6-1, "Maneuver Warfare" is described as the Marine Corps ground combat doctrine. The Infantry Officers Course (IOC) at The Basic School has taken the lead by restructuring its entire curriculum to indoctrinate new infantry officers in the concepts of "Maneuver Warfare." The Marine Corps Command and Staff College incorporates the ideas of the "commander's intent" and the "focus of main effort" (FOME) into its course work and practical exercises. The pages of the Marine Corps Gazette are continually filled with articles on "Maneuver Warfare." Despite all of the above, one gets the impression that all the commotion is just a fad and that, for the most part, "Maneuver Warfare" is still a "red-headed step child." Actual employment of "Maneuver Warfare" is not as pervasive as we would like to think. If the unit commander understands the concepts and believes in them, then the unit will be employed accordingly. At the Command and Staff College, a grand total of one hour is devoted to FMFM-1. This is enhanced by a gratuitous visit by Bill Lind, the leading "Maneuver Warfare" proponent. That is the sum total. Application of "Maneuver Warfare" to MAGTF doctrine is never even discussed. The Marine Corps must cast off its traditional GCE myopia. Contrary to popular belief, the GCE is not the center of the universe. The MAGTF must become the driving force, employing its subordinate elements to accomplish the MAGTF mission. The concept of operation, the courses of action, and the scheme of maneuver must be the MAGTF's, and not the GCE's. The name itself has served to confuse the issue. Many Marines equate "Maneuver Warfare" with mechanized vehicles and sweeping blue arrows. Some began using terms such as "commander's intent" and "focus of main effort," without understanding the subtle, but important, meanings. Confusion and misunderstanding still surround the concept, and there is still more than a little reluctance to accept the new doctrine. This is understandable, bureaucratic institutions are notoriously slow to accept change, and the Marine Corps is no different. Perhaps a different perspective on "Maneuver Warfare" will help amplify the concept. B. H. Liddell Hart's theory of the indirect approach is a more complete and less confusing concept.(6) Two ideas proposed by Liddell Hart are very instructive. The first is what he calls the line of natural expectation, which is taking the route, path, direction or approach that the situation would naturally dictate. This would be very direct and probably expected by the enemy. Such an action would be attacking what Bill Lind calls a surface, but would be applicable to almost any endeavor.(8:73-80) The natural line of expectation is not necessarily a geographic one and it transcends the tactical, operational, strategic and grand strategic spheres of activity. The second element, and perhaps the most instructive, is the theory of the "expanding torrent." Liddell Hart describes a torrent of water as it encounters a series of dams or banks. The water beats against the obstruction until a breach is found or created. The water initially dribbles through and begins to widen the crack. The pent up water on either side begins to wear away the shoulders of the breach and the water behind pours straight through. The breach is widened until the flow of water is equal to the original torrent. The obstacle becomes ineffective and it begins to crumble as the rush of the torrent passes by.(8:9) It has been popular, in recent years, to expound on the capabilities of the MAGTF. When a new mission or concept arises someone immediately professes the suitability of the MAGTF for that mission. This may be true, though I suspect not in all cases, because the MAGTF is an incredibly versatile and diverse instrument that comes in a single, compact package. This package can be modified, in any number of ways, to adapt to any number of situations and missions. To operate effectively, according to the "Manuever Warfare" doctrine, some adaptations must be made and some mind-sets must be altered. The element that requires the most significant adaptation is the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). The CSSE is the heart of the MAGTF. Should an opponent cut out the heart, the brain and limbs will quickly wither and die. It is as essential for the members of the CSSE to understand the concepts of "Maneuver Warfare" as it is for members of the other three elements. They must also understand the meaning of "focus of main effort" (FOME) and its effect on designating priorities. The CSSE must also limit the burden of the bureaucracy on the maneuver battalions and squadrons. "Maneuver Warfare" will require the CSSE to become proactive and not reactive. Through the use of liaison officers and monitoring of the tactical nets, the CSSE will have to anticipate the immediate needs of units in contact and push these forward.(8:34) Mobile-loaded packages of supply classes I, III, and V, moving with appropriate maintenance and repair capability and tailored to a specific unit, will facilitate tactical operations. Situational awareness on the part of all members of the CSSE is essential to ensuring support at the critical time and place. The GCE and the ACE will be preoccupied with the battle. This will have two effects; the first is requesting resupply when it is a crisis and delay could be disastrous; the second is enemy units they have bypassed will pose a problem for the actual conduct of the resupply and all other CSSE operations. Use of helicopters or routes that avoid by-passed enemy units will have to be used. Rear area security will be a prime concern and a primary responsibility of the CSSE. The standard configuration of a MAGTF includes but a single GCE. There will not be sufficient maneuver units to accomplish the GCE mission and protect the CSSE. The CSSE must become more self-sufficient in terms of its own defense. During the Korean War a standard tactic of the North Koreans was to infiltrate large numbers of infantry into the rear areas of U.S. units. The infiltrators would cut main supply routes (MSR) and attack CSS and fire support units.(14:57-73) Usually these units were unprepared and unable to deal with this threat and chaos resulted. However, there were many examples of the rear units forming temporary tactical units and defending themselves, such as the rear units of the Army's Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division during the First Battle of the Naktong.(14:60) To protect against rear area attacks by the North Koreans, the Marines started to keep their CSS close behind the combat units, which provided some measure of protection.(2:B-17) German General Balck provided his rear units with anti-tank weapons and successfully destroyed significant numbers of Russian Tanks. Combining these examples and maturing the ideas holds promise for effectively dealing with rear area security issues. The rear area faces two threats. One threat is from unconventional forces and the other is from enemy manuever units focusing on and attacking the rear area. To deal with terrorist or spetsnaz type forces, the personnel in these areas will have to be on alert. They must question and report situations that are suspicious. They must be armed and ready to defend themselves and their immediate area. This requires a defense plan and each Marine must know his part. The second threat is more serious. Since time immemorial, armies have been paranoid about their rear area because they are prime targets for enemy attack. However, if the positions are developed properly with personnel trained and ready, attack of a rear area could be a two- edged sword. The CSSA or CSSD when immobile for any length of time must organize for self-defense. This would consist of forming separate cantonments that can become defensive strongpoints. These should be set up in belts that are mutually supporting and completely dominate the area. Tactics and techniques of a position defense are employed to organize and coordinate the fires of the cantonments. A tactical decision will have to be made regarding the dispersion of these cantonments and compromise between ability to conduct CSS operations and protect from air, artillery and ground attack. An alarm or warning system must be developed to signal an enemy infiltration or direct attack. When the alarm is sounded each Marine picks up his weapon and assumes his defensive role. The intent is to bog down an enemy attack in a morass of mutually supporting strongpoints that delay him and disperse his effort. This will break up his attack, stripping away his infantry causing him to reach his culminating point. The attacker's vulnerability to counterattack by the GCE or ACE is increased. There are two arguments against the CSSE providing for its own defense. One is based on the concern for over- taxing the Marines of the CSSE and the second is the consequent degradation of service support to the MAGTF.(16) There will be some degradation of support, however, the overall negative effective will be less than taking maneuver units out of the line and committing them to rear area security. This concept should not overly tax the CSSE Marines either. They will conduct their normal duties until a potential problem arises, then move to their defensive positions. At night, they will be required to conduct local security patrols and establish listening posts. The local security will require only a few Marines and can be done on a rotating basis. During the day, Military Police patrols and routine movement of Marines executing routine duties will provide for security. The degradation of support will be minimal and more than offset by the depth added to the MAGTF battlefield. The ACE in "Maneuver Warfare" has been the subject of widespread debate. Some of the reformers have suggested that all the Marine Corps needs is a slow attack plane for close air support.(9) This is absolute foolishness and seriously undermines the credibility of its proponent. To support his contention, Mr. Lind uses the example of the WW II German pilot Hans Rudel, whose exploits on the Russian front are legend.(9) Colonel Rudel is famous for his record of tank kills and sorties flown. He flew in a Junkers JU- 87G "Stuka" specifically configured to attack and kill tanks. The slowness of his aircraft and the ability to spot ground targets are cited as an example of what Marine aviation should be able to do. Mr. Lind conveniently overlooks several facts that are pertinent to the argument. The first is that no other pilot came anywhere close to Rudel's record. Rudel was not flying against an integrated air defense, such as can be found in many countries today, and Rudel was shot down over thirty times. Additionally Mr. Lind expresses doubts about the survivability of helicopters; what would make a slow fixed wing plane anymore survivable. The Stuka had to be withdrawn from operations over Britain because of prohibitive losses.(13) The modern battlefield is complex beyond imagination, especially in the air. Surface-to-air-missiles (SAMS), Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) and sophisticated target acquisition and fire control radars are combined into integrated air defenses. The air-to-air threat presents a similar impediment to survival, especially to slow planes. survival of any and all aviation assets requires a complex combination or "package" of fighters, attack, and electronic warfare planes. All of these aircraft will have complicated avionics systems to facilitate mission accomplishment. Without this integrated air effort, the close air support planes "can't get there from here." The application of the ACE in "Maneuver Warfare" has some interesting historical precedents... U.S. Marine historical precedents. Marine Air Groups (MAG) 24 and 32 were assigned to support U.S. Army operations in Luzon, Philippines during January and February 1945. As a part of this operation MAGs 24 and 32 provided support for the First Armored Cavalry Division's 100-mile-dash to Manila. Their mission was to conduct reconnaissance ahead of, and behind the division, and to guard the division's open left flank.(5::342-:347) The missions of the division and of MAGS 24 and 32 were very successful. This is a classic example of employing the ACE as a maneuver element. The air groups were apprised of the ground commanders objective, given a mission and a desired effect. The air group commanders used their own tactical judgement in employing their assets to support the entire operation. Therein lies the key to employment of the ACE in "Maneuver Warfare." Convey to the ACE the mission of the MAGTF and the commander's intent. Ensure the ACE is kept apprised of the operations of the other elements of the MAGTF. Assign them a mission that states the desired effect on the enemy and establish priorities. Then, allow the ACE to employ his assets to accomplish the mission and defeat the threat, as he sees fit. The ACE must be responsive to the MAGTF commander's will, not the GCE. I don't mean to imply that the ACE will not provide air support to the GCE. All elements of the MAGTF will do what is necessary to accomplish the mission. The ACE is the MAGTF commander's means to influence and shape the battle before the GCE gets involved. The ACE is the most mobile and flexible of the elements of the MAGTF. If it can't directly win the ground battle, it can effectively set up our enemies for defeat, and not just by close air support. The objective, in "Maneuver Warfare," is to interrupt the enemy commander's thought process and degrade his ability to command his subordinates and fight the battle. The ACE can attack this objective by disrupting the enemy's plans, interdicting his communications, separating his forces and suppressing his fire support. Every time the enemy commander tries to adjust, the MAGTF commander frustrates this initiative with his ACE. This induced frustration combines with what Clausewitz called friction, to breakdown the enemy's ability to operate. The MAGTF commander begins to get inside what Colonel John Boyd calls the Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) loop.(8:5) B. H. Liddell Hart refers to it as "dislocation of the enemies psychological and physical balance."(6:6) If the ACE only partially accomplishes this, it has been successful. The GCE has been the focus of attempts to move the Marine Corps to a doctrine of "Maneuver Warfare." OH 6-1 Ground Combat Operations was written with the concepts of "Maneuver Warfare" in mind. Although the adoption of "Maneuver Warfare" has been most complete in the GCE, there is still a long way to go. Many times in modern history prophets have forecast the waning influence of infantry on the battlefield. Artillery in WW I, and subsequently armor and air, had supposedly neutralized the infantry. These forecasts have been based on the superiority of new and emerging technology. The plane, tank, or firepower of some new weapon has repeatedly made the infantry "obsolete." However, the infantry has always managed to, not only survive, but prove itself indispensible. The reason for this success, indeed the success by any element on any battlefield, is expressed by John English in his book On Infantry: ... the infantry arm was primarily sustained on the field of battle through the tactical ability and applied intelligence of man.(3:217) The employment of infantry in "Maneuver Warfare" will force some uncomfortable situations on the leadership of the GCE. Plans will have to flow into operations. Once the operation has begun, flexibility to adjust to the situation is paramount. Decisions will have to be made on "sketchy" information. Subordinate leaders will have to be trusted and allowed to lead. Following up the holes or "gaps" in the enemy defenses found or created by the lead platoons and squads may require early commitment of the reserve. The initial FOME may have to become a fixing force to prevent the enemy from cutting off the breach. Close coordination with the ACE to maintain or exploit the breach until the GCE can commit its reserve will begin to attack the enemy commander's mind. The ACE can quickly present another problem for the enemy to react to before he has been able to contain the breach. This employment of combined arms will attack the enemy commander's ability to cycle through the O0DA loop. The technique to accomplish this is not well understood by many Marines. This is the infiltration attack. The term "infiltration" immediately conjures up images of individual Marines using stealth to creep into enemy areas undetected. Most Marines associate infiltration with snipers or reconnaissance units. When employed by the GCE it is something all together different. This is an attack with all the associated fighting and employment of combined arms concomitant with that activity. Upon contact with heavy resistance, the attackers slide off and bypass it. The attacking elements continue to infiltrate in and around the enemy defenses. (8:11) B.H. Liddell Hart's expanding torrent helps to conceptualize what is happening. As a company commander, Rommel was exceptionally adept at this technique.(iS) During the first battle of the Naktong, the North Koreans nearly destroyed the U.S. Army Twenty-fourth division with this type of attack. The twenty-fourth division's situation was restored by committing a U.S. Marine brigade and elements from adjacent divisions in a frontal and very costly counterattack. (14) The remaining elements of the GCE are a potential vulnerability that an enemy can exploit. Compared to many potential adversaries, including those in the "third world, the GCE is short on artillery, armor, and mechanized assets. These assets must be husbanded and employed at the critical time and place and not exposed before. The tendency of apportioning out our engineers and reconnaissance assets tends to decrease their effectiveness and sustainability. The practice of having reconnaissance teams control supporting arms, except on high value targets, compromises its presence and detracts from its mission. Tactical excellence and intelligent employment of all GCE assets, while avoiding the natural line of expectation are the road to GCE success. The MAGTF command element has the daunting task of orchestrating the subordinate elements. The principle impediment to success of a MAGTF is the potential for each of the elements to pursue it's own agenda. This will cause us to dislocate our own balance before the enemy has the opportunity. Failure is assured. However, when focused on the objective and working together, the MAGTF can be greater than the sum of its parts. As a self-contained package, the MEB and the MEF can sever its lines of communications and operate independently. With mobile CSSD's, fuel and rearming points (FARPS), and aerial refueling, a MAGTF can operate much as General W.T. Sherman did on his march to the sea. This can provide a theatre Commander in Chief (CINC) an operational maneuver group that can make deep penetrations or operate in an enemy's rear area and sustain itself for a considerable length of time. The MAGTF is especially suited for Liddell Hart's concept of the "expanding torrent," The scenario fits in both offensive and defensive operations. In the defense, the enemy attack is blunted in the main battle area or allowed to penetrate and then counterattacked in its rear or flank. A breach is found or created by a ground or air counterattack. The forward echelon of the enemy attack is cut off and isolated. The MAGTF commander commits his reserve, which consists of portions of the ACE to exploit the breach and disrupt the follow-on echelons. The sudden shock of massed air attack combined with the ground attack opens the crack until it reaches torrent proportions. This further demoralizes the enemy. His withdrawal becomes a route. In offensive operations a gap is found or created and the scenario above is repeated. The MAGTF commander has at his command an integrated, sustainable and potent force. There exists no other commander with access to such a versatile force, whose members all wear the same uniform, speak the same language and have the same heritage. This fact alone reduces internal friction to a level that other organizations can only imagine. The MAGTF has the potential to cycle through the OODA cycle at amazing speed. Whole-hearted adoption of "Maneuver Warfare" doctrine will exploit this unity and make the MAGTF an irresistible force. Bibliography 1. Brickhouse, Maj. Kevin G. "A Primer on Maneuver Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette October 90, 38 2. Craig, Brigadier General E. A. Special Action Report, First Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF, 11 September, 1950 3. English, John A. On Infantry. Praeger, 1984. 4. Fuller, Major General J.F.C. The Conduct of War 1789- 1961. Greenwood Press, 1981. 5. Garand, George W. and Strobridge, Truman R. History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Volume IV, Western Pacific Operations. Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1971. 6. Hart, B. H. Liddell. Strategy 2d ed. Signet, 1974. 7. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM-1, Warfighting, 1989. 8. Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Westview Press, 1985. 9. Lind, William S. "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation." Marine Corps Gazette, May 1989 10. McBreen, LCPL Brendan B. "Commanders Intent." Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, 63. 11. Moore, Maj Scott R. "The Art of MAGTF Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette, April 89, 12. Operational Handbook 6-1. Ground Combat Operations. 13. JU 87, Stuka. Rand McNally Encyclopedia of World War II. 14. Robertson, Dr. William Glen. Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950. Combat Studies Institute, 1985. 15 Rommel, Field Marshall Erwin. Attacks. Athena Press 1979. 16. Sayen, Major John J. "A Review of OH 2-6 MAGTF Rear Area Security." Marine Corps Gazette, December 1989, 25. 17. Saxman, Major John B. "The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette, August 1989. 18. Sherrod, Robert. History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. Combat Forces Press, 1952. 19. Walter, Capt. David L. "Infiltration: An Indirect Method." Marine Corps Gazette, March 1990, 38. 20. Woodhead, Colonel John A. III. "Resolving the Rear Area Threat. Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988,
