The Maneuver Warfare Dilemma: What It Will Take To Make It Work AUTHOR Major Jeffrey J. Patterson, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE MANEUVER WARFARE DILEMMA: WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO MAKE IT WORK I. Purpose: To identify manpower and training issues that need to be addressed before we can fully integrate maneuver warfare into the Marine Corps. II. Thesis: The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as its warfighting doctrine, but it will take much more than rhetoric to put this concept into practice. Our challenge, therefore, is to identify needed changes in existing policies in order to bridge the gap between concept and reality. III. Discussion: Maneuver warfare is a philosophy for "fighting smart" to ensure success in war. There is, however, a large gap between the philosophical concept and its practical application. Maneuver warfare is not a concept that can be practiced independently by operational units. It requires the support of the entire Marine Corps and in some cases it requires the support of the entire nation as well. This paper takes an analytical look at the following four key factors that determine success in war. 1. National will 2. Tactical and technical expertise 3. Leadership 4. Intelligence By using these factors as a framework for analysis it examines national service as a way of generating the national will. Additionally, it examines existing rotation, assignment and promotion policies to see if they support the maneuver warfare concept. Finally, the paper examines training policies and practices and intelligence capabilities to see if they can be improved to better support the maneuver warfare concept. IV. Summary: As a result of my analysis I have identified several needed changes in our manpower and training policies that need to be addressed before we can bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality in the area of maneuver warfare. V. Conclusions: Fundamental changes in policy will be required to fully realize the fighting potential of maneuver warfare. Although the Marine Corps has little influence over national will, we can and should make changes in our personnel assignment, promotion,and training policies to produce a Marine Corps that can fully embrace the ideals of maneuver warfare THE MANEUVER WARFARE DILEMMA: WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO MAKE IT WORK OUTLINE Thesis: The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as its warfighting doctrine, but it will take much more than rhetoric to put this concept into practice. Our challenge, therefore, is to identify needed changes in existing policies to bridge the gap between concept and reality. I. The definition of maneuver warfare II. Keys to success on the battlefield 1. National will 2. Technical and tactical expertise 3. Leadership 4. Intelligence III. Developing national will 1. Better media relations 2. National Service in support of foriegn policy objectives IV. Developing technical and tactical expertise. 1. Manpower policies that conflict with the maneuver warfare philosophy. a. Rotation and personnel assignment policies b. Up or out promotion policies 2. The need for the Regimental System V. Training our leaders for maneuver warfare 1. Learning decsion-making and military judgement 2. Intelligence training for our leaders VI. The need for better intelligence capabilities 1. Understanding national assets 2. Intelligence dissemination THE MANEUVER WARFARE DILEMMA. WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO TO MAKE IT WORK The term maneuver warfare has recently become a buzz word used by many military professionals, but fully understood by only a few. As a result of a small group of military reformers and the Commandant's publication of FMFM 1 many Marines have adopted the term to describe their philosophy of warfighting even though their philosophies are often very different from one another and from the intended meaning of the term. FMFM 1 has this to say about maneuver warfare: Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in or about war that should shape our every action... It is a state of mind born of a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. In short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves - a philosophy for "fighting smart". (3:77) In theory this sounds good, but in reality, wars are not won by philosophers. Our challenge, therefore, becomes how should we be organized and what must we do to put this theory into practice. If maneuver warfare is fighting smart to ensure success on the battlefield, we must first examine those factors which can be developed in peace time to ensure victory in war. Once we identify these factors, we must examine our existing system of manpower and training to see if it contributes to their development. Military scholars will admit there are many factors that contribute to success in war. As military professionals we have come to know these factors as the principles of war. Upon closer examination, however, I have consolidated these principles and have determined that wars have been won or lost based on the following four key factors. 1. National will 2. Technical and tactical expertise 3. Leadership 4. Intelligence I will briefly address each of these factors and subsequently examine present manpower and training policies to see if they contribute to developing them. Where they fall short, I will recommend possible changes to correct the shortcomings. The first factor we must discuss to ensure success is national will. Karl von Clausewitz in his study "On War" tells us that war is composed of a trinity. He reminds us that the trinity consists of the army, the people and the government. He further states that without the people's support there can be no army, and therefore, no success in war. (2:89) The Vietnam War is the best historical example of this profound but simple principle. The Vietnam War was lost for several reasons, but the single most important cause was our failure to muster the national will to win. (8:12) Ho Chi Minh, on the other hand, never lost sight of this important fact. He focused his efforts on consolidating the will of the Vietnamese people, while destroying ours. The entire philosophy of guerrilla warfare is based on this principle. Despite our overwhelming technical and military might, adversaries that adopt this philosophy of warfare remain our greatest threat. This threat can not be defeated by technology and weapons alone. We must win the "hearts and minds" of our allies while uniting the will of the American people. Galvanizing the national will must be an important part of every national strategy. Unless the army, the people and the government work in harmony, defeat is inevitable. The next requirement for success in war is technical and tactical expertise. This requirement is often overlooked in today's literature on military thought. Too often, today's writers lead us to believe that it is the military genius of great generals that wins wars. Although it can be argued that an army can not win without good leadership, the converse is also true. More often than not, it is the technical and tactical expertise of the soldier that allows great generals to orchestrate stunning victories on the battlefield. Frederick the Great was a great strategist, but it was the superb discipline and training of his men that allowed him to out flank and defeat his enemies on the battlefield. Prussia was famous for its drill fields. They were the admiration of European armies of the time. Prussian drills were designed to perfect tactical mobility, firing skills and discipline under fire. Frederick himself, admitted that it was the skill of his army that allowed him to practice the the art of generalship when he said: Unless every man is trained beforehand in peacetime for that which he will have to accomplish in war, one has nothing but people who bear the name of a business without knowing how to practice it. (7:99) No matter how masterful the plan, victory is not certain until the opposing forces meet each other on the field of battle. That force which is better equipped and trained will win. Maneuvering a force on the battlefield to attack an enemy's weakness is the job of generals, but defeating the enemy is the job of Marines. Their success depends on firepower and tactical and technical expertise. By the same token, an army that is well trained and equipped, but poorly led will quickly meet its demise. The last and final requirement for success, therefore, is superior leadership. Military leadership is the combination of many factors; charisma, intellect, courage (both moral and physical), decisiveness and strength of character are just a few. Clausewitz thought this factor was so important he devoted an entire chapter to it entitled "Military Genius." The South's early success during the Civil War was both a tribute to Robert E. Lee's fine leadership and a testimony to the poor leadership of the Union Army at the highest levels. The Army of Virginia, under Robert E. Lee, consistently out maneuvered and out fought a better equipped and better supplied Union Army. Lincoln tried many different generals , but it was not until he found Grant that he had a leader capable of defeating Lee. The German Army in WW II was probably better trained and better prepared than any of the Allied armies, yet their ultimate defeat can be partially attributed to their poor leadership at the very top. Despite the advice of his generals, Hitler chose to direct the course of the war himself. His later policies and decisions proved to be disastrous, and greatly contributed to his own defeat. A study of history, therefore, demands that we develop good commanders to lead the forces we send into battle. The final requirement for success in war is superior intelligence. Without it, commanders will not make the right decisions. Decisions and their ensuing plans are based on the commander's intent, and according to maneuver warfare doctrine, the commander's intent should focus on the enemy. Decisions and plans based on faulty intelligence often lead to disaster. Pearl Harbor is a good historical example of what can result from poor intelligence. Our failure to predict the Japanese attack cost us the majority of the Pacific Fleet in one day. The Japanese failure to locate our carriers during the attack allowed us to regroup and eventually go on the counter-offensive earlier than we had anticipated. Our intelligence failure was costly in terms of lives and naval forces, however, the Japanese failure ultimately cost them the war. Additionally, it can be argued that the allies' success in WW II was as much a result of superior intelligence as any other single factor. Had the allies not developed ULTRA to break the Axis code, the world would be a very different place today. Good intelligence about an enemy prevents him from surprising us. History has shown, time and time again, that surprise has been a crucial element of battlefield success. The unit that can deceive the enemy as to his true intentions can achieve surprise and the victory that usually accompanies it. Barton Whaley conducted a study of battles between 1914 - 1968. He discovered that the victory rate of units that achieved surprise was approximately 92 %. (10:App B) Having defined maneuver warfare and briefly examined its requirements for success, let us examine some of our present military manpower and training policies in light of these requirements. Concerning the requirement to develop national will, I believe that we learned an important lesson from our Vietnam experience. The Marine Corps has developed cordial relations with the press and continues to stress media relations in its formal schools. The recent experience in Southwest Asia (SWA) indicates that this administration has learned it is best to set policy and unify the national will, while it leaves the fighting to the professionals. The fighting in SWA, however, was short lived and we must look for ways to solidify the national will in conflicts of longer duration. As was previously stated, guerrilla wars are the greatest threat to world peace and national security. Therefore, We must look for ways to educate and unify the diverse population of our country if we are to ensure public understanding and support for future U. S. involvement overseas. A mandatory national service program might be one way to achieve this goal. The definition of national service would have to be liberal to allow for a wide variety in the selection of how one could serve his country. Programs could include the traditional conservation projects, urban renewal projects and helping the sick and elderly. They could also include international service projects that would support our policies overseas. As Clausewitz has stated, "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means." (2:69) As the leader of the free world and a nation that relies heavily on foreign trade for its economic survival, we are very much involved in world politics. Our "laissez faire" policies of the past have contributed to the cause of the past two world wars. Americans are citizens of the world, and as such, we have an obligation to exercise a strong foreign policy that promotes regional stability and world peace. However, we have grown to rely too heavily on economic aid and technology to solve world problems. This tendency has caused us to overlook our most valuable asset - the American people. Most Americans do not understand world politics, and as a result they do not see the need for U.S. involvement overseas. A national service program that included overseas projects would increase the nation's awareness of world politics and thus solidify its will should armed conflict become necessary. Despite our many foreign aid programs, our intentions are often misunderstood. The programs fail because the aid never reaches the people who need it most. When it does, the people are not made aware of the fact that it comes from the United States. We are cornered into guerrilla wars because we fail to address the root of the problems that cause these wars. Many Third World countries are faced with problems of poverty, social inequality and human rights violations. U.S. programs that are people oriented would be better received and would further our own understanding of foreign cultures and politics. They could gradually introduce western ideas and values to Third World countries and slowly destroy the seeds of insurrection and instability. Additionally, should military involvement be required at a later time, Americans involved in overseas projects would be a great source of human intelligence. Adversaries of a national service program would argue that it would be too costly and impossible to organize, however, several studies refute this argument. Micheal W. Sherraden and Donald J. Eberly have participated in one such study to examine these arguments. As they discovered, many western nations already have some form of a mandatory national service program. Germany, France, the Netherlands and Denmark link national service to a military draft and many Third World countries use national service to advance community development. Additionally, their studies concluded : There is reason to believe that a national service program would pay for itself in the value of its work and service projects alone, and more than pay for itself if additional economic benefits are considered. (4:174) As a nation, we need to be more involved in world politics. By doing so, we can help solve world problems before they reach crisis levels. History has shown that we can win on the battlefield, but we can still lose the fight in the economic and political arena and eventually lose the war unless we have a strong foreign policy to compliment our armed forces. A national service system that included international service programs designed to support of our foreign policy objectives overseas would galvanize our national will and ensure that our military victories were complete. The next requirement for success in war is technical and tactical expertise. Present Marine Corps promotion and assignment policies, however, do anything but foster this goal. Take for example, a Marine infantry officer. Upon graduation from his basic training he can expect to serve two to three years in the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) before being transferred to a "B" billet (independent duty such as, recruiting or barracks duty) He will usually serve a total of at least six years working outside his military occupational specialty (MOS) before returning to the FMF. Unless he was fortunate enough to attend a formal career level school, he will return to the FMF not to practice his MOS, but to learn it. By the time he has learned enough about the new weapons, policies and tactics to be proficient, he is transferred back out of the FMF to another "B" billet or staff job. Once again his tactical and technical expertise begins to atrophy. It is not uncommon for a combat arms officer to spend less than one third of his career actually practicing his trade. It is very difficult to stay current in your military occupational specialty under these conditions. How can we expect a Marine to be tactically and technically proficient if he is not given ample opportunity to practice his trade. No civilian organization could remain competitive in the business world with such an assignment policy, yet we have allowed this policy to thrive in the Marine Corps. The combat effectiveness of our Corps would increase exponentially if we could delete non essential billets and shorten the periods Marines spend away from the FMF. A graph of a Marine's technical and tactical performance should indicate a steady increase. It should not reflect a sine wave that peaks once every seven or eight years. The second manpower policy that degrades the combat effectiveness of our Corps is our up or out promotion policy. Our present promotion system is a classic example of the "Peter Principle". We tend to promote our Marines to one level above their competency level and then promptly pass them over and force them out of the service. Some Marines are outstanding platoon sergeants, but they do not possess the required managerial or organizational skills to be good gunnery sergeants. By the same token, there are officers who are excellent tacticians and commanders at the company level, but who do not have the desire or the skill to make the transition to the operational level. Present promotion policies require us to pass them over and eventually force them out of the service. Why must we dismiss a Marine who is doing an outstanding job at one level for not being able to handle the additional responsibilities at the next level, especially if he has no desire to be promoted? It could be argued that no one would want to stay in the service without being promoted, but this argument only holds water if pay raises are just tied to promotions. A Marine could receive pay raises based on job performance and time in service regardless of his rank. The civilian sector has operated this way for decades and it has proven to be very effective. Upon closer scrutiny, it actually proves to be a more cost effective way of doing business. Take for example, the estimated cost of training a pilot with 11 years of service. In 1976 dollars, it cost $307,421. Under present policies, if the pilot fails to make selection he will be forced to resign. In this case, the Marine Corps would be forced to accept a self inflicted loss of $307,421.(1:101) He may still be a superior pilot, even though he may not possess the skill to be a squadron commander. Doesn't it make monetary sense to keep him as a pilot? Another example of our misdirected assignment policies is a derivation of the one mentioned above. In our effort to be fair, we often assign people to command billets that have no business being in command. Consequently, the reverse is also true of technical and staff billets. We should be less concerned with fairness and more concerned with putting the right person in the right job. Billets should be assigned by qualification and merit alone. People who do not want supervisory billets should not be assigned them and they should not be penalized if they are competent technicians or staff officers. In general, our entire assignment policy is disruptive, expensive and counter to the adoption of a maneuver warfare philosophy. The adoption of assignment policies more along the lines of Britain's Regimental System could help alleviate some of the above mentioned problems and help foster more esprit de corps within the Marine Corps. (1:95-98) The Regimental System is designed to build pride and loyalty in one's unit. It gives Marines the feeling of security and belonging. Because officers and men stay with their units longer, and always return to the same unit after serving in "B" billets, they tend to know each other better. As a result they learn each others strengths and weaknesses. This is essential for understanding mission type orders. Mission type orders are a key element of maneuver warfare. These orders rely heavily on commander's intent and unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) . Units cannot, however, develop SOPs or understand commander's intent unless they train together for long periods of time. The Regimental System ensures units remain together long enough to establish useful SOPs and long enough for subordinates to intuitively know their commander's intent. SOPs allow units to streamline the planning and execution phases of an operation. This allows commanders to make decisions and take actions quicker than the enemy. This ability allows the commander to get inside the enemy's OODA loop, the theory being that once inside it is easy to defeat him. Colonel Boyd describes the OODA loop theory as follows: The party that consistently completes the cycle (Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action) faster gains an advantage that increases with each cycle. His enemy's reactions become increasingly slower by comparison and therefore less effective until, finally, he is overcome by events. (3:84) Having looked at manpower policy changes we could make to better support our maneuver warfare philosophy, we will turn our attention to training and education. There is a large debate taking place over what should be the focus of effort in our military training. There are those who argue that training should focus on technology and tactics while others argue that training should focus more on the art of war. In reality, success in war requires an intimate understanding of both. Commanders cannot practice operational art without first knowing the technical aspects of their weapons systems and how to best employ them in a tactical scenario. It is for this reason that, historically, most military training has focused on the science of war. We know today, however, that the art of war is every bit as important as the science of war. The question then becomes not only how much of the art of war do we teach, but how do we teach it? The answer varies depending on the rank of the individual we are dealing with. At the lower enlisted and company grade officer level we should continue to concentrate our efforts on the technical aspects of war. The Marine Corps' reemphasis on basic warrior training is a step in the right direction. Tactical packages in all formal schools from NCO through captain have increased in quantity and quality. This trend should continue. Formal school training for individuals, however, is not enough. More formalized unit training is required. We must train at the unit level to see if our warfighting team can apply the skills it has been taught in a coordinated effort. This is also the level where we can begin to integrate the art of war with the science of war. As we have discussed, personnel instability caused by our manpower policies often make it difficult to conduct meaningful unit training above platoon or company level. None the less, unit training up to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level in joint and combined environments is essential if we hope to capitalize on the technical and tactical expertise of our troops. Whenever possible, training should approximate actual combat conditions. There are few short cuts. There is a big difference between drawing blue arrows on a map and actually having to execute them. Unit training evolutions such as Combined Arms Exercises (CAXs) and Cold Weather Training at Bridgeport should be expanded to include regimental, brigade and MEF size headquarters. More "force-on-force" exercises should be conducted whenever possible. We should train as we expect to fight. Although war games and map exercises are a good way to practice operational art they are not a substitute for field training. Another shortfall we experience in our training programs is a belief that, something taught is something learned. Nothing can be further from the truth. Although the critique or "hot- wash-up" has become an important part of every exercise or training evolution, we very rarely schedule time to redo an attack or exercise to see if we have actually learned the the lessons from our previous evolution. Time should be allocated to redo every major evolution immediately upon its completion to see if lessons have been mastered. Too often we wait an entire year before we attempt a similar exercise and by then 50%, of the unit has changed and we make many of the same mistakes that supposedly we learned the year prior. The same problem is evident in our formal schools. Very often we schedule time to critique an exercise but we move on to a new subject before we schedule time to perfect the previous one. This problem is not only a result of assignment policies but it is a result of our teaching philosophy as well. The Infantry Officer Course (IOC) has been singled out by Bill Lind, a well known military reformer and critic of the Marine Corps, on a number of occasions as the premier example of how military training should be conducted. I will, therefore, use IOC to illustrate my point. The IOC has adopted a 4 step philosophy of teaching. During the first step the basic concepts are taught in the classrooms. The second step applies the lessons learned through a series of sand table and map exercises. The third step further applies those concepts in the form of a Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT). The final step is a field exercise or a live fire exercise. Although the final exercise is critiqued, the students move to the next subject whether or not they have mastered the previous one. The schedule does not allow time for the fifth and most crucial step -- practice. Practice must be the final step prior to any test and in the case of the military, war is the only true test. The difference between success and failure in war, as in athletics, is practice. Once a new play has been introduced, a team must practice it over and over again before it can execute it without error. Too often we feel that because something is taught and critiqued it is learned Understanding how to do a particular task does not equate to actually performing it. Repetition is the mother of learning. The key to success is execution and the key to execution is practice. In football the team that executes its offense the best usually wins regardless of the type of offense they play. In battle, the unit that executes its doctrine the best will usually win. The need for repetition and practice cannot be overstated. It reemphasizes the need to adopt a Regimental System to keep our units together longer so they will have sufficient time to practice as a team. I have addressed some of the problems involving the the technical and tactical education of our Marines but how do we train our leaders in the art of war? First it should be noted that the field grade level is the first level where it is appropriate to shift our focus and concentrate on the art of war. At this level, technical expertise should be assumed, however, additional technical and tactical expertise may still be required as a prerequisite. There are some who profess that to understand operational art one must become a military historian. A knowledge of military history is important, but it is only the beginning. One must be able to apply history to present day technology and circumstances. The ability to do so requires military judgment. Military judgment is the ability to correctly and quickly surmise a situation, make a decision, and then act upon it. Knowledge of history can help in this process but it does not make us more decisive. Military judgment, like military science, is best learned through practice. Military education of our leaders should focus on decision-making. Leaders should be given the opportunity to analyze different situations and make decisions on how to overcome the situation to ensure success. Formal schools should use "force-on-force" scenarios assisted by computer driven or manual war games designed to simulate battlefield situations that require students to make these types of decisions. Whenever possible, real scenarios should be used to familiarize the students with actual contingencies. Additionally, students should be required to play the role of potential enemies and devise and execute plans to defeat our existing operation plans. By doing this, we can realize the following benefits: (1) The most obvious benefit would be that our war plans would be continually tested, evaluated and updated based on the results of the war game. (2) Probably the most important benefit relates to our final requirement for success in war, intelligence. The students would learn a great deal about potential adversaries and would become intimately familiar with enemy weapons' capabilities and tactics. Intelligence training is essential for military leaders. Detailed knowledge about the enemy, terrain and weather are required if our leaders are to make good operational decisions. Since military decisions are based on intelligence, a large portion of the training of our senior leaders should be in the area of intelligence. Sun Tzu had this to say about intelligence: Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total. (9:129) It is imperative that Marine Corps intelligence capabilities continue to improve. The importance of this requirement needs to be reflected in our budgets as well as our training. One of the biggest benefits of "force-on-force" exercises is that they require the intelligence community to practice their trade in a simulated combat environment against a thinking enemy. Too often traditional exercises relegate the unit intelligence officer to nothing more than the designer and monitor of his own scenario. We need to exercise the intelligence community in all of our training exercises. The MEU (SOC) program is a perfect vehicle for doing this. Exercises should be conducted that require intelligence officers to gather specific information about particular trouble spots throughout the world. This would require them to use national collection assets and other nonorganic intelligence assets, as well as their own intelligence assets. The drill of actually tasking, collecting, and analyzing various sources of information would be invaluable to our intelligence officers and their staffs. The Marine Corps does not have, nor will it ever have, the budget or the assets to be self sufficient in the areas of intelligence collection and analysis. Therefore, we need to be experts on how to exploit the assets of other existing agencies. Close coordination with these organizations will ensure they provided us with timely and meaningful products. Another area where we need to be experts is the area of intelligence dissemination. We need to improve on the way we push tactical intelligence down to the using unit. A quote from a letter of a battalion executive officer on the front lines in SWA illustrates this point: I'm briefed about what every Iraqi Army Corps, Division and Brigade has done that day. I know where the 'national assets' are. I don't know what those four guys with NVGs are doing 10 KM to my right or who's behind the next hill.(6:4) Too often intelligence is available but it never gets into the hands of the people who need it the most. Intelligence information is too valuable to be hidden behind a green door. The formation of the Surveillance Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group (SRIG) was designed to consolidate our intelligence effort. Although it has centralized our intelligence capabilities under one commander, it has not consolidated our intelligence effort. The SRIG should concentrate its efforts in the areas of tactical intelligence and intelligence dissemination of all source intelligence. The intelligence estimate is one of the first steps in the planning process and it is the first requirement for battlefield success. We need to strengthen our focus in this area if we hope to continue to enjoy success in future wars. In summary, it can be restated that maneuver warfare is a philosophy of fighting smart. The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as its warfighting doctrine, but it will take much more than rhetoric to put this concept into practice. Our challenge, therefore, is to identify needed changes in existing policies in order to bridge the gap between concept and reality. Some changes, such as an overseas national service program require national support. However, other changes are simple and can be done in-house. All of the changes will require command attention at the Headquarters Marine Corps level. Everyone believes in fighting smarter, but I have suggested ways that we can better put our beliefs into action! Now it is up to the leaders of our Corps and country to make the tough policy decisions that will change the rhetoric into reality. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Banyan, Phillip. The All Volunteer Army: A Societal Commentary to its Evolution and its Future. Monteray, California: Naval Post Graduate School, 1977. 2. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War Ed. Tr. Micheal Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986. 3. Department of the Navy. Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Warfighting, FMFM- 1. Washington D.C., 1989. 4. Eberly, Donald and Micheal W. Sherridan. National Service: Social, Economic, and Military Imports. New York, Pergamon Press, 1982. 5. Greenwood, John Officer Education and Training in the United States Marine Corps. Washington D.C.: The National War College, undated. 6. Huddelston, Craig. Executive Officer, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, Letter about his first impressions of the Gulf War, October 15, 1990. 7. Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy from Macheavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963. 8. Summers, Harry. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 1981 9. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Tr. Samual B. Griffith. Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 1963 10. Whaley, Barton. Strategem: Deception and Suprise in War. Massachussets: Cambridge Massachussets Center for International Studies MIT, 1969
