Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Operation: Do We Have The Mobility? AUTHOR Major John H. Parker, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy Executive Summary Title: Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Operation: Do We Have The Mobility? I. Purpose: To establish the validity of the amphibious triad for conducting over-the-horizon operations and whether or not this triad will lend itself to conducting successful amphibious assaults. II. Problem: The Navy and Marine Corps have developed an over-the-horizon doctrine for conducting amphibious assaults due to the changing battlefield and advanced technology. Moving to this doctrine without solving the mobility assault requirements, could prove disastrous in an amphibious assault conducted against a hostile beach. III. Data: Since the Second World War, the Marine Corps has continued to improve its capabilities to conduct amphibious operations through the procurement of new equipment and the advent of modern technology. At the same time, the forces that the amphibious task force will encounter during the assault also have the capability to inflict serious damage because they too have new weapons and technology. As a result, the Navy and Marine Corps have adopted the doctrine of conducting over-the-horizon assaults to ensure the success of the assault. Although a great idea, there are mobility problems associated with the over-the-horizon concept that could jeopardize amphibious assaults. The current assault lift with the task force does not support over-the-horizon operations. IV. Conclusions: The over-the-horizon assault greatly enhances the success of the amphibious assault. With the Amphibious Task Force lacking the assault mobility, the over-the-horizon assault is doomed from the very beginning. V. Recommendations: The Marine Corps must continue to push, develop and procure the elements of the amphibious triad. Only then will the Navy and Marine Corps possess a true over-the-horizon assault capability. Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Operations: Do We Have The Mobility? Outline Thesis Statement: Over-the-horizon is the future of amphibious operations but without an improved triad we are advertising the capability prematurely. I. Amphibious Operations History A. Historical Background B. Ship-to-Shore Triad C. Over-The-Horizon capability II. LCAC A. Capabilities B. Role C. Limitations III. AAAV A. Replace AAV-7 B. Capability C. Counterpart IV. MV-22 A. Counterpart to AAAV B. Replace CH-46 C. Capability D. Alternatives Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Operations: Do we have the mobility? Since its earliest beginnings, the United States Marine Corps, with its amphibious capabilities, has played an integral part in the national strategy of the United States. The ability to project power on foreign shores through the concept of amphibious landings has been one of the primary reasons for the success and existence of today's Marine Corps. Between 1922 and the Second World War, after having conducted numerous amphibious landings, the Marine Corps became the pioneer of amphibious doctrine. It was during this span that procedures for amphibious operations were refined, often by trial and error. Even today, amphibious operations are among the most complex of military operations to attempt. The amphibious assault is an offensive operation that relies on maneuver, speed and surprise. The chief disadvantage to a force conducting an amphibious assault is the requirement to build-up forces from nothing to full combat power. The build-up of strength ashore must be quick, uninterrupted, and include forces strong enough to overcome the enemy. It is while this build-up is occurring that the landing force is most vulnerable. Tactical mobility determines how quickly the build-up can take place. The typical surface-to-surface assault practiced in the late 1980s has varied only a little from the World War II models. In this "classical case," several waves of amphibious assault vehicles containing infantry in tracked vehicles (e.g., the LVTP-7) attack a beachhead. The landing ships (Landing Ship Tank/Landing Ship Dock/Landing Platform Dock) launch these amphibious vehicles from close offshore, and the initial waves of LTVPs are closely followed by waves of landing crafts, usually LCUs and LCMs, transporting tanks and artillery. The workhorse of the conventional landing, the LVPT-7, has a water borne speed of about 6-11 miles per hour. As launch distances are generally restricted to 4,000 yards (2 nautical miles) from the beach, transit takes about 20 minutes which could be a life time in a high threat environment. (7:104) Since the classic amphibious assaults of World War II, increased accuracy, range, lethality and numbers of enemy precision guided munitions and mines have driven the Navy-Marine team to over-the-horizon launch distances in order to reduce the risk to the amphibious task force. No longer can the amphibious task force afford to steam boldly to within 4,000 yards of the beach before commencing a ship-to-shore movement at conventional landing craft speed. The proliferation of "smart" weapons, such as ground-launched cruise missiles, throughout much of the developed and even the Third World has rendered such assault suicidal. The advantage of over-the-horizon amphibious assaults allows the amphibious task force the stand-off and maneuver room it needs and in turn increases the area of concern to an enemy defending against possible amphibious assault. With an over-the-horizon landing, advantages for the Navy include: -increased reaction time to air-launched cruise missiles -reduced ship vulnerability to deep and shallow water mines -reduced ship vulnerability to shore-based direct and indirect fire weapons -increased capability to conduct feints The Marine assault force will also enjoy increased benefits as a result of this concept. Landing force advantages include: -the ability to attack at the time and place of our own choosing -a shorter window of vulnerability while crossing the beach range -a widely dispersed enemy defensive posture (6:361) Ideally, the amphibious assault should land where the enemy is weakest and not defending at all. Since it may not always be possible to land where the enemy is least prepared, 0TH capabilities must be capable of forcible entry across opposed beaches. The United States, as a global maritime power, can not afford to have a forcible entry capability, whenever and wherever needed. Before we can benefit from the advantages of 0TH, there are several factors that will limit our capability to conduct an over-the-horizon assault and must be overcome. It will require all elements of the ship-to-shore movement to negotiate the 30-50 mile run quickly, simultaneously deliver combat troops and heavy equipment, over a variety of beaches, and have the legs necessary for return trips. Currently, the capability does not exist. Over-the-horizon is the future of amphibious operations but without an improved triad we are advertising the capability prematurely. The Marine Corps and Navy are in the process of developing a triad of equipment to conduct 0TH amphibious assault: (1) the air cushion landing craft (LCAC) (2) the advanced assault amphibious vehicle (AAAV), and (3) the MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor assault aircraft. Each element of the triad is specialized, yet some degree of overlap exists to provide the necessary redundancy for a combined air and surface amphibious assault. (3:37-38) A major milestone in the movement toward an 0TH amphibious assault force was achieved when the first LCACs began arriving in 1980. The amphibious capabilities of LCAC, combined with its speed and range, provide a quantum improvement in ship-to-shore movement. The LCAC employs Hovercraft technology to skim across the ocean surface on a cushion of air. It has a range of 200 nautical miles and with a full payload can travel at speeds in excess of 50 knots in sea state 2 and 40 knots in sea state 3. Overloaded, it will still achieve 30 knots in sea state 2. Unconstrained by winds, tides, reefs, underwater obstacles, beach gradients and beach trafficability, the LCAC can cross the shoreline and proceed inland at speeds up to 35 knots. In addition, it is less vulnerable to mines than conventional landing craft. Ashore, it will cross 20 foot ditches and 5 foot vertical obstacles, knock down small trees, and climb gradients up 13 percent. (2:75) It can also carry 25 combat troops in a special compartment. The most significant operational characteristics of the LCAC are its speed and its ability to cross beaches that have been previously unassailable. The LCAC will cross approximately 80 percent of the worlds coastline as compared to about 17 percent for conventional landing craft, enormously complicating a defender's task. The LCAC is primarily a logistics support craft used to haul combat support and combat service support equipment ashore. Combat support and combat service support are the most critical lift requirements during the first 90 minutes of an amphibious assault. There is no better or faster way for the landing force commander to get his tanks, light armored vehicles, heavy artillery, and their necessary ammunition ashore during that crucial time, than by LCAC. Essentially unarmored, the LCAC is not an assault craft. Vulnerable to small-arms fire and light shrapnel, the LCAC was not intended for tactical forcible entry. The craft is simply too valuable, too big and too few in numbers to be able to suffer attrition. This situation will not change appreciably because the lift capacity of current and planned amphibious shipping precludes increasing the number of LCACs beyond projected quantities. (1:42) As mentioned earlier, conventional landing craft travel at speeds of 8-11 knots and must be launched from 3-5 miles offshore. The LCAC is designed to replace the venerable landing craft. The LCAC's greatest value is their employment in the high speed build-up of combat power ashore for the landing force. Despite the capabilities of the LCAC other equipment limitations prevent today's Marine air-ground task force commanders from fully exploiting the new landing crafts potential in over-the-horizon assaults. Today, for example, a significant amount of the Marine Corps' combat force continues to be transported ashore in tracked amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs). These have been improved greatly since World War II but are still hampered by slow water speeds of well under 15 miles per hour. Moreover, the combination of heat, noise, fumes, and motion make for a very rough ride within the troop compartment during waterborne operations. Troops can not be expected to retain fighting effectiveness after more than approximately 30 minutes afloat in the current amphibians. Hence, the horizon for the AAV is frequently only 4,000 meters offshore. (1:40) The current assault amphibian, designated the AAVP7A1, has been upgraded in a number of ways since it first entered service in 1972. The latest upgrade is intended to continue the AAVP7A1 into the late 1990s at which time it will have to be replaced. No further upgrades are planned. The next generation assault amphibian must possess requisite mobility, firepower, survivability and armor protection to provide the Marine Corps with the capability to conduct amphibious forcible entry and ground combat operations into the second decade of the 21st century. The AAV, currently in exploratory development is intended to provide that capability. The new amphibian will be designed for uninterrupted movement from ships over-the-horizon to objectives at the shoreline or much further inland. Overall, it will represent a greatly improved assault capability, with higher speed both on land and in the water, upgraded firepower, armor protection, and enhanced survivability against enemy arms. Part of this equation is well on the road to success. A goal established for the AAAV program was to achieve 20 knots over water with a tracked amphibian. This speed has been reached in test models. (9:28) Procurement of a follow-on assault amphibian must take place soon, but with advanced technology and a capability comes a price. Cost is the major prohibitive factor. A recently published figure cites $6.6 billion for research, development and procurement. That figure is eight times the size of the Marine Corps' entire fiscal year 1991 procurement budget. Given the apparently lean years ahead, the Marine Corps will have a tough fight on its hands. As mentioned earlier, the LCAC and AAAV would complement one another during the ship-to-shore phase. Relying on the LCAC alone would drastically effect the combat power build-up from 20 miles offshore. LCAC transit time to the beach will be approximately 30 minutes; 10 minutes will be required to offload in the landing site; 30 minutes transit time back to the ship; 20 minutes to enter the welldeck; and 30 minutes more transit time back to the beach. This all works out to 90 minutes between the time an LCAC makes its initial landing and returns with a second load. Turnaround time for a third load to the beach will be further delayed because of the need to refuel the LCAC. (2:77) Considering the amount of time required for LCAC turnaround, and the lack of the AAAV, the battlefield commander would be at great risk conducting an amphibious landing over-the-horizon. With the current AAV, the only way it could work with the LCAC, in 0TH operations, would be for the LCAC to carry the AAVs. Each LCAC can carry three AAVs. Carrying the AAVs ashore in LCACs significantly reduces the number of LCACs available to carry TOWs, tanks, LAVs, artillery and other combat support and combat service support units ashore. For example, 5 of the 6 LCACs supporting a MEU would be required to land the 14 AAVs normally assigned. Of the 33 LCACs supporting a MEB, 16 would be required to land its 47 assigned AAVs. (2:78) By landing the AAVs by LCAC and remembering the turnaround time of 90 minutes, a significant delay will occur in the build-up of combat support and combat service support units. Clearly, the need for the AAAV is evident, working with the LCAC, for the rapid build-up of combat power ashore in 0TH operations. The third and final leg of the triad concept is the MV-22. The MV-22 (medium lift assault) is the air counterpart of the AAAV, intended to replace the CH-46 and CH-53A/D helicopters. The MV-22 is intended to complement the CH-53E helicopter, which carries the heavier combat loads, such as light armored vehicles (LAVs) and M198 155mm artillery. The MV-22 Osprey, when fielded, will provide the 0TH air component for combined surface and air assault or, when necessary, the all-air amphibious assault. The MV-22 is intended to replace the aging CH-46 which is entering its 27th year of service. The aircraft was developed in the early 1960s with the first one fleet-operational in 1962. The CH-46 lacks the range (approx. 60 miles) to conduct over-the-horizon assaults (anywhere from 12-100 miles). Again, this places the amphibious task force at risk to enemy weapons systems, limits the area of operation, and drastically reduces the flexibility of the ground commander. Along with the range limitations, helicopters are slow moving and have a high heat and noise signature making them extremely vulnerable to anti-air artillery fire and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). With the threat of sophisticated weapons, battles will be fought at night and in adverse weather which hampers the CH-46 helicopter's operational capability significantly. The solution to these problems is the MV-22 Osprey. It was designed as and all-weather, medium-lift assault aircraft, it will be capable of vertical take off and landing (VTOL), short take off and landing (STOL) and conventional fixed wing flight. It is being fitted with forward looking infrared radar (FLIR), the Tactical Navigation Global Positioning System (GSP), and a color night vision compatible cockpit. It is capable of carrying maximum pay-loads of 18,000 pounds (VTOL) or 23,000 pounds (STOL), flying more than 1,000 miles without refueling, with an in-flight speed of 300 knots. It is also capable of carrying 18-24 passengers. (5:319) One of the greatest advantages this revolutionary aircraft presents, is its ability to provide dramatic increase in lift, speed, and versatility in any weather, day or night, from any amphibious ship in today's inventory. Its primary benefit is seen in rapid surprise over-the-horizon assault. The MV-22 Osprey will allow a much more rapid closure to the beach, giving the amphibious task force the option of operating from over-the-horizon, out of range of many weapons systems. As a result of this capability, it allows for many maneuver landing points spread out over a much greater distance. Tactical mobility is enhanced by the MV-22. It allows the MAGTF commander to move freely on/or around the battlefield. Extended range, speed and endurance of the MV-22 open up a wide range of opportunities within a given objective area and deny a potential adversary the option of massing forces for a predictable amphibious assault. The MV-22 with its latest technology by all indications should be the aircraft to replace the CH-46. With new technology comes a price that has to be paid. Individual cost of the MV-22 is often stated as approximately $32 million. As a result of the cost factor, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney in 1989 canceled the MV-22 program with only research-and-development funds programmed in fiscal 1991. The research-and-development effort to date, has validated the tiltrotor concept. Four full-scale development aircraft are flying, and two more MV-22s are nearing completion. Future plans call for operational tests of the aircraft to continue with additional funds hopefully being approved in the fiscal budget in FY-92. (9:6) In the interim, recommendations have been made to replace the MV-22 with existing CH-53s and CH-60s (Army helicopters). (4:373) In terms of MV-22 alternatives, neither the CH-60/CH-53E meet the parameters set forth for medium-lift assault requirement. The CH-60 is an outstanding helicopter, but it does not have the load-carrying or range capability for an assault helicopter. On the other hand, the CH-53E has too much load-carrying capability for an assault helicopter; it is not compatible with assault landing zones; and commanders have to consider the risk associated with putting too many Marines (the CH-53E can carry 55 passengers) in a simple vehicle. As mentioned earlier, the primary mission of the CH-53E is to provide assault helicopter transport of heavy weapons, equipment and supplies during amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore. With the CH-60 being too small and the CH-53E too big, another alternative, not a viable one, would be to extend the service life of the CH-46. This would be a quick-fix solution to the medium lift requirement. In turn, this will set the Marine Corps back regarding the over-the-horizon attack capability and would force the Marines to go into the 21st century with 1960s technology. In summary, the technology to modernize our ship-to-shore triad is currently available. The high cost of that technology has precluded the Marine Corps from fielding the AAAV and MV-22. As a result only one third of our triad is truly over-the-horizon capable. We may be advertising the 0TH capability prematurely. The vulnerability of ships and slow-moving assault vehicles to modern weapons systems has made the traditional concept of amphibious assault obsolete. Avoiding enemy defense, and seeking to achieve tactical surprise, future amphibious assaults will be launched from unprecedented distances off-shore. The incorporation of the new amphibious triad will transform the amphibious assault into a daring but highly practical form of offensive warfare. A full 0TH amphibious assault capability will not exist until all the legs of the triad outlined above, have been procured. The LCAC, AAAV and the MV-22 will offer the Marine Corps a unique degree of flexibility in moving troops from ship-to-shore during over-the-horizon amphibious operations. The proposed amphibious triad gives the MAGTF commander the ability to control and quickly maneuver within a battlefield area almost three times allowable by the current amphibious triad. The amphibious triad will be a significant leap forward into the 21st century in terms of mobility and survivability for Marines and the Marine Corps' expeditionary mission. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Alexander, Joseph H., Col., USMC. (Ret) "The Next Assault Amphibian." Proceedings November 1989 pp. 38-42. 2. Bailey, Thomas A., Maj., USMC. Over-The-Horizon Assault by LCAC." Marine Corps Gazette January 1986, pp. 74-80. 3. Earl, Robert L., Lt.Col., USMC. "The Over-The-Horizon Alternatives." Marine Corps Gazette October 1988, pp. 37-38. 4. Flanagan, Robert M., Lt.Col., USMC. "The V-22 Is Slipping Away." Proceedings August 1990, pp. 39-43. 5. Labrecque, Terrence P., CMDR, USN. "Seabased Logisitcs: Viable or Not?" Marine Corps Gazette January 1990, pp. 36-42. 6. 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