Fire Support Coordination By The MAGTF Command Element--What Is Its Real Role? AUTHOR Major David N. Penman, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION BY THE MAGTF COMMAND ELEMENT -- WHAT IS ITS REAL ROLE? Our Commandant clearly delineated in FMFM 1, Warfighting, what Marines must do to prepare for and conduct war. The basic concepts -- commander's intent, focus of effort, tempo, shaping the battlefield -- to name a few, are all well known to us. We as Marines also know that at the heart of our warfighting ability lies the combined arms of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. We learned from history the supreme value of MAGTF employment as a combat multiplier. What we have not learned from history is the best, most efficient way for the MAGTF command element to fulfill its role in executing the commander's intent. A critical element in any commander's ability to shape the battlefield, to project his "thoughts forward in time and space," is the efficient employment of supporting arms. This is especially true for the MAGTF commander. Unfortunately, the doctrine and concepts currently written, or under review, for the MAGTF command element do not provide for the execution of these necessary functions. If the Marine Corps is to operate efficiently in the future in the joint warfighting arena, we must more clearly define the roles, duties, and functions of the command element in fire support coordination. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION BY THE MAGTF COMMAND ELEMENT -- WHAT IS ITS REAL ROLE? OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Before the command element of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force can achieve its maximum warfighting potential, its fire support coordination responsibilities must be more clearly delineated. I. History of the MAGTF command element (CE) A. Informal beginnings B. First official use C. Maturity of the concept D. The CE today II. MAGTF CE role in fire support coordination A. Fire support definitions B. Basic fire support role defined C. Comparison to an FSCC III. Need for an agency A. Doctrine for and against B. Pros and Cons C. Relationship to individual duties FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION BY THE MAGTF COMMAND ELEMENT -- WHAT IS ITS REAL ROLE? In order to understand the potential role and functions of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) command element (CE) in fire support planning and coordination, one must first have an appreciation for the role of the command element itself. Not only should one understand the concepts and principles under which we currently train and fight, but one should be familiar with the historical perspective of how these concepts evolved. The "combined arms" concept or "air-ground" integration essentially has its beginnings in the Pacific Theater of World War II. One of the earliest examples of Marine air- ground employment by a single commander is in Guadalcanal, where General Vandergrift not only commanded two Marine divisions and two Army divisions, but Marine numerous aircraft squadrons from Henderson Field as well. The experience gained at Guadalcanal highlighted the need for a command structure that could better integrate the effectiveness of the division/wing operations. Consequently the Marine Amphibious Corps (MAC) was introduced and maintained, although with varying degrees of success, throughout the remainder of the war. By wars end there was no doubt about the value of the air-ground team as the best use of combat power. Refinements in the command and control structure challenged the Marine Corps in the early post-war years, but almost no doctrinal progress was made before the activation of the 1st Provisional Brigade for duty in the Korean War. The use of the 1st Provisional Brigade, especially the deployment of the Brigade as a MAGTF with its own CE, was a milestone in MAGTF history. It marked the first time the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) went to war as an integrated team. During the Korean War, the combined arms team aspect of the MAGTF concept certainly proved its supreme warfighting value, but the same proof did not prevail for the headquarters. Even before the armistice, the Harris Board was reporting the results of the first systematic examination of the MAGTF concept. The Board confirmed the need of a single commander, and his need for an integrated air-ground staff. The question of which commander, however, was not clear -- whether it should be a separate commander or a component commander, serving as the task force commander with a separate, or augmented, staff. (5:18) In 1954 the Commandant of the Marine Corps attempted to clarify the issue by promulgating a letter called The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Concept. But confusion and divergent opinions remained, especially over the employment of aviation, and the 1954 letter was cancelled after only two years. Another board, known as the Hogaboom Board, convened in 1956 with a "sweeping mandate: to determine the optimum organization and composition, to include equipment and tactical concepts, for maximum FMF effectiveness to discharge its mission." (5:22) Some of the more interesting Hogaboom Board conclusions which pertain to the headquarters issue include the following: - The air-ground task force type of command structure was not normally required, or desirable for amphibious operations. - A table of organization should be developed for a brigade-type headquarters. - The division headquarters was designed not only to command, plan, and execute division operations, but to command attached aviation units as well. (5:23) So this pattern of debate, for and against a MAGTF headquarters, was set. Briefly some of the other highlights in the MAGTF command element evolution are: - Publication of MCO 3120.3, The Organization of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (27 Dec 1962), which "advanced the broad employment policy of normally establishing a separate headquarters for MAGTF operations involving 'substantial' aviation and ground elements." It also provided for four types of MAGTF's, ranging in size from the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to the Marine Expeditionary Corps (MEC). (5:27) - FMFM 0-1 superceded MCO 3120.3 in August 1979. One of its key mandates said, Regardless of the size of the MAGTF, it will include the following four major components: A command element A ground combat element An aviation combat element A combat service support element (3:1-2) Regarding the MAGTF headquarters, it said, "A notable difference between a MAGTF headquarters and the headquarters of the more traditional organizations... is that it is not, in all cases, a permanent headquarters." (3:3-1) In fact, most of the headquarters at the time were, at best, only the nucleus of the operational requirement. - In April 1983, MAGTF headquarters received their first "permanent" status with the publication of Green Letter No. 5-83: Development and Employment of Marine Forces. The letter called for six full MEB headquarters, each capable of fielding two MEU headquarters, and three MEF nucleus headquarters, which would be flushed out by subordinate MEB headquarters after compositing. (5:6) - Except for FMFM 1, Operational Handbook (OH) 2, The Marine Air-Ground Task Force, is the current how-to guide document for MAGTF operations. Although not yet doctrine, OH 2's views of the CE are: The command element (CE) is the MAGTF headquarters. It is a permanent organization composed of the commander, the general or executive and special staff sections, the headquarters section, and requisite communications and service support facilities. (10:2-2) Which brings us to FMFM 1, Warfighting. Surprisingly, for being the cornerstone doctrine for our warfighting philosophy, the book says very little directly about the MAGTF. In the Organization section of Chapter 3 there are, however, two insights worthy of note. After recognizing the four basic "components," it says this about MAGTFs, "They have no standard structure, but rather are constituted as appropriate for the specific situation. The MAGTF provides a single commander the optimum combined-arms force for the situation he faces." (4:42) Then towards the end of that section the following comment is made, "Further, we should streamline our headquarters organizations and staffs to eliminate bureaucratic delays in order to add tempo." (4:43) The intent of this statement is certainly clear enough, and all Marines must continuously review and evaluate the functions our headquarters are actually performing. So the history of the MAGTF headquarters has gone around, should there be a separate headquarters or not? If so, should it be permanent or not? Recently the wheel turned slightly further by a return of "imbedding" a MEB head- quarters into each of the MEF headquarters. But from this state of flux we must attempt to examine the role of the supporting arms personnel on the MAGTF CE staff. As one might expect, the role for the staff is also undergoing an evolutionary process. The current ideas, or at least the terminology, Supporting Arms Special Staff (SASS), dates to 1983, when it was introduced in the "7-series" of operational handbooks. OH 7-1 stated in part: To discharge the MAGTF command element's fire support coordination responsibilities, fire support, air, NGF [Naval Gunfire], and target information officers are assigned to the MAGTF staff. In the Handbook, these officers collectively are called the MAGTF Headquarters Supporting Arms Special Staff. This name replaces the title Fire Support Information Center which doctrine provides no functions for, and which is so close in phrasing to FSCC that in practice it leads MAGTF staffs to attempt to perform fire support coordination functions which are best performed by the GCE. (9:1-2) Today we can only speculate whether or not the author of those words really understood the dilemma his words would cause for future fire support personnel on the MAGTF staff. One can believe the author's indent was to steer the micro- manager type MAGTF staff personnel away from doing the GCE's job for them, and clearly this remains an important concern. On the other hand these words led to a perception that the MAGTF command element staff has no requirement to perform fire support coordination functions. The continual emphasis on any words and phrases, e.g., "planning cell," which are used to discourage the command element form doing one of the subordinates jobs, tends to simultaneously deter the MAGTF CE from doing the necessary fire support functions which are best performed at the MAGTF headquarters. The lack of performance of these functions, which current doctrine is not fully providing for, results in a less than optimum execution of the MAGTF commander's intent. But what are some of these fire support planning and/or coordination functions that cause some Marines to remain steadfastly committed to only the GCE performing them? An examination of the current FMFM's under development on this subject frequently make reference back to the definitions in Joint Pub 1-02. In an attempt to establish some common ground, and avoid personal biased in the definitions, some key Joint Pub 1-02 definitions follow: Fire plan - A tactical plan for using the weapons of a unit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated. Fire support coordination - The planning and executing of fire so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. Target acquisition - The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. Target analysis - An examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. Allocation - The translation of the apportionment into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation/task. Apportionment - The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and /or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time. Considering these definitions, and the fluctuating conceptual framework for MAGTF CE, what is envisioned as the role for the MAGTF CE in fire support coordination? Although each manual makes its own elaboration on the answer to this question, the doctrinal publications currently under development seem to share a general acceptance of the following basic theme: The role of the MAGTF CE in fire support coordination is to implement the MAGTF commander's intent which will be focused on operations which will take place in the future. The MAGTF CE's effort is in planning as opposed to the actual integration of the delivery of supporting arms on enemy forces in close proximity of forces of the GCEs. The ability of the MAGTF CE to conduct fire support coordination is centered around the Supporting Arms Special Staff (SASS) in the MAGTF G/S-3, which is primarily a planning cell. This cell is the focal point for fire support planning and directing MAGTF supporting arms employment. (8:I-1) This role statement was followed by a list of fire support coordination tasks to be performed by the MAGTF CE (see Figure 1). However, from the above role statement, the dichotomy of purpose and function for the MAGTF CE begins to unfold. Most military personnel who are familiar with the duties and functions of a Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) would say the role of the SASS is very similar to, if not the same as, the role of the FSCC at high levels of command.* Considering their similarities further, an obvious question seems to be, "Why is the entire draft FMFM 2-7A dedicated to, and in fact titled, Fire Support Coordination by the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command Element?" Admittedly, the MAGTF CE should not be actively involved in the integration of fire and maneuver, like it is done at the infantry battalion or regiment, but many of the MAGTF CE's functions are still fire support coordination in the terms defined above. But is the SASS an agency, like an FSCC, or is the term, SASS, a security blanket label attached to some of the special staff officers in the MAGTF headquarters, who happen to be advisors to the commander on the employment of supporting arms? *(For comparison, Figure 2 is a list of duties required of a Fire Support Coordinator (8:II-13)) Within the context of a discussion on command and control systems, the draft FMFM 2-7 says, "The commander establishes agencies to assist in organizing, planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling fire support." (7:1- 6) A table which follows this statement, lumps in the SASS, as an agency for the CE, right along with the FSCCs for the GCE and the DASC (Direct Air Support Center) and TACC (Tactical Air Command Center) for the ACE. On the other hand, the draft FMFM 2-7A states specifically SASS personnel do not work in fixed locations. It further explains that although some of their work is done in the MAGTF combat operations center (COC), many of the duties the SASS personnel are required to perform must be done away from the COC. Liaison and coordination with higher and adjacent headquarters, on a myriad of issues, exemplifies this need. Although the latter employment of SASS personnel may more closely relate to the long range, deep battle focus the CE staff should maintain, it surfaces the old adage -- "Who's minding the store?" -- when several of the SASS principals are simultaneously away from the MAGTF COC. FMFM 2-7A suggests that SASS personnel simply coordinate their actions so that a representative is always present in, or available to, the COC. An alternating representative in the COC sounds like a very good idea; one that would: - reduce the manpower requirements of the MAGTF COC, - allow the SASS personnel greater flexibility to do their jobs as they saw fit, and - make better use of a "generalist" fire support representative. But it is one that does not work, by my observations and experience, in the Marine Corps today. After serving on the SASS at the MEU, MEB and MEF levels of command, in both FMFLANT and FMFPAC, through numerous exercises and deployments, I have come to one conclusion: COC watch officers, operations officers, G-3's, and especially MAGTF commanders, don't want to hear what an artillery officer has to say about the employment or allocation of aviation. In fact, I believe there is even a general hesitancy to accept the recommendation of the staff air officer, when the issue is outside of his community. After all, "What does a 'rotor-head' know about fighter/attack aircraft?" Or consider a similar axiom, "Jet- jocks know nothing about assault support." Unfortunately, there is another very key aspect of the fire support coordination responsibilities of the MAGTF CE that goes unattended when the SASS does not function as an "agency" with the MAGTF COC - targeting. One of the most significant influences the MAGTF commander can have on shaping the battlefield is through a very active targeting system. The MAGTF CE is the key link to many internal, and almost all of the external, intelligence gathering sources. The target acquisition and target analysis processes, as defined above, must be a continuous, 24 hour-a-day process. The fluidity of the modern battlefield does not allow time for target analysis to be done once a day when a member of the SASS happens to get around to it. But what are some of the specific tasks or duties expected of the other supporting arms representatives on the MAGTF CE staff? They parallel rather closely the duties of their counterparts in an FSCC -- except for the actual terminal clearance of fire missions on targets. The following are examples of the duties of just the artillery officer and the air officer, as they are sufficient to illustrate the similarities. For the Artillery Officer: Normally functions as the fire support officer (FSO), who coordinates the activities of the other members of the SASS. Prepares estimates of supportability, addressing MAGTF- level considerations. Establishes liaison with fire support personnel at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. Supervises the planning process for conduct of the deep and rear battles. Assists the air officer in reviewing offensive air support requirements from elements of the MAGTF. Coordinates with the MAGTF G/S-3 and personnel in the joint intelligence center (JIC) concerning recommendations for target priorities and attack guidance. For the Air Officer: Advises the MAGTF commander on aviation matters. If needed, prepares an aviation estimate of supportability, addressing MAGTF-level considerations. Consolidates MAGTF air support requirements. Establishes liaison with the ACE, the GCE AirO, and the AirOs of higher and adjacent forces headquarters. (6:1-6 -- 1-8) Just looking at the amount of work involved to "consolidate" and "review the offensive" air support requests is a full time job, and to the degree that there are immediate air requests to be sorted out, there is no future planning be done. Similarly, when the AirO is out performing his liaison duties with higher and adjacent headquarters, he is not consolidating air support requirements. So where does that leave the MAGTF command element in regards to its proper and necessary role in fire support coordination? I do not know. However, based on my personal experience and review of the proposed "doctrine" on the subject, the Marine Corps can't get there from here. Yes, traditional functions and responsibilities of an FSCC belong in the GCE, but the loose connotations of the SASS leave to many important functions undone or only partially done. Many of the duties and responsibilities of the individual officers, and the SASS as a whole, are well thought-out and make a good beginning, but more needs to be accomplished. The Marine Corps needs to come to grips with the issue, especially the aspects of fire support planning for the deep battle and active, aggressive targeting. We need to stop hedging around and make our doctrine say what we mean. If what we want is an agency within the MAGTF CE to perform fire support functions, planning and/or coordination, then we need to name it appropriately and treat it like any other agency currently in doctrine. If what we want is the MAGTF CE to perform fire support functions on an informal basis, then we need to drop the name "SASS" and stop expecting to find a thing that isn't. Until the Marine Corps gets its internal act together, we will continue to come up short with the "higher and adjacent" headquarters (read joint community) with whom the MAGTF command element must work. Fire Support Coordination Tasks of the MAGTF CE 1. The establishment of fire support coordination reports, fire support coordination measures (e.g., fire support coordination line) and fire support coordination procedures when existing procedures are inadequate. 2. Tasking of elements of the MAGTF to perform those functions required to integrate supporting arms with each other. 3. Resolving of fire support conflicts between MAGTF elements when these conflicts cannot be resolved at lower levels. 4. Planning for future operations. 5. Recommending to the commander the apportionment of aviation and naval gunfire efforts and where necessary, reallocation of artillery assets belonging to the GCEs when more than on GCE is in the MAGTF. 6. Conducting targeting functions to meet the MAGTF commander's intent. A targeting committee may be formed consisting of representatives from the GCE(s), ACE, CSSE, G-2, and SRI Group. 7. Requests and coordinates external fire support or target acquisition support with higher or adjacent forces. 8. Disseminates pertinent information to other elements of the MAGTF and to forces outside the MAGTF. 9. Planning, in conjunction with the other MAGTF elements, fire support including fire support for rear security. The focus of the planning is usually deeper than the fire support planning conducted by the other elements. Figure 1 Duties of a Fire Support Coordinator 1. Advising the commander on fire support. 2. Coordinating the preparation of estimates of supportability. 3. After receiving the commander's concept of operations, preparing the fire support plan, with assistance from the supporting arms representatives. 4. Ensuring that fire support plans can be implemented with the fire support means available and , if necessary, coordinating with the operations officer (G/S-3) and the commander to secure additional means or to modify plans. 5. Recommending fire support coordination measures to the commander. 6. Working with the operations officer as he establishes boundaries, as these will impact on fire support coordination measures. 7. Providing clearance on requests for fire missions and airstrikes from subordinate units. Coordinating clearance, when required, with senior and adjacent units. This may be delegated to the appropriate supporting arms representative. 8. Disseminating target information received through FSCC channels to other staff agencies and commands requiring the information. 9. Advising the commander on the selection of targets, attack guidance/target precedence. 10. Maintains close liaison and working relations with the operations officer and the intelligence officer to ensure the most effective planning and application of fire support. Figure 2 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Department of the Army. Headquarters Department of the Army. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations, FM 6-20- 30. Washington, D.C., 1989. 2. Department of Defense. Office of the Chairman the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02. Washington, D.C., 1989. 3. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, FMFM 0-1. Washington, D.C., 1979. 4. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Warfighting, FMFM 1. Washington, D.C., 1989. 5. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Training and Education Center. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. MAGTF Education Publication History of the MAGTF. Quantico, 1989. 6. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Fire Support Coordination by the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command Element, FMFM 2-7A (Coordinating Draft). Quantico, 1990. 7. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations, FMFM 2-7 (Coordinating Draft). Quantico, 1990. 8. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination, FMFM 6-18 (Draft). Quantico, 1990. 9. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Fire Support Coordination by a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), OH 7-1. Quantico, 1983. 10. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force, OH 2. Quantico, 1987.
