The Deception Of Detente' AUTHOR LCDR James R. McMillan, Jr., USN CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE DECEPTION OF DETENTE' I. Purpose: To establish the validity for NATO to maintain its military strength in Europe until the military threat posed by the Soviet Union has been reduced by substantiated reforms. II. Problem: The West has seized the opportunity, during an era of reduced tensions in Europe, to reap 'peace dividends' by cutting defense budgets and reducing their military force structure. The result is a weakened NATO, potentially incapable of repelling military adventurism by the Soviet Union. III. Data: Separating the reality from the rhetoric of Soviet reforms is difficult, if not impossible. Despite claims to the contrary, Soviet defense spending continues to increase in real terms by 3% annually, accounting for as much as 17% of the GNP. Soviet efforts to convert to a civilian industrial base were unsuccessful due to insufficient funding, while annual economic and military aid to client states, such as Cuba and Vietnam, exceeds $15 billion (1989). Glasnost has continued to face tough resistance at all levels of government. Opposition parties still have not been permitted to run candidates, thereby allowing the Communist Party to maintain its control over the new Soviet democracy. Although Soviet foreign policy has garnered the most reform laurels, the Soviet Union has failed to control one of its major beneficiaries (Iraq) and continues to support client states hostile to the West. The Soviets claim they will only maintain a force adequate for unquestionable defense, yet Soviet military production continues to double that of NATO. The Soviet Union is improving strategic offensive ballistic missile systems and continues to add advanced ballistic missile submarines and sophisticated naval combatants to their inventory. IV. Conclusions: The Soviet Union has not ended the Cold War; they have only changed the format. By establishing closer ties and reducing tensions with the West, the Soviet Union has used diplomacy to reduce Western defense spending. The Soviets are currently exercising financial `load-shedding' by reducing their worldwide military presence. The Soviets are substituting quantity with quality in their military arsenal, using their 'peace dividends' to enhance weapon quality and continue their support of client states hostile to Western interests. V. Recommendations: The U.S. and its Western allies must provide the Soviets with an atmosphere favorable for the success of Perestroika, Glasnost, and the reforms in foreign policy and military force structure. The West must not, however, allow Soviet reform propaganda to weaken the political ties and military strength of NATO. The military presence and strength that has maintained peace in Europe for over 40 years should continue until the reality can be distinguished from the rhetoric of Soviet reforms. THE DECEPTION OF DETENTE' OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Although pro-Western trends in the Soviet Union appear to be bringing the Cold War to an end, a prudent Western Alliance should maintain its military strength until reality can be distinguished from the rhetoric of Soviet reforms. I. Changes in the Soviet Union A. Long standing policies and doctrine B. Events within the Warsaw Bloc C. Soviet leadership D. Cold War II. Economic Restructuring A. Perestroika B. Market Economy C. Centralized control D. Military versus civilian industrial base E. Public perception by the West F. Military spending trends G. U.S./USSR GNP comparisons H. Economic aid to client states III. Political/Government Reform A. Glasnost B. Tolerance for diverse political views C. Democratization Soviet-style D. Legislative process E. Communist Party resistance to change F. Gorbachev nears dictator status IV. Foreign Policy A. Diplomatic changes B. Troop withdrawals C. Soviet position during Coalition war with Iraq D. Soviet opportunities in Latin America E. Warsaw Pact nations V. Military Overhaul A. Reductions in deployed nuclear and conventional arms B. NATO military reductions C. Impact on U.S. military capabilities D. Advances in Soviet weapons and delivery platforms VI. Soviet Reforms -- Reality or Rhetoric A. Changes to the Cold War format B. Possible Soviet motives C. Stability of the Western Alliance THE DECEPTION OF DETENTE' Soviet troops, tanks, and missiles are leaving Eastern Europe and are heading back to the Soviet Union. The Berlin Wall and its guards are gone, and Germany is united under a single flag. The U.S. and the Soviet Union were allied against a third world threat! Is this the Soviet Union we have known for nearly fifty years, and is Nobel Peace Prize winner Mikhail Gorbachev the type of leader that the West would expect to see live to political maturity in the Soviet Union? For decades the United States and our Western Allies have been playing economic hardball with the Soviet Union, and now we seem to be only one out away from a stunning victory in the forty-five year old Cold War.(3:9, 4:7) The sudden changes in Soviet economics, internal politics, foreign policy, and the military have removed the certainty with which the West could evaluate the Soviet threat.(4:3-5) Western public opinion of the Soviet Union has shifted from that of an 'evil empire' to that of a remorseful former foe who now wants to seek peace and prosperity. Peace and prosperity for whom and for how long are questions the West should be pondering. Although pro-Western trends in the Soviet Union appear to be bringing the Cold War to an end, a prudent Western Alliance should maintain its military strength until reality can be distinguished from the rhetoric of Soviet reforms. Through economic restructuring (Perestroika), the Soviet Union is attempting to overhaul its grossly inefficient economic system. Centralized decision-making was purportedly the primary cause for the failure of the economy, but a technologically antiquated industrial base and a monetary system that are incompatible with the world market also share in the blame for economic failure.(3:9-11) We may accept the shortcomings of the ruble; however, closer scrutiny of the Soviet economic blunder would indicate that the real problem with the economy may not lie with decision-makers and outdated industry, but more so with a massive defense budget and the monopolization of industrial might by the military.(8:4) Soviet defense spending has increased steadily for the past twenty five years.(4:4) In 1988 alone, the Soviet Union spent the equivalent of $300 billion on their military programs. Under Gorbachev, total military spending has continued to increase in real terms at an annual rate of 3 percent, while the U.S. has experienced a steady decline in excess of 11 percent annually. It has also been estimated by Western sources that in 1989, Soviet military spending represented as much as 17 percent of their gross national product (GNP). This figure is nearly twice the estimate that the Soviets officially reported. U.S. military expenditures for the same time period equated to less than 6 percent of the U.S. GNP.(3:33, 4:4-5) According to Nikolai Petrakov, an economic advisor to President Gorbachev, the Soviet economy needs a massive injection of at least $10 to $12 million to pay for consumer goods to achieve any significant progress in the Soviets transition to a Western market economy. $12 million seems insignificant when this same economy has pumped on an annual basis as much as $5.5 billion (1988) in military and economic aid to Cuba.(3:24) An additional $10 billion is also provided to other clients such as Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Ethiopia.(4:5) Even the most elementary economist could surmise that trimming a little fat from the $15 billion in handouts to regional outcasts could provide the financial impetus to give the Soviet economy its much needed shot in the arm. Since the needs of Cuba out-weigh the needs of a struggling Soviet economy and the lofty goals of Perestroika, we might ask ourselves what purpose the Castro regime continues to serve in the Soviet grand strategy, For over two years, the Soviet leadership has boasted of their military reforms and ongoing efforts to convert the economy from a military emphasis to civilian production. They have also aired an overly optimistic goal to reform the Soviet economy in as little as 500 days. This crash program was proposed by prominent Soviet economist Stanislav Shatalin and endorsed by President Gorbachev in support of his own economic Perestroika. A recent Defense News interview with Vladimir Lopatin, a member of the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies and an advisor to President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Republic, indicates several contradictions (`big gaps' as he calls them) between Kremlin words and deeds. The former Soviet Army major cited that currently no established government agency, institution, or committee is capable of implementing or overseeing military reforms in the central government of the Soviet Union. Lopatin further indicated that efforts to convert the economy from military to civilian production have actually been undermined in recent moves by President Gorbachev. (9:18) In September 1990, President Gorbachev approved a state conversion program without consulting Soviet legislators or government departments affected by the program. The program, designed to shift the economy to civilian production vice military, provided $14 billion for the conversion effort. This gesture played well with Western press initiatives to show the new face of the Soviet Union, but it did not, however, fare so well with the Soviet legislators who had expected at least $64 billion to ensure the success of the program. With one hand (Gorbachev) is voting for the market economy, and with the other hand he is signing the decision on the preservation of the military-industrial complex," Lopatin says, "This sort of approach practically dooms Perestroika."(9:18) The policy of Glasnost (openness) is an outward indication that the Soviet Union is beginning to exhibit greater tolerance for and recognizes the potential value of diverse political views. Demokratizatsia (democratization) has surfaced as a new word in the official party dictionary. Democratization, in the Soviet sense, can in no way be compared to the Western version, but it has opened the door for public participation in the party's political processes. Voters are now being provided with a choice in most elections. Contested elections are even held for the Congress of People's Deputies, a legislative body of 2,250 deputies that meets annually. From this group of elected officials, the Supreme Soviet is elected and may now serve up to eight months per year. President Gorbachev also intends to expand the role of the Supreme Soviet commissions to include participation in the decision-making processes of foreign policy and strategic planning. Further advances on the local and regional level include the shift of many previously appointed political positions to elective positions and the establishment of a commonwealth of sovereign states within the Soviet Union. (3:11) The success of Glasnost in the Soviet Union is extremely critical to the security of Europe and other Western interests. Tough resistance to political change currently exists at every level of government from local party bosses up to the central committee, posing a considerable threat to the success of Glasnost. Gorbachev's sweeping political changes, supposedly for the betterment of the governed people, has helped build an extremely powerful political base from which the President can operate and control the affairs of state. From this position of political power, Gorbachev can implement his economic reforms and 'regulate' the degree and speed of success of his other reform programs.(3:11) Despite the pronounced frustration with communism and the appearance of the democratic institution of a voting public, the Communist Party remains in power. The predominant reason political control is maintained is not because the people want it that way, but because no opposition political parties have been tolerated by the incumbent. The people may vote for the candidate of their choice, but all the choices are party members. Thus, the Communist Party remains in control of all governing bodies.(3:11) The advantage of Glasnost and the limited public participation in the nation's politics is that the central government can now hold the public, as well as local officials, responsible for the success or failure of their local and regional governments. The reduction of public unrest and hostility toward the central government and Communist Party would also be a welcome by-product of the new political openness. Soviet foreign policy has taken on a new perspective in recent years. Normalization of relations with China, setting up diplomatic ties with South Korea, and the agreement to restore consular relations with Israel are just a few of their diplomatic initiatives. Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait provided the Soviet Union with an excellent opportunity to show the world the sincerity of its desire to cooperate with the West in reducing regional tensions. With the world watching, the Soviet Union exchanged diplomatic visits with Baghdad to try to solve the conflict peaceably. The Soviets even voted with the United States on United Nations sanctions, condemnations, and resolutions against Iraq. The final act required to erase Western doubts about Soviet sincerity would have been for the Soviets to take a stand either financially or militarily against their client state Iraq. With the Soviet Union as his chief benefactor, a decisive stand by the Soviets could have sent a message that even Saddam Hussein may not have been able to overlook. In the Coalition's war with Iraq, the Soviet Union sent a misleading and unfortunate message to Saddam Hussein. They left their military advisors on station in Iraq. Soviet military support was never publicly offered to U.S. or coalition forces, and financial support of this magnitude was probably never considered. The Soviets could have chosen to remain silent and continue to work the diplomatic front, but instead they chose to let their ambassador to the United States publicly challenge the U.S.' intent in the war, asserting that excessive force was being used against Iraq. This statement could have been extremely detrimental to Arab unity within the coalition, but fortunately, the Soviet outburst was ignored and the coalition remained intact. Saddam Hussein continued his uncompromising stance, with what he may have believed to be the indirect support of the Soviet Union, only to lose the stability of his own country as well as Iraq's newly founded 19th Province. Opportunity knocked for the Soviet Union to take a stand on the side of 'right' and 'might', but the call went unanswered. Why? Many reasons may exist as to why the Soviets failed to seize the opportunity afforded them by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The true reason, or reasons, may never be known, but the many possibilities that come to mind lead to some interesting questions. Did the Soviets underestimate the U.S./Coalition resolve to free Kuwait? Did they underestimate the U.S.' ability to keep Israel out of the war, and thereby hold a coalition force together? Or did the Soviets think that Iraq could actually win the war? These are all good questions that provoke thought, but all are unanswerable from our vantage point. The one thing that has been answered is that when an opportunity was provided for the Soviet Union to show its sincerity in the quest for regional peace, they opted to sit (not stand) behind their client state, allowing the U.S. to jump into what could have been another Vietnam. The Soviets, although lacking in the Middle-East, have made some significant overtures for reducing tensions in Latin America. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista Government was persuaded by Moscow to hold free elections. Moscow has also urged a reluctant Castro to implement major economic and political reforms. Whenever Soviet desires are met with resistance, a corresponding reduction in military and economic air may be in order. At face value these actions may seem impressive, considering that they are positive and are conducted in the Western Hemisphere. Regardless of the fanfare, the Soviets still view Latin America, especially Cuba, as a strategic goldmine.(4:19) Many Latin American countries are economic and political disasters, needing and waiting for a helping hand. Reduced military obligations in Eastern Europe may provide the financial impetus for the Soviet Union to expand its influence through economic aid to Latin American countries, and with U.S.-Soviet relations on an upswing, there may also be less hesitation on the part of these countries to cooperate with the Soviets. Experts at the art of propaganda, the Soviets claim that their new foreign policy contributed to the unification of East and West Germany into a single German state. As a result of other actions taken on their part, the Soviets also accept credit for the many new governments that have emerged among their Warsaw Pact allies. They further claim that it should now be clear to the world that their new foreign policy and military activity are not frivolous, but are in earnest and meant to last over the long-haul.(2:33) To cut the noose from around the neck of a man you have just hung is hardly grounds to accept credit for saving his life. Germany has only returned to the state in which it existed prior to the Soviet occupation at the end of World War II. The reunification was not as a result of Soviet good will or revised foreign policy, but rather the product of economic bankruptcy on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has done nothing more that lighten its external load so that it may financially reinforce internal reforms and militarily quell civil unrest throughout the union.(4:11-13) As to the clarity of its actions, a detailed look at the `reforms' and `cutbacks' within their military structure makes a perfectly clear picture of the Soviet's true intent! From a military perspective, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Eastern Europe, coupled with the reduction of deployed conventional and nuclear armament, indicate a new direction in the way the Soviets intend to do business. The Soviet Union now assures the West that they will only maintain a military force sufficient enough to leave no doubt as to the Soviet Union's ability to defend itself.(2:33, 4:62) The dividends from such actions will undoubtedly go beyond the Soviet Union's wildest estimates and expectations. NATO has already initiated the transfer of thousands of pieces of military hardware from Central Europe to NATO countries in Northern and Southern Europe, in compliance with the spirit of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty. Although this is an opportunity for several NATO countries to update their weapons inventory, it also serves to draw on vital U.S. war reserves stored in Germany.(5:36) Even prior to these cuts, the Soviets were breathing a sigh of relief. Most notably, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, former Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army and current arms control advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev, stated, "The NATO Bloc has changed. It is no longer a military union in constant readiness. . ."(1:26) Whether the General's assessment is correct or not is not important. What is important is the Soviet Union's perception of the strength and conviction of the NATO alliance. Has NATO lost too much of its military leverage already? How long before NATO will begin observing the first of many Soviet treaty violations, coupled with major slowdowns and fabricated obstacles at the bargaining table?(6:1) Although the U.S. refuses to hold talks with the Soviet Union on cuts in naval forces, the propaganda of Soviet military reforms has provided the Congress of the United States the impetus it needs to give the Soviets exactly what they seek. As a result of cuts to the defense budget, the U.S. Navy will experience cuts to surface combatants that will bring force strength down to a level not seen since the start of World War II. Beginning in 1992, an entire class of anti-submarine warfare frigates is scheduled to be eliminated. Forty of the forty eight will be sold or mothballed, while the remaining eight will go to the reserve fleet. All four of the Iowa Class battleships, the main battery for naval gunfire support in amphibious operations, are scheduled to be returned to mothballs.(7:4) The amphibious capability of the U.S. Navy has been in steady decline since our massive military presence in Europe began decades ago, and in view of continued budget cuts, it is highly unlikely that this trend will change. With loses in amphibious capability, loses in naval gunfire support ships, and an army that no longer stands guard in formidable numbers in Europe, how will the U.S. get back into Europe when the Soviet Union decides that opportunity knocks? The most publicized of all Soviet reforms has been the reduction of their vast arsenal of weapons. Tank production has been cut in half, down to about 1,700 annually. Artillery and multiple rocket launcher output has also been reduced, but at a much less significant level. Even the tremendous nuclear capability of the Soviet Union is being scaled down with respect to the total numbers of missiles. Although the cutbacks seem to reinforce the `new thinking' of the Soviet Union toward reducing the threat, again we must go beyond the headlines. A reduction of 50% in tank output pales insignificant when this new figure of 1,700 tanks is still double the annual output of NATO. Obsolescent tanks are being eliminated on a unilateral basis, but serve only to aid in standardizing and modernizing the reorganized army. Some minor increases in antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile systems have also been observed, but the real eye-opener is the Soviet advances in strategic offensive missile systems.(4:5,35-36, 11:23) The removal of vast numbers of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe by both the West and the Soviet Union has served to accelerate the spirit of detente' and reduce the chance of global conflict. This is certainly good news for Europe, but what about the threat to the United States?(4:4) What about the thousands of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) currently stockpiled in the Soviet inventory? The Soviets' present capability could destroy the United States in the span of thirty minutes. Is it any surprise that the Soviet Union considers their strategic nuclear capability to be their number one concern?(4:7, 10:11-15) The Soviet Union is currently upgrading their entire ICBM force. They are now focusing on greater yields, mobility for enhanced system survivability, and an increased warhead capability for existing weapons. Older weapons are being destroyed, and the destruction is well documented for propaganda sake. The production rate, however, of more modern strategic offensive missile systems such as the SS-18, -24, and -25 ICBM's and the SS-N-21 and -23 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), have not changed in the past two years. To ensure the delivery and survivability of these systems, the Soviet Union has continued to maintain its ship production; producing larger, more sophisticated combatants and submarines.(3:34-35, 4:5,36,51-56) For a country on the brink of economic disaster, the failure to reap `peace dividends' in their nuclear output adds considerable uncertainty about the `new thinking' of the Soviet Union and should be taken as a warning to the United States, if not all Western nations. The media has had a field day with the new Soviet initiatives in foreign policy and military cutbacks. Unfortunately, if we look past the photogenic smiles and hand-shaking sessions, we can find many reasons to view these maneuvers with caution and some alarm. Let us not assume for even a minute that one morning the Soviets woke up and decided that the West was no longer a threat, and that our form of government, our economic programs, and military structure were compatible with Soviet interests.(4:100-102) The Soviets have been dueling with the West for quite a while now, and all it has accomplished is to solidify the Western Alliance and destroy the Soviet economy.(4:47) Although it may not be as overt as it once was, the Cold War is still on, but continues under a different format. Soviet military and economic aid will continue to support client states hostile to Western interests.(4:17) Soviet normalization with regional foes will simply remove an immediate threat to the national security of the Soviet Union and allow time for military cutbacks and a budget-breather for Soviet defense spending.(3:31) When NATO countries respond in kind with immediate military cutbacks (for the sake of saving a buck), we fall right in line with the revised Soviet game plan.(8:2-15) Closer diplomatic ties and business relations with the West has also opened the door for the eventual transfer of sensitive military technology.(4:11) This technology will certainly aid in Soviet military modernization and contribute exponentially to reductions in defense research and development spending. It does not require a defense analyst to surmise at this point that the advantages the Soviets can gain through normal relations by far exceed the gains they made in prior tactics against the West. With current economic conditions as they are in the United States and other Western nations, the Soviets could have picked no better time and format to initiate their grand deception through diplomacy. We can applaud the new direction the Soviets have taken and wish them the best for the success of Perestroika and Glasnost, for both must succeed. Successful Perestroika, without corresponding advances towards a Western-style democratization, could produce an empire more economically and militarily formidable than the combined assets of the Western Alliance.(3:11,143) The West should therefore view the Soviet reforms and proclaimed successes with great caution and scrutiny. Our allied military strength has kept peace in Europe for over 45 years, and to lessen our resolve at the first signs of reduced tensions implies weakness and a breakdown in a long-standing, effective coalition. Weakness provides opportunity, and opportunity for the Soviet Union has often provoked adventurism and on occasion, war. Let the West maintain its defense and encourage continued Soviet reforms and friendly initiatives. Make the Soviet Union show us the reality, and not the rhetoric, of Perestroika and Glasnost before the West jeopardizes a peace we have worked so hard to preserve. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Akhromeyev, Sergei. Cold War Traces Linger in West. Defense News, October 29, 1990. 2. Akhromeyev, Sergei. U.S.-Soviet Ties Slowly Evolve. Defense News, March 11, 1991. 3. Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power, 1989. Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 1989. 4. Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power 1990. Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 1990. 5. Hitchens, Theresa. NATO to Move Weapons from Central Europe. Defense News, December 17, 1990. 6. Hitchens, Theresa, and George Leopold. Soviet Treaty Compliance Threatens SNF Talks. Defense News, March 11, 1991. 7. Holzer, Robert. Navy to Shrink Surface Ship Fleet to 55-Year Low. Defense News, December 3, 1990. 8. Kipp, Jacob W. Where Then is the Threat?: Soviet Military Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era. Military Review, December 1990. 9. Leopold, George. Ex-Soviet Major Says Kremlin is Stifling Military Reform. Defense News, October 15, 1990. 10. Powell, Colin L., General, USA, CJCS. Enduring Realities, Enduring Defense Needs. Defense 90. Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September/October 1990. 11. Zaloga, Steven J. Soviet Military Developments: The Case of the Vanishing Tanks. Armed Forces Journal International, March 1991.
