Reconnaissance Personnel Shortfalls AUTHOR Major James P. McIntyre, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Manpower EXECUTIVE SUMMARY RECONNAISSANCE PERSONNEL SHORTFALLS Mission preparation is a key element in the success or failure of an operation. Reconnaissance provides the commander key elements of information that will enable the development of a thorough operation plan. The key to a strong reconnaissance unit is experienced and well trained reconnaissance personnel. The Marine Corps acknowledges the importance of reconnaissance. Reconnaissance battalions and separate companies' Tables of Organization have been created to support the increasing roles of the Marine Corps across the broad spectrum of today's conflicts. In a time of mandated reductions in service strength, the Marine Corps has increased the size and missions of its reconnaissance units. However, the current manning and training of the existing reconnaissance units does not support the increases in the Tables of Organization or missions. In order to ensure it has the requisite reconnaissance skills to perform all assigned tasks, the Marine Corps must initiate new assignment policies and restructure its present reconnaissance organizations. The solutions to the Marine Corps reconnaissance problems are the establishment of a primary military occupational skill for reconnaissance personnel, restructuring of Marine reconnaissance units, and the utilization of standardized training packages. These changes will create a career path that can be tracked by monitors, an all source reconnaissance organization, and a training pipeline that will be cost effective and concentrate on sustainment rather than indoctrination training. RECONNAISSANCE PERSONNEL SHORTFALLS OUTLINE Thesis Statement. In a time of mandated reductions in service strength, the Marine Corps has increased the size and missions of its reconnaissance units. However, the current manning and training of the existing reconnaissance units does not support the increase in the tables of organization or missions. In order to ensure it has the requisite reconnaissance skills to perform all assigned tasks, the Marine Corps must initiate new assignment policies and restructure its present reconnaissance architecture. I. USMC view of reconnaissance units. A. Infantry units with enhanced skills. B. Reconnaissance considered a secondary military occupational skill. II. USMC current assignment policies to reconnaissance units. A. Assignment is not HQMC directed. B. Assignment is directed by MEF's resulting in billets not being filled by the most qualified personnel. III. USMC reconnaissance structure. A. Size and scope of reconnaissance units were increased in 1987 by HQMC. B. HQMC did not provide dedicated personnel to fill the billets. C. Manning levels have not kept pace with the current HQMC restructuring. IV. Crux of the reconnaissance personnel problem: HQMC failure to assign reconnaissance a primary MOS. A. Personnel strengths are unstabilized. B. Reconnaissance units need to be restructured. C. Specialized MOS training programs need to be standardized. V. Current USMC reconnaissance problems can be rapidly corrected. A. Assignment of a primary MOS by HQMC. B. Merging force reconnaissance company and reconnaissance battalion. 1. To centralize reconnaissance efforts. 2. To form the foundation for a reconnaissance career pipeline. Mission preparation is a key element in the success or failure of an operation. Reconnaissance provides the commander key elements of information that will enable the development of a thorough operation plan. The key to a strong reconnaissance unit is experienced and well trained reconnaissance personnel. The Marine Corps acknowledges the importance of reconnaissance. Reconnaissance battalions and separate companies' Tables of Organization have been created to support the increasing roles of the Marine Corps across the broad spectrum of today's conflicts. In a time of mandated reductions in service strength, the Marine Corps has increased the size and missions of its reconnaissance units. However, the current manning and training of the existing reconnaissance units do not support the increase in the Tables of Organization or missions. In order to ensure it has the requisite reconnaissance skills to perform all assigned tasks, the Marine Corps must initiate new assignment policies and restructure its present reconnaissance architecture. The Marine Corps has always viewed reconnaissance units as infantry units with enhanced capabilities. Assignment to both the force reconnaissance company and reconnaissance battalion is not driven by centralized standards. Mainstream Marine Corps philosophy has been that reconnaissance Marines are basically infantrymen with some additional training, and there has been great resistance to creating a primary military occupational specialty (MOS) with its own unique requirements or career path.1 Accordingly, assignment to these units has not always been Headquarters Marine Corps directed, but often sourced internally by Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters assigning unit quotas to fill reconnaissance units. This method has proven to be inadequate. Commanders are reluctant to provide quality Marines whose loss will degradate the parent unit's capability to fill its critical billets. As a result, many reconnaissance billets are filled with second-string players or remain vacant. Many qualified Marines who have extensive reconnaissance backgrounds are lost due to reassignment. This problem persists due to the high rate of personnel turnover and the time required to train a reconnaissance Marine. Marines are managed by the Manpower Department at Headquarters largely by their primary MOS. A Marine is eligible for transfer after two years on station which is about the length of the reconnaissance training cycle when one attends the various schools (Amphibious Reconnaissance, Airborne, SCUBA, Ranger). If his next assignment is based as it normally is on his primary MOS, it may remove him from the reconnaissance community. Some attempts have been made to monitor the secondary MOS, but this effort has been unsuccessful, especially with the need to fill out infantry battalions for unit deployment. The assignment of the 0321/8654 MOS as a primary MOS would allow more reconnaissance Marines to remain in billets they have been trained for and enable them to use skills they have been taught.2 Marines who remain in reconnaissance units for long periods of time are viewed by many of their seniors as mavericks. The Marine Corps is very parochial in its thinking. Extended duty outside an individual's primary MOS is viewed with skepticism and is considered career damaging. As a result, many experi- enced reconnaissance Marines are attrited by promotion boards. The Marine Corps has established its reconnaissance doctrine in FMFM 2-2. Initially, the reconnaissance battalion was tasked with the mission of conducting ground surveillance in support of the Marine division and the force reconnaissance company was tasked with the mission of conducting preassault operations and deep reconnaissance operations to support the landing force. In March, 1979, FMFM 2-2 was reviewed and both reconnaissance units were assigned the following generic missions: Collecting information about the enemy. Engagement of the enemy by supporting arms. Capture of selected prisoners. Implant sensors and beacons. Conduct specialized terrain reconnaissance including beach, road, route, and helicopter landing zones/drop zone reconnaissance missions. Conduct initial terminal guidance operations. Conduct special missions as required.3 In 1985, the Marine Expeditionary Unit Specialized Operational Capable MEU (SOC) was created by the Marine Corps and the special missions assigned to reconnaissance units in FMFM 2-2 with Change 1 were defined as follows: The MEU (SOC) must be able, in an extremis situation, to conduct an emergency hostage recovery mission from extended ranges, at night, under EMCOM conditions to rescue hostages and expeditiously withdraw and transport them to amphibious shipping or another safe haven.4 To properly prepare for and accomplish these missions, the Marine Corps needs a stabilized and well trained reconnaissance community. The crux of the Marine Corps reconnaissance problem lies in its inability to recognize that reconnaissance skills are perishable, and it is-more cost effective to maintain skills than it is to constantly indoctrinate and train new personnel. Training a reconnaissance Marine is quite expensive. If the reconnaissance Marine attends the Amphibious Reconnaissance, SCUBA, Airborne, and Ranger Schools, the cost can easily exceed $75,000 per man.5 Within the last three years, the Marine Corps has created an additional company for the reconnaissance battalions assigned to the First and Second Marine Divisions and five additional force reconnaissance platoons for the force reconnaissance companies assigned to the First and Second Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Groups. However, the present manning levels of the reconnaissance units Marine Corps-wide cannot support the Tables of Organization that existed prior to the recent organizational expansion. The attainment of suitable manning levels for reconnaissance units is complicated by the extensive entry-level skill training an individual needs to be in an operational status. The skills gained during the Marine's initial reconnaissance tour must be enhanced to prepare him to function in a force reconnaissance unit. The average tour length for a Marine assigned to a reconnaissance unit is two years. Approximately two thirds of the Marines who successfully complete their tours never again serve in another reconnaissance billet. The remaining one-third are assigned to force reconnaissance units for a follow-on three year tour. Once reassigned, these Marines will receive additional specialized training before assignment to an operational platoon. If a Marine is retained for a second tour and is assigned to a direct-action platoon, he will receive over one year of intensive training--at a cost in excess of $100,000--to prepare the individual for the emergency hostage recovery mission. On paper, the Marine Corps has increased the missions and size of its reconnaissance units, but it has failed to ensure that the billets created are filled with properly trained Marines. As a result, the Marine Corps reconnaissance capabilities have been degraded due to personnel shortages. The solutions to the Marine Corps reconnaissance problems are the establishment of a primary MOS for reconnaissance, restructuring of Marine reconnaissance units, and utilization of standardized training packages. These ideas have been discussed and briefed on numerous occasions but have been rejected by traditionalists within the Marine Corps. The initial objections were that basic infantry skills were being over-specialized. The initial objections were reinforced by the fear that recognition of reconnaissance as a primary MOS would create a group of elitist. With the advent of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOC), these arguments were expanded to state this if the Marine Corps establishes reconnaissance as a primary MOS, the Marines assigned to direct-action platoons could be lost to USSOC. These arguments are irrelevant today. Reconnaissance is much more than a refinement of infantry skills; the demanding MOS criteria established by the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES), the Marine Corps Maritime Special Purpose Force Tasks, Conditions and Standards and the Joint Fleet Marine Force Atlantic and Pacific Standardized Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable Training Handbook requires extensive training in explosive, electronics, communications, marksmanship and specialized entry and extraction techniques. In today's joint environment, the argument that Marines will be absorbed by USSOC is even more irrelevant. The Marine Corps Campaign Plan of June, 1989 develops a forward looking strategy for the Marine Corps that places great emphasis on joint operations across the broad spectrum of conflict. Prior to 1987, the Army Special Forces faced the same problems Marine reconnaissance units are confronted with today. The Special Forces were undermanned and ill trained. Billets were filled by unrestricted combat MOS's and often gapped. To correct this problem, the Army in 1987 designated Special Forces as a primary combat branch. As a result, all staffing requirements were filled, training was standardized and Special Forces Groups were regionally orientated. This move has paid dividends. In three years time, billets have been stabilized, personnel assigned to the units have been placed in a career pipeline, and training has been standardized to ensure each Special Forces Group maintains and possesses the same basic skills. These moves have institutionalized a formidable force that has not only strengthened the Army's combat effectiveness but USSOC's as well. The Marine Corps must follow the Army's example. In the long term, a primary reconnaissance MOS may need to be established. Manpower policies should be revised to serve training and operational needs, not the convenience or management philosophies of remote headquarters. 6 Initially, present manning shortfalls can be augmented by Headquarters Marine Corps screening personnel files and assigning experienced Marines to reconnaissance units. However, this administrative action can only be an interim measure. To ensure long-term personnel stability in reconnaissance units, Headquarters Marine Corps must institute procedures to develop a career program for the reconnaissance community. The career program must be structured to guarantee stability of personnel assignments in the reconnaissance community. To accomplish this Headquarters Marine Corps must develop a personnel pipeline that assures early identification of potential enlisted and officer candidates for assignment in the reconnaissance field. Once the candidates are screened and placed in a training pipeline, occupational field sponsors must track their progress. Marines who successfully complete their initial reconnaissance tour should be assigned follow-on assignments of greater responsi- bility within the reconnaissance community. To ensure long-term personnel stability in reconnaissance units, monitors at Headquarters Marine Corps in concert with the reconnaissance primary MOS occupational field sponsors must institute the issuance of by-name orders for all personnel required to fill reconnaissance billets. FMFM 2-2 with Change 1 has narrowed the focus of the reconnaissance battalion and the force reconnaissance company missions. However, the FMFM fails to recognize that one unit with the proper manning and skill levels can accomplish all the missions that are currently assigned to two distinct units who are opcon to two separate commanders. While reconnaissance forces have been with us for many years, they have never been properly organized, trained or used in a manner that exploits their potential.7 To enhance the Marine Corps manpower efforts to establish a primary reconnaissance MOS and a training and occupational field pipeline, it is incumbent on Headquarters Marine Corps to develop an organizational structure that parallels manpowers efforts. The present organization of reconnaissance units creates areas of interest that will hinder the development of a strong reconnaissance community with a primary MOS. This situation not only stymies the development of a primary reconnaissance MOS but additionally hinders the Marine Corps efforts to adhere to the present Marine Corps Campaign Plan. The campaign plan places great emphasis on reconnaissance units to provide Marine Corps MAGTF's with Special Operation Capabilities (SOC) that can either complement USSOC operations through interoperability or support. To ensure the Marine Corps can easily manage a primary reconnaissance MOS and has the formidable resources to support the reconnaissance requirements of MAGTF's SOC and USSOC, the present reconnaissance organizational structure must be redesigned. The present reconnaissance units within the Fleet Marine Force must be composited to create one all source recon- naissance battalion that is assigned to each Marine Expedition- ary Force. The merging of the units will create reconnaissance battalions capable of providing tailored reconnaissance packages. These packages will support the missions stated in FMFM 2-2 with Change 1 and the reconnaissance requirements outlined in the Marine Corps Campaign Plan. The formulation of the sole source reconnaissance battalions will provide an excellent basis for enhancing the training programs and the warfighting skills of the Marines assigned. Additionally, restructuring will enable monitors to easily track a Marine's career and ensure that all reconnaissance billets are filled with competent individuals. The establishment of a primary MOS and the reorganization of the present reconnaissance battalions will assist in the standardization of training. The focus will be redirected toward maintenance of perishable reconnaissance warfighting skills. Less time will be lost to indoctrination training and formal schools, and more time devoted to sustainment training and to perfecting perishable specialized skills. The key for standardized training is to ensure that no matter to what unit an individual is assigned, he will not have to be retrained in his basic reconnaissance skills. The Marine Corps must establish a progressive training program that complements the establishment of a primary reconnaissance MOS. The program must be geared to ensure continuity from initial entry into reconnaissance units through placement in direct-action platoons. The organizations to implement and oversee this training are already in place and are resident in the Landing Force Training Commands and the Special Operation Training Groups of each Marine Expeditionary Force. The courses of instruction to ensure the reconnaissance Marines are properly trained are outlined in the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System; the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Fleet Marine Force Pacific Standardized Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable Training Handbook; and the Marine Corps Maritime Special Purpose Force Tasks, Conditions and Standards. The Marine Corps reconnaissance problems do not require a herculean effort to remedy. The hard part was accomplished when Headquarters Marine Corps realized that to meet current mission taskings the current reconnaissance units Tables of Organization must be increased. To ensure that reconnaissance units are mission capable, existing billets must be filled with quality Marines. Headquarters Marine Corps needs to establish a primary reconnaissance MOS, fill existing billets, restructure its reconnaissance units and utilize standardized training packages to ensure the personnel are properly trained. These simple actions will provide the ground commander with well-trained reconnaissance Marines. ENDNOTES 1 "Marine Corps Reconnaissance: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," Marine Corps Gazette (October 1988), p. 63. 2 "Does Reconnaissance Need Fixing?," Marine Corps Gazette (January 1988), p. 48. 3 FMFM 2-1: Amphibious Reconnaissance, p. 8, Ch 1. 4 Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Standardized Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations (MEU(SOC)) Training Handbook, p. I-3. 5 "Does Reconnaissance Need Fixing?," Marine Corps Gazette (January 1988), p. 48. 6 "Does Reconnaissance Need Fixing?," Marine Corps Gazette (January 1988), p. 48. 7 "Fixing the Reconnaissance Problem," Marine Corps Gazette (January 1988), p. 44. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books FMFM-1. Warfighting, 1990. FMFM 2-2 with Change 1. Amphibious Reconnaissance, 1979. Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Standardized Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operational Capable (MEU(SOC)) Training Handbook, 1989. Magazines Coates, Robert J., Capt, USMC. "Does Reconnaissance Need Fixing?,"Marine Corps Gazette, (January 1988), 47-48. Flanagan, Neil G., Sgt, USMC. "The Right Manpower Source," Marine Corps Gazette, (January 1988), 46. Flores, Susan J., Major, USMC. "Marine Corps Reconnaissance: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1988), 62-67. Fox, Wesley L., Col, USMC. "Fixing the Reconnaissance Problem," Marine Corps Gazette, (January 1988), 44-47. Klimp, Jack W., Col, USMC. "Scouts and Scouting: A Lost Art?," Marine Corps Gazette, (July 1990), 75-76. Wilson, Gary I., Major, USMCR. "The SRI Conceptual Architecture," Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1988), 68-69. Bulletins and Pamphlets MCCDC/MCRDAC Group Reconnaissance Working Group After Action Report, 1990. Marine Corps Campaign Plan, 1991. MCO 3501.12, Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System Volume XI, Combat Service Support Elements, 1988.
