The Myth Of The MAGTF AUTHOR Major Jacob M. McFerren, USA CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy Executive Summary TITLE: The Myth of the MAGTF I. Purpose: To expose the lack of published doctrine for fighting MAGTFs at all levels but particularly at MEF and multi-MEF levels. II. Problem: Although the MAGTF concept of the 1990s and beyond is certainly a sound concept, it is not without its organizational problems. Staff organizations, especially at the higher levels, are redundant. The paucity of written doctrine regarding MAGTF operations exacerbates the confusion in the Marine Corps surrounding the MAGTF and its employment. III. Data: The MAGTF concept of a combined arms fighting force consisting of an air arm, a ground force, and their supporting logistical units, all responsive to a single commander is an example of sound organizational evolution. MAGTFs come in all sizes and do not fit neatly into military categories. The concept has an historical evolution that proves its worth in two world wars and countless incursions in countless foreign shores. Our political leaders, slow to mobilize the Army have been relatively quick to use Marines as an international tool of U.S. policy. But as good as the concept is, it lacks published doctrine to aid in education, deployment, and employment. Doctrine is the interface between of theory and tactics and when there is no doctrine there is no base knowledge, no foundation to build on. The Marines have embraced manuever warfare wholeheartedly but MAGTF organization is incompatible with manuever warfare. Draft publications admit the MAGTF commander cannot influence the battle past the planning stage. After this point, what use is the MAGTF staff? In fact, given the recent deployment to the Persian Gulf, why do we need three permanent MEF staffs and their concommitant MEB staffs? IV. Conclusions: Educationally, the Marine school system still focuses on the primacy of the GCE. Together with a unilateral history of deployment and a "my sandbox" mentality against joint operations, the MAGTF may not realize its operational potential. V. Recommendation: The Marine Corps must study carefully lessons learned from the Persian Gulf and organization for combat at the MAGTF staff levels to cut the myth out of the MAGTF concept to link the concept with reality. The Myth of the MAGTF Thesis: The MAGTF concept is a good one. Born on the banks of the Potomac, nurtured through countless skirmishes in distant lands, matured in the Pacific, it has become the hallmark of the modern Marine Corps. It is the ultimate in task organization, expeditionary potential, and operational employment for any crisis, low-intensity, mid-intensity, or high-intensity: or is it? In fact, the Marine Air Ground Task Force may be more an organization of convenience, never twice the same, put together under Naval constraints, and organized contrary to implementing its own manuever warfare doctrine. I. Concept A. Extant combined arms team B. Unilateral deployment C. Unilateral employment D. Expeditionary nature II. History A. Combined arms team B. Unilateral deployment prior to WWI and in certain cases thereafter C. A tool of policy, but not politically oriented D. Problems III. Doctrine A. Manuever warfare vs. FMFM 1 1. Organization contradicts each other 2. MAGTF Cdr not a warfighter a. Planning b. SASS c. SOC 3. Problems IV. Deployment A. Compositing 1. MEU (SOC) 2. MEB 3. MEF B. Multi GCE operations, or operations above MEF level C. Problems V. Employment A. Congress and modern warfare dictate joint operations 1. MAGTF by doctrine is a unilateral package, therefore not a Joint multiplier but a joint inhibitor a. Piece of the pie doctrine and attitude b. Travel time to the objective 2. Force reduction and budget restraints demand joint compatibilty B. No doctrine for ops of multiple GCE or ops above MEF level 1. Pre-Desert Storm 2. Post-Desert Storm VI. Conclusion A. Organization and doctrine opposed B. Reality and doctrine opposed C. Capabilities and reality opposed D. MAGTF, as presented, a myth. The Myth of the MAGTF If it be now, `tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come. The readiness is all. (Hamlet, v.ii.209-211) The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept is a good one. Born on the banks of the Potomac, nurtured through countless skirmishes in distant lands, matured in the Pacific, it has become the hallmark of the modern Marine Corps. It is the ultimate in task organization, expeditionary potential, and operational employment for any crisis, low-intensity, mid-intensity, or high-intensity: or is it? In fact, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force may be more an organization of convenience, never twice the same, put together under Naval constraints, with a command organization which contradicts its own manuever warfare doctrine. "MAGTFs are task-organized for rapid deployment/employment. They offer any warfighting commander-in-chief a readily available, self-sustaining, combined arms combat force." (19:3) No other service organization by itself can offer the CINC such a force in one package. The moment the Naval-Marine task force sets sail, the MAGTF becomes available for employment by the National Command Authority and the designated regional commander-in-chief. MAGTFs come in four variations, generally relating in size to the Ground Combat Element (GCE), the core around which the pearl of the MAGTF forms. The largest MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) formed around a reinforced Marine division as the GCE. The medium-sized MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) formed around a reinforced infantry regiment. MEBs can be further delineated as amphibious, Maritime Prepositioned Forces (MPF), or Norway Air-Landed (NAL). The smallest MAGTF, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), [MEU(SOC)] has as its nucleus, the reinforced infantry battalion landing team. There is a fourth type of MAGTF, the Special Purpose Force (SPF) which is a completely unique, one-mission, one time use force organized for missions not appropriate for a MEF, MEB, or MEU. SPFs are usually smaller than the MEU but need not be and in some cases, may be larger. The point: like a pearl, each MAGTF is unique; no two MEFs, MEBs, MEUs, and certainly no two SPFs are the same, ever. The evolving doctrine admonishes MAGTF planners to receive the mission, organize the MAGTF, and then classify it by type. (21-3) The author of the draft document for MAGTF operations likens the MAGTF to the duck-bill platypus because neither the platypus nor the MAGTF fall neatly into either animal or military catagories. In fact, in Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra Lepidus might as well have been asking Antony to describe a MAGTF when he asked for a description of a crocodile: Lepidus: What manner o'thing is your crocodile? Antony: It is shaped, sir, like itself, and it is as broad as it hath breadth; it is just so high as it is, and moves with its own organs; it lives by that which nourisheth it; and the elements once out of it, it transmigrates. (12:II.vii.40-44) Indeed, the MAGTF like its reptilian-amphibian relative, is a strange creature unlike any other: unique unto itself. But this strange uniqueness is precisely what proponents point to as an asset rather than a drawback to the MAGTF. The MAGTF may be deployed by air, ground, or sea. The amphibious squadron need not be tied closely to the Navy's carrier battle group, leaving the Navy's operational element free to conduct maritime business. In fact, excepting the transportation from shore to shore provided (most often) by the Navy, the MAGTF is the only military unit in the United States inventory capable of unilateral deployment and, should the need arise, unilateral employment. No one else need become involved in the operation. The exceptions are if the MAGTF is an MPF or the NAL MEB, in which case the U.S. Air Force flies the Marines to link up with their prepositioned equipment in theater. But these are exceptions and these two very different MAGTFs lack a distinct capability found in other MAGTFs. Neither the NAL nor an MPF MEB has forced entry capability. They must enter the theater through secure or at least benign ports both air and sea. However, the forward deployed MEUs certainly have forced entry capabilities both by surface and helicopter borne means (although limited to about a company sized unit per wave in the air). And since these units are forward deployed and available to the president in a relatively short time, the expeditionary nature and unilateral employment options make the MAGTF a useful tool of U.S. policy no matter what the animal looks like. In this past year alone, the President has unilaterally used a MAGTF in Liberia and Somalia where a forward deployed MEU(SOC) performed Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. These operations are just the latest in a 216 year history of unilateral employments of United States Marines abroad. Over 175 times Marines have gone ashore "From the halls of Montezuma, to the shores of Tripoli . . ." and places not so well known. Although the employment was unilateral the landing force was always in some way supported by its naval parent. Quite often this support was naval gunfire as in Korea in 1878. This supporting arms concept was the nascent stage of "the concept of a fully integrated, independently sustainable combined arms force." The Advanced Base Force concept proposed by a course of instruction in 1910 required "the development for procedures for close integration of artillery with infantry forces. ." (18:6) This concept was used successfully in Vera Cruz (1914), Haiti (1915), and Santo Domingo (1916). WWI saw a large scale deployment of Marines integrated into the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) under General J.J. Pershing's command, and consequently, the increase in size of the Corps. Moreover, WWI saw the birth of Marine Aviation, although not in its close air support role initially but in anti-submarine roles. Later, both Marine squadrons flew bombing missions but in support of British and French forces. In any event, the stage was set for the maturation of MAGTF concepts in the next world war, although with some important limitations. (18) Prior to WWI, and as we have seen in certain cases thereafter, the Marines were primarily deployed and employed unilaterally. "Send in the Marines" became a populist battle cry especially in the years after the Spanish- American War when our new Manifest Destiny was most manifest. The U.S. Navy, aided in part by Alfred T. Mahon's treatise, Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 surged ahead to command the world's seas and took the Marine Corps with it. (1:612) The naval projection of ground forces became the international policy tool of the president. Sending in the Marines did not necessarily mean the United States was at war. Quite the contrary, it might be argued otherwise. The president needed relatively little if any popular or congressional support to land a contingent of Marines, execute his policy, re-embark, and set sail. The small "footprint in the sand" left behind by these incursions hardly provided reason for much more than howling and gnashing of teeth by the country involved. And, of course, without an international forum extant, such as the League of Nations or the United Nations, there was little a country unable to retaliate in kind could do to deter American presidents from walking softly and wielding the Marines. At home these military forays were an internal political boon. Since the Marines were constantly at sea, did not - - for the most part - - consist of the young men of the neighborhood, and were volunteers for foreign service in an expeditionary force, there was very little political reason nationally for a president not to practice gunboat diplomacy when and where he decided. Marines, although an integral tool of policy, were - - and to some extent remain today - - an apolitical entity to the American people and internal politics. To land Marines in Honduras, Nicaragua, Lebanon, Somalia, Liberia, the Cambodian island of Koh Tang takes relatively little notice and costs relatively little at home or abroad for a president. So presidents have landed Marines in the past; so they will land Marines in the future. But what does the MAGTF of the 90's do when it hits the beach? How does it do whatever it has been landed to do? What is MAGTF doctrine? Clausewitz describes military theory in On War as the general study of war that, lights up the whole road for him (the commander), facilitates his progress, educates his judgement, and shields him from error." Furthermore, theory, ". . . should educate the mind of the future leader in War, or rather guide him in his self-instruction, but not accompany him to the field . . . ." (4:141-142) Theory is not war by algebra. Tactics, on the other hand, are those ends and means to which one applies theory to win on the battlefield. This application of theory to tactics is doctrine. Doctrine is the philosophy of war meeting the reality of resources. Doctrine is the base guide through which one tests theory; doctrine marries the best of theories with the cold truths of battlefield limitations. Doctrine requires a shared base of theoretical knowledge. The Marine Corps philosophy, its theory of modern war, is found in FMFM 1 Warfighting. This book embraces manuever warfare as its doctrine. Simply put, manuever warfare advocates bold and audacious movement, ". . .rapid, violent, and unexpected actions creating a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope and which shatters his cohesion. (21:8-15) The tenets of manuever warfare have been available to military organizations since Hannibal and probably before, and might be best summed up as initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. Of these tenets, initiative is mostly personality dependent; agility is a matter of task organization and equipment available; depth is terrain and supporting arms dependent. Synchronization, the aggregate of all a leader's combat power focused at the precise moment and place (time and space), is the most important, and moreover, the most "teachable" and "learnable". Synchronization is where doctrine becomes important, not as a battle drill on the operational level but as a baseline of knowledge: a start point. Doctrine is the blank canvas and painter's pal let staring the artist in the face. The artist is limited only by the physical realities of the dimensions of the canvas, the color spectrum, his imagination, and his baseline knowledge of his craft. Once the artist touches brush to canvas the end result will necessarily be an individual result of schooling and personality. The same is true in the military art. Presently, the Marine Corps suffers from a paucity of this baseline knowledge for fighting the MAGTF. There are more than a few publications which mention fighting the MAGTF, fewer still that try to describe the military duck-bill platypus, and none (yet) that actually get to the business of fighting the mammal/animal/amphibian/reptile. (2:6) Perhaps one of the factors contributing to the dearth of doctrine is the MAGTF organization itself. A combined arms team responsive to a single commander appears quite simple on the surface. The three elements, ground combat element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE), and combat service support element (CSSE) all respond equally to the command element (CE), who coordinates these assets to fight the battle. However, as the emerging publication MAGTF Operations notes emphatically: . . .because of span of control problems, most MAGTF commanders must excercise their authority through chains of commands. d. Because of all this, (unique situations, remote location of MAGTF commander in relation to action, size of MAGTF) a MAGTF commander has very little ability to influence a battle joined. His main opportunity to influence a battle is during the planning stage. Once the battle is joined, the MAGTF commander can usually only influence the battle by providing fire support or committing the reserve. (21:4-1) To influence an ongoing battle directly then, the MAGTF commander must establish a MAGTF reserve either by holding out elements from the GCE, ACE, or a combination of both. Either way, this inhibits the GCE's ability to successfully accomplish his mission. Quite often the rule of thumb becomes "the MAGTF reserve is employed by the GCE commander." If that is indeed the case, then the MAGTF commander does not have a reserve; it is in fact the GCE reserve no matter what one chooses to call it. This leads us to a quandry brought on by the physical constraints of the organization. If the MAGTF commander takes a reserve, he ultimately may denigrate the accomplisbment of his own mission. If he does not, he may also denigrate the accomplishment of his mission. From a manuever warfare perspective, the MAGTF commander faces a lose-lose proposition. He personally is not able to influence the battle through bold and audacious operational moves against the enemy because he does not have MAGTF troops directly responsive to him. The MAGTF commander, as LT Gen Cheatham says, is then relegated to ". . .tactical guidance, establish(ing) liaison, and allocat[ing] resources." (11:3) Relegating a commander to guiding, liaisoning, and allocating has sparked a heated debate in the Corps about whether or not the MAGTF commander is a warfighter. But there really should be no debate; if the commander of the MAGTF is a marine, he is a warfighter. However, this superficial debate masks the real one. Without MAGTF troops how does the commander directly influence the action? If the organization of the MAGTF precludes the MAGTF commander from directly influencing the battle once joined, what is the purpose of the MAGTF commander and staff? With proper staffing and subordination, could not the GCE or ACE commander and his staff perform allocation functions? It would appear so. The MAGTF staff's purpose and position becomes even more obtuse as one considers the Marine Corps' practice of compositing MAGTFs. The recent war in the Gulf provides an excellent study in compositing. The first MAGTF to arrive was an embarked MEU; in time it was joined by MPF MEBs, which built into a MEF, until eventually elements of three MEFs were in theater both ashore and afloat. The total deployment took about four months. Amphibious shipping limitations prevent the simultaneous deployment of any MAGTF larger than a MEB. However, as BG (ret) Simmons told a group of Command and Staff College students recently: "The aphorism is, the Corps deploys by MEBs and fights as divisions." (15) Besides the obvious truth of his statement, the general's statement hides another deep-rooted belief still harbored today even in Marine resident schools. That is, ultimately everything supports the GCE. Time and again at the Command and Staff College, during examples, excercises, and graded requirements students are told to apply MAGTF answers to questions actually requiring a GCE solution. Until the Corps can shake its philosophical focus on primacy of the GCE, the MAGTF commander will remain unable to influence the battle just as the evolving doctrine states. In fact, the composite MAGTF in Southwest Asia (SWA) fought as a curious mix of an Army Corps and a MAGTF. I MEF was given operational control of the Tiger Brigade of the US Army's Second Armored Division. This 5700 man army air-ground task force came complete with attack air (AH-1 Apaches), supporting artillery (including a battalion of multiple launch rocket systems or MLRS), and logistic support, but rather than keep the separate brigade as MAGTF troops they were placed under operational control (OPCON) of 2 MarDiv. The two main GCEs in country, 1 MarDiv and 2 MarDiv operated as divisions under the command of LT General Boomer, I MEF commander and commander, MARCENT (Marines, Central Command). Prior to the massive deployment, many heated discussions centered on who would actually be in charge once all the MAGTFs from MEU to MEF composited. The question was, which GCE would be superior and which ones subordinate, and what then would those less than equal staffs do, especially at MEF level? The answer? Only a single MEF headquarters deployed in country: I MEF from the West Coast. Headquarters II MEF on the East Coast remained in CONUS and Headquarters III MEF remained in Okinawa; they would not have had a purpose in SWA even though their respective GCEs, ACEs, and CSSEs were deployed. The headquarters elements were "extras under the MAGTF concept. However, recognizing the need for overall fire support control and air control at the I MEF Hqs, the Marines formed a corps-like Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) which controlled fires and a corps-like Direct Air Support Center (DASC) which controlled the air. These were not planning cells but operational cells senior to the division FSCCs and DASCs. They not only coordinated and allocated, but also directed those entities on the battlefield for the I MEF commander. To quote one officer who served on the I MEF staff when asked about staff organizations and command and control relationships, "We were making it up and writing it down while we were doing it." (16) The MEBs afloat remained afloat for the most part. Although one did land eventually, it was absorbed into I MEF. (16) In fact, command and control for these multi GCEs was managed as the now defunct OH-6 suggested; the MAGTF commander functioned simultaneously as the GCE commander. (19:3-3) While not overburdensome for the commander, the added weight of double duty for the MAGTF staff required additional personnel until by G-day the MAGTF staff for I MEF numbered in excess of 2500 marines! (16) So, without the additional MEF headquarters in theater there were no multi-MEF operations, only the compositing of elements of the three MEFs under the beefed-up headquarters of I MEF. Had the Corps decided to deploy multi-MEF headquarters no doubt further command and control problems would have surfaced concerning standardization, operational procedures, equipment shortages and compatibility (especially in the communications and data-processing areas), and personal working relationships between relative strangers. Leaving these headquarters while deploying their elements suggests unnecessary redundancy and begs the question: Are existing MAGTF staffs on both coasts at MEB and MEF level necessary for successful deployment and employment of their units in combat operations? Recent events suggest otherwise. Unilateral deployments of MEU(SOC)s aside, the current structure of MAGTF staffs and consequent compositing for larger deployments needs to be addressed and quickly. MAGTF deployment by doctrine is unilateral. Modern warfare from drug interdiction to the next global confrontation dictates otherwise. More importantly, the United States Congress demands joint operations by law. Joint operations are inherently more complicated than single service forays. FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, addresses life in the joint world for MAGTF doctrine at the operational level: Perhaps most important, a MAGTF commander must be prepared to articulate the most effective operational employment of his MAGTF in a joint or combined campaign. If he cannot, he will in effect depend on the other services to understand fully the capabilities of the MAGTF and employ it correctly, an assumption which is likely to prove unwarranted. (17:29) Recently a Marine general speaking at the Command and Staff College at Quantico expressed his frustration regarding joint operations: "As far as I am concerned the more joint, the more problems." The general, who was speaking under non-attribution, went on to suggest that a MEU(SOC) or some other MAGTF would have been more suited to conducting Operation Just Cause in Panama . . .unilaterally! Regardless of the Marine Corps' lack of strategic airlift and true special operations abilities (not capabilities) the sheer magnitude of occupying a country, changing its government, and rebuilding it staggers the imagination. Panama City swallowed in excess of an army division; the airborne airfield seizures at Rio Hato and Tocumen / Trujillo airports took the entire 75th Ranger Regiment and a reinforced brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division. 58 C-141 Starlifters and dozens of C-13O Hercules flew in the initial assault phase of the operation, supported by Air Force fighters and special operations aircraft. Joint Special Operations Command orchestrated operations throughout the theater that would dwarf a boat company into insignificance. And all within thirty-odd hours of notification. To suggest that a MEU(SOC) could have achieved - - unilaterally - - such results is wrong. In fact, they could not. In fact, the MEU(SOC) afloat could not get there quickly enough to react the the National Command Authority's exeution time and so the operation was carried out with only the in-country marines at Rodman Naval Base. The point of the matter is, such "my piece of the pie" attitudes and doctrine passed on from generation to generation of Marines will eventually hurt the Corps. Insistence that the MAGTF always be employed unilaterally and husband its resources will necessarily result not in the MAGTF concept being thought of as a joint multiplier but as a joint inhibitor. Force reduction and future budget constraints demand joint compatibility. Moreover, recent events have shown once again, the US military will fight not only joint but also combined, and perhaps, unified. Now the Marine general can increase his joint problems not only algebraically but geometrically. Reality tells us no one can do it alone; the services will all be too small. Reality tells us we probably will not be able to do it in one language. The Marine Corps recognizes its paucity of published doctrine for MAGTFs with multiple GCEs, and operations at MEF and multi-MEF level. There is no more self-critical, analytic service in the United States. The Corps was caught - - along with the rest of the services - - in the micro-world of low-intensity conflict when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Pre-Desert Storm myopia is understandable. The money for training was in special and covert operations not in World War II-like sea deployments and European Plain armored envelopments. The post-Desert Storm period will necessarily refocus attention on the drug war, but no longer in a myopic way. Already initial impressions from SWA are flowing back to Quantico through the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System beating their authors home. (2O) These suggest some stark truths for the MAGTF regarding reality, organization, doctrine (or lack of it), and capabilities. No doubt the Corps will study these lessons closely and act to excise the myth from the MAGTF retaining the concept of a tightly organized, standardized, combined arms team capable of operating in any environment with anyone. It must, and soon. The readiness is all. Bibliography 1. Bailey, Thomas. The American Pageant: A Historv of the Republic. 3rd ed. Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1967. 2. Blaisol, Leonard A., MaJ, USMC. "Fighting the MAGTF: Doctrinal Vacuum." Command and Staff College, Quantico: May 1990. 3. Burkhard, Alfred E., Jr., MaJ, USA. "Amphibious of Ambiguous? Is the Corps Caught in the Confluence?" Command and Staff College, Quantico: May, 1990. 4. Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 5. Duke, Scott G., MaJ, USMC. "The MEU(SOC) Airfield Seizure." Command and Staff College, Quantico: May, 1990. 6. Duncan, Douglas C., MaJ, USMC. "Ironies of Manuever Warfare." Command and Staff College, Quantico: May, 1990. 7. Gray, Thomas G., MaJ, USMC. "A Need for a MAGTF FSSC." Command and Staff College, Quantico: May, 1990. 8. Hirsch, E.D., Jr. Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,1987. 9. Hummer, Steve, MaJ, USMC. "Six Hours to Execution." Command and Staff College, Quantico: Nov. 1990. 10. Langdon, L.K., MaJ, USMC. "Rear Area Security: Fact Or Fiction?" Command and Staff College, Quantico: Nov. 1990. 11. Lizana, G., MaJ, Spanish Naval Infantry. "Is the MAGTF Still Incomplete?" Command and Staff College, Quantico: Nov, 1990. 12. Shakespeare, William. Antony and Cleopatra in The Complete Pelican Shakespeare. Alfred Harbage gen. ed. New York: Viking Press, 1982. 13. Shakespeare, William. Hamlet Prince of Denmark in The Complete Pelican Shakespeare. Alfred Harbage gen. ed. New York: Viking Press, 1982. 14. Silva, Luciano S., Maj, USMC. "Fighting the MAGTF: The Multiple GCE Dilemma." Command and Staff College, Quantico: May, 1990. 15. Simmons, Edwin H., BG, USMC(Ret). "Pusan Perimeter Symposium." Command and Staff College, Quantico: 14 March 1991. 16. Telephone interview with a U.S. Marine major who served on I MEF staff during Desert Storm who wishes to remain unnamed. 6 April 1991. 17. U.S. Marine Corps, Campaigning. FMFM 1-1. Quantico: 1990. 18. U.S. Marine Corps. "History of the MAGTF." MAGTF Education Publication, Quantico: 1989. 19. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Pocket Guide. FMFRP 2-5A. Quantico: 1989. 20. U.S. Marine Corps. Operation Desert Shield Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) First Impressions Report, Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Quantico: 1991. 21. U.S. Marine Corps. Unnamed Draft (Presumably of OH 2, MAGTF Operations), Quantico: 1991. 22. U.S. Marine Corps. Warfighting. FMFM 1. Quantico: 1989.
