MAGTF (SOC): Making Our Primary Force Development Objective A Reality AUTHOR Major Victor D. Lance, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: MAGTF(SOC): MAKING OUR PRIMARY FORCE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE A REALITY I. Purpose: To examine the Marine Corps' special operations background and propose the most effective organization for Special Operations Capable Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. II. Thesis: The Marine Corps' goal of making all MAGTFs "Special Operational Capable" is logical and farsighted; however, we must decide specifically "how" to implement this concept before our goal can be achieved. III. Overview: The U.S., and particularly the Marine Corps, has a rich history of special operations involvement. By the early 1980's, however, that capability had atrophied to the extent that we could not respond to increasing threats to national security and interests abroad, primarily in Third World countries. DOD directed a revitalization of special operations forces, and the Corps responded by self-evaluating to determine capabilities and limitations. With MEUs the initial focus of the program to enhance our special operations capabilities, many obstacles were overcome and success was rapidly evident. With Gen. Gray's strong advocacy the Corps became better able to conduct Maneuver Warfare using (SOC) principles, punctuated by rapid staff planning and amphibious raid capability. The next logical step was the development of special operations capability in our MEBs and MEFs. The Corps has yet, however, to establish specific procedures for the organization and operation of MEBs/MEFs(SOC). Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM had somewhat negative effects on the (SOC) program. IV. Conclusion: With the global security environment uncertain and dynamic, the Marine Corps has adapted itself to provide the Nation a responsive force with great utility across the entire spectrum of conflict. The ability of MAGTFs to conduct special operations is a force multiplier which contributes toward making the Navy-Marine Corps Team the force of choice to deal with future conflicts. If the Corps is to maximize its warfighting potential, it must establish specific procedures for its MAGTF(SOC) program and begin implementation in earnest. V. Recommendations: The Marine Corps should implement MAGTF(SOC) by ensuring that specific portions of larger MAGTFs are (SOC). Specifically, a MEB(SOC) should be one which contains a MEU(SOC) as an integral unit. A MEF(SOC) then, is one which contains one or more MEBs(SOC). The "linchpin" in these configurations is the ability of MAGTF staffs to conduct rapid response planning and the opportunity for (SOC) portions of larger MAGTFs to undergo extensive training and evaluation to develop teamwork. MAGTF(SOC): MAKING OUR PRIMARY FORCE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE A REALITY OUTLINE Thesis Statement: The Marine Corps' goal of making all MAGTFs "Special Operational Capable" is logical and farsighted; however, we must decide specifically "how" to implement this concept before our goal can be achieved. I. Background and Implementation: 1983-1986 A. Deputy SECDEF directs revitalization 1. Third World increasingly unstable, armed, and aggressive 2. U.S. national security and interests threatened B. Corps conducts self-evaluation C. Corps develops MEU(SOC) program 1. Traditional capabilities enhanced 2. Amphibious raid is cornerstone D. Challenges confront program 1. Internal resistance 2. Gator Navy balks 3. New organization, weapons/equipment, training, and techniques required E. Gen. Gray applies emphasis to (SOC) II. Continued Rapid Improvement: 1987-1988 A. Few distractions and ample funds facilitate growth 1. Improvement in operational proficiency noted 2. Organizational modifications reflect focus B. Ability to conduct Maneuver Warfare enhanced III. Ups and Downs: 1989-1991 A. Landmark Documents 1. MEU(SOC) Playbook and training handbooks 2. FMFM 1 Warfighting 3. MAGTF Master Plan B. Operation JUST CAUSE - Panama 1. Largely an "Army show" 2. Corps' (SOC) not fully utilized C. Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM 1. Focus off (SOC) 2. Successful NEOs -- Liberia and Somalia IV. The Future of the (SOC) Program A. Despite success, future uncertain 1. Key questions unanswered 2. Shrinking defense budget 3. Corps' role scrutinized 4. CMC change -- Summer '91 B. MEB/MEF(SOC) options 1. Entire MAGTF is (SOC) 2. Portions of MAGTF are (SOC) C. MEB(SOC) 1. MEU(SOC) as fifth element 2. SRIG detachment D. MEF(SOC) 1. One or more MEBs(SOC) 2. SRI Group V. Conclusion A. Corps has decided future role 1. Utility across spectrum of conflict 2. (SOC) is force multiplier 3. (SOC) does not equal LIC B. Dedicated, lengthy workup essential for teamwork C. Gator Navy indispensable D. (SOC) has come far in seven years E. Corps must decide specifics of implementing (SOC) It has been almost six years since the Marine Corps deployed its first "Special Operations Capable" (SOC) Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), The 26th MAU. (18:67) Despite some initial resistance to the idea of creating Marine units capable of performing special operations, a program has been created whereby the Sixth and Seventh Fleets continually have a compact but increasingly effective forward-deployed maritime amphibious force capable of conducting a broad range of operations across the spectrum of conflict. (15:22, 23:41) Although the Marine Corps' initial intention was to limit development of (SOC) to its smallest standard MAGTF -- the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) (15:23)*, the present Commandant of the Marine Corps, General A. M. Gray, has been so impressed with the improvement in operational proficiency which the (SOC) program has made in the Corps as a whole, that he has directed that all MAGTFs will be (SOC) by the year 2000. (28:ES-2). The Marine Corps' goal of making all MAGTFs special operations capable is logical and farsighted; however, we must decide specifically "how" we intend to implement this concept before our goal can be achieved. *The word "expeditionary" replaced "amphibious" in 1986, at the direction of CMC, General Gray, when used in reference to Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. Thus, "MAU" became "MEU", etc. He felt the new term more accurately described the true nature of our MAGTFs, meaning they should not be considered as being limited to employment from Navy ships, but rather that they are able to be introduced into a theater by a variety of means: land, air, and sea (12:18). BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMENTATION: 1983-1986 Before proposed recommendations on the best way to implement MAGTF(SOC) are offered, a thorough review of the evolution and current status of the program is necessary. The subject of developing the Marine Corps' special operations capability has been a cause for considerable discussion within the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps in particular since 1983 when Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV published a memorandum specifically directing a revitalization of special operations forces in our Armed Forces. (1:16, 23:41) He stated that: U. S. national security requires the maintenance of Special Operations Forces (SOFs) capable of conducting the full range of special operations on a worldwide basis, and the revitalization of those forces must be pursued as a matter of national urgency. Therefore, I am directing that the following steps be taken: 1. Necessary force structure expansion and enhancements in command and control, personnel policy, training, and equipment will be implemented as rapidly as possible and will be fully implemented not later than the end of Fiscal Year 1990... (15:22) This renewed interest in special operations came primarily as a response to the increasing number and scope of unconventional threats to the security and interests of the United States, particularly in Third World countries where, various sources warned, our military's primary involvement would occur in the foreseeable future. (14:40) Our Commandant, General Gray, predicted, "It is the Third World, the so-called low-intensity conflict arena, where we are most likely to be committed in this decade..." (10:18) Thus, in the upcoming period of uncertainty and dynamic change, the Third World would become increasingly unstable, armed, and aggressive. The weakening of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe signaled both a shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world and decreased probability of war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. As Soviet sponsorship for ideological wars of national liberation withered due to internal economic strife, several key factors indicated an increased potential for armed conflict in the Third World. These factors were: 1. Urbanization/Population Shift. A major shift in population so that by the year 2000, four-fifths of the world's population would live in Third World cities. 2. Perceived Inequities. A unequal distribution of resources and quality of life within countries and between neighbors. 3. Nationalism. A swelling of national pride which manifests itself in anti-Western feelings and shrinking ability to forward base U.S. military forces. 4. Proliferation of Arms. With increased access to highly technical and destructive military capabilities, along with the willingness of industrialized nations to sell them, the qualitative differences between military might of the traditional powers and the Third World were diminishing. (28:2-2 to 2-4) Terrorism, prevalent in Third World countries and increasingly associated with the drug trade, showed no sign of abating. Between 1968 and 1986, there were approximately 500 terrorist attacks on U.S. DOD personnel and assets, with over half of them in the last four years. (23:42) Americans were identified as the targets of twenty-five percent of all terrorist attacks, a sobering statistic. (21:46) The growing concern at the national level for decreasing stability in the Third World and corresponding accelerated interest in developing our special operations capability was manifested in a series of related actions that made clear the seriousness with which we viewed the situation. (21:48) These actions were: 1. The creation of ready counterterrorist forces from all four services. 2. The revitalization of existing special operations forces. 3. The institution of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as a unified command with responsibility for coordinating all special operations conducted by the U.S. 4. The creation of a new billet in DOD, The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. In order to comply with the aforementioned Assistant Secretary of Defense directive, the CMC, General P. X. Kelley, proceeded to determine what special operations capabilities the Corps already possessed and which ones we needed to develop in order to enhance our utility to the Nation, without duplicating capabilities of existing special operations forces. (15:23) First, we needed to redefine the term "special operations." For years we viewed special operations as either environmentally oriented (e.g. cold weather, jungle, desert) or a type of amphibious operation (e.g. raid, airfield seizure, evacuation of noncombatants). Only recently, as the scope of special operations has increased, has the idea been accepted that special operations also should include variation of forms of maneuver (e.g. cliff assault, riverine operations) and special types of missions (e.g. in-extremis hostage rescue, tactical recovery of aircraft/equipment/personnel, reinforcement of an unarmed ship). (17:14) The results of the 1984 FMFLANT study, directed by General Kelley, indicated that our MAUs were already capable of performing special operations to a great degree, and it specified which capabilities we should/should not develop in order to enhance our ability to perform our assigned role under title 10 of the U.S. Code. Figure 1 highlights the results of the study. Click here to view image With its vision clear concerning the direction of special operations development, the Marine Corps collectively viewed this opportunity as a chance to exorcise some of the specters of the recent past, such as: 1. Our association with the U. S. military and political failure in Vietnam. 2. The failed attempt to rescue hostages held by Iran. 3. The bombing of our barracks and U.S. Embassy in Beirut. 4. Numerous terrorist incidents around the world with which we seemed unable to cope.* 5. A growing concern within the Corps over its decrease in basic warfighting ability and misdirected emphasis on "cheerleading skills." (24:15) 6. Several publicized incidents regarding our Security Guard Forces, highlighted by the court martial of Marines serving at our embassy in Moscow. Because of the above incidents, our many positive involvements during this period, such as the liberation of Grenada, were overshadowed by the selected successes of some nations in the special operations arena. The contrast was stark. While the American Armed Forces were seen as a collection of bumblers unable to perform any task requiring finesse -- the special operations forces of other nations, *In 1986, a forward deployed MEU in the Mediterranean Sea was unable to respond to an airline hijacking because the plane was flown to several locations, leaving the MEU unable to respond due to the inability to plan and execute rapidly. especially the Israeli paratroops who carried out the Entebbe Raid and the West German border policemen who rescued hostages from the airport at Mogadishu, seemed to provide a set the tone for the future. As a result, Marines, who like to think of themselves as members of a first rate military organization, sought to achieve that same level of operational proficiency. Thus, anxious to sail past the doldrums of the early 80's, the Corps concentrated on developing its preparedness to conduct special operations. The first step was to enhance those pre-existing special operations capabilities in the MEU, the logical force of choice due to its forward deployed nature and size (about 2,000 Marines and Sailors). (26:31) In 1986, the Marine Corps established the functions to be accomplished by the MEU(SOC) as the spearhead for larger follow-on MAGTFs. The intent was to achieve the level of special operations capability required to operate effectively in low-intensity conflict and to counter terrorist threats. WCCP 8-1 provided the following guidance to FMF commanders: 1. It created the framework for institutionalizing (SOC) as a means of enhancing our traditional maritime capabilities. (30:i) 2. It established 18 special operations missions, beyond the traditional conventional ones, which a MEU must be able to conduct in order to be considered (SOC). (30:2-3 to 2-5) They are listed as follows: a. Amphibious Raids b. Limited Objective Attacks c. Protection of Noncombatants or Installations d. Show of Force Operations e. Reinforcement Operations f. Security Operations g. Mobile Training Team h. Civil Affairs Operations i. Military Tactical Deception Operations j. Fire Support Control k. Counterintelligence Operations l. Initial Terminal Guidance m. Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare n. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain o. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft, Equipment, and Personnel p. Recovery Operations q. Specialized Demolition Operations r. In-Extremis Hostage Rescue 3. In addition to listing capabilities, it explained the limitations of the MEU(SOC). (30:2-7) 4. It mandated that the criteria for a (SOC) designation would be a comprehensive tactical evaluation. (30:2-3) 5. It emphasized that MEUs(SOC) could be employed either as a complement to conventional operations or in the execution of a maritime special operations mission. (30:1-4) 6. It established the Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) as a task organized core of each MEU's special operations capability. (30:3-3 to 3-6) 7. It set forth the structure of the MEU(SOC) to include many detachments to aid in meeting the formidable list of mission capability requirements, such as: a. Detachment from an air and naval gunfire liaison company b. DS artillery battery with 105/155 mix c. Counterintelligence (CI) Team d. Detachment from a force imagery interpretation unit (FIIU) e. Detachment from a force recon company f. Detachment from an interrogator/translator team (ITT) g. Detachment from the low altitude air defense battery (LAAD) h. Detachment from the Marine aerial refueler/ transport squadron i. Detachment of Marine air support squadron j. Detachment of AV-8B Harriers k. Detachment from a radio battalion. (30:2-7 to 2-9) With the above guidance in mind, Fleet Marine Force Commanders instituted the program in earnest in 1985, each starting with the institution of a Special Operations Training Group (SOTG) to guide in special skills training and coordinate with outside agencies in equipment testing and acquisition. Despite CMC's strong endorsement, the concept was met with some resistance from Marines who didn't understand or agree with it. (23:41) Viewed in some circles as "mystery, magic, and secrecy", the all-too-familiar laments which always seem to accompany change were heard, such as: "So what's wrong with the old way?" "It was good for the past 200 years, why change now?" And "Why are we trying to compete with other service branches in the special operations arena?" (16:30) An even more difficult task was to convince the Navy, particularly the amphibious warfare branch (Gator Navy), of the necessity to make specific and, in some cases, radical modifications in the way we operated. Since the amphibious raid is the cornerstone of the SOC program, the ultimate goal has always been the ability to conduct simultaneous amphibious raids on short notice at night under EMCON from over the horizon by air and/or surface means, against distant inland targets, followed by a planned withdrawal. (28:B-1, 30:2-3) Add to this the following inherent considerations, to name just a few, and it is understandable why the Gator Navy balked at the magnitude of equipment and technique modifications confronting them: 1. Integrated Rapid Response Planning (20:18-21) which facilitates speed and surprise--two essentials for achieving operational success. 2. Employment of Rigid Raid Craft (RRC) and Combat Rubber Raid Craft (CRRC). (9:37-39) 3. Integrated predeployment training and (SOC) certification. (18:71) 4. Joint training and operations with SEAL team detachments. (19:26) Once the program was underway, the Corps had to deal with challenges in equipment acquisition and employment, organizing, training, and operating. Since the program began, some 185 new items of equipment were identified as required, such as: radios, cameras, digital communication terminals, navigation aids, boats, weapons, night vision devices, cold weather clothing, vehicles, and numerous minor items associated with air and ground reconnaissance units. (18:70) In organizing for MEU(SOC), a third MEU headquarters was added on each coast to allow each MEU's subordinate elements a six month training program under MEU control. Personnel stability was increased to ensure the same team could train and operate together, a key factor in developing teamwork. Battalion landing teams were reorganized to provide company- sized maneuver elements--each with a specialized means of mobility: Raid Craft (boats), Amphibious Assault Vehicle, helicopter, and surface landing craft. This scheme gave MEU forces great flexibility in the ability to conduct amphibious operations under a variety of climatic and terrain conditions, where the weakness of one means is compensated by the strength of others. (9:38) In putting the new organization and equipment together, dedicated predeployment training was instituted, focusing on rapid response planning and the night amphibious raid. Not only did all MEU elements train together, starting with individual basics, but the Navy Phibron was included to ensure complete synchronization when deployment time arrived. The training was realistic, intense, and progressive. MEU units received priority for school attendance (SNCO Academy, NCO School, Platoon Sergeant and Squad Leader Courses, advanced markmanship schools, coxswain/navigators course, etc.), ranges and training area usage, ammunition, and maintenance. The predeployment training also featured situational training exercises and the development of unit SOPs and playbooks to facilitate rapid planning. Just prior to deployment, the MEU/Phibron team underwent a comprehensive three day tactical evaluation in which realistic, dynamic situations dictated rapid, well-timed responses with multiple assets. This SOCEX, as it was named, was the MEU's "final examination" in which a passing grade was required to earn the (SOC) designation. Since the MEU(SOC) concept was relatively new, despite the Corps' early experience in special operations, we had no "sheet of music" to follow. (21:45) When General Gray became Commandant in 1986, an immediate, noticeable emphasis was applied to the (SOC) program which spurred it to success sooner than most expected. We relied on "turned on brainpower", and what General Victor H. Krulak described as "sunbursts of creativity in operational techniques and material development", and the initiative of Marines at all levels. (11:26, 19:27) Because immediate, visible improvement was observed in units undergoing (SOC) training and deployments, the popularity of the program rapidly grew, converting many who previously were skeptics. CONTINUED RAP ID IMPROVEMENT: 1987-1988 It was during this period that the (SOC) program quickly accelerated to create tremendous improvement in the quality of MEU the Corps was producing. With no armed conflicts to distract attention, ongoing emphasis at the highest levels of the Corps, and teamwork at the lowest, we were able to focus completely on this area. (11:25) With this continued improvement many skeptics became believers. One battalion commander commented, "The wizardry (of MEU(SOC)) is associated with the benefits of a concentrated mixture of realistic and stressful training, broad guidance, and hard work...it is more challenging than anything outside of combat." (16:30) Many also discovered, to their surprise, that (SOC) training improved their units' ability to conduct conventional operations while it created an improved environment to develop junior leaders. (16:31) Although the initial operational focus of MEUs(SOC) was the Mediterranean Littorals, primarily as a contingency force to counter the increasing terrorism threat, company-sized "contingency MAGTFs" deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1986/87 validated (SOC) fundamentals and techniques in oil platform raids. Numerous minor course corrections were made as Corps decision makers listened to the many recommendations which bubbled up from the lowest levels. Two of the most biggest organizational adjustments were made during this period: 1. Responsibility for providing battalion landing teams (the ground combat element of the MEU) became reposed in a single infantry regiment on both east and west coasts, and that this regiment would contain four infantry battalions instead of the usual three. This action resulted in a more reasonable training/deployment/recovery cycle, and an increase in information sharing and corresponding improvement in corporate knowledge. 2. Several months later, Fleet Marine Force Commanders deemed that, in order to give forward--deployed MEUs(SOC) greater combat power, each battalion within the MEU(SOC) regiment would be beefed-up to four rifle companies vice the normal three. Because the reapportionment of Marines in both these moves came at the expense of the other two regiments in 1st and 2d divisions, the spread of Marines among the three infantry regiments appeared roughly as follows (2d MARDIV example) : Unit Primary Focus # Marines 8th Mar MEU(SOC) 4,500 2d Mar NATO/Norway 3,200 6th Mar MPS/Panama 2,600 The greatest benefit experienced by MEUs(SOC), and the Marine Corps as a whole, during this period of exponential growth, was that being able to conduct special operations facilitated our ability to conduct "Maneuver Warfare," the emerging warfighting doctrine of the Corps. In describing how he intended the Marine Corps to fight, General Gray explained: The Marine Corps of the future will fight a high tempo, fluid, combined arms, maneuver oriented conflict. Our goal will be to collapse our opponent, destroying his ability to fight as a cohesive, organized force; this is the way to obtain quicker results with fewer casualties. In battle our principal advantage will be our ability to fight in such a way as to disrupt our opponent's decision process. That is to say, our advantage will be due less to equipment than our excellence at tactics and the operational art. (10:18) The Corps found, through realistic training exercises and evaluations, that the best way to practice Maneuver Warfare at the MEU level was by conducting related amphibious operations, such as a noncombatant evacuation, supported by a series of raids, which could come from over-the-horizon during day or nignt in almost any weather by either surface and/or air. We rediscovered that even an enemy of superior size couldn't be strong everywhere. By pinpointing the inevitable weaknesses and shaping the battlefield, we could concentrate small but potent forces at specific locations, conduct a variety of missions quickly, and conclude with a planned, rapid withdrawal. So, for example, to evacuate an American embassy in a hostile environment, it became clear that it was unnecessary to overcome all enemy forces in the area to accomplish the mission. This, we concluded, was the true value of MEU(SOC). (3) UPS AND DOWNS: 1989-1991 During this period continued dramatic operational improvements were offset by the largest deployment of Marines since World War II. The major influences on the program were: (1) the publishing of landmark documents, (2) Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, and (3) Operation Desert Shield/Storm. In March, 1989 the Fleet Marine Force Commanders jointly published the MEU(SOC) OPERATIONS PLAYBOOK and the MEU(SOC) TRAINING HANDBOOK (Vols. I-IV). The result of a vast amount of operational experience and cooperation between units, these documents were noteworthy because they standardized, in extensive detail, procedures for conducting training and operations for MEU(SOC) throughout the Corps. Prior to their publication, there were no specific "how to" manuals to guide MEUs or their elements in the attainment of special operations capability. Also published in March 1989 was FMFM 1 WARFIGHTING, a doctrinal publication which established "Maneuver Warfare" as the Marine Corps' doctrine for warfighting. In July, 1989, the Warfighting Center, at the direction of CMC, published the MAGTF MASTER PLAN (MMP). This document was particularly significant because it established force deployment goals for the period 1990-2000, with the intention of further enhancing the aggregate usefulness of the Fleet Marine Force as a national instrument for naval power projection. A farsighted, bold directive which clarified the existing (SOC) framework, its salient points are: 1. A forecast that the naval services--the Navy and the Marine Corps--will bear the brunt of future national response in conflicts short of general war. (28:CMC) 2. The intended expansion of SOC within the MEFs specifically, that all MAGTFs would be (SOC). (28:CMC, ES-2) 3. The establishment of 49 prioritized MAGTF capabilities, to be emphasized during this timeframe, the first of which was "the capability to conduct amphibious raids on short notice at night in adverse weather conditions under EMCON from OTH via air or surface means against distant inland targets." (28:6-1) 4. The prediction that the most probable employment of MAGTFs in the future would be in the low-to-mid intensity range of conflict. (28:A-2-1) See Figure 2. Click here to view image Although scheduled for publication in 1991, the updated MMP, which covers 1992-2002, is currently being staffed in draft form. A few significant differences and similarities between this version and its predecessor are worth mentioning: 1. It is not quite as ambitious and is less specific in its predictions than the former publication. For example, it does not state that the most likely environment for future MAGTFs will be in low-to-mid intensity conflict; instead it says the Corps must remain flexible and be prepared to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. Also, it is less emphatic concerning the goal of ensuring that all MAGTFs are (SOC). (27:ES-1) 2. It is equally vague concerning "how" we intend to make all MAGTFs (SOC). (27:7-2) 3. It is considerably more concise. The national-level decision not to employ a MAGTF (6th MEB in the original plan) to participate/conduct Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in December, 1990, was viewed by many Marines as the Army's encroachment on the Corps' well-earned historical status as the Nation's force-in-readiness, and a signal that our (SOC) lacked credibility. (19:25) This claim, which appeared logical considering the Army's quest for a new role (funding) in wake of the recent collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, that eliminated a large portion its primary mission, was not entirely valid. In retrospect, however, the apparently abrupt transformation of JUST CAUSE into largely "an Army show" is more plausible than it originally appeared in light of the facts that: (1) the pre-existing Army support infrastructure in Panama was unique and Army-oriented, and (2) the desire for OPSEC caused Army planners to not inform the Corps of the change to OPLAN task organization. In the wake of publication of the above-mentioned key documents and our limited involvement in JUST CAUSE, an unforeseen crisis arose, sparked by Iraq's 2 Aug 90 invasion of Kuwait, which temporarily averted the complete attention of the Corps. Although the (SOC) program was placed on the "back burner," three events occurred during this time frame which were germane to the future of (SOC), and are worthy of consideration: 1. Throughout this period both FMFLANT and PAC each maintained a forward deployed MEU(SOC) despite the extensive deployment of Marine units to SWA. 2. Two MEUs(SOC) flawlessly conducted two contingency operations on short notice; noncombatant evacuations in Liberia and Somalia. 3. 11th MEU(SOC) was completely assimilated, into 5th MEB, one of the units designated to conduct an amphibious assault into Kuwait. (29) This is significant because in doing so, the MEB's ability to conduct special operations rapidly atrophied in the absence of the "habitual association" between MEU elements which is so essential in the attainment and maintenance of (SOC). (5:2) Unfortunately, some in our Corps still fail to realize that special operations skills, like a garden, will wither and die unless regularly cultivated. With Operation Desert Storm largely completed, the Corps' attention is slowly reverting to the priorities established in the MMP. With the Corps facing imminent, substantial budget cuts and concomitant decrease in personnel strength, it is wrestling with decisions which will determine its ability to achieve the force development goals it has established for itself. THE FUTURE OF THE (SOC) PROGRAM Because of its proven value, the (SOC) program would appear to have a secure place in the future of the Corps. That well-earned security is not guaranteed, however. Several key considerations require further attention such as: 1) Will continued development of our ability to conduct special operations remain a priority? (2) If so, to what extent will we develop that ability? (3) Toward what end of the spectrum of conflict will we orient? and (4) Specifically, how can we make MEBs and MEFs special operations capable? With the U.S. facing an uncertain and potentially dangerous future national security environment with diminishing defense resources, Marine leaders emphasize the affordability, strategic mobility, self-sustainability, expeditionary nature, and operational flexibility of the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team. (15:23, 11:25) The people of the United States, who collectively decide the size and character of our armed forces and, specifically, the amount of emphasis each branch receives in terms of funding, may not agree that we're as vital and desirable to America as we think we are. Based on the unusual nature of our recent war with Iraq, and the perception shaped by the news media regarding the surgical effectiveness of "smart" weapons and a high technology military, many Americans may believe that amphibious forces are obsolete. Gen. Omar Bradley did. (13:3) "Heck," Joe American may exclaim, "they didn't land those guys ashore in Kuwait; we didn't even need them!" Even as intense battles for resource allocation are underway, it is a certainty that the Corps' overall personnel strength will be substantially reduced within the next few years, commensurate with other service branches. Gen. Gray espouses that it is our "aggregate usefulness to the Nation," the ability to "go at any time by air or surface, and to do it right" that makes us desirable in the eyes of Americans. (12:18) Further, he also believes that "the continuing forward deployment of these (SOC) forces contributes to deterring our adversaries while providing a visible warning of our ability to respond across a broad spectrum of conflict." (11:25) While Gen. Gray cannot claim authorship of the SOC program, it was under his leadership and wholehearted proponency that it took root and flourished. With his term as CMC ending this summer it is uncertain whether his replacement will pursue (SOC) with the same degree of interest. The decided effect the upcoming change of Corps leadership will have on the (SOC) program cannot be overstated. The tremendous progress it has facilitated in our operational ability could easily and rapidly be neutralized or reversed by a lack of concern or opposition by the new regime. Assuming that the goals established in the MMP remain unchanged, with SOC as a priority, how then will we create MEBs and MEFs(SOC)? There are two basic options, each with several variables : 1. That the entire MEB/MEF be trained in special operations to the same degree as the present MEU. 2. That portions of the MEB/MEF be trained in special operations, to the extent that the MEB/MEF can be considered (SOC). The first option, although alluded to in the MMP is not feasible because MEBs/MEFs are too large to expect all members and units to be highly trained in special operations. (28:6-2) Additionally, unlike MEUs, MEBs/MEFs don't have the opportunity to conduct the six to nine-month workup with dedicated Navy ships followed by a six-month deployment. It would be impossible to provide larger MAGTFs the same degree of personnel stability and priority for special weapons and equipment, logistical support, and training support. In short, we are deluding ourselves if we think we can create MEBs/MEFs in which all members and units are SOC. The second option is where I believe the answer to the question lies, that is, to have portions of the MEB/MEF highly trained in special operations. The relatively new concept of MAGTF(SOC) is not universally well understood; therefore, few have conjectured a solution. Col. Magee and LtCol. Wilson believe the answer is the creation of a maritime special purpose force (MSPF), as the core of each MAGTF's special operations capability. (17:15) The problem with this idea is expressed, unintentionally perhaps, by the authors in the suggestion that their proposed plan enables a MAGTF to quickly tailor a force capable of conducting special operations. Further, the units which Magee and Wilson believe should make up the MSPF for each MAGTF do not normally operate together. Thus, the implication is that these units, each possessing unique skills, could be quickly assembled and expected to conduct special operations missions on short notice. While this idea has some merit, it ignores one of the bedrock principles which have made MEU(SOC) successful: that units deemed "SOC" undergo intensive training as a team for months, followed by a comprehensive tactical evaluation. (4:2-10) Their approach can be likened to creating a team of all-star athletes from various teams and expecting them to perform smoothly together. Teamwork is a condition which results from practicing extensively; it rarely occurs simply because people want it to happen. In contrast, wouldn't a prudent fan rather bet on a team which contains a host of talented individuals who have trained and played together extensively? The method I propose to create larger MAGTFs(SOC) mirrors the latter analogy above, and is outlined below: Proposed MEB(SOC) Composition 1. A standard MEB command element (CE), which contains an SRI Group detachment. 2. A regimental landing team (RLT)(-) as the ground combat element (GCE). 3. A Marine Air Group (MAG)(-) as the air combat element (ACE). 4. A brigade service support group (BSSG)(-) as the brigade service support group (BSSG). 5. A MEU(SOC), whose integrity will normally be maintained. It can be detached to conduct advance force operations, functioning as the MEB(Forward) until the arrival of the MEB. When forward deployed, it can be a spearhead for the MEB. In the forward echeloning concept, the MEU(SOC) lands as the MEB(Forward), operating as directed until the arrival of a MEB. (28:4-3, 27:3-3) See Figure 3. Click here to view image In this concept, as depicted above, there is no set procedure regarding how the MEU is absorbed/relieved by the arriving MEB. The three methods currently practiced are: 1. Composite MEU, by element, completely into MEB. 2. Composite MEU into MEB except CE, which is retained for planning and execution of special operations missions. 3. Maintain integrity of MEU within MEB. (5:1) The third method provides a ready, potent, and detachable special operations capability whose advantages over other options are: 1. The MEB doesn't have to task organize in impromptu fashion if a special operations mission arises. 2. The MEB is best prepared, with this organization, to conduct both conventional and special operations missions. 3. The MEB commander can retain vital command and control of all Marine forces by assigning taskings to four vice three units. Units of the MEU(SOC) could be either tasked to support or cross-attached to other elements to weight that force for a particular mission. (1:3) 4. Conventionally, the MEB loses virtually nothing because it plans and trains in tasking the MEU to support other MEB elements. For protracted conventional operations ashore the MEU(SOC) can be fully assimilated into the MEB. (1:3) 5. Since the MEB headquarters contains a detachment from SRI Group, consisting of small units from ANGLICO, Force Recon, Radio Bn, CI, and ITT, it has a small built-in special operations capability that can either be task organized to augment the MEU(SOC) or retained for separate employment under direct control of the MEB. The fact that a MEB contains a MEU(SOC) does not automatically make it (SOC). The "linchpin" in this arrangement is the developed ability of the MEB commander and his staff to: (1) effectively conduct rapid response planning, which will enable timely employment of the MEB's special operations capability, and (2) practice "mission profiles", consisting of various complex missions, involving the entire MEB, with established conditions and standards for each. (6:5-2, 22) Proposed MEF(SOC) Composition Creating the MEB(SOC), using the above framework, is the "hard part" of MAGTF(SOC). The "easy part" is creating the MEF(SOC). A MEF(SOC), simply then, is one which has both of the following characteristics: 1. One or more MEBs(SOC). 2. As with the MEB, the MEF commander and his staff must have the practiced ability to conduct rapid response planning, which enables the accomplishment of a variety of MEF mission profiles. (22) Also, the MEF CE contains an entire SRI group, which can be employed in identical fashion as the MEB's SRIG detachment, but under the command of the SRI Group Commander. The only criticism of the above proposals for MEB/MEF(SOC) composition is that they create situations in which one MAGTF contains another MAGTF. I fail to recognize any anticipated disadvantages inherent in such an arrangement. CONCLUSION The Marine Corps has passed the juncture whereby it selected its future role in the evolving national security plan. Our Commandant has decided on a course which, if followed to its completion, will provide the Nation a Corps whose aggregate usefulness is second to none. Our ability to deploy by a variety of means, our sustainability, and the ability to effectively operate across the spectrum of conflict should make the Navy-Marine Corps Team the force of choice to counter likely future threats. Prudent decisionmakers in our government should recognize this when determinations for defense budget spending are made. Consequently, with our efforts focused on broad utility, instead of upon a particular range of the spectrum of conflict, the Corps must avoid the fixation, nurtured at DOD level, with associating "special operations" with so-called Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC). While special operations may be expedient in such an environment, they are equally applicable to both mid and high-intensity conflict as well. Furthermore, although certain types of special operations are desirable in a LIC environment, some are not. Despite our admirable special operations capability, we need even further enhancement and corresponding change of mindset before we become as good as we should be in the LIC arena. If our special operations capability is a "force multiplier" which magnifies our global utility, and if the cornerstone of (SOC) is the amphibious raid, then the Gator Navy is the foundation on which that cornerstone is laid. Although the Corps advertises its ability to deploy using a variety of means, the most effective operating platform for Marines, when permanent onshore U.S. presence is becoming eclipsed, is amphibious ships. The cooperation and commitment to operational excellence of the Gator Navy then, which provides MAGTFs a unique form of mobility and sustainability, is indispensable to the future of (SOC), for without the full support of the Navy our ability to conduct special operations will never mature. The Gator Navy must wholeheartedly embrace the (SOC) concept if we, as a team, are to achieve our potential as America's maritime force-in- readiness. To truly maximize the value of our special operations capabilities, the Corps, in sync with the Navy, must be able to rapidly composite MAGTFs(SOC) with other Marine "force modules", deployed by sea or air, so that we can apply force with greater precision and discrimination. Finally, the Marine Corps has made great strides in the development of its special operations capabilities during the past seven years. Originally intending to make only minor adjustments to its traditional capabilities, the Corps has honed its (SOC) program to the point where the Commandant's goal is to make all MAGTFs special operations capable. Through FMFM 1 and the MAGTF Master Plan, we have charted our course for the future. Now is the time to make intelligent, realistic decisions as to how we will commence implementing and achieving the force development goals we have established for ourselves. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Anderson, Jr., LtCol A. 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Bruce A., "Maintaining Our Special Operations Capabilities," Marine Corps Gazette, November, 1989, 37-39. 10. Gray, Gen. A. M., "A Conceptual Framework for the Future," Marine Corps Gazette, May, 1988, 18. 11. Gray, Gen. A. M., "Annual Report of the Marine Corps to Congress," Marine Corps Gazette, April, 1988, 24-27. 12. Gray, Gen. A. M., "29th Commandant Speaks to Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, September, 1987, 18. 13. Heinl, Col. R. D. Jr., Victory At High Tide. Annapolis, MD: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1969, 3. 14. Karch, Col. Lawrence G., "The Corps in 2000," Naval Institute Proceedings, November, 1988, 40-45. 15. Kelley, Gen. Paul X., "The Marine Corps and Special Operations," Marine Corps Gazette, October, 1985. 22-23. 16. MacPherson, LtCol. Robert I., "A Marine Infantry Battalion and Special Operations Training," Marine Corps Gazette, November, 1989, 30-32. 17. Magee, Col. James G., and Wilson, LtCol. Gary I. USMCR, "Maritime Special Operations," Marine Corps Gazette, September, 1990, 14-16. 18. Murdock. Maj. Harry M., "MAU(SOC) A Powerful Maritime Force," Marine Corps Gazette, August, 1987, 66-71. 19. Murray, LtCol. Terrence P., "State of the Union--The Navy-Marine Corps Team," Marine Corps Gazette, April, 1990, 24-27. 20. Rakow, Col. William M., and Brinkley, LtCol. Clyde S., "Rapid Response Planning," Marine Corps Gazette, June, 1989, 18-21. 21. Rylander, R. Lynn, "The Future of the Marines in Small Wars," Naval War College Review, Autumn, 1987, 45-54. 22. Smith, Col. R. M., former Regimental Commander, 8th Marines, Lecture on Marine Corps Warfighting Capabilities, Command and Staff College, 14 March 91. 23. Tomka, WO Thomas G., "The Future MAU(SOC)," Marine Corps Gazette, 41-42. 24. Twomey, MajGen D. M., "Are We Training to be First- String Players or Cheerleaders?," Marine Corps Gazette, October, 1982, page 15. 25. U. S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1, Warfighting, 6 March 1989. page 59. 26. U. S. Marine Corps, FMFRP 2-5A, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Pocket Guide, pages 10-17 and 29-31. 27. U. S. Marine Corps, Marine Air-Ground Task Force, Master Plan (MMP) 1992-2002, Draft. 28. U. S. Marine Corps, Marine Air-Ground Task Force, Master Plan 1990-2000, 7 July 89. 29. VonWald, Lt.Col., Warfighting Center, MAGTF Integration Team. Personal Interview about the maintenance of Marine Corps' special operations capability during the recent crisis in Southwest Asia, Quantico, Virginia, 20 March 91. 30. Warfighting Center Concept Publication 8-1, Operational Concept for Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable), September, 1990, 14-16.
