Close Air Support: Where Do We Go From Here? AUTHOR Major Robert A. Lodge, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? I. PURPOSE: To highlight the necessity for the Marine Corps to make germane changes to close air support (CAS) doctrine and policy, to purchase needed equipment, and to not become enraptured with the quick-won success in the Gulf War, because like all wars, it was unique. Our next war will be very different. II. PROBLEM: The stunning victory by allied forces in the Gulf War against a supposedly formidable enemy has given many the giddy feeling that our armed forces, especially our air forces, are all powerful. The intense, elaborate, and extremely accurate fire power that was displayed by allied air forces has given some the mistaken notion that air power alone can win a war - possibly the next one. If unchecked, this notion could be catastrophic, especially to the Marine Corps. As this country's expeditionary force in readiness, the Corps' very existence depends upon its ability to provide CAS for the landing force. III. DATA: After six weeks of the most intense and accurate bombing that any combatant has ever experienced, and four days of equally rapid and violent ground warfare, the fourth largest army in the world capitulated to an allied force led by the United States. It was a war unlike any before, and probably unlike any that will follow it. Who could have imagined that almost one million armed warriors could square off on a battlefield, and six weeks later one side would come away victoriously while suffering less than 500 casualties? It boggles the mind. In retrospect, all studies and analysis of previous wars were made to look ridiculous as TV analysts nightly "fought" the war before actual combat commenced. The allied results were so impressive, and the American people so mesmerized by the stunning television video of "smart" bombs destroying enemy targets, that the armed forces today face an insidious threat: defeat as a result of a dramatic victory. The danger to the Marine Corps is in not recognizing that fact. IV. CONCLUSION: In this era of high technology, CAS procedures developed in previous wars will become increasingly less effective and eventually cease to be of value unless the Marine Corps uses foresight in planning and instituting necessary changes. V. RECOMMENDATIONS: That the Marine Corps must revise and change its CAS doctrine, procedures, and equipment to ensure CAS remains a viable mission. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? OUTLINE THESIS: In this era of high technology, CAS procedures perfected in previous wars will become increasingly less effective and eventually cease to be of value unless the Marine Corps uses foresight in planning and instituting necessary changes. I. Evolution of CAS A. By the Marine Corps B. By other air forces C. Through doctrine II. Significance of CAS A. To aviation combat element B. To ground combat element C. To MAGTF commander III. Role of CAS on battlefield A. Availability factors B. Influencing factors C. Threat factors 1. Enemy 2. Training 3. "Friendly-fire" casualties D. Enhancing factors IV. Future CAS availability A. As provided by other services B. As provided by Marine Corps CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? The country is awash in the euphoria of a great victory: Saddam Hussein, the reincarnation of Hitler, has been crushed. The victory won in the desert . . . is not only historic. It is also classic. It will be written about by military historians for decades to come. More important, it will be studied in military academies as an example of a perfect military operation. (5:7) As we rush to celebrate the thrashing of what was once the world's fourth-largest army, we must not lose sight of two very important facts: (1) the enemy air and anti-air defense threats were extremely deficient, almost to the point of being non-existent, and (2) the next war will not be fought like the last one! Retired Army Colonel David Hackworth pointedly notes: Air power did a most impressive job and virtually won this war by itself. Air was the hammer and the ground and naval forces were the anvil. Air power worked here because of the desert terrain; once the allies achieved air supremacy, air-to-ground attacks could continue unimpeded. Few future battlefields will be similar. This campaign cannot serve as a model for the future. (3:49) American air forces "owned" the skies over Kuwait and Iraq; they could do whatever they wanted, whenever they wanted, but, as allied commander General H. Norman Schwarzhopf correctly noted, Saddam Hussein was not a military strategist or tactician; he was a fool. He allowed us more than six months to develop our plan and to build our forces. Our next enemy was watching; he will not be so generous. So what conclusions can be drawn, what lessons are to be learned, and where do we go from here? Many strategists, particularly those specializing in aviation, have the mistaken belief that a war can be won with air power alone. Unlike in any other country, air power is the basis of U.S. military strength. Still, blind faith in this single power can be potentially catastrophic. The idea that we can defeat a hostile ground force by simply pummeling its lines of supply and communication has yet to be proved in the annals of war. This was clearly illustrated in the Vietnam War. North Vietnam resisted intense U.S. bombing for years. (7:2) As was shown again during the recent Gulf War, until ground forces physically occupy enemy territory the enemy cannot be considered defeated. It is in this physical occupation of territory that air power plays a significant role -- a role neither realized, nor appropriately recognized, by most military strategists or ground force commanders. For the better part of the past ten years, the "hot" topic of discussion among military strategists has dealt with maneuver warfare. However, these discussions have usually pertained to the rapid and decisive movement of ground forces only. Among Marine strategists, these discussions recently have focused on the argument that the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is more than a supporting arm. They argue that the ACE is an additional maneuver element fully capable of assisting the MAGTF commander in winning on the battlefield. Whether we consider the ACE a maneuvering element, or just the focus of main effort, is irrelevant. What is important, and is the key issue that most maneuver warfare discussions consistently neglect, is the integration of air power, specifically close air support (CAS), for the maneuvering ground forces. As this country's expeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps must address the CAS issue. In this era of high technology, CAS procedures developed in previous wars will become increasingly less effective and eventually cease to be of value unless the Marine Corps uses foresight in planning and instituting necessary changes. As difficult as it may be for some Marines to believe, the Corps' very existence is at stake. Whether by surface assault or airborne assault, attacking Marines must be able to depend on CAS in the carrying out of their amphibious mission. As the old saying goes, "The times they are a changin." The Marine Corps must be prepared to change with them. Close air support has been around almost as long as there have been airplanes. Within the Marine Corps, CAS dates from the fighting in Nicaragua in 1928. (9:363) At one time or another, "every major country with an air force has tried it [CAS] in some form." (13:101) Used extensively, CAS has met with varying degrees of success -- the Marine's heroic defense in the battle of Khe Sanh; in failure -- the defeat of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) in the early days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. After most wars, whether having participated or not, the Marine Corps has introduced new weapons and modified its tactics and procedures to increase the effectiveness of CAS. The Corps should do no different today. By definition, CAS is "air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces." (1:70) To understand this definition fully, one must first understand the difference between air support that potentially has immediate impact on the battlefield (CAS), and air support that "shapes the battlefield" (deep air support). Once this distinction is understood, the "detailed integration" of CAS must be considered. Material and troops are easier to keep away from the battle than to engage at the front. They are easier to destroy when they are in assembly or configured for movement than when they are deployed to do battle. Consider this analogy: one well-placed bomb on a tank factory or assembly area can destroy many tanks, or at least prevent further tank production; one well-placed bomb on the battlefield destroys one tank. (13:160) Thus, a decision must be made: do we concentrate air power against immediate targets or targets that may "ultimately" affect us on the battlefield? Before answering that question, I believe a more fundamental question needs to be considered: Is CAS obsolete? Until the Yom Kippur War, if air superiority had been attained, CAS had usually been available to the superior force. However, the early events of the Yom Kippur War changed forever the traditional idea of air superiority. For the first time, "an armed force with a vastly inferior air force was able to gain and maintain air superiority in certain cases strictly through the utilization of an extensive air defense system." (10:37) The combined efforts of the Egyptian and Syrian air defense systems were so effective that the IAF lost 61 aircraft while performing CAS missions. (2:34) Now the IAF no longer views CAS as a viable mission, believing that it is too difficult for pilots to identify friendly forces on the ground, and that their primary mission is to destroy the enemy. (13:101) In this country, before the Gulf War, it was said: Few of today's tactical commanders, brigade and below, have much confidence that CAS will play a major role in their part of the battle. First of all, no ground commander in his right mind would commit himself to mortal combat relying on a key weapon system that might or might not be there. (2:37) This skepticism exists primarily within the Army and, I believe, is caused by the ground commander's lack of awareness and knowledge of the air battle. This skepticism must never be allowed to exist within the Marine Corps! MAGTF commanders must make a conscious decision, and they must convince their leaders of the wisdom of this decision: not to commit Marine ground combat element (GCE) forces until air superiority has been established. This is an important decision, and one the MAGTF commander must stick to religiously. While CAS is third on the list of priorities to the ACE during amphibious operations (after establishing air superiority and extending the air defense umbrella), within the context of direct support for the GCE, CAS is the most important priority. Let us suppose for a moment that CAS is not a viable mission. In my opinion, because of a lack of sufficient naval gunfire and artillery support, this supposition calls into question whether the Marine Corps can conduct a surface or airborne assault on anything other than an unopposed beach or undefended landing zone -- both beyond the reaches of the enemy. In other words, the Marine Corps would no longer have a mission! Therefore, while CAS may be third in the order of priorities to the ACE, it is the most important priority to the MAGTF because it allows the MAGTF to conduct amphibious operations. CAS is the MAGTF commander's "ace-in-the-hole." It gives him a power projection capability. It allows him to have an immediate and immense impact on an enemy's ability to fight. This impact, while usually temporary, allows the supported GCE commander to maneuver his forces in a ship-to-shore movement. Once ashore, there are considerations that may affect the availability of CAS; therefore, the GCE commander must take these into account while preparing his fire support plan to support his scheme of maneuver. First, maintaining air superiority over the amphibious objective area (AOA) is almost as critical as gaining it. Second, as part of "shaping the battlefield," deep air strike missions may take precedence, thus limiting sorties allocated to CAS. Finally, his unit may not be the focus of main effort, or a unit on his flank may be deemed in more trouble, and so require the preponderance of air support. (2:37) While CAS missions are generally conducted (and are most effective) in a low threat environment, it does not follow that CAS will be unavailable when "total" air superiority does not exist. Still, one must consider the trade-offs: the accuracy of the weapons delivery is inversely proportional to altitude and airspeed; these factors are in turn inversely proportional to the enemy threat. For example: the greater the threat, the lower the altitude and the faster the speed of the CAS aircraft, and thus the greater the risk to the accuracy of the CAS mission. Most current writing (pre-Gulf War) concerning CAS has dealt with "The Threat." With central Europe as the likely battle zone, Soviet doctrine and weapons the enemy, and the Yom Kippur War the last "real operational test," few commanders viewed CAS as viable in the next war. (2:34) With the results of the Gulf War not yet fully analyzed, but with initial indicators of CAS effectiveness very positive (except for "friendly-fire" casualties), we are already looking at the "next war." For the foreseeable future, most pundits play down the idea of a central European war, and with the current Soviet doctrine of employing tactical air defenses well known, and with the Soviets again reeling from another embarrassing defeat of their weapons systems, I would argue that CAS is indeed still a viable mission, especially if properly used in the maneuver warfare concept of battle. Still, we must not stop analyzing our enemy, or revising and changing our doctrine, procedures, and equipment to ensure that CAS remains a viable mission. It is very important that we closely analyze our victory over Iraq from every perspective. We must not be misled by the sanitized version of the war that we saw on television. As the war progressed, it quickly became obvious that our air forces faced a "paper tiger" enemy air force. We cannot lose sight of the fact that vastly improved radar-controlled air defense systems and heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles integrated with improved methods of interception by highly sophisticated and heavily armed "look down, shoot down" fighter aircraft, if properly used by an enemy, could make current CAS aircraft's chances of survival marginal at best. These potential defense improvements by our adversaries underscore three significant facts: (1) that ground force commanders must be extremely knowledgeable of the capabilities as well as the limitations of supporting aviation assets, (2) that ground force commanders must use the hours of darkness and periods of reduced visibility due to weather conditions as the primary means of concealment when moving their forces, and (3) that advanced technology must be incorporated into current and future CAS aircraft to increase their survivability. The ground force commander's knowledge, or lack of it, concerning his aviation assets could well decide the outcome of a battle. It is commonly recognized by commanders that "battlefield situations which may be in doubt can usually be resolved by the commander who can bring the greatest amount of firepower to bear on his enemy at the critical moment." (8:11) Because of our enemy's capability to launch an attack or stop our own attack with his superior numbers of tanks and artillery, tactical surprise is one of our best weapons. A unit's ability to operate effectively during the hours of darkness and periods of reduced visibility due to weather conditions makes surprise possible. To achieve this effectiveness, a commander must initiate a training program that will give his unit the necessary experience to function successfully during these periods. The most critical factor of this training program is realism. Although our soldiers are of the highest quality, they still do not train realistically enough for war. There is too much emphasis on safety. As a result, units do not train for integrated combat in a live-fire environment, where artillery, armed helicopters, close air support jets, armored vehicles and soldiers replicate the violent and confusing conditions found on the battlefield. You don't learn football by going to the gym and watching videotapes. You learn by getting bruised on the field. (3:49) With today's "zero-defect" mentality, safety during training is of paramount importance, thus causing many commanders to shy away from combat oriented training. Yet, battle-tested commanders are well aware of the risks involved in employing supporting arms: the likelihood of "friendly- fire" casualties. Anytime supporting arms are used "in close proximity to friendly forces," avoidance of friendly casualties is a foremost concern of commanders. Nothing lowers the morale of the "grunt" more than suffering "friendly-fire" casualties. Besides the fact that it is a tragic waste of manpower, the psychological impact could change the tide of the battle in favor of the enemy. Regrettably, in the Gulf War, almost as many American troops were killed by "friendly-fire" as by the Iraqis. Most of these casualties were the result of errant CAS missions. It is a sad fact that our overemphasis on restrictive safety measures during peacetime training exercises most likely had a significant impact on these unnecessary and tragic casualties. Experts claim that "such errors are inevitable in the chaos of battle," and point to the fact that in previous wars approximately 30 percent of American deaths were caused by fellow Americans. Despite the improved accuracy of today's weapons, the potential exists for U.S. forces to sustain even higher friendly-fire figures. One reason for this is the emphasis on launching offensive maneuvers at night, compounded by many of our allies possessing the same weapons as our enemies. "In the heat of battle, when a guy is getting shot at and a target appears, more often than not he'll shoot," says one Army lieutenant colonel. This "shoot first, ask questions later" mentality can only increase the potential for more friendly-fire casualties. (4:33) Improvements not specifically designed to improve CAS, but to decrease friendly-fire casualties, will surely be made, and will undoubtedly improve CAS. However, I disagree with these "experts" and their feeling of "inevitability." I firmly believe friendly-fire casualties reveals an inherent deficiency in our ability to closely integrate airpower (or for that matter, any supporting arm) with maneuvering ground forces -- in other words, a lack of proper training! To accomplish a CAS mission successfully requires constant, intense training -- training that we fail to do enough of. As important as training may be, it is not the only area of concern. As we begin to look to the future, each of the services is involved in a joint study to decide which type of aircraft is needed for tomorrow's CAS missions. Unfortunately, they are not making much headway. Since as far back as 1970, the Congress has addressed the issue of CAS aircraft. Efforts were made to adopt a single aircraft to meet the future CAS requirements of the nation's four "air forces." While it was recognized that this achievement would be positive in many respects, it was finally decided that this goal was not "realistically achievable." The unique combat requirements of each service ruled out a single CAS aircraft. For example, the Army is oriented toward attack helicopters that can maneuver and can be used with frontline troops. Within their limitations, helicopters can deliver effective fires; however, a good part of the Army's CAS requirements is met by fixed wing aircraft that are more survivable and deliver larger volumes of firepower. The Air Force can perform this mission for the Army . The Marine Corps and Navy require fire support aircraft which can operate from aircraft carriers. Historically, the Marine Corps and the Navy have operated the same aircraft; however, since Marine Corps aircraft must be capable of moving ashore in support of amphibious assaults, its aircraft must operate from small austere airfields. (11:19/20) It was because of these earlier efforts that the Marine Corps opted for the V/STOL concept that led to today's AV-8B aircraft, the Marine Corps' primary daytime CAS aircraft. Tomorrow's CAS aircraft must be capable of doing many things, not the least of which are: (1) penetrating enemy air defenses at low altitude, (2) conducting air-to-surface attacks to support the GCE's scheme of maneuver, (3) carrying a variety of weapons to include precision guided weapons for point targets and area coverage weapons for both fixed and mobile targets, and (4) communicating with both airborne and ground controllers. Additionally, future CAS aircraft must be "reasonably affordable" within future defense budgets. (6:12) This last condition is probably the most critical as it will undoubtedly affect the others. One point no one argues over is the cost. A fixed-wing, close air support aircraft that can cope with the threat, accomplish the mission with accuracy in adverse weather or darkness, and has the command and control, navigation and pilot-workload-reducing systems necessary to rapidly and flexibly integrate itself into the battle at the front line is the most expensive fighter one can buy. (2:35-36) Tremendous sums of today's money will be required to save lives on tomorrow's battlefield. Our leaders must continue to be convinced to spend this money! With all the above in mind, visualize a black, wet and stormy night. Low ground fog has reduced the visibility to less than a couple hundred feet. It was just this type of night when General Washington crossed the Delaware River in his attack on Trenton during the Revolutionary War. It is also the type of night that we, as future MAGTF commanders, should want if we ever have to "land the landing force" on some hostile, distant shore. As commander of this landing force, we will undoubtedly want to know if sufficient firepower will be available to support our landing. Until artillery can be brought ashore much later in the landing, two means of fire support are available: naval gunfire (NGF) and air support. There are factors, that when considered, make the availability of both of these supporting assets questionable. Presently, the Navy is woefully lacking in NGF ships -- a situation that will get worse! The massive demonstrations of firepower that we regularly saw played out on our television screens during the recent Gulf War, as the big 16" guns of the battleships Missouri and Wisconsin battered the Kuwaiti coastline in support of Marine forces, will be but distant memories; these two dreadnoughts will soon be mothballed as part of budget cutting measures. Thus MAGTF commanders will be left with one supporting arm as their Marines prepare to make an amphibious assault against a hostile shore -- the ACE. In the future, given the parameters of this fictitious scenario, even the ACE will be hard pressed to meet the MAGTF commander's demands. While many types of aircraft can provide CAS, currently only one Navy or Marine aircraft can provide day and night all-weather CAS: the A-6E Intruder. The only carrier-based, all-weather, night-attack aircraft in the U.S. arsenal, the A-6E is a formidable weapon system, capable of carrying up to eight tons of ordnance with a range and payload exceeded only by the giant B-52. However, the A-6E has serious deficiencies that greatly reduce its effectiveness on the modern battlefield. Lack of airspeed and maneuverability, and the dangers imposed upon it by the limitations of the ordnance that it carries, make the A-6E extremely vulnerable in a high threat environment. Realizing that the A-6E is the only all-weather aircraft in the inventory, and because of the recent canceling of its replacement, the A-12, the Navy is making every effort to extend the Intruder's service life well into the 21st century. Upgrades under the Systems/Weapons Improvement Program allow the A-6E to carry such weapons as the HARM, Harpoon, Maverick, and SLAM missiles; all are extremely accurate laser- guided weapons that were used with great effect during the Gulf War, but unfortunately cost more than one million dollars each, and thus are rarely delivered in peacetime. According to retired Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, "The 120-mile range SLAM and the 80-mile range Harpoon can attack heavily defended targets while the A-6E remains at a safe stand-off distance ....." The A-6E also will receive radar upgrades, giving the aircraft internal means to identify its target more easily. (12:29) Still, these upgrades can be considered only if the A-6E makes it to the next battlefield. In the realities of today's world, for Marines, that becomes no easy task. Currently, the Marine Corps has three A-6E squadrons, a total of 30 aircraft. By 1993, this number will be zero. In slightly more than two years the Marine Corps will be totally dependent upon Navy or Air Force aircraft to provide night, all-weather CAS in support of an amphibious assault. In the recent Gulf War, with a reinforced Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in theater, 20 Marine A-6E's were flying in support of the MEF. Had a "foul weather" amphibious assault been necessary, the availability of only 20 all-weather aircraft, even if they were dedicated strictly to CAS, could have proven catastrophic to the landing force. Had this amphibious assault been necessary, most of the offensive air support would have been necessarily provided by non-Marine aircraft. Unfortunately, neither the limited number of aircraft, nor the service that provides them, is not the ground commander's major problem. The availability of aircraft is his real problem. Aircraft arriving within the AOA can come from only two sources: a land-based airfield or an aircraft carrier. Since the U.S. lacks suitable numbers of advanced foreign airfields for use in an emergency, and the Marine Corps does not regularly have any carrier-based attack squadrons, there is little chance that Marine aircraft will be supporting an amphibious assault until an airfield has been seized or an expeditionary airfield can be constructed. Yet, there usually will not be enough time to do either. The astute reader may now be contemplating this question: "In a joint environment, why can't the Navy or the Air Force provide the Marine Corps' night/all-weather CAS requirement?" Currently, the Navy is desperately fighting to maintain its carrier task forces. It remains to be seen how many carriers will be available once budget cuts are made. Without question, in the future there will be fewer than there are today. For a MAGTF commander to assume that any of these limited assets will be available continuously during an amphibious assault could be a fatal mistake. The NIMITZ class nuclear aircraft carrier is an awesome weapons platform unique to U.S. naval forces. Used in the right scenario, it is extremely effective; used incorrectly, it becomes an extremely vulnerable floating target. In the Gulf War, the Navy was initially very leery of bringing its carriers into the Persian Gulf, but eventually four carriers sailed into the Gulf to oppose an enemy with a limited air and sea capability. Should our next enemy possess a credible navy or air force, we cannot expect this type of carrier support. In a war between the super-powers (we must plan worst case situation), or even in a third-world conflict similar to the Falklands War, where British forces faced a country with a potent air force and a potential submarine threat, the aircraft carrier could be subjected to massive air attacks by enemy bombers armed with long range anti-ship cruise missiles, complemented by attacks from enemy submarines armed with sea launched cruise missiles and torpedoes. Consequently, most, if not all, Navy aircraft would be used in defending the carrier task force -- not in supporting the Marines ashore. As for the Air Force supplying the necessary support, don't count on it; comparable problems exist. The Air Force's principal all-weather aircraft, the F-111 and F-15E, are too few in number, based at airfields inaccessible to Marines, and most likely would be dedicated to supporting the Army's "airland" battle -- not Marines! Now let us assume for a moment that we can somehow seize an advanced airfield, or better yet, a country like Saudi Arabia gives us free use of its airfields, or that sufficient carrier aircraft are available to support the GCE's scheme of maneuver during a late night assault. Does this mean the ground commander will automatically have continuous and effective CAS available to him? It is highly unlikely, because a new set of problems arise. It has often been said that a unit will fight only as well as it has trained. Only through detailed planning and extensive realistic training can the Marine Corps expect to successfully receive CAS. As previously mentioned, the most critical factor of any training program is realism: the closer to realistic combat conditions, the better. Yet, little actual planning and even less actual training is conducted on the squadron and battalion levels, especially between Navy or Air Force squadrons and Marine infantry battalions. If CAS techniques must be learned in the heat of battle, many lives will needlessly be lost. We will never know how our forces would have fared had the Iraqis put up a determined fight. Could allied air forces have provided the necessary CAS? To prepare our forces properly for tomorrow's CAS environment, we must refocus our priorities. We can begin by revamping our training. Tomorrow's training environment, while not ignoring troop safety, should stress "proper coordination, positive procedures for target identification, firm direction of the attacking aircraft in the target area, and accurate weapons delivery." (8:14) First stressed in 1968, these points remain valid today. Of note is the fact that all except the last point is controlled by the maneuvering ground force. This is a significant factor, one that most ground commanders fail to comprehend. Once a ground commander makes the decision to employ air support against a target impeding his attack, he expects a prompt response to his request. Therefore, the ACE must ensure that supporting aircraft arrive in sufficient numbers, on time, and carrying the proper ordnance necessary to destroy the target. From the ground commander's point of view, timing is the most crucial factor. (8:11) To a Marine unit halted on an enemy beach, a minute can seem like an eternity: any delay could mean the difference between life or death. Yet, there are many factors that will cause significant delays -- not the least of which are communications failures, target acquisition and marking, availability and experience of the forward air controller (FAC), and the delivering aircrew's experience. It has long been known that communication is the key to command and control, and, therefore, to success on the modern battlefield. Communication must be rapid, secure, and reliable. (8:13) It was not for a lack of other lucrative targets that the Gulf War's air campaign's initial targeting was against the Iraqi command and control system. Today, most Marine infantry units cannot consistently complete tactical air requests due to recurring communications failures. In a world where we can transmit both orally and visually through thousands of miles of space, our small unit leaders are often unable to communicate with an orbiting aircraft less than five miles away. This is primarily due to the unreliability of the FAC's UHF radios. Hand in hand with communications failure are the problems of acquisition and marking of targets. On one thing CAS pilots agree: for a reasonable degree of accuracy, targets must be marked -- either by someone or by something. It is almost physically impossible for a pilot to "fly at tree-top levels, navigate, maneuver to avoid enemy defenses, keep track of friendlier, acquire enemy targets, maneuver to attack enemy targets, and live." (2:35) Some would argue that because of the proliferation of sophisticated, mobile air defense weapons systems, and our supposed inability to mark a target consistently and accurately, that CAS may not be feasible even in a low intensity environment. I would counter by pointing to the remarkable success of laser-guided munitions during the Gulf War. Laser-guided technology, while still in its "infancy," has proven itself reliable enough to work consistently in a CAS environment, almost to the point of being considered a force multiplier. But what if a pilot is unable to find his target via laser-designation? Currently, the PPN-19 RABFAC, a beacon/transponder used by FAC's to designate targets, is the only device available to the ground commander for control of aircraft in the all- weather/night environment. However, it is useable by only the A-6E. This capability needs to be extended to other aircraft. Even if aircraft availability, communications failure, or target acquisition and marking are not a problem, two variables remain that could endanger the outcome of a CAS mission: the FAC and the aircrew in the attacking aircraft. Present Marine Corps task organizations assign three aviators to each infantry battalion and one to each regiment to act as air officers (AO) and FAC's. Additionally, tank battalions, reconnaissance battalions, and light-armored infantry companies each rate two FAC's/AO's. However, continuous low aircrew retention rates have often resulted in this policy being short changed. The truth is: usually, only deploying units get their full complement of aviators. Additionally, most Marine aviators mistakenly consider a tour of duty as a FAC/AO to be an undesirable interruption to their flying, while also being a non-career-enhancing tour that is the result of some previous mistake. But, because the role of the FAC in the CAS mission is indispensable, the Marine Corps should find a way of enhancing the prestige of this billet and the importance it plays within the air-ground team. (8:65) An aviator assigned as a FAC/AO receive basic instruction in air-ground operations (insufficient compared with what they need) and normally spends 12 to 18 months with a ground unit. Again, during aviator "shortages," this policy is not always adhered to. The Marine Corps' adoption of the "rent-a-FAC" program during the 1970's and 1980's was intended to alleviate these shortages by assigning FAC's to infantry battalions only when they were operationally needed, but this policy caused additional problems. These "rent-a-FAC's" were normally the least experienced aviators in the squadron, and therefore more likely to have trouble in carrying out their mission. They could not give the ground commander the aviation knowledge and expertise that he so desperately needed, and, just as important, these junior aviators didn't receive the aviation tactical training they so desperately needed. Because of its inadequacies, and increased aviator retention, the "rent-a- FAC" program was discontinued in 1987. With today's beginning downward trend in aviator retention, FAC availability will again become an issue. Equally important as the FAC is the aircrew flying the CAS mission. Aviators don't magically acquire bombing skills. Operational training must include sufficient periods of live ordnance delivery, target acquisition techniques, and CAS and communication procedures to produce an aviator capable of destroying a target on his first attack -- essential in a high threat environment. (8:5) Today, not enough training is allotted to the CAS mission to accomplish these goals. The current A-6E Training and Readiness Manual calls for only two CAS missions to be flown every six months, hardly the requisite number to prepare an aircrew for the hazards of a CAS mission. Fortunately, there are some glimmers of hope on the horizon. The ground commander can expect dramatic improvements in CAS weapons-accuracy with the addition of the F/A-18D Hornet aircraft during the mid 1990's, and the increased production (and I hope "hands-on" training) of laser-guided air-to-ground munitions that were so effective in the Gulf War. But, these two items, in of themselves, are not enough. There are still many things that need to be done to further improve the success of the CAS mission. Some possible improvements include enhancing the "under- the-weather" F/A-18D to make it "all-weather," and using a data-link system between aircraft, FAC's, and remotely piloted vehicles for real-time intelligence on the battlefield. The role of the FAC would be dramatically improved with the purchase of new radios with increased range and reliability. Target acquisition would be dramatically improved with the availability of a "RABFAC-like" piece of equipment that is lightweight, data-link and long-range capable, and can be used by all CAS aircraft. A "cheap fix," obtaining colored marking rounds (red, yellow, purple, etc.) for use by tanks, artillery, and mortars for daylight CAS missions also would help significantly. Can we accomplish any of the above? Yes! With appropriate foresight, and the proper allocation of funds toward critical areas, the Marine Corps can continue to be the trend-setter in CAS procedures. If any of the above suggestions make it down to the "operator" level, the Marine Corps' capability for improving its CAS techniques will be dramatically improved. Yet, if the Corps flatters itself too much for its success in the Gulf War, without seeing the war for what it really was, and adjusting accordingly, our very existence is in danger. Meanwhile, those in the Fleet Marine Forces will continue to do what Marines have always done -- compensate for the many inadequacies that exist -- and find ways to improve our mission capability as it currently exists. Otherwise, CAS will die a premature death! And so might the Marine Corps! BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1, 1986. 2. Garrett, Thomas. "Close Air Support: Which Way Do We Go?" Parameters, Vol XX, No.4, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, December 1990. 3. Hackworth, David H. "Lessons of a Lucky War." Newsweek Magazine, 11 March 1991, pp.49. 4. Hammer, Joshua. "Risking "Friendly Fire"." Newsweek Magazine, 4 March 1991, pp.33. 5. Keegan, John, "How the War was Won," Washington Post, March 3, 1991, Section C., p.7. 6. Kennedy, R. C. "Close Air Support Design Alternative Study (CASADA)" Phase 1, Vol II - Mission Requirements Package. Science Applications International Corporation, Dayton, Ohio, January, 1989. 7. Lind, William S., "If We Fight This War, Can We Win?," Washington Post, August 19, 1990, Section C., p.2. 8. May, Donald L. "Control of Close Air Support in Conventional War." Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. April 1968. 9. Moskin, J. Robert. The US Marine Corps Story. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977. 10. Naviaux, Jacques C. Close Air Support - A Major Dilemma. Marine Corps Gazette, July 1982, pp. 37. 11. New, Noah C. CAS - A User's Product. Marine Corps Gazette, May 1974, pp. 19-20. 12. Steigman, David S. "Navy Ponders Options After A-12 is Killed." Navy Times, January 21, 1991, p. 29. 13. Warden, John A. III. The Air Campaign - Planning for Combat. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988.
