Organizing Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Supply For Combat AUTHOR Major William F. Johnson, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: ORGANIZING FLEET MARlNE FORCE (FMF) SUPPLY FOR COMBAT I. Purpose. To identify the requirement for organizing FMF supply activities for combat effectiveness and to investigate the feasible alternatives for organizational structure. II. Thesis: FMF retail supply activities should be structured primarily for combat effectiveness and secondarily for peacetime efficiency in accordance with Marine Corps Doctrine. III. Data: The appropriate organizational structure for the Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs), has been a long standing challenge for the Corps. Marine Corps Doctrine mandates the task organization of units to enable the operating forces to provide rapid crisis response, at any level of conflict, to any area of the world. In developing appropriate structures for the FSSGs, Combat Service Support (CSS) commanders are faced with the dilemma of balancing the requirements for mobility and combat effectiveness in a deployed environment, while maintaining peacetime efficiency in garrison. Supply, as a function of CSS, is one of the most difficult areas to structure in meeting these requirements. CSS Elements (CSSEs) are currently task organized at the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Service Support Group (MSSG); Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Service Support Group (BSSG); and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Service Support Group (FSSG) levels; but only the MSSGs are fully manned and regularly trained as units. The BSSGs consist of a headquarters nucleus and rarely receive realistic training as a unit. The FSSGs are permanent, functionally structured, MEF service organizations, which rarely deploy. More importantly, due to pressures to maintain high levels of peacetime readiness, they are becoming increasingly entrenched in permanent, fixed facilities utilizing high- technology mechanization and industrial equipment. IV. Conclusions. A 1987 Study by the Center for Naval Analyses, internal Marine Corps staff documentation, professional articles by some of the Corps Logisticians, and personal interviews of cognizant headquarters personnel, were utilized to determine feasible alternatives in dealing with this CSS dilemma as regards to the supply function. A possible solution centers around the compositing of BSSGs by combining functional, building-block units from the FSSG's with nucleus organizations from the Landing Support Battalions Landing Support Party. V. Recommendations. Critical personnel shortages in the FSSGs promise to worsen with the quest for a post-war peace dividend. Support for the residual MEF, after compositing two BSSGs, will necessitate reducing FSSG services. CSS facilities and equipment must be mobile or be deleted. CSS training must become more operationally oriented in todays fast-paced battlefield. Training must include both formal instruction and practical experience in tactical dispersion, mobility, and rear area security. As we resolve our CSS structural dilemma, we must face the rear area threat head- on. ORGANIZING FLEET MARINE FORCE (FMF) SUPPLY FOR COMBAT OUTLINE Thesis: FMF retail supply activities should be structured primarily for combat effectiveness and secondarily for peacetime efficiency in accordance with Marine Corps doctrine. I. Combat Service Support (CSS) Element (CSSE) A. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Service Support Group (MSSG) B. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Service Support Group (BSSG) C. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Service Support Group (FSSG) II. Permanent organization in garrison A. Fixed facilities B. Data processing support C. Personnel constraints III. Doctrine A. Warfighting doctrine B. CSS doctrine IV. The dilemma A. Mobility B. Combat effectiveness C. Peacetime efficiency V. Alternatives A. Compositing B. Permanent CSSEs VI. Solutions A. Organizational structure B. Training ORGANIZING FLEET MARINE FORCE (FMF) SUPPLY FOR COMBAT The U. S. Marine Corps has long maintained its claim as the Nations force-of-choice for crisis response. During a recent force-structure review, the Commandant restated the Corps basic mission and role in the Department of Defense: To provide naval expeditionary forces as the most flexible and effective crisis response for the Nation. ... We are uniquely configured to task organize air- ground and logistics forces which can adapt to uncertain geopolitical and economic situations, and in conjunction with the Navy, provide the force-of-choice for crisis response. These naval expeditionary forces can operate from forward bases, or sustainable mobile sea bases, which permits application of military presence on our terms. This forms the basis for our posture as the Nation's force-in-readiness for use in all levels of conflict. (4:1) Central to the capability to rapidly deploy task organized air-ground and logistics forces in all levels of conflict is the Marine air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). For those less familiar with the Corp's expeditionary jargon, the MAGTF consists of a fully integrated, balanced force including a Command Element (CE), Ground Combat Element (GCE), Air Combat Element (ACE), and Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). Flexible response capability is provided by tailoring the MAGTF for the most likely employment, i.e. Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) for light-intensity-conflict (LIC); Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) for mid- intensity-conflict (MIC); and Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) for high-intensity-conflict (HIC). (4:2-4) Each MAGTF is sized for expected level of operations under each scenario, LIC/MIC/HIC, as a MEU/MEB/MEF, respectively. The relative size of these balanced forces can be visualized by review of their respective GCE's. The MEU GCE is a reinforced battalion; the MEB GCE is a reinforced regiment; and the MEF GCE is a reinforced division. The corresponding CSSE for the MEU/MEB/MEF under the LIC/MIC/HIC levels of conflict is the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG), the Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG), and the Force Service Support Group (FSSG), respectively. The task organized CSSEs are structured for combat effectiveness in providing a variety of functions to the supported MAGTF. (12:4-1) The one significant exception to this approach in task organizing Combat Service Support (CSS) organizations is the FSSG. It is the only permanently structured CSS organization in garrison. The FSSG is structured for efficiency in garrison with its eight permanent functional battalions collectively providing the six functional areas of CSS, including supply, maintenance, transportation, deliberate engineering, health services, and services. (12:4-1,4-2) Any Marine who has served at both the battalion and group levels in the FSSGs will agree that permanent structure has in many instances become "permanent facilities." While most military leaders would applaud the efforts of commanders to increase output through technological efficiency, and to improve working conditions for the troops, the FSSGs have increased productivity and efficiency by increased reliance on permanent, fixed, facilities; commercial industrial equipment; and commercial supplies and services. Unfortunately, some of these improvements, which do in fact provide better service to the customer in garrison, are no longer mere enhancements. These improvements are the very mechanisms by which we accomplish the primary mission. Some of this equipment cannot be deployed, and some functions cannot be readily duplicated in a deployed environment. This leaves key CSS functions, such as supply and maintenance, highly dependent on tenuous host-nation-support in a deployed environment The Supply Battalions are probably the most difficult of the FSSGs' functional battalions to organize for deployment. Severe CSS personnel reductions in recent years have trimmed the Supply Battalions from over 1,500 Marines and Sailors to approximately 800 total personnel. To survive in this austere environment, increasing dependency is placed on commercial technology and trappings associated with fixed facilities. The Battalion's Preservation, Packaging, and Packing (P,P&P) Facility, which prepares all equipment and supplies for shipment and storage, is a fixed, high output, materiel preservation and wood box-making shop with heavy, commercial, floor-mounted machinery. The facility is manned by a cadre of experienced civilians and the normal influx of school-trained Marines. The worst case of not being able to deploy, however, is the Battalion's retail supply activity, the Supported activities Supply System (SASSY) Management Unit (SMU). To support its customers with the level of materiel support to which they have become accustomed during the Reagan years, albeit with fifty percent manning, the SMU has become totally automated. Its operation is dependent on a sophisticated, fixed-base installation data processing facility; a high throughput mechanized warehouse; a commercial-item procurement section; and an ever-increasing host of personal-computers. While a Deployed Force Automated Services Facility (DFASC) [deployed data processing facility] exists to support the personnel, maintenance, supply, and other systems functions for each MEB in a MEF, these hardware facilities were outmoded years ago by the systems software they were supposed to support. In the case of the SMU, its main-frame, data-base operating system software cannot be supported by the DFASC in the field; additional local programs required to run daily inventory file updates and minimum supply and maintenance systems analysis for operations cannot be supported; and the mechanized warehousing system cannot be supported. In addition to crippling data processing constraints, the mechanized warehouse with its automated conveyors; logistics automated bar-code markers, readers, and scanners; and automatic stock routing and location systems cannot be deployed. Additionally, the local sources for commercial item and services support cannot be deployed. According to Marine Corps warfighting doctrine: Fleet Marine Forces must be organized for warfighting and then adapted for peacetime rather than vice versa. Tables of organization of Fleet Marine Force units should reflect the two central requirements of deployability and the ability to task organize according to specific situations. Units should be organized by type only to the extent dictated by training, administrative, and logistics requirements. (11:42-43) Like the principles for war in general, there are guides for the planning, organization , management, and execution of CSS specifically, i.e. the seven principles of CSS as stated in FMFM 4 Combat. Service Support: (1) Responsiveness. Responsiveness is the provision of the right support at the right place at the right time and is the keystone of CSS; (2) Simplicity. Simplicity is the avoidance of complexity. CSS plans and operations should be conceptually simple, structurally simple, and procedurally simple. (3) Flexibility. CSS plans and operations must consider alternative organizational structures and procedures to achieve both responsiveness and economy; (4) Economy. Physical centralization of CSS assets tends to foster economy, however at the expense of responsiveness. Commanders must not allow economy to hamper military effectiveness and mission accomplishment; (5) Attainability. Attainability is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations; (6) Sustainability. Sustainability is the ability to maintain support throughout an operation; and (7) Survivability. Survivability is the inherent capacity of the organization and its capabilities to prevail in the face of potential destruction. (12:3-1,3-2) Recognizing the duality of the challenge to CSS commanders to balance responsiveness and economy, review of both Marine Corps warfighting and CSS doctrine reveals the priority of military effectiveness and mission accomplishment over economy. It logically follows that FMF retail supply activities should be structured primarily for combat effectiveness and secondarily for peacetime efficiency in accordance with Marine Corps doctrine. Aside from real-world contingencies, exercises to test the deployed capabilities of CSSEs are routinely conducted at the MEU or MSSG level. At any one time there is at least one MEU afloat. For a brief period, two MEUs are afloat, with one in garrison conducting pre-deployment training. MEU/ MSSG deficiencies in organization, operating procedures, and personnel are corrected in the training process. Meaningful testing of CSSE capabilities at the MEB or BSSG level is less frequent, both from fewer contingencies at this level of operations and fewer exercises. Further, for cost and other reasons, most MEB level exercises are conducted within motor-transport range of the supporting FSSG. Due to pressures to maximize support and ensure favorable exercise results, BSSG support is heavily bolstered by trips to the FSSG in garrison. While the DFASC is designed to support a MEB, it is never relied on in exercises because of systems difficulties. From the CSSE's perspective, these conditions create training artificialities which render these exercises significantly ineffective in measuring deployed CSS capabilities. Meaningful testing of CSS capabilities at the MEF or FSSG level is almost nonexistent. Exercises at the MEF level are cost-prohibitive except for limited command-post and staff exercises. Recent MEF-level employment in response to real-world contingencies is limited to the recent Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Southwest Asia. While the Marine Corps enjoyed considerable logistical success in its operations during Desert Storm, time was clearly on our side in developing an ad-hoc, off-the-shelf commercial data processing and retail supply capability. (3) According to cognizant Headquarters personnel, a high- capacity, commercial, Interim Force Automated Services Facility (IFASC), was procured, shipped, and installed in a modern, host-nation port warehousing facility in an around- the-clock, herculean effort to create a deployed capability that didn't exist at the outbreak of hostilities. Systems and warehousing experts were brought in from key billets throughout the Corps to get this new facility operational. The retail FSSG supply facility was up and running and dealing independently with wholesale materiel item managers in December, four months after deployment of U.S. Forces to the region. (3) The efforts and expertise of the personnel responsible for successfully developing a mechanized retail supply capability in Saudi Arabia are highly commendable and are rightly acknowledged. Indeed, this speaks very highly of the dedication, ingenuity, and capabilities of our Logistics personnel and our logistics surge capabilities in wartime. The concern exists, however, that yet to be developed is a mobile, comprehensive retail supply system at either the MEB or MEF level of operations that can be deployed to ensure initial or sustained supply support for the MAGTF. Unlike the large, relatively secure rear area enjoyed in Saudi Arabia, a world contingency where hostilities break out in the amphibious objective area (AOA) at or near the outset is not difficult to envision. As Major G. Wilson pointed out in his 1984 article in the Marine Corps Gazette: On today's fast-moving, high-technology battlefield of unprecedented intensity, we will not normally be afforded the time or luxury of large built-up support areas. Brigade Service Support areas (BSSAs) or Force Combat Service Support areas (FCSSAs) at fixed facilities offer lucrative targets. (7:50-54) Indeed, Spetsnaz-type tactics used not only by the Soviets, but by many third-world nations employ specifically designed mechanized units to destroy rear support areas. (6: 36-37) This concern over the structure of our FMF retail supply activities centers not only on the lack of mobility of systems hardware and facilities, but also on the adequate training of personnel to operate deployed hardware and systems. If the MAGTF is really the Nation's force-in- readiness to respond to real-world contingencies at any level of warfare, each element of the MAGTF must be prepared to accomplish its mission in short order. The Supply battalions currently provide personnel and military-occupational-specialty (MOS) training for the standing task organizations of three MSSGs and two BSSG headquarters nuclei and maintain supply support for the residual MEF in garrison. From the personnel resource aspect of this arrangement, the numbers are marginal. After accounting for personnel who cannot be deployed for a variety of reasons, the same Marines and Sailors are almost constantly deployed. In addition to personnel shortages, the most highly trained key personnel are kept in the rear to ensure the continuous operation of the retail supply activity in support of the MEF. This practice, coupled with critical personnel shortages, results in the inevitable degradation of supply support at the cutting edge. Clearly, the Corp's CSS machine has room for structural improvement, whether this might equate to a tune-up or a result in a major overhaul. CSS types are the first to admit it. The question is, how do we wrestle this anomaly of providing flexible , effective CSS in a deployed environment with an organization which is efficient in garrison? In the same vein, shouldn't we attempt to optimize peacetime readiness? The Corp's leaders have in fact wrestled with this dilemma of how to structure CSS organizations, facilities, and systems which are both effective in combat and efficient in peacetime for decades. Unfortunately, the problem is getting harder. Weapon systems now include thousands of parts, to the tune of stocking over 35,000 line items at each of the FSSGs' SMUs. Throughput for these military equivalents to Sears and Roebuck department stores is staggering, the First FSSG SMU averaging over 37,000 consumer level requisitions for parts and supplies each month. Full mechanization is a must for this level of operations. In 1985 the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff, RD&S, tasked the Center For Naval analyses (CNA) to develop and evaluate MEF combat service support and logistic system structures to support Marine Corps operations through 1990/2000. The study developed and examined two general approaches for organizing the functional assets of the FSSG into a MEF CSSE, assuming the permanent structure of two MSSGs in support of MEU deployments. The first approach organized assets into functional supply battalions, maintenance battalions, and the like, further broken down into companies capable of providing sufficient assets for a MEB but requiring compositing of functional detachments from each functional battalion to form BSSGs for deployment. The second approach organized the MEF CSSE along MAGTF lines with permanent BSSGs as part of the MEF CSSE structure. (2:1-4--1-8) In an effort to determine the preferred alternative, the CNA Study then evaluated both approaches against eight criteria: (1) Command and control (2) Training and supervision (3) Equipment limitations (4) Peacetime requirements (5) Transition from war to peace (6) Facility requirements (7) Administrative changes (8) Philosophy of structure (2: 1-7) The study showed that for a variety of reasons, including equipment and personnel resources, there were insufficient assets to provide full support for two MEBs and a MEF residual. Most of the criteria utilized to evaluate the alternative structures favored the MEF CSSE structure that organized assets along functional lines. Because not all of the criteria favored one approach over the other, however, the CNA offered conditional solutions to MEF CSSE structure. (2:1-6) The conditions proposed as key determinants in choosing a CSSE structure were the expected times over which the MEBs would deploy and consideration of requirements for MSSG training and experience in providing rear area security for the MEBs. The functional approach to MEF CSSE structure was considered to be the preferred alternative if MEB deployments were few and of short duration; however, the MAGTF permanent BSSG structure was preferable for longer, more frequent deployments. The permanent BSSG structure was considered to provide better potential for training in rear area security than the functional MEF structure requiring compositing to form a BSSG. (2:1-6) Colonel J. Woodhead III recommended a small-scale test of the functional realignment of the FSSG's battalions into companies capable of being composited into BSSGs, using the FSSG's Motor Transport Battalion, in a 1986 article in the Marine Corps Gazette To form a BSSG the FSSG currently has to create as many as 31 detachments, most if not all, without established tables of organization or equipment. The restructure of the Motor Transport Battalion into a headquarters and three, near mirror image, line companies would greatly simplify the compositing of BSSGs. The Motor Transport Battalion would form a single motor transport detachment with a functional platoon from each line company. The following advantages would be realized: (1) Less personnel/ equipment turbulence for deployments. (2) Unit structure corresponds to deployment and employment. (3) Organized to meet mission of supporting two MEBs or four MEUs and the residual MEF. (4) Compositing based on known strength, not nebulous detachments. (5) Task unit commanders get units, not collections of people and gear. (6) Combat service support units act as units and morale responds accordingly. (8:29-30) There have been numerous appeals over the years for more permanence in our task organized CSSEs. Colonel Woodhead made such a case in a separate article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1987: In reality we have permanent CSSE headquarters. We just keep changing the people, equipment, and designations. Unfortunately this results in lost time, wasted motion, and perfection in re-inventing the wheel, rather than using it. Since we have these permanent staffs (they are repeatedly taken out of hide) the only question that remains is how to man these structures. The approach used by I MEF for a period, using landing support companies (from Landing Support Battalion (LSB), FSSG3 as nuclei for the compositing of BSSGs, appears to have merit. The mission of the LSB Landing Force Support Party is to provide CSS until a CSSE arrives ashore whereupon a landing support company could provide the nucleus for the BSSG. The air and ground combat elements of the MAGTF deserve professional, trained, and organized support from people they train with, not a collection of strangers busy trying to form in the midst of a fight. The alternative is permanent BSSGs that fly in the face of advantages to task organizing and constrain the Corp's ability to weight its logistical effort in accordance with MAGTF needs. (9:35) Despite the inherent difficulties encountered in resolving one of the Corps' most perplexing organizational problems, the Corp's thinkers are not resting on their laurels. Upon the Commandant's return from a recent trip to Southwest Asia, he tasked his staff to look into the task organization utilized by the FSSGs in the Gulf as a model for the FSSGs' structure in garrison. (1:3) Cognizant Headquarters personnel state that a comprehensive effort is being initiated to resolve the FSSGs' structural issues in response to the Commandant's concerns. Headquarters is envisioning a jointly sponsored study by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) as the MAGTF proponent, and the Deputy Chief of Staff For Installation and Logistics as the supporting establishment proponent. (10:3) While a popular headquarters idea towards restructuring the FSSGs involves formation of task organized direct support MAGTFs at each level of operations, i.e. Division Service Support Groups (DSSGs), BSSGs, and MSSGs, the required personnel and equipment aren't available. The CSS organization utilized in Southwest Asia absorbed the assets of two FSSGs and additional staffs to support nearly a Corps of Marines in a joint environment, which may not provide much insight into the normal employment of a MEF, or feasible alternatives for MEF CSSE structure. One aspect of the organization, which appeared to be in a constant state of flux due to the influx of both supporters and supported, may provide food for thought. Somewhere between the CSSE spectrum of MSSGs to FSSGs, support organizations provide a range of functions, some of which can be provided by direct support CSSEs, and some of which are best provided by a general support organization. The general support mission lends itself to centralization by function and efficiency through economies of scale, not unlike our current FSSG structure. (5) Returning to the doctrinal requirements for rapid mobility of our CSSEs and the shortage of personnel in the FSSGs, which is certain to become more critical in the upcoming peace-dividend force reductions, the Corps must organize to meet known requirements effectively and forego capabilities for which there is no immediately foreseeable requirement. Since the LIC level of contact is most probable, the MSSGs should remain permanent. Next most probable in the level of warfare is MIC, with the BSSGs in support of the MEB. Here is where the going gets tough. As the 1987 CNA Study pointed out, there are insufficient personnel levels and equipment to support the MSSGs, two MEBs and the residual of a MEF. If we are sincere in countering real world threats to our rear area security, and if deployment of our MEBs in MIC crisis response is realistically envisioned, we must develop a creditable, rapidly mobile BSSG beyond the current BSSG headquarters nucleus. Colonel Woodhead's building-block approach of compositing platoons from functional companies in the FSSGs' functional battalions with a landing support nucleus to form BSSGs, appears to be a viable alternative, albeit requiring major battalion reorganization. From a supply perspective, a creditable deployed data processing and retail supply and field warehousing system is a must. If it is envisioned that the MEBs could be deployed simultaneously in separate geographical locations, two such systems per MEF should be developed and fielded. The Corp's MAGTF II and Logistics Automated Information System could well provide this capability should the requirement be formally identified. (3) From a personnel training perspective, periodic training as a BSSG in the field, operating the systems that would be in place when deployed, and total independence from the supporting FSSG are basic requirements. CSS training should include formal instruction and practical experience in tactical dispersion, mobility, and rear area security. The one remaining and difficult-to-resolve structural issue is the residual MEF. According to doctrine we may deploy as MEUs and MEBs -- but we "employ" as MEFs. After reflection on recent events in Southwest Asia, it stands to reason that we must be prepared to rapidly employ our FSSGs to support MEF response to world contingencies in a HIC environment. While functional structure and centralization is inherent to the general support mission, and efficiency through economies of scale is realized, we must remain mobile. A single criteria should be utilized for determining mobility: Move it or lose it! This must be enforced ruthlessly, as it has been in the past in the Corps. If we are really the Nation's force-of-choice for crisis response in all levels of conflict, we'd better develop the real capability to sustain that force, whether it be MEU, MEB, or MEF. Otherwise, from a logistics perspective, our claim is hollow. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Taskings in Support of CMC SWA Trip. Memorandom, 10 October, 1991. 2. Center For Naval Analyses. Anaiysis of Marine Corps Combat. Service Support. Structure, CNR 127/ April 1987. 3. Crutchfield, J. C., LtCol., USMC. Headquarters Marine Corps, Code LPS, Telephone interview, 10 January, 1991. 4. First Force Service Support Group. Force Reduction Study, 16 April, 1990. 5. Gordan, D. E., LtCol., USMC. Headquarters Marine Corps, Code LPM, Telephone interview, 16 February, 1991. 6. Hayden, H. T., LtCol., USMC. "The CSS Battalion (Rein)." Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1986), 37-38 7. Wilson, G. I., Maj., USMC. "Updating the Corp's Logistics Support." Marine Corps Gazette, (April 1984), 50-54 8. Woodhead, J. A. III, Col., USMC. "Reorganizing the FSSG." Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1986), 29-30 9. Woodhead, J. A. III, Col., USMC. "Headquarters for Combat Service Support." Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1987), 35 10. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Code LPM. FSSG Organization for Combat in SWA. Talking Paper, 10 December, 1990. 11. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. Warfighting, FMFM 1, 1989. 12. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Combat Service Support, FMFM 4, 1987.
