Air As A Maneuver Element: An Idea Whose Time Has Come? AUTHOR Major Thomas X. Hammes, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: AIR AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME? I. Theme: Marines have been discussing using air as a maneuver element for several years. Yet we have not explored the requirements inherent in such an approach to determine if the idea is feasible. II. Thesis: To determine if air can be used as a maneuver element, we must answer the following questions. First, what do we want air to accomplish? Second, is it necessary to use air as a maneuver element to accom- plish those tasks? Third, if air is to be used as a maneuver element, what doctrinal, educational, organizational, training and equipment changes must be made? Finally, if those changes are feasible, who should control air when it is used as a maneuver element? III. Discussion: FMFM 1 and FMFM 1-1 define clearly what air should accomplish on the battlefield. These manuals direct all elements of the MAGTF, including air, to focus on "shattering the enemy's cohesion" through "attacking weaknesses" that cause the greatest damage to the "enemy's ability to fight." Examining the possible command and control arrangements for using air assets in battle, it is clear that, theoretically, air can make the greatest contribution to the MAGTF's fight as a maneuver element. Current doctrine, organization, training and equipment can, with very minor changes, accommodate air as a maneuver element. Education and the Corps' traditional relationship between air and ground are the primary stumbling blocks. Air can be used as a maneuver element, the question is who should control it? The key to this question lies in the current state of professional education and the current institutional bias of the Corps. IV. Summary: The idea of using air as a maneuver element is valid. There are no doctrinal, organizational, training or equipment limita- tions which preclude using air as a maneuver element. There are educa- tional and institutional reasons why the ACE is not capable of executing this role. V. Conclusions: Air should be used as a maneuver element. For the immediate future, the MAGTF commander should directly control air when it is used as such. This is a feasible, logical solution today and a natural step to the full use of the ACE as a maneuver element. AIR AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME? OUTLINE Thesis: To determine if air can be used as a maneuver element, we must answer the following questions First, what do we want air to accomplish? Second, is it necessary to use air as a maneuver ele- ment to accomplish those tasks? Third, if air is to be used as a maneuver element, what doctrinal, educational, organizational, training and equip- ment changes must be made? Finally, if those changes are feasible, who should control air when it is used as a maneuver element? I. Background discussion A. Previous arguments in favor B. Previous arguments opposing II. What do we want air to do A. Doctrine 1. FMFM 1 2. FMFM 1-1 B. South West Asia example C. Define role of air in maneuver war III. To be or not to be a maneuver element A. Maneuver war and the OODA loop B. Possible organizations IV. Changes needed A. Doctrine 1. Marine Corps 2. Joint 3. Amphibious B. Education 1. Deficiencies 2. Corrections C. Organization 1. Command and control requirements 2. MAGTF versus ACE D. Training E. Equipment V. Control of air as maneuver element A. MAGTF B. ACE VI. Summary AIR AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME? During the past few years, Marines have been discussing the concept of using air as a maneuver element. While some have bogged down in obscure semantics about what constitutes a maneuver element, others have pushed the idea that the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) has unique capabilities which maximize the effect of airpower. Mr. Bill Lind initiated the current version of this discussion in the May 1989 Marine Corps Gazette. He ignited a number of responses with his statement: . . .when we speak of air focus of efforts, we are not saying that air is the focus for the MAGTF. There has been some misunderstanding on this point. Because in almost all situations it is the ground battle that is decisive, all efforts of the MAGTF are focused on the ground battle. As noted above, the air focus of efforts is the answer to the question, "What can air do that no other arm can do that will have a decisive effect on the ground battle?" . . .Once ground combat is joined, history suggests air will seldom, if ever, be the MAGTF's focus of effort. The history of attempts to achieve decisions by air alone is one of repeated failure.1 In August, 1989, several authors took exception to Mr. Lind's statement. Major J. B. Saxman wrote: In order to truly employ the tenets of maneu- ver warfare, the ACE must operate as an independ- ent maneuver unit, synchronized with, not subju- gated to, the operations of the GCE.2 Later in the same issue, S. B. Donnell expanded on this concept, suggesting that Ground Combat Element (GCE) units could be assigned to the Air Combat Element (ACE). The ACE could become the focus of effort. . . responsible for securing the airfield and, no doubt, would need ground forces assigned to his operational control.3 Finally, Captain R. A. Menton stated that not only could the ACE require the assignment of GCE assets, it might also require units from the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) and even the MAGTF Command Element (CE). It is clear from these and other articles that the concept of using air as a maneuver element is being actively discussed throughout the Marine Corps. It is equally evident that some Marines are adamantly against using air as a maneuver element. In contrast, others are virtual crusaders for making the ACE commander a maneuver commander co-equal with the GCE. What neither side has done is analyze what they want air to accomplish and then explored the practical aspects of how that can be accomplished. To determine if air can be used as a maneuver element. we must answer the following questions. First, what do we want air to accomplish? Second, is it necessary to use air as a maneuver ele- ment to accomplish those tasks? Third, if air is to be used as a maneuver element, what doctrinal, educational, organizational, training and equip- ment changes must be made? Finally, if those changes are feasible, who should control air when it is used as a maneuver element? WHAT WE WANT AIR TO DO In determining what we want air to accomplish, we must turn to our capstone manuals, FMFM 1 and FMFM 1-1. Accord- ing to FMFM 1, the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy's cohesion, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which he cannot function. By our actions, we seek to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpect- edly and faster than the enemy can keep up with them.4 FMFM 1 goes on to state the best way to achieve this dislocation is to seek the enemy "gaps". Toward this end, we concentrate our strength against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking quickly and boldly where, when, and how it will cause the greatest damage to the enemy's ability to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly. We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively seeking out signs of weakness, against which we will direct all available combat power.5 The Commandant has stated that FMFM 1 is how the Marine Corps will fight. Based on this very clear guidance, we can state we want air to "shatter an enemy's cohesion." We want to employ its unique capabilities to find and exploit gaps that can "create a situation in which he cannot function." South West Asia provides an obvious example of how this can be done. The air campaign quickly destroyed Iraq's ability to contest Allied use of the air, thus creating a vulnerability (gap) which we proceeded to exploit. Build- ing upon this success, the CINC employed his ground forces to place the Iraqis on the horns of a dilemma. If they moved to fight our ground forces, their ground forces were exposed to our air power. If they remained dispersed to avoid our air power, they became vulnerable to our ground forces. The Iraqis faced "a menacing dilemma", they could not counter. While it can be argued that SWA was a unique case not likely to be repeated, one basic condition of that conflict will apply to many future conflicts. Third world nations cannot afford the technology neces- sary to provide a successful defense against an air and naval campaign. While the vulnerabilities created by the inability to defend against an air and naval campaign will vary from insignificant to decisive, recent events indicate US forces are capable of creating these gaps. This points to the role air should play in maneuver warfare. Air, like all other forces, must be focused on finding and then exploiting key enemy weaknesses. Air is capable of creating either local or general "gaps" through the destruction of enemy air defenses. Then it can carry the attack through these gaps. In addition, air's inherent range, speed, and firepower make it an ideal weapon to exploit opportunities created by other forces anywhere in the MAGTF's area of operations. In answer to "what do we want air to do?", we want it to provide a flexible, powerful weapon the MAGTF commander can commit at the critical time and place. In some cases, it will directly assist the GCE. In others, it will operate independently. In all cases, air should focus on shattering the enemy's cohesion. Now that we know what we want air to do, how should we organize to accomplish that? Simply put, is it necessary to use air as a maneuver element to achieve the desired re- sults? TO BE OR NOT TO BE A MANEUVER ELEMENT The very basis of maneuver warfare, as discussed in FMFM 1, is to educate, organize, train and equip your forces to execute the OODA* loop faster than your opponent. The keys to executing successfully are a short chain of command and flexible, decisive commanders who rapidly exploit oppor- tunities presented by the changing situation. The inherent range, speed, flexibility and firepower of air make it an exceptional weapon in this type of war. Yet if we tie air to the GCE scheme of maneuver, we severely restrict those capabilities. To maximize air's effect on the MAGTF battle, we must be willing to use it as a maneuver element. Air must be free to exploit opportunities presented in executing the missions assigned by the MAGTF commander. It must be inde- pendent of the GCE. The increased decision making time resulting from checking with the GCE HQs and the shortened area of interest of the GCE commander are antithetical to the concepts of maneuver warfare. *Col. Boyd's famous decision cycle--orientation, observation, decision, and action. Therefore, it is clear that airpower should be employed as a maneuver element. Any lesser role reduces the effect air can have on the MAGTF fight. While it is clear that air should be used as a maneuver element, it is not yet clear how that should be accom- plished. As previously stated, the focus of our study must be how to employ airpower most effectively to destroy the enemy's cohesiveness. The key to effectiveness lies in the command and control arrangements used to bring airpower to bear.* The MAGTF can employ its airpower, to include rein- forcements from joint task force, theater and national level assets, through a number of different command arrangements. First, the ACE can be employed in its traditional role as a supporting element of the GCE. While in this role, the ACE provides the six functions of aviation for the MAGTF and its entire concept of operations is tied directly to the GCE. Previous discussion in this paper discounts this approach. Second, airpower can be employed directly by the MAGTF commander. In this arrangement, the MAGTF commander will make the tactical decisions concerning employment of air and *There is a key difference between employing air efficiently and effectively. Centralized control leads to the most efficient use of air as represented in number of sorties generated per aircraft, tons of bombs delivered, etc. However, this is not a measure of effectiveness. Effective- ness is measure by how well air assists in accomplishing the mission. This may be accomplished by flying far fewer missions but having those missions more responsive to the commander executing the mission. and the ACE commander will execute those decisions. This arrangement elevates air from being simply a supporting arm to the GCE to being a supporting agency for the MAGTF scheme of maneuver. Yet when considering the requirements placed on the ACE staff, this role is very similar to that of responding directly to the GCE. The organization and train- ing of the ACE staff changes only in the level and depth of its focus. Third, the ACE can be treated as a maneuver element, task organized with the CE, GCE and CSSE elements necessary for successful execution of its mission. Under this ar- rangement, the ACE commander is responsible for developing his own concept of operations in support of the MAGTF con- cept, then implementing that concept for the duration of the fight. This implies taking over the five functions of command--gathering information, analyzing that information, planning a response, disseminating information/orders and supervising their execution. In short, the ACE must contin- ually execute its own OODA loop as it relates to the MAGTF battle. Fourth, the ACE can be employed in a combination of the above roles. Some elements of the ACE can support the GCE. Some fight directly for the MAGTF commander. Some execute a specific ACE mission. While each of these methods of employing airpower have been touched on in either the Command and Staff curriculum or in the Gazette, none of the discussions have considered the practical details which must be resolved before the last three can be implemented. The impact of five major areas needs to be considered before we conclude how to use airpower most effectively. These areas are: (1) Doctrine--Joint and Service (2) Education (3) Organization (4) Training (5) Equipment DOCTRINE Joint and service doctrine seem to part company in a number of areas regarding the use and control of air power. FMFM 1 Warfighting stresses decision making at the lowest possible level. In contrast, the air control doctrine and systems of both the US Air Force and the US Marine Corps are based on centralized control of all air sorties via the Air Tasking Order. The divergence between our capstone manuals and execu- tion gets even wider when one reads FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. This Marine manual virtually proposes the ACE operating as a maneuver element. The MAGTF's organic aviation allows the commander to project power well in advance of close combat, to shape events in time and space. The headquarters organization, with separate headquarters for the tactical control of ground and air actions, can free the MAGTF command ele- ment to focus on the operational conduct of war.... While the tactician looks at the immediate tactical problem and the conditions directly preceding and following, the operational commander must take a broader view. He must not become so involved in tactical activities that he loses his proper perspective.6 These paragraphs imply the ACE commander is fighting as a maneuver element to shape the battlefield for the MAGTF commander. It further implies the MAGTF commander is not fighting this battle himself because the purpose of the separate air HQs is to free the MAGTF commander from that burden so he can concentrate on the operational level of war. In short, the Marine Corps' capstone manuals come down firmly on the side of those who wish to use the ACE as a maneuver element. While Marine doctrine proposes using the ACE as a maneuver element, the question remains, can air be used that way? Since virtually all future conflicts will be joint rather than purely naval, we must examine how this approach lines up with Joint Doctrine as it applies to employing aviation. According to Joint Doctrine, the key factor determining how the MAGTF commander will use his organic air power is the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander's concept of the use of air. This has been a source of great concern to the Marine Corps and has resulted in a both the OMNIBUS AGREEMENT of 1986 and a carefully crafted definition of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). In his address to Command and Staff College students on 15 March 1991, LtGen D. A. Wills, Deputy Chief of Staff Air, US Marine Corps explained the Omnibus Agreement as follows: (1) The MAGTF commander always retains OPCON of Marine air assets. (2) The JTF can take either excess sorties or up front sorties from those the MAGTF can generate. The JTF can NOT take the aircraft, only the sorties. (3) JTF retains OPCON authority over the MAGTF air assets via the MAGTF commander. (4) JTF may designate the JFACC as his coordina- tor of air. This interpretation of the Omnibus Agreement supports the use of Marine Aviation as a part of the MAGTF. There- fore, the MAGTF commander is free to employ his air in any fashion he sees fit. However, the Omnibus agreement goes on to say "nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the theater joint force commander, in the exercise of operational control..."7 Thus, despite the fact the Omnibus strongly endorses the idea the MAGTF should fight as a unit, the JTF commander is still free to organize as he sees fit. The JCS definition of the JFACC supports the JTF's authority to reorganize as he sees fit. joint force air component commander-(DOD) The joint force air component commander derives his authority from the joint force com- mander who has the authority to exercise opera- tional control, assign missions, direct coordina- tion among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areeas. (Empha- sis added.)8 Based on the Omnibus Agreement and the JCS definition of the JFACC, it is obvious that the JTF is free to employ air in any manner he wishes. While both documents guide him toward leaving Marine Air as an integral part of the MAGTF, he will make his decision based on what he feels is the most effective employment of air power in support of his opera- tional plan. Thus the Marine officers assigned to the JTF staff become key players. They must present logical, coherent arguments for keeping Marine Air as an integral part of the MAGTF. The JTF must be convinced that Marine Air can sup- port his plan most effectively by remaining under the com- mand and control of the MAGTF commander. Failure to convince the JTF to leave Marine air under the MAGTF commander renders any discussion about how to employ Marine Air as a maneuver element academic. Quite simply, the MAGTF commander won't have to worry about it because he won't have any air. The next doctrinal factor which influences how a MAGTF commander employs his air is joint amphibious doctrine. According to JCS Pub 3.02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, when an amphibious operation is being conducted, the Initiating Directive will define an Amphibious Opera- tions Area. All air space within this AOA belongs to the Commander, Amphibious Task Force. He will execute control through his Tactical Air Officer using the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).9 Marine Air and its embarked assets will be hard pressed to execute a mission as a maneuver element during the open- ing phase of an amphibious operation. First, the ACE com- mander owns no airspace. Second, in the opening phase of the operation, he does not have any control agencies func- tioning. Third, the ACE commander does not have any assets ashore. His aircraft are either aboard CATF shipping or flying into the AOA from an airfield outside it. In either case, the ACE is not in a position to execute a mission type order. JCS 3.02 further states: At the termination of the amphibious assault, the amphibious task force will be dissolved, the assigned airspace will be disestablished, and the responsibility for "airspace control," defined as coordination, integration and regulation of air- space, normally will be exercised by the Air Force component commander through a joint air operations arrangement for the joint force commander.10 This paragraph simply means that at the end of an amphibious operation, the MAGTF is right back in the previ- ous situation where he has to negotiate use of his airpower with the JTF. Further limiting the employment of air as a maneuver element by the MAGTF is JCS Pub 3. 02. 1 Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations. While discussing air planning for the amphibious campaign, this manual clearly never considers air as a maneuver element 11. The process for employing air described in Section VIII, page 31 is the epitome of using the ACE as a sortie generator rather than an independent element. Obviously there are numerous contradictions between Joint and Marine doctrine. Further, Joint Doctrine is often vague--the result of compromises necessary to get doctrine signed by all services. Thus while doctrine presents some problems for the MAGTF commander in the employment of air as a maneuver element, it does not preclude it. Doctrine is essentially neutral. If the MAGTF commander wishes to employ his air as a maneuver element, he can. To do so, he must convince his superiors, JTF and CATF, that in doing so he can make the strongest contribution to their success. To be able to make that argument convincingly, the MAGTF commander must have a very clear understanding of both Marine and Joint air control doctrine and procedures. This bring us to the second key consideration in any discussion of using air as a maneuver element. EDUCATION All doctrine, organization, training and equipment decisions made by military forces are based on their percep- tion of war. This perception is shaped to a large degree by the education they have received. Education is the most critical element in any consider- ation of how the Corps can use air as a maneuver element. Unfortunately, our current formal education process clearly fails to address the issue of using air as a maneuver element. For instance, in Command and Staff College, the subject is discussed formally only as a segment of other aviation instruction and peripherally in several other packages. While it is discussed vigorously within the conference groups, the failure of the school to frame and guide the discussion leads to widely divergent results based on the individual background of the faculty advisors/students in each group. Given that the graduates of this college will man the joint, MAGTF and ACE billets responsible for the employment of Marine Air, this is a very significant defi- ciency. If we want to employ air as a maneuver element in accordance with FMFM 1, two major changes must be made to our educational process. First, we must teach our officers about the employment of airpower rather than the techniques and processes of employing air assets. The difference may sound trivial but is in fact a major problem. In teaching the employment of airpower, we must embark on an honest evaluation of the historical success of airpower in support of campaign plans. We cannot accept either the Douhet (old Air Force) approach of airpower as a separate element capable of winning on its own nor the limiting concept of using air only as another supporting arm (old Marine Corps). Rather we must try to determine what condi- tions, organizations and approaches have maximized the value of airpower to the complete campaign. Throughout the course of this study, we must focus on the use of airpower in the joint/combined environment. Based on this study, we should consider how to best organize, train and equip the MAGTF to successfully employ airpower. As part of this educational process, our officers must think through the employment of airpower in the joint arena from the operational level of war down to the nuts and bolts of execution. The second major area that must be dealt with through education is a clear understanding of the MAGTF's unique capability to employ airpower. While Marines consider it gospel that air is best used in conjunction with ground forces, few can give specific examples of what benefits are derived from this arrangement. Our education program must examine this subject in detail and present students with concrete examples of why it works best. For example, we can examine the single mission of air interdiction. In a detailed study of the problem, officers at the Air War College determined that four separate tasks must be accomplished to effectively interdict a target. The target must be located, identified, prioritized and at- tacked.12 The key point of the study was the fact that of the four tasks required to successfully interdict a target, air alone could only effectively execute the last--the attack. To locate, identify, and prioritize the target, air needed the assistance of other organizations. It is in exactly these areas that the unique organi- zation of the MAGTF has its greatest strength. Under a single commander, we have the reconnaissance (air and ground), the analytical, and the C2 (command and control) assets to execute the first three requirements or air inter- diction. Our assets can perform these functions in all weather and with a degree of accuracy unmatched by either national or airborne-systems. Further, the MAGTF ground assets can assisting in the fourth step of air interdiction, attack, by marking the target with lasers, indirect fire, or beacons. The MAGTF can provide all these services without exposing aircraft or personnel to enemy air defenses. This is only one example of one type of air mission that the MAGTF, due to its very organization, is better suited to execute than any other fighting force. The use of air in close air support, reconnaissance, and anti-air warfare, all provide further examples of the unique capabil- ities of the MAGTF. It is vital our officers understand these unique capabilities prior to their assignment to joint billets. The Corps must have people capable of clearly articulating these benefits. If we do not, JTF might well take our air in the honest belief the assets can better be employed under central command and control. Our educational system must make an aggressive top to bottom effort to rigorously explore the use of airpower in modern war. Our officers are a product of their education and will organize, train and equip our forces in consonance with their beliefs. The challenge for education is to expose our officers to all the possibilities for employing air in a campaign plan. Failure to do so means air will never be employed as a maneuver element by Marines. If we do not think about and discuss the concept, we certainly cannot execute it. ORGANIZATION Using air as a maneuver element places some very spe- cific organizational requirements on the MAGTF. Regardless of whether the MAGTF or the ACE controls aviation, the headquarters must be able to complete the OODA loop as it applies to the deep battle. This clearly implies a rela- tively sophisticated Combat Operations Center (COC). In fact, executi.ng the OODA loop quickly and effective- ly is much more complex when air is used as a maneuver element. Four major C2 requirements increase dramatically when air is used as a maneuver element. First, the inherent mobility and flexibility of aviation vastly increase the area of influence and area of interest of the commander. Second, intelligence requirements increase both in quantity and type. Quantity due to the increase in the area of interest. Type because the controlling headquarters must be able to employ real time information as well as collect and process intelligence for a comprehensive picture of the battlefield. This ability is necessary because air power must fight the immediate battle while anticipating and shaping the battle 24-96 hours out. Further, the MAGTF, functioning at the operational level of war, also needs a broader, deeper picture. While these, tasks may seem to require the same abilities and organization, in fact they drive an organiza- tion in fundamentally-different directions. In the March 1991 Gazette, Major Moore addressed exact- ly this point. The relative value of timeliness varies with the level of combat. MAGTF warfare, it should be remembered, is fought at both the tactical and operational levels. Tactically, intelligence timeliness can be measure in a few hours, if not minutes....Tactical intelligence relies on hastily developed, fragmented images, and timeliness depends on a rapid sequence of reporting, analy- sis, recommendation and dissemination. For this reason, intelligence organization at the tactical level must be decentralized, the overriding con- cern being rapid transmittal of information Tactical intelligence focuses on exploiting fleet- ing opportunities, and, thus, timeliness depends on rapid reporting. Operational level intelligence, on the other hand, demands more careful scrutiny of informa- tion: timeliness is more a function of accuracy than speed. Identifying the enemy's center of gravity or his point of main effort requires piecing together widely disparate reports and painstaking analysis. Conclusion and recommenda- tions encompass the entire MAGTF area of interest, whereas the chaos of the immediate battle assumes secondary importance. Operation intelligence, therefore, must be centralized.13 Third, the increased area of influence. the speed of air assets and their limited endurance mean the commander will be forced to make more, faster decisions. In addition, the range of airpower insures the headquarters controlling it must also be able to plan, coordinate and execute in the joint arena. The days of aircraft attacking the target supported only by other aircraft are over. Strike planners must be able to integrate ground designators (laser and beacon), long range artillery (out to 60 KM), rocket systems (ATACMS), naval gunfire and TLAM as well as electronic and other support rrom Army, Navy and Air Force aircraft. Fourth, the controlling headquarters must be able to translate the commander's decisions into clear, concise orders and rapidly disseminate them. Given these four requirements, which headquarters is best suited to employ air as a maneuver element? The MAGTF headquarters is currently organized and trained to execute exactly these functions. Thus the changes necessary for the MAGTF to use air as a maneuver element will be a matter of increasing current capabilities rather than creating new ones. The primary disadvantage of making the MAGTF commander directly responsible for fighting the ACE is the fact that he and his staff must now function on two different levels of war--closely directing the ACE's battle and planning the overall MAGTF fight. There is always a tendency for staffs and commanders to focus on the immediate fight (in this case, the air-ground battle) to the detriment of their other responsibilities. This is particularly dangerous given the current MAGTF organization which consolidates all intelligence gathering and processing at the MAGTF level. If the MAGTF commander is fighting the ACE's battle, there will be a natural tend- ency for his intelligence gathering organizations to focus on that battle to the detriment of the ground battle and future operations. Conversely, the ACE fighting as an independent maneu- ver element has its own strengths and weaknesses. It pri- mary strength is that the commander who trained, deployed and leads the ACE also fights it. Theoretically, the indi- vidual best qualified to employ air is the man who leads it. Unfortunately, the traditional role of the ACE staff is that of a supporting arm responding to a maneuver element. Only with the recent rewrite of FMFM 3-1 Command and Staff Action in 1989 has the Marine Corps officially accepted the ACE focusing on supporting the MAGTF commander's battle and not just on supporting the GCE's scheme of maneuver. (Indi- vidually, many Marines resist even this modest step.) Thus to fight as a independent maneuver unit, the ACE must create entirely new capabilities rather than expand on existing ones. Second, the ACE will have even more difficulty than the MAGTF in focusing both on his battle and on the traditional support role for the GCE. For while the ACE may well be given a maneuver mission, this will not relieve him of all responsibility for supporting the GCE. Finally, the ACE will require major augmentation of its intelligence section before it can execute the OODA loop effectively. TRAINING Regardless of the concept used, training will be based on the education and beliefs of the officer commanding the organization. Either the MAGTF or the ACE is capable of fighting air as a maneuver element once the commander ac- cepts the concept of employing air as a maneuver unit. The key to training is education. If a commander can be educated to evaluate how air as a maneuver element can best support his mission, he can develop a training program to achieve those ends. The actual type, level and frequency of training re- quired to use air as a maneuver element is tied directly to the concept of employment. If air is to be employed directly by the MAGTF, the necessary training will be limited to the planning and functioning of the MAGTF staff. In sharp contrast, if the ACE is to function as a maneuver element in its own right, significant training will have to take place. The ACE will have to transition from a organization that focuses on the air battle and supporting the GCE to a maneuver element focusing on executing the MAGTF commander's intent. EQUIPMENT The equipment required to use air as a maneuver element largely exists within the current Tables of Equipment for the MAGTF CE and ACE. The primary task will be determining how the current equipment will be used to support a combat operations center capable of using air as a maneuver ele- ment. In addition, careful attention must be given to equip- ment requirements necessary to tie each headquarters into the joint command and control system that will dominate future war. CONTROL OF AIR AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT The final question is "who should control air when it is being used as a maneuver element?" In examining doc- trine, organization, training and equipment, we found these factors to be essentially neutral on the subject of who should control air. While each presents some challenges, none is a war stopper. The key factor in determining how airpower should be employed lies with the commanders and staffs at all levels from ACE to JTF. The outlook of these individuals has been shaped largely by their education. (Remember, understanding the new doctrine is only one aspect of education.) Further, Marine Corps schools are just beginning to grapple with the subject of air as a maneuver element. Thus very few commanders or staff officers in the fleet have had the opportunity to thoroughly consider, discuss and develop their own positions on this question. The question of who should control air when it is used as a maneuver element essentially comes down to the issue of how senior commanders feel about it. Following his address to the Command and Staff College, LtGen. D. A. Wills, Deputy Chief of Staff Air, USMC, was asked who he thought should control aviation assets when they are used as a maneuver element. His unequivocal answer was "the MAGTF". Given General Will's position, experience and educa- tion- his opinion reflects not only the official position of Marine aviation but most likely the opinion of his contempo- raries. Thus while there are no practical limitation to using the ACE as a maneuver element, the Corps' institutional bias combined with the background of our senior officers effec- tively precludes that option. Until such time as opinions change, the ACE as a maneuver element is not feasible. Therefore, by default, air employed as a maneuver element will have to be controlled by the MAGTF commander and his staff. SUMMARY What we want air to accomplish is clearly delineated in FMFM-1 and FMFM 1-1. Air must contribute to the MAGTF commander's ability to identify, locate and attack key enemy vulnerabilities. These attacks must focus on disrupting his command and control to the point he cannot function. Given this role for air, it is clear that airpower will, at times, be used as a maneuver element with the mission of striking directly at those key enemy vulnerabili- ties. While there are no doctrinal, organizational, training or equipment issues precluding the use of air as a maneuver element, the Corps current educational system and doctrine have traditionally opposed this view. The recent changes in doctrine and progress, within the educational systems have not been in place lone enough to overcome the inertia inher- ent in a large organization. As a direct result, the FMF has not developed the latent capability of the ACE as a maneuver element. Based on this realistic appraisal of where we are, the MAGTF commander should not attempt to use his ACE as a maneuver element without making a long term commitment to preparing it for that role. For the immediate future, the MAGTF commander should directly control air when it is used as a maneuver element. This is a feasible, logical solution today and a natural step to the full use of the ACE as a maneuver element in œhe future. FOOTNOTES 1 William Lind, "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation," Marine Corps Gazette (May 1989), 59. 2 J. B. Saxman,"The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare, "Marine Corps Gazette (August 1989), 89. 3 S. B. Donnell, "The ACE as a Maneuver Element, "Marine Corps Gazette (August 1989), 64. 4 FMFM 1 Warfighting (March 1989), 60. 5 Ibid, 60. 6 FMFM 1-1 Campaigning (January 1990), 28 and 62. 7 White Letter No. 4-86, Commandant of the Marine Corps, (18 March 1986), 3. 8 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02 The DOD Dic- tionary of Military and Associated Terms (1 December 1989), 197. 9 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3.O2 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (1 November 1986, Change 5), 7-9. 10 OPCIT, JCS 1-02, 7-10. 11 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3.02.1 Joint Doc- trine for Landing Force Operations, (December 1989), VIII 26- 30. 12 P. T. Bingham, Air Power and the Defeat of the Warsaw Pact Offensive: Taking a Different Approach to Air inter- diction, Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1987. 13 R. S. Moore, "Finding the Gaps: Intelligence and MAGTF Warfare' "Marine Corps Gazette, 64-65. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bingham, P. T. Air Power and the Defeat of a Warsaw Pact Offensive: Taking a Different Approach to Air Interdiction. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1987. Dean, D. J. Airpower in Small Wars: The British Air Control Experience. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1985. Drew, D. M. Rolling Thunder 1985: Anatomy of a Failure. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1986. Donnell, S. B. "The ACE as a Maneuver Element." Marine Corps Gazette. (May 1989). FMFM 1 Warfighting. (6 March 1989). FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. (25 January 1990). FMFM 3-1 Command and Staff Action. (January 1989). Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02 The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (1 December 1989). Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. (1 November 1988, Change 5). Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-02.1 Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations. (December 1989). Lind, William. "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation." Marine Corps Gazette. (May 1989). Moore, R. S. "Finding the Gaps: Intelligence and MAGTF Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette. (March 1991). Murray, W. C. The Luftwaffe. Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1985. Saxman, J. B. "The Role Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette. (August 1989). Steadman, K. A. A Comparative Look at Air-Ground Support Doctrine and Practice in World War II. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1982. Warden, John A. III. The Air Campaign. Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press, 1988. Watts, Barry. The Foundations of US Air Doctrine. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University Press, 1984.
