Operational Airpower: A Common Sense Approach AUTHOR Major Stephen L. Hoog, USAF CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: OPERATIONAL AIRPOWER: A COMMON SENSE APPROACH I. Purpose: To provide a common sense approach for air commanders to determine the most effective use of airpower at the operational level of war. II. Discussion: The instrument of war was forever changed with man's first flight in 1903. Since that time early theorists like "Billy" Mitchell and Giulio Douhet offered their approach to the employment of airpower. They focused on strategic bombing as a means for airpower to win wars independently of land or naval forces. World War II, Korea, and Vietnam showed that effective employment of airpower must go beyond strategic bombing developing the missions of superiority, interdiction, and close air support. Military analysts soon began studying war at its three different levels: strategic, operational and tactical. This breakdown allowed analysts to better understand the cause and effect relationships of war. Airpower is primarily an operational level "tool" of war that must be tailored to meet the requirements of given mission. There are many factors the air commander must consider in developing his gameplan for the employment of airpower. My interpretation of these factors are as follows: Analysis of Mission, Campaign Integration, Enemy, Combat Capability, Geography, Time to Influence, Space for Operations, and Logistics & Basing. Factors are not taken sequentially but rather each must be viewed constantly with the overall big picture in mind. Each factor is discussed to illustrate their importance and interrelationships. III. Conclusion: These factors together form the acronym ACE-CG-TSL and provide the commander a framework to approach the operational employment of airpower. This framework is a common sense approach in determining the most effective use of airpower at the operational level of war. OPERATIONAL AIRPOWER: A COMMON SENSE APPROACH Thesis Statement: The acronym ACE-CG-TSL provides the air commander with a framework to approach the operational employment of airpower. This common sense approach will help air commanders in determining the most effective use of airpower at the operational level of war. I. Brief History on the Evolution of Modern Airpower A. Douhet's and Mitchell's Position B. Effectiveness of Strategic Bombing II. A Common Sense Analytical Process A. Three Levels of War B. Importance of the Operational Level III. Factors and discussion of their effects on Operational Airpower Employment A. Analysis of Mission B. Campaign Integration C. Enemy D. Combat Capability E. Geography F. Time to Influence G. Space for Operations H. Logistics & Basing IV. Conclusion A. Tactical framework acronym METT-TSL B. Operational Airpower framework acronym ACE-CG-TSL C. A common sense approach to Airpower Employment OPERATIONAL AIRPOWER: A COMMON SENSE APPROACH The instrument of war was forever changed with man's first flight in 1903. Early theorists such as Giulio Douhet and William "Billy" Mitchell argued that airpower would become the most decisive element of war. They thought that by applying airpower directly at an enemy's warmaking capability rather than its deployed forces, airpower could destroy not only the enemy's ability to wage war but also his will to fight. (3:2) World War II provided the opportunity to test these and other theories concerning airpower. During the course of the war classic missions of airpower were refined and developed. Strategic bombing, interdiction, and close air support were used extensively in both theaters of operations. Strategic bombing, however, became the theorists' main focus in their effort to show the decisive nature of airpower. Both Germany and Japan were subjected to massive allied strategic bombing raids designed to break the enemy's will to resist. Even today military historians debate the effectiveness of strategic bombing not only in WW-II, but also in Korea and Vietnam as well. One way to determine the effectiveness of strategic bombing is to study its impact on the three different levels of war. These three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical, allow us to understand better the cause and effect relationships in war. (8:2) The strategic level of war is normally the concern of both national command authorities and the highest military commanders. War at the operational level is conducted by theater level commanders. Finally, tactical level warfare is practiced by individual units and their commanders. The relationship between each level of war seems clear. At the tactical level engagements may be either won or lost, but the campaigns that make up wars must be won at the operational level. Finally, political victory must not be lost at the strategic level. At the operational level strategic bombing during World War II proved to be effective within certain limitations. What most historians failed to realize is that airpower is just a tool, a hammer, in the theater commander's war-chest. (8:69) A craftsman will choose exactly which type of hammer to use in various situations. A sledgehammer is good for breaking up foundations while a finishing hammer is best for delicate woodwork. He might chose a ballpeen hammer to reshape damaged sheetmetal. Like a hammer in a craftsman's hand, airpower should be tailored by the commander to suit each mission. The question now becomes, "what factors must the operational commander consider in tailoring airpower to accomplish his mission? " At the tactical level of war there are many step-by-step checklists on how to plan air attacks against specific targets. Yet, at the operational level detailed checklists simply become unwieldy and overly concerned with statistics. In addition, at the operational level of war parallel and concurrent planning goes on continuously. Factors are not taken sequentially but rather each must be viewed constantly with the overall big picture in mind. The factors listed below in Table 1 must be considered when working with airpower at the operational level. Click here to view image Taken together, these factors represent a common sense approach in determining the most effective use of airpower at the operational level of war. In the following sections each factor will be discussed to illustrate their importance and interrelationships. Analysis of Mission Failure of airpower at the operational level is usually the result of not having a clear understanding of the mission. As a result, understanding the mission and deciding which type of airpower "hammer" should be employed is the most important problem the air commander must solve. A craftsman who decides to try and drive a woods crew with a hammer has a similar problem. When he is finished, the screw will not hold properly, the surrounding wood will be needlessly damaged, and it will take five times as many blows as a nail to drive home. Likewise, even the most powerful air force can fail if the commander chooses the wrong tool to accomplish the mission. Operation Rolling Thunder flown during the Vietnam War is a classic example of the problems associated with first defining and then deciding how best to accomplish the mission. During the course of the three year operation, the mission objective shifted constantly. Its stated mission varied from showing support for the South Vietnamese government to inducing North Vietnam to cease combat operations in the South. In between, Rolling Thunder focused on interdicting supplies from the North and as a means to support the expanding combat role of American ground forces. (3:63-67) As a result of mission objective confusion and additional limitations placed on the use of airpower, Operation Rolling Thunder met with only limited success Air commander's must thoroughly understand each assigned mission. Then, they must analyze airpower's ability to accomplish the mission and tailor their forces accordingly. As each factor is considered it will become apparent which "hammer" in airpower's toolbox in suited to the mission. Campaign Integration As General Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, "One of the most important and least understood factors in modern war is that it is essentially a matter of teamwork . . there is no such thing as a separate land, sea, or air war." (6:363) This does not mean there is never a separate air campaign plan, but rather that each campaign plan must be integrated into a single theater-wide effort. Normally, gaining and maintaining air superiority is the primary focus of the air commander. JCS Pub 1-02 defines air superiority as "that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over the other which permits the conduct of operations . . . at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force." (8:237) It is hard to overstate the importance of first obtaining air superiority. Since 1939, no nation has ever lost a war while it maintained air superiority. (10:10) Campaign integration begins with the battle to control the skies. The air commander should use all available assets to accomplish this goal. For example, during the 1973 Arab- Israeli war, Israeli gunboats attacked Egyptian surface-to- air missile sites to open a corridor for Israeli aircraft. (10:15) In addition, Desert Storm opened with "Apache" AH-64 attack helicopters destroying several key radar sites in the Iraqi air defense network. Once air superiority has been obtained the air commander can bring the full weight of airpower to bear on the enemy. The historical interdiction mission provides an excellent case study on campaign integration. Those who discount airpower's ability to interdict forces tend to rely on a numerical "attrition" model. Effectiveness of airpower's interdiction is based solely on the number and types of vehicles and supplies destroyed. This tactical level approach fails to measure the effect interdiction can have at the operational level of war. (1:1) Operation Strangle conducted in Italy during World War II is a good example of interdiction. For over a month allied airman tried to starve out the German forces in central Italy with a massive interdiction campaign. The Germans were forced to move at only night because of the heavy losses during daylight hours. When it became apparent that interdiction alone was not enough to force the Germans out, the allies launched an integrated air and ground offensive called "Diadem." (1:13) The commander of the German defense, General Von Senger, described his defeat against the allied offensive in these terms: The enemy's mastery of the air . . . was a major source of worry for the defender, for it prevented all daylight movements. We were accustomed to making all necessary movements by night, but in the event of a real breakthrough this was not good enough. In a battle of movement a commander who can only make the tactically essential moves by night resembles a chess player who for three of his opponent's moves has the right to only one. (5:224) Campaign integration at the operational level is more than just combined arms operations. Both seek to force the enemy into an unfavorable dilemma. Combined arms, however, is focused more at the tactical level such as the defense of a specific hill. At the operational level, the enemy must be forced to choose which mountain range to defend in the first place. Integration of airpower into the theater campaign plan will help ensure that the enemy's options are few and far between. Enemy Behind analysis of the mission, understanding the enemy is the next most important task for the air commander. As Sun Tzu said some 2,500 years ago, "know the enemy, know yourself: in a hundred battles you will never be in peril." (7:2) But what does knowing the enemy entail? It is more than simple knowledge of enemy equipment capabilities and tactics. Specific intelligence such as speed, payload, and weapons of enemy tactical forces should be a given. Your forces must possess the information required to successfully meet and defeat the enemy at the tactical level. The key to victory, however, lies in understanding the enemy on the operational and strategic level. The first step in developing operational level knowledge of the enemy is to understand the nature of the conflict itself. What is the enemy's political objective? What are the enemy's sources of national power? Where does the conflict fall on the spectrum of war? What is the enemy's intent in conducting operational level warfare? Generally, airpower is more effective as a tool of war against more industrialized opponents who are conducting conventional warfare. As the air commander, one must address these questions as a minimum to determine the overall nature of the conflict. The enemy's center of gravity should become apparent from this examination. Center of gravity is defined by JCS Pub 1-02 as "that characteristic, capability, or locality from which a force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." (8:241) Too often we project our own centers of gravity as those of the enemy. The bombing of the POL storage sites in North Vietnam is just one example. Some analysts thought the destruction of North Vietnam's POL would disrupt their entire war machine. Although the bombing by U.S. Forces caused heavy POL losses and hardships in the North, it had minimal impact on the war being waged in South Vietnam. (3:93) A commander must be able to look at the war through his enemy's eyes. Then both the enemy's center of gravity and his critical vulnerabilities will become obvious. Combat Capability Each air commander must know the combat capability of the tools of war he controls. To some this seems as simple as counting the number of assets in terms of aircraft, bullets, and bombs, This easily quantifiable number would then represent the total combat "force" a commander should expect to generate. However, combat capability equates better to a measurement of work rather than one of force. Work is the product of a force (F) applied over a specific distance (D) or Work=FxD. But just what does the "D" stand for to the air commander? The "D" in the combat capability equation is a combination of many variables. At the top of the list is personnel training and readiness. The best equipment in the world is only as good as the men and women who employ it. In addition, command and control are essential in getting the most out of each and every asset. Efficient command and control allows the commander to make the combat capability of the whole greater than the sum of each individual part. Additionally, technology has the ability to be a combat multiplier in certain situations. A good example is the smart bombs" first employed in Vietnam and more recently in operation Desert Storm. (3:159) Finally, the commander needs accurate and timely intelligence so he can employ his combat capability where and when it is required. Combat capability, therefore, is an assessment made by the commander based on knowledge, experience, and understanding of his people and assets. The commander must then be able to relate this knowledge to his understanding of the enemy's capabilities and intentions. Only then will Sun Tzu's maxim of "know the enemy, know yourself: in a hundred battles you will never be in peril" apply. (7:2) Geoaraphy Geography can be broken down into two components for analysis. The first is the actual topography present in the theater of operations. Certain airpower missions such as interdiction and close air support are significantly affected by terrain, vegetation, and natural obstacles. Normally, natural barriers such as rivers and mountains provide excellent choke points to interdict enemy supplies. These choke points make airpower more effective by providing a natural opportunity to concentrate assets at a critical point. Again, close integration with the land campaign is required to ensure our own interdiction effort will not interfere with future ground operations. Weather is the second consideration the air commander must include in his planning. Despite many advances in technology, airpower is still most effective when airman can "see" the target. Night vision devices can now turn night into day for round the clock air operations. Despite these advances in technology ordinary cloud cover is still the single biggest cause of aborted missions. According to General Horner, the air component commander of Operation Desert Storm, the air campaign was extended several days because of the sorties lost due to exceptionally poor weather. In comparison, the weather in Western Europe is normally three times as bad when compared with the Middle East. (3:121) Therefore, air commanders must carefully consider the impact of weather on his ability to bring combat capability to bear on the enemy. Time to Influence As the commander begins to formulate a plan that combines all the factors listed above, he must consider the time available to accomplish the mission. At the operational level of war the air commander normally has weeks or months available to shape the combat theater. History has shown, however, that no matter how much time or combat capability the air commander has he will always have to establish priorities. Once the first priority of air superiority is accomplished, airpower's combat capability is usually split between strategic bombing, interdiction and close air support missions. Strategic missions usually have the potential for the greatest overall effect on the enemy, however, it usually takes the longest time to be effective. Again, the air commander must know the enemy to determine their centers of gravity. In certain limited war situations strategic bombing may have a very limited impact on the enemy. (3:62) Interdiction also has the potential to cause the enemy significant problems but may take from days to weeks to be effective. Finally, close air support provides the most immediate effort on the battlefield but is generally limited to a specific tactical situation. The air commander must recommend to the theater commander the allocation for each of these missions in both combat assets and time required to influence the situation. Space for Operations The amount of space available for air operations is normally defined by the political situation. In many limited wars these political limitations can significantly affect airpower's ability to influence the battlefield. For example, during the Korean War the United States limited its air forces to operations.south of the Yalu River. This allowed the Chinese a sanctuary from which they launched combat operations into Korea. (10:16) Air commanders must take these potential limitations into consideration when developing an air campaign plan. In addition, friendly forces may sometimes be forced to compete for the same airspace. In joint or combined operations, such as Desert Storm, the air commander must integrate Air Force, Navy and Marine air assets into a single air campaign plan. Separate operating areas may be established to help facilitate the employment of airpower to shape the battlefield. However, the air commander must not let the situation degenerate into several separate air forces fighting their own war within each sector. Logistics and Basing The availability of suitable bases may be the dominant factor in airpower's campaign planning and execution. (8:194) In areas where few suitable bases are available, the air commander may be severely limited in employing his airpower. Likewise, more available bases translates into greater combat power and flexibility for the commander. Naval air forces, because of their deployable nature, may often provide the nearest means of aviation support. Sustained employment of airpower requires vast amounts of logistical support. Besides the large volumes of fuel and ordnance required, airpower by its nature is complex and time consuming to maintain. For example, during World War II it took 85 personnel to keep a single B-29 bomber flying in combat. (8:194) Although modern aircraft of today are designed with lower maintenance as a primary consideration, it still takes large numbers of highly trained personnel and expensive parts to keep them flying. In all cases, the air commander must continuously analyze available basing and logistics factors to determine their potential effect on employment of airpower. At the operational level of war there are few hard and fast standards the air commander can apply in all situations. However, at the tactical level of war there are numerous battle drills and standard operating procedures that may prove useful. Although there are still many variables that must be considered, a tactical commander's focus is by necessity on a much smaller scale. One method the tactical commander has in approaching his problem is known as METT-TSL. This acronym stands for: mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time, space, and logistics. (9:50-1-50-7) It provides a framework to break a mission down into separate considerations that must be addressed. The factors an air commander should consider when analyzing the use of airpower as a tool of war also can be formed into an acronym as shown in Table 2. Click here to view image It has been often said that the operational level of war is more like an "art" rather than a "science." Each potential conflict must be analyzed in depth to determine cause and effect relationships. Lessons of past wars and knowledge of today's capabilities should both go into the commanders thought process. The acronym ACE-CG-TSL provides the air commander with a framework to approach the operational employment of airpower. This common sense approach will help air commanders in determining the most effective use of airpower at the operational level of war. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bingham, Lt. Col. Price T. Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the Operational Art, Cadre Paper. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1989. 2. Brown, Neville. The Future off Airpower. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986. 3. Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power. New York: The Free Press, 1989. 4. Craven, Wesley F. and James L. Cate. The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol III, Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949. 5. Frido von Senger und Etterlin. Neither Fear Nor Hope. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1964. 6. Senate Committee on Military Affairs. Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs. 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945. 7. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Tr James Clavell. New York: Delarcorte Press, 1983. 8. U.S. Air Force. Airpower Research Institute, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education. Basic Aerospace Doctrine fo the United States, Vol II. Maxwell AFB, 1990. 9. U.S. Marine Corps. Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Planning a Battalion Attack. A(A)112, Quantico MCS, 1989. 10. Warden, Col John A. The Air Campaign. Virginia: Pergamon-Brasseys, 1989.
