Supporting Arms In Amphibious Operations, Past And Present
AUTHOR Major Samuel J. Head, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: SUPPORTING ARMS IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, PAST AND
PRESENT
I. Purpose: To identify the lack of capability of supporting
arms in today's military fighting force when conducting
amphibious operations.
II. Problem: The capability of supporting arms, naval gunfire
artillery, and aviation, has been reduced to a level that puts
the mission of amphibious operations at risk.
III. Data: During World War II the United States Navy had a
large number of fighting ships that could support an amphibious
operation. These fighting ships were capable of providing both
naval gunfire and aviation assets. The naval gunfire capability
was available in a multiple of calibers (16-,14-,12-,8-,6-and 5-
inch). The number of aircraft carriers available in 1945 totaled
116. Today the Navy can launch only 15 aircraft carriers and
provide 16 and 5-inch gunfire support. The number of ships that
are capable of firing the 16-inch gun are four, two of these are
scheduled for deactivation, with the other two probably to
follow. A solution to the naval gunfire shortfall might be the
lightweight 8-inch gunfire system, and the tomahawk cruise
missile. The aircraft carrier problem might be a little harder
to solve. One solution might be an increased number of LHD's
that are to be commissioned, which would position Marine Corps
AV-8B's as additional aircraft support.
IV. Conclusion: A shortfall in supporting arms capabilities has
placed the success of future amphibious operations in jeopardy.
V. Recommendations: The Navy has to develop new and improved
naval gunfire systems that will provide effective support to the
amphibious operation. The Department of Defense should allow the
Navy to keep its 15 carriers and increase the number of LHD's for
amphibious operations.
SUPPORTING ARMS IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, PAST AND PRESENT
Thesis Statement: The study of present day supporting arms
capabilities identifies several weak links that must be corrected
to ensure the successful execution of amphibious operations in
the future.
I. Supporting Arms During WW II (Saipan)
A. Naval Gunfire
B. Artillery
C. Aviation
II. Supporting Arms in Present Day Operations
A. Naval Gunfire
B. Artillery
C. Aviation
III. Future Requirements in Supporting Arms Capabilities
A. Naval Gunfire
1. Tomahawk Cruise Missile
2. Lightweight 8-inch Gunfire System
B. Lightweight 155mm Howitzer
C. Aviation
1. LHD
2. MV-22
SUPPORTING ARMS IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, PAST AND PRESENT
MAJOR SAMUEL J. HEAD CG# 10
The United States has long been a world leader, and
especially so, in this century. The ability to project power
from the sea --to include amphibious operations-- has been a
capability that supported and enhanced this leadership role. OH
1-1OO defines Amphibious Operation as:
...an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing
forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing
on a hostile shore. It normally requires extensive air and
naval gunfire support and is characterized by closely
integrated efforts of forces trained, organized, and
equipped for different combatant functions. (11:I-1)
This definition outlines very specifically the requirements that
are needed to be successful in this type of operation.
Furthermore, the study of past operations will show the
interconnected reliance of supporting arms in accomplish-
ing this difficult mission. The studs of present day
supporting arms capabilities identifies several
weak links that must be strengthened to ensure the
successful execution of amphibious operations in the future.
The nation's military history is replete with examples of
amphibious operations. The Saipan operation is a classic case
and worth reviewing. Clearly, the decisive use of supporting
arms during the battle of Saipan was a determining factor in the
success of the operation, and this was not an isolated case. The
effective use of supporting arms was to prove effective in the
leapfrogging' strategy adopted by the military in the Central
Pacific Campaign during WWII.
Admiral Nimitz had recommended launching a major amphibious
operation against either Truk or the Marianas in mid-June 1944,
to be followed by an assault on the Palaus about 1 October, --
Operation Granite. However, the Army Air Force was pressing for
the early capture of the Marianas. (4:20) The Marines would land
this time not primarily to seize advance naval bases or air bases
to support the fleet, but to capture something significantly
different: bases for strategic air power. (6:552) The JCS had
issued a directive on 12 March ordering Admiral Nimitz to
"institute and intensify" aerial bombardment of the Carolines and
to conduct carrier attacks on the Marianas, Palaus, and other
profitable targets. Consequently, the Southern Marianas were to
be seized, target date 15 June, and B-29 bases and secondary
naval facilities developed there. (4:20)
Since the original GRANITE operation was no longer in
effect, GRANITE II was issued on 3 June. With the change, the
Marianas were listed first as compared to last in the original
listing.
Operation Target Date Tentative
Capture Saipan, Guam, Tinian 15 June 1944
Capture Palan 8 September 1944
Occupation Mindanao 15 November 1944
Capture Southern Formosa
and Amoy or Luzon 15 February 1945 (4:22)
Task Force 56's (Expeditionary Troops) mission was to
capture, occupy and defend Saipan, Tinian and Guam and be
prepared for further operations. The mission pertaining to
Saipan and Tinian was assigned to the Northern Troops and Landing
Forces (NTLF) with the following major units:
Corps Troops (Administrative and Services Elements).
1st Battalion, 2d Marines.
2d Marine Division (Rein) (Less 1st Battalion, 2d Marines)
(plus 1st Battalion, 29th Marines).
4th Marine Division (Rein).
XXIV Corps Artillery.
Saipan Garrison Forces (Task Group 10.13).
Tinian Garrison Forces (Task Group 10.12).
In Expeditionary Troops reserve, prepared for commitment on
Saipan, Tinian, or Guam, was the United States Army's
27th Infantry Division. (4:27)
The effective utilization of combined arms, naval gunfire
and artillery, was to be a determining factor in the swift
capture of Saipan by the NTLF. The combined arms assets in Task
Force 58 employed by NTLF were:
Naval Gunfire
Task Force 58 (TF58)
(7) Battleships
(13) Cruisers
(58) Destroyers (4:35)
Artillery
10th Marines (Rein).
14th Marines.
XXIV Corps Artillery.
27th Division Artillery. (4:27)
Task Force 58 consisted of different types of ships armed
with different calibers and combinations of naval guns. This
array of calibers provided for a devastating and highly effective
weapon system to punish the Japanese defenders. To provide for
effective coverage of the entire island, Saipan was divided into
eight Fore Support Sectors (FSS) (Figure 1). (4:39) A closer
look reveals that FSS 2 and 3 were a subdivision of FSS 1, which
provided for the utilization of ships to support the
Click here to view image
landings over assigned beaches in that area. Commencing on 13
June Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's TF58 initiated intense pre-
D-Day bombardments of Saipan. For seven hours battleships fired
their main batteries (16" and 14") guns into the western shores
turning the island into a scene of desolation. The heavy
bombardment caused severe problems for the defenders, as revealed
by these entries in captured Japanese diaries:
...I was horrified by the number of deaths on our side due
to the naval gunfire which continued every day.
...We did not stay long in this fourth headquarters, caught
in the concentration of naval gunfire the wounded and dead
continued to increase.
...most feared...was the naval gunfire shelling which
managed to reach the obscure mountain caves where CP's were
located.
...The greatest single factor in the Americans success was
naval gunfire.
...The feeling of everyone is `if they would only stop the
naval gunfire.'
...The enemy naval gunfire, using mainly a shell with
attacked instantaneous fuze (land shell) has great
destructive power. They also use a shrapnel shell. The
call for fire on land is extremely quick and accurate and
until night attack units are some tens of meters away from
the enemy, they continue to receive naval gunfire.
...The practical experiences of the defense forces in Saipan
in the battle which lasted over half a month lay only in the
power of the enemy naval gunfire bombardment. (4:248)
The bombardment continued and on D-minus 1 (14 June) ships
of the Joint Expeditionary Forces (JEF) arrived to assist TF58's
efforts. With the arrival of the "old battleships," the quality
of gunfire support actually improved. This was due largely in
part to the experience crews of the old battleships had gained
during earlier operations. Pre-D-Day support was intensified as
the D-day assault loomed closer. Throughout the operation naval
gunfire supported with speed and increasing effectiveness. The
total number of rounds expended on troop support missions (not
including pre-D-Day bombardment) by battleships, cruisers, and
destroyers in the Saipan operation were 138,391, a weight of
8,500 tons. In addition to this 5,882 starshells were fired.
(4:247)
Once ashore, artillery was added its weight in support of
the operation. To provide additional fire support at the
earliest opportunity, and to add to the naval gunfire support,
artillery was embarked on varying types of amphibious vehicles
for early landing. Slightly behind the 2d and 4th Marine
Division's 34 LST's (landing ship, tank) were 8 LST's with the
division's artillery, and two LST's with the XXIV Corps
artillery. At 1315 on D-Day, the 14th Marines started landing
and by dark had all of its units ashore. The 10th Marines
commenced landing late in the day and by dark had its 1st and 2nd
Battalions ashore. The following morning the 3d and 4th
Battalions of the 10th Marines were ashore by 1800.
The requirement to get all artillery units ashore early in
the landing did cause some problems. All units sustained damage
from enemy fire, but the 5th Battalion and 14th Marines took the
worst blow. The following "box score" tells the story:
By 1430 (16 June) all of Baker Battery's guns had been
knocked out-0545: Two guns in Able Battery knocked out-
0630: Other two guns Able Battery knocked out-0730: One
gun Charlie Battery knocked out. This left us with two
guns, We fired them.
When I say `knocked out' I mean just that--trails blown off.
sights blown off, recoil mechanisms damaged, etc. By 1000,
with the help of the divisions ordnance and by completely
replacing one or two weapons, we were back in action--full
strength--12 guns. (4:82)
Personnel losses to the battalions during the period included
eight killed and over 50 WIA. As the enemy was very active no
one had time to count the number of shells that landed in the
area of the units, but the nearest estimate was 300. Even with
the heavy losses in artillery to the battalions, all weapons were
back in action by 1000, a great contribution to the ordnance and
maintenance personnel.
The XXIV Corps Artillery had begun to land and was well
ashore on D-Plus 1. These units now assumed an important role in
the fight. Twenty-one of the twenty-four 155mm howitzers and
eleven of the twenty-four 155mm guns were in position and firing.
Long-range destruction, night harassing and interdiction fires
were begun in general support and reinforcement of the 10th and
14th Marines, and subsequently of the 27th Division Artillery.
Observers in liaison planes conducted registrations deep in enemy
territory, prevented movement and assembly by personnel during
daylight hours, placed destruction fires on enemy installations,
and provided important intelligence information for future
missions. (4:109)
Certainly the four major artillery units (one for each
division plus XXIV Corps Artillery) performed a vital function at
Saipan. There were 291,459 rounds fired during the operation.
This figure can not tell the whole story: time and time again
the 75's, 105's, and 155's brought timely, effective fire on the
enemy points of resistance. All artillery units were
exceptionally well trained, well led, and when assigned a
mission, hit their targets. (4:250)
Naval aviation provided the air support for the Saipan
operation. Commencing on 11 June, Vice Admiral Marc A.
Mitscher's Task Force 58 initiated three and one-half days'
intense bombardment. Task Force 58 consisted of the following
aircraft carriers:
Large carriers: Hornet, Yorktown, Franklin, Bunker Hill,
Wasp, Enterprise, Lexington and Essex
Light carriers: Bataan, Cabot, Belleau Wood, Monterey,
Princeton, San Jacinto, Cowpens, and Langley (4:35)
From these eighteen carriers over 900 planes provided a
tremendous bombardment over the operational area.
In support of the Saipan operation and while the carriers
were still over 200 miles east of the islands, a 225 plane sweep
surprised the Japanese in the Mariannas and destroyed 150 planes
in the air and on the ground. This crippling blow depleted the
local air strength by about one-third and thereafter prevented
the enemy from reacting in strength. The United States
advantage, once gained, was never lost. "Control of the air,
reported Admiral Nimitz, "had been affected by the original
fighter sweep on 11 June." (4:35)
On 12 June the serious bombardment began; Saipan and sister
islands felt the impact of tons of bombs on airfields and
installations. The 13th brought a resumption of the rain of
bombs. With most of the planes destroyed on the ground or
missing in action, the Japanese responded only with sporadic dusk
and night attacks during this preliminary phase.
The following diary entry indicates the effect of the bombing as
seen by a Japanese tank noncommissioned officer, Tokuzo Matsuyo:
11 June--At a little after 1300. I was awakened by the air
raid alarm and immediately led all men into the air raid
trenches. Scores of enemy Grumman fighters began strafing
and bombing Aslito Airfield and Garapan. For almost two
hours. the enemy planes ran amuck and finally left leisurely
amidst the unparalleledly inaccurate anti-aircraft fire
All we could do was watch helplessly.
12 June--The all day strafing and bombing was much heavier.
It must have caused great damage to Garapan and Aslito
Airfield.
13 June--At 0930, enemy naval gunfire began firing in
addition to the aerial bombing. The enemy holds us in utter
contempt. If only we had a hundred planes or so. (4:36)
Aviation provided a preponderance of the support during the
initial phases of the operation. Air spotters, in light
observation aircraft, directed the efforts of the pilots against
the enemy artillery and troop concentrations. At times many
planes were stacked up waiting for directions to their targets.
Once the artillery was landed much of the air request for support
was handed over to the artillery. The spotters continued to play
a crucial role in the adjustment and direction of fires on the
enemy.
The effective, decisive and voluminous assets of naval
gunfire, artillery and aviation employed at Saipan paid great
dividends to the success of the operation. At every opportunity
possible these weapons hurled shells and bombs at the enemy.
Every time the Japanese attempted to use their force they were
met with tons of ammunition and they were virtually destroyed at
every turn by our superior firepower. As seen earlier in the
accounts of captured diaries, they paid dearly for their limited
gains. The end was always the same, a large body count with no
tangible results to show for their efforts. This story was told
after each and every operation during the Pacific Campaign.
The history of the Saipan operation is a marvelous example
of the use of supporting arms in the amphibious role. However,
amphibious operations and the capability for the United States to
conduct successful operations is now in question. When compared
to the World War II example, Saipan, many problems become evident
in today's supporting arms capabilities.
Let's start by looking at the naval gunfire capability and
limitations. The capability of the Navy to provide naval gunfire
support to the amphibious operation in the 1944-1945 time frame
was tremendous. The navy had the following number of ships with
a gunfire platform:
16” 14” 12” 8” 6” 5”
Battleships: 13 9 1
Battle Cruisers: 3
Heavy Cruisers: 24
Light Cruisers: 45
Destroyers: 482
(5: 467-487)
This listing only covers the main armament. All the ships had
the 5-inch gun as a secondary armament. In the case of the
battleships, they had as many as twenty 5-inch guns. Figure 2
has a detailed listing of the capability of each gunfire
platform. (13:48) The sheer power of the ships providing naval
gunfire support to the amphibious landing was evident in the
accounts of the aforementioned diaries captured during Saipan.
Click here to view image
The naval gunfire capability that is avaIlable for an
amphibious operation today is drastically limited. The number of
gunfire platforms that the Navy can provide are as follows:
16” 5”
Battleships 4
Cruisers/Destroyers/Frigates 127 (10: 131-143)
These ships are a far cry from the number and types of gunfire
platforms that were available during World War II. Besides the
16-inch and 5-inch gun, the navy has the Tomahawk cruise missile
which can be used to provide a fire support help. This weapon
comes in three types:
Land attack, nuclear warhead, 1,500 nautical miles
Land attack, conventional warhead (1,000 lb), 700 nautical
miles
Anti-ship, 250 nautical miles (10:195)
As demonstrated in South West Asia, Desert Storm, the Tomahawk is
a very capable and highly accurate weapon. The major drawback to
the employment of this weapon is the cost. At an average cost of
1.4 million dollars the use of this weapon becomes highly
restrictive. (3:36) Budget cuts limited production in FY 1990 to
only 400, down from 510 in FY 1989. In FY 1991, the Navy sought
funding for 600, but Congress reduced that number to 400. The
Navy has announced its requirement for 3,630 missiles to fill the
inventory needs. (10:196) With the deactivation of the
Battleships, naval gunfire support will be severely limited.
This shortfall will cause a major problem in supporting a hostile
landing by U.S. forces and may require the use of the Tomahawk to
fill the gap.
Carrier-based aviation has long been a major player in
providing supporting fires to the amphibious operation. With the
limited assets the Navy has to deliver naval gunfire support, and
the limited ranges that the ships can reach (Figure 2), carrier
aviation will play a much larger role in the future. The United
States had 116 carriers by the end of 1945. The following is a
list by class and number:
CLASS NUMBER
MIDWAY 3
ESSEX 24
INDEPENDENCE 8
ENTERPRISE 1
RANGER 1
SARATOGA 1
COMMENCEMENT 19
SANGAMON