The MAGTF'S Decisive Blow: An ACE-Drawn Reserve AUTHOR Major Jack R. Harkins, Jr., USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE MAGTF'S DECISIVE BLOW: AN ACE-DRAWN RESERVE I. Purpose: To survey the conceptual framework for the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) to provide all or a portion of the MAGTF reserve. II. Problem: The ACE has capabilities that characterize maneuver elements, but is not truly viewed as such by most Marines, nor considered suited to perform the reserve role as the decisive force in battle. MAGTF doctrine as a whole is evolving toward formalization and the potential to expand or restrict the practice and thought of MAGTF leaders is embodied in the case for developing the ACE-drawn reserve concept. III. Position: The ACE has combat power, mobility, the capability to execute mission-type orders, command and control, ability to survey and control terrain and other characteristic of maneuver elements central to Maneuver Warfare. The imperative for a potent reserve to drastically change the balance in warfare should cause Marines to consider all the power resident in the MAGTF that might compromise part or all of the reserve. Although doctrine does not provide for the ACE performing the reserve role, it has capabilities that can enhance employing the reserve in a bid to seal victory. At both the operational and tactical levels the ACE can fulfill the reserve role. The MAGTF commander establishes the criteria for selecting an ACE- drawn reserve by applying METT-TSL and by stating: the probable missions of the reserve, the requirements for mission success, and the tasks to the elements forming the reserve. Principles of the reserve engaging decisively only on the commander's order and committing the reserve in mass are applied to the method of constituting the reserve from the ACE. The reserve may be the aircraft and crews that are in a re-arm, refuel, rest cycle or it may be forces which are sequestered out of action until their commitment as the reserve is ordered. IV. Conclusion: The MAGTF commander can select the ACE to constitute all or part of his reserve. Recognizing this potential and developing it should become a priority of doctrine-makers and MAGTF planners, and Marines should be taught that the potential exists. The MAGTF's Decisive Blow: An ACE-Drawn Reserve The battles at the landing beaches and the helicopter landing zones had been violent and brief. That is, except for Task Force Heavy's day-long running duel with enemy anti-armor companies while the tanks had moved inland from the air-cushion craft landing zones and had taken Landing Force Objectives 2 and 3. Now the Marine Expeditionary Brigade's ground combat power was completely ashore and the amphibious assault had gained the beachhead the commander wanted to protect the airfield and port during the landing of the 3rd and 1st Marine Divisions and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, in follow-on order. Marines and Sailors who had made the landings were now grateful for the decision to come in under overcast and through rain clouds. Since their opponent's air forces had never showed up during the assault and the Marine A-6 air attacks had been so devastating to what enemy artillery and armor had tried to stop them (and only two helos had missed their LZs and aborted), quick success and light casualties had given a bright cast to the gray clouds. But the general wasn't showing elation as he finished passing his orders for D+3 to D+6: "While all those regiments and helo squadrons are coming inland and we push the beachhead line out, I'm sure the enemy pressure will increase. They may concentrate enough at the foothills that we could destroy their presence in the western peninsula, if we hit fast. I'm giving the MEB mechanized reserve back to the 5th Marines CO. He'll need everybody to keep the beachhead secure while guiding the arriving battalions and handing off battle areas. What we need now is a reserve that can strike out and destroy the enemy division and their artillery when our reconnaissance finds them massing. I'm having the Air Group Commander put a third of all units into a reserve task force that will be fully read-in to all engagements and enemy situations and be able to strike at a massed force, as well as defeat its air support, within an hour of the signal. To keep air superiority and still fly all the ongoing close air support we need will give MAG-50's committed two-thirds a tough chunk to chew; but, as always, our success will hinge on the aircrews and I know they can do this. Questions?" Since this CG's trademark was 'no such thing as business as usual,' the latest innovation caused only a few moist frowns and then the commanders and staff officers moved back through the dark and mist to get the word to their own people. The foregoing fictional scenario portrays an action that draws immediate criticism and correction by a preponderance of Marine aviators posed with the concept of placing aircraft and aircrews in reserve. Responses primarily approximate "airplanes aren't put in reserve, just like artillery isn't put in reserve and "no, the ACE can surge to meet the critical time/place opportunity but fly everything in a normal tasking schedule in the meanwhile." Little other attention is afforded the issue even in academic and decision-game venues. This may evidence that the common reaction is right and the concept of the reserve must not encompass Marine aviation, or it may mean that the concept has been neglected and merits development. This essay is an attempt to determine if one case can be proven. The commander of the modern Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) brings into an operational theater a force of such versatility and capability that its range of employment is practically limited only by the talent and imagination of its leadership. The balanced and complementing Ground Combat Element (GCE) and Aviation Combat Element (ACE) are able to tailor their sizes and make-up according to mission and enemy threat variables, and the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) task organizes to become as much "tail" as the "teeth" need. So a MAGTF can be called upon to conduct a massive amphibious assault against opposed shores in a high-intensity conflict or to perform a hostage rescue in isolated counter-terrorist actions, or to do any and all in between. The most compelling aspect of the MAGTF in relation to the range of roles and enemy situations it must address is that it includes a powerful air arm. As expeditionary combat aviation the MAGTF ACE is the most unique force in the world. Combat aviation has a deserved high status in modern warfare that is long standing. The United States' most recent war against the armed forces of Iraq in the Persian Gulf brilliantly recalls the words of German General Erwin Rommell: "The future battle on the ground will be preceded by battle in the air. This will determine which of the contestants has to suffer operational and tactical disadvantages and be forced throughout the battle into adopting compromise solutions. "(13:39) Still the Marine Corps professional community has tended to undervalue the significance of the ACE and demonstrated more concern to division elements. During a 1991 formal Marine Corps school's two-day practical exercise, for example, the Decision Game's written reference to the 6th MEB contained only the identification of three infantry battalions. A bias to consider Marine Aviation merely a fire support arm--the aerial corps artillery--and to espouse that it isn't decisive, degrades progress of doctrine and practice to maximize the utility of all the MAGTF's power. As Marines discourse on maneuver warfare, recognition should be accorded to the ACE's ability to execute Mission-Type orders, to move against and engage enemy forces on the surface, and to survey and control terrain, characteristic abilities of maneuver elements. Army Air-Land Battle Future already speaks eloquently to the employment of aviation in massed attack formations as a maneuver asset that can have operational level influence for decisive actions.(7:28) The MAGTF ACE employed with imagination and verve could surely take at least as crucial a place. The potential for the ACE to fulfill the vital role of the MAGTF reserve, just as well as being the MAGTF focus of effort, certainly merits recognition and doctrinal development. A question likely vital to pursuing the subject further at all is whether any argument may persuade aviators to devote more consideration to this issue. If so, it surely must emerge from a voice in the air. In his excellent book of operational-level art, The Air Campaign, Colonel John A. Warden III, USAF, makes very compelling arguments for air forces to employ reserves. Describing the shock value of reserves, he emphasizes the mental shock to enemy troops and commanders from the appearance of reserves, and that a physical shock effect can also be achieved. Since momentum is a product of mass and velocity, a force's momentum, assuming a constant velocity, will be in direct proportion to its mass. Thus air forces massed by committing reserves could overwhelm by momentum and shock.(12:118) Colonel Warden contends that a sortie not flown is not a sortie lost, despite the general feeling that aircraft are to fly as much as possible, and that some target will appear for every sortie.(12:119) He instructs that not every day of battle has equal importance for either opponent: In fact, effort in war comes in spurts and surges, rather than some inexorable pressure like a flowing river. Lulls between enemy offensive or defensive surges offer opportunities that can be exploited if force is available to do so. The theater commander would like to be able concentrate ground and air power to take advantage of these opportunities, but he can't if close air has been expended in some mechanical way. Thus a sortie may be more valuable on one day than on another. And a sortie that is available on a later day because an aircraft was not previously lost in combat or is not down for needed maintenance may not be a wasted sortie by any means. Indeed, a sortie saved is worth more than a sortie rashly used.(12:126) Doctrine for the employment of a MAGTF is both in place and emerging. Within Marine Corps, Navy, and joint orders and handbooks, the material for guidance, restriction, or license, is prevalent. Dictums and principles laid down by authoritative strategists, tacticians, and just plain warriors describing the use of a combat reserve are well summed by William S. Lind in Maneuver Warfare Handbook: In both the offense and the defense a strong reserve provides the key to retaining the initiative and achieving victory. It is a tool with which you widen gaps and create breakthroughs by reinforcing local successes. It also comprises the counterattack forces. Without a strong reserve, even the most promising opportunities will be wasted, for you will be unable to exploit them. Indeed a strong reserve offers such potential advantages that it should reflect a sort of inverse proportionality-- the weaker the main force with respect to the enemy, the stronger the reserve. Also the more uncertain or confusing the situation is, the stronger the reserve should be.(6:22) The MAGTF commander in concurrence with a strong reserve may then seek the doctrinal guidelines for constituting the MAGTF reserve. He will find that the topic is not treated exhaustively in Marine Corps manuals and handbooks. In joint landing force doctrine only the complexity of reserve commitment is expressed, in the ground combat operations realm only fundamental precepts and the suitability of tanks and mechanized units for the reserve are covered, and aviation doctrine omits the reserve. This fortunately affords the commander the comfortable latitude enjoyed when interpreting generalizations and the declarations of Clausewitz, et al, to his own universe. Considerable implications for a commander's methodologies descend from whether his role is at the Operational level of war or at the Tactical level. A simple determinant test of this resides in FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. Operations, the discipline of campaigning, uses tactical actions to realize a strategic aim. It governs force deployments, commitments to or withdrawal from combat and tactical action sequencing to achieve strategic objectives. Tactics is the discipline of fighting and winning in combat. Tactics maneuvers forces, applies and coordinates fires, sustains forces for combat, and collects and passes combat information.(4:5-7) The distinction as to which level of war a MAGTF commander is performing, operational or tactical, is important for the consideration of the reserve as a concept, since reserves can have very different origin and content at each level. MAGTFs, including MEFs, are most likely to be tactical elements, performing missions assigned by a higher level such as a unified command or joint task force. Still, in a limited theater or a low to mid-intensity conflict occurrence, a MAGTF could be the lead command for planning and completing a campaign to achieve a national strategy objective. A MAGTF commander could even experience entering a theater of war as a tactical commander--to land a MEF and achieve an assigned objective, for example--then become an operational commander required to develop and execute a campaign of pacification or nation-building. Since the MAGTF could perform at either level, the differences of tactical and operational reserves should be clarified. Tactical reserves are forces designated to be in readiness to engage an enemy force, begin an advance through a penetration, gain a decisive objective, etc., in a battle that is actually joined. An example is the tank battalion of the division made the reserve for a MEF in the defense. All MAGTFs, of course, have forces and thus all (MEUs, MEBs and MEFs) are capable of establishing and employing a tactical reserve. Just what force(s) should become the MAGTF tactical reserve, and how it is controlled will be considered further on. The operational reserve is combat power which the commander can calculate use of at a future time or place (not for "today's battle"). Therefore, operational reserves can be massed conventional fires (including air strikes), theater unconventional weapons, or even various forms of logistic support, as well as forces. Whatever the commander introduces that substantially changes the combat power equation or denies the enemy options can be operational reserves. The operational commander may be able to generate reserves as a campaign progresses from one battle to the next --unlike the tactical commander who must have a reserve readily available to the battle he is fighting. A MEF, then, may be able to employ operational reserves (and even a MEB or a MEU in very precisely drawn circumstances); and in theory it should be able to constitute the reserve from any or all of its elements, including the ACE. The MAGTF commander or air planner may feel in need of an example of a successful air reserve on which to found his choice to constitute an operational reserve from the ACE. One case is that air reserves won the Battle of Britain: British Air Marshall Dowding in August-September 1940, having kept a third of the RAF fighters out of the battle zone and out of the fighting (even through what Churchill called the darkest hour!) put operational and strategic reserves into the air in complete mass on 15 September against Germany's attempted knock-out bombing raid on London. The RAF thereby made approximately twice the opposition the Luftwaffe thought possible and broke the daylight bombing effort.(11:99, 151- 165) In that case the RAF was in the defense and was outnumbered. So, a commander might begin to make those conditions two criteria for holding an aviation reserve, but he shouldn't assume that Air Marshall Dowding would! If it is valid on the offensive or when favorably matched to an enemy's strength, to hold ground forces in reserve, why shouldn't air forces be so used as well? Dowding's courage to hold a reserve through the darkest hour would surely have supported holding some squadrons out of an offensive air schedule. The lesson, perhaps, is that the only criteria for the operational reserve is the capability to achieve the desired result. Armed with some history to support constituting his operational reserve from the ACE, the MAGTF commander then considers the method he will apply and the correct description. Tenets of reserve employment require that the reserve not engage decisively until the commander so orders, and that the commander commit the reserve as a whole entity--not piecemeal. Appropriate terminology for the holding of some squadrons, or some numbers of aircraft and aircrew, out of action to form a reserve is to sequester those forces. When a force is sequestered as the reserve, two tenets are fulfilled and, at least briefly, some warriors experience frustration. The ACE commander who receives the mission to sequester a reserve for the MAGTF could have some squadrons concentrate solely on the known, scheduled missions and have other formations wait in readiness, focused upon the possibilities for tomorrow's unfoldings. The MAGTF commander who is phasing a force ashore and is supported with carrier-based or out-of-country based aviation might select the ACE's shore-based units, as they locate within the beachhead, to be in reserve and concealed, while air superiority and close air support goals are maintained with carrier and remotely sited elements. This ACE-ashore reserve protects its strength and disposition from the enemy, builds up munitions and fuel stocks, closely monitors the ground and air campaign developments, and plans routes and tactics for maximum effectiveness when committed. The local security and defense requirements this would entail are significant, but should be considerably less difficult to meet than if the ACE-ashore was mounting regular flight schedules. At the operational level the ACE might provide part of a reserve whose mission to open a new front at the right moment would involve lifting forces and combat stocks far across the theater. This would require extensive preparation to move by strategic lift and theater transport assets. For example, a MEF that air lifted a MEB with its GCE, ACE and CSSE behind an enemy's borders, would demand sequestering that entire MEB for the airlift preparation some days in advance of commitment, if the maneuver had to be executed instantly on order. Were the commander to decide that the operational reserve could reside within the ACE without sequestering any elements, there may be a feature employed in the air schedule to ensure certain numbers of aircraft were in Alert status. On a cyclical basis then, the reserve would actually appear on the Air Tasking Order (ATO) as alert missions. As previously cited, the operational commander may be able to generate reserves from one battle to the next. For example, the sections/divisions returning from deep air strikes may be turned into Alert formations in reserve for the events emerging as tomorrow's battle. If a case for drawing the MAGTF reserve from the ACE at the operational level is somewhat well-based by now, the issue of the tactical MAGTF's reserve is surely still very problematic for most. The tactical commander, though aware of his senior's intent, would more likely carry concern for the craftsmanship in the attack (or defense) his MAGTF is building than for the artistry of the overall operation. That concern will lead him to seek criteria for the method of constituting a tactical MAGTF reserve, especially one drawn, or partially drawn, from his ACE. METT-TSL (consideration of: Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops and fire support available - Time/Space, and Logistics) will obviously be the starting and concluding reference on setting criteria for reserve constitution. Mission capability will be the most vital determinant in force selection, so the commander endeavors to foresee the mission his reserve must perform and evaluate the ability of the ACE to accomplish it. At this juncture the practices of the higher level commander are pertinent: the joint task force or unified commander's taskings for Marine air and the potential use of a Joint ATO can profoundly impact the MAGTF commander's employment of the ACE in a Joint Theater of Operations. In concert with the higher commander and the air component commander, if one is appointed, the MAGTF commander must validate the missions and profile he expects to assign to the ACE. With the joint issue addressed, the specifics of the ACE reserve role capability can be examined. An ACE-drawn reserve can: Seize air superiority in a highly contested situation, conduct an attack to destroy or neutralize an enemy force, pursue a retreat or withdrawal, interdict an attacking formation, deny use of an avenue of approach or movement corridor, control vital terrain or routes, and more. Aviation alone is not the choice to seize terrain objectives that must be occupied, capture enemy ground elements, or gain ground. [Of course, the GCE commander may well add that ground forces alone aren't the best choice for these latter missions either.] Determining the probable mission of the reserve and the ACE's matching capabilities has commenced the criteria for constituting the ACE-drawn reserve. Attention is drawn then to the size and content of the reserved force and the technique to designate and employ it, although in the application of METT-TSL the consideration of forces available has been ongoing and overlapping. The tactical commander should express the reserve requirement in terms of the mission(s) the reserve is to perform. Projecting the battle conditions, the enemy actions, and his own achievements may be the most trying of all the commander's functions, and is probably an art; but it deserves effort, for by this the reserve mission is focused. The requirement for success of the mission should be stated next. Will gaining air superiority for one day seal a victory? Is destruction of an enemy force or weapon system required? Will neutralization be sufficient? By setting out the reserve mission and requirements for success, the commander serves the future performance of his reserve while supporting his force selection decision. A force in reserve positions and prepares itself and plans its actions, just as a committed attacking or defending force, and it must rely on the commander assigning it as the reserve for crucial orientation through mission and success requirement statements. Tasking is then laid upon the subordinate commander who controls the forces selected for the reserve to effect its constitution. The tasking must clarify if the reserve is sequestered or able to participate in some action(s) concurrent with preparedness for commitment to the MAGTF commander's bid for victory. Recalling the principle that the reserve avoids decisive engagement until the commander so orders, or until a triggering event the commander has identified (in stating his intent or the reserve mission), lends weight to sequestering. While the paper chart of scheduled, committed and returned aircraft and crews may portray, say, 40% strength always available on deck in some condition of preparedness; that assumes that all sorties end by returning in condition to fly again rapidly. Once launched, a flight that would theoretically be part of the reserve in a few hours--upon return, re- arm, refuel, rest--could be lost or damaged; and the commander can't preclude the decisive engagement of the reserve in piecemeal order. This is not to forbid a pact between the ACE and MAGTF commanders employing a cyclical alert reserve / scheduled sortie pattern to rotate aircrews and craft while sustaining the reserve by some feature, such as bonus scheduled sorties that could be cancelled. Trust and a thorough grasp of the commander's intent can usually part the waters of limitations. Command and control of the reserve is a major concern of the commander and he will verify with the controlling subordinate commander the procedures and communication links necessary to employ his selected reserve both prior to and during commitment of the force. The desire to commit the reserve in mass, at once, may dictate that airborne command and control assets support the reserve, just as it may dictate that the reserve have cohesive units, such as squadrons, in the force to enhance simultaneous, coordinated maneuver/attack. The Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) that launches the ACE-drawn reserve by the commander's order or guidance must be as prepared as the reserve formation itself to respond in consonance with the requirements for success. So the TACC shall know and rehearse its tasks along with the reserve force. The procedures and capabilities described above may be better illustrated with the following possible example: A robust MEB's ACE tasked with providing the reserve in sufficient strength to neutralize enemy armored flank formations of regimental size, and to maintain momentum by regaining any air superiority lapses against a significant fixed-wing and helo threat, has designated two-fifths of the total command to be in reserve. The air group operations officer has all units to divide into fourths and makes up three task forces. Every squadron and detachment is tasked to maintain a 25% level in Task Force A, 25% in Task Force B and 50% in Task Force C. The aircraft and aircrews of Task Forces A and B are used in the daily schedules to fulfill ATO missions; Task Force C is sequestered as the MAGTF/ACE reserve. Since every squadron remains involved in all operations, the squadron COs exercise responsibility to keep the reserve force crews situationally aware and involved in the reserve mission planning. Task Forces A and B divide the day's missions by twelve hour blocks for each, to facilitate setting tempo and coordination with supported units. As the GCE and CSSE request increases to the current ATO, the ACE commander employs his reserve, the extra aircraft and crews in Task Force C above the mandated strength of the MAGTF reserve, to add sorties. Squadrons retain latitude to rotate aircraft and personnel among the Task Forces, keeping the aircrews briefed on missions and requirements as they take their place in reserve. While the MEB commander uses the GCE's maneuver and ACE's long- range impact to shape the battlefield and put the enemy into a dangerous dilemma, the reserve is yearning to deliver a decisive blow. The MAGTF's multi-dimensional nature should be maximized, rather than limited, by the practices and proclamations of Marines. Drawing a MAGTF reserve from the ACE is a capability that promotes that maximization, if Marines of the ground and air realms alike will acknowledge and develop it. Sufficient potential is revealed by this initial survey to demonstrate that guidelines for the formation and employment of a MAGTF reserve drawn from the ACE can be crafted with the flexibility and coherence to support a commander's establishing his criteria and methods to make his bid for victory with Marine Corps aviation. Bibliography 1. Blunt, V.E.R. The Use of Air Power. Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1943. 2. Dunnigan, James F. How To Make War: A Comprehensive Guide To Modern Warfare. New York: William Morrow, 1988. 3. Frommelt, Jr., W. Todd. An Analysis of the Command and Control and Integration of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Fixed Wing Aviation In Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore. Quantico, VA: Student Research and Writing AY: 1984-85, 1985. 4. FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1990. 5. Gaines, R. Stockton, Willard E. Naslund,.and Ralph Strauch. Combat Operations Decisionmaking In Tactical Air Command and Control. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1980. 6. Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985. 7. Mets, David R. Land-Based Air Power In Third World Crises. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1986. 8. Ostovich III, Major General Rudolph. "Army Aviation in AirLand Battle Future." Military Review February 91: 25-29. 9. Record, Jeffrey. "Why the Air War Worked. " Armed Forces Journal International April 91: 44-5. 10. Strategy and Tactics of Air Warfare. Will Fowler, ed. Seacaucus, NJ: Chartwell Books, Inc., 1979. 11. Taylor, Telford. The Breaking Wave. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967. 12. Warden III, John A. The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988. 13. Westenhoff, Lt. Col. Charles M. Military Air Power. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1990.
