FMFM-1 And Marine Aviation

AUTHOR Major Paul R. Hill, USMC

CSC 1991

SUBJECT AREA - Aviation

Executive Summary

TITTLE: FMFM-1 AND MARINE AVIATON

I. Purpose: To present a reorganization of the Marine Air Wing and the Marine

Air Command and Control System that will support our philosophy of warfighting

as stated in FMFM-1 and our command and control concept.

II. Problem: The organization and structure of the Marine Air Wing and the

Marine Air Command and Control System are based on a centralized commander

tasking aircraft to do specific missions with faceless agencies controlling the resour-

ces of the entire wing. This structure and organization is the antithesis of our war-

fighting philosophy.

III. Data: The Marine Corps' warfightlng philosophy is centered around Marines

gaining an advantage over the enemy by learning to think and act more quickly

than the enemy in the chaotic and uncertain atmosphere of war. To accomplish

this, requires that Marines at all levels have the situational awareness, com-

manders intent, authority and resources to recognize and exploit opportunities on

the battlefield. To support our warfighting philosophy, we have also developed a

command and control concept called the C4I2 concept. Although it is not well

documented, it does exist, and it can be compared to our current aviation com-

mand and control system.

IV. Conclusions: The structure of the Marine Air Command and Control System

is, in many instances, contradictory to our C4I2 concept.

V. Recommendations. We must change the structure of the Marine Air Wing and

the Marine Air Command and Control System to support our warfighting

philosophy.

FMFM-1 AND MARINE AVIATION

OUTLINE

Thesis: The current organization and command and control system for Marine

Aviation is not structured in accordance with our philosophy of warfighting. To

implement our warfighting philosophy and maximize the effectiveness of Marine

Aviation, the Marine Air Wing and the Marine Air Command and Control System's

organization must be changed.

I. The Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy

A. Maneuver warfare

B. The employment of resources

C. The organization of resources

II. Aviation C2 versus our warfighting philosophy

A. Why we have Marine Aviation

B. How we employ aviation

III. The Marine Corps' command and control concept

A. Relationship to our warfighting philosophy

B. How we employ command and control systems

C. Mission of our command and control systems

D. Functions of our command and control systems

E. Attributes of command and control systems

IV. Aviation C2 versus the Marine Corps' C2 concept

A. Current aviation organization

B. Current aviation C2 philosophy

C. Deficiencies of the current system

V. Organizing to fit our warfighting philosophy

A. The Marine Air Support Group

B. The Marine Air Defense Group

C. The Marine Air Warfare Group

D. The Marine Wing Support Group

E. The Tactical Air Command Center

F. The approach to reorganization

FMFM-1 AND MARINE AVIATION

FMFM-1 states the Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy. This philosophy is

called "maneuver warfare," but it entails a far greater scope than the accepted

milItary definition of the term. Our philosophy states that maneuver warfare is a

way of thinking about and functioning in war. The way of thinking centers around

focusing on the enemy and applying our combat power in such a way that destroys

his cohesion This is done by constantly presenting the enemy with rapid and unex-

pected actions that create dilemmas with which he cannot cope. (13:60) The way of

functioning in combat centers around learning to operate more effectively and more

quickly than the enemy in dealing with the two prominent characteristics of war,

chaos and uncertainty. This is accompiished by giving commanders at all levels

considerable latitude to accomplish the aims of their senior commanders when op-

portunities arise. (13:62) Because opportunities on the battlefield are fleeting, com-

manders must be able to exploit them immediately rather than having to request

permission or to wait for further orders from higher headquarters. A key word in

our philosophy is speed. To defeat the enemy, commanders must observe, orient,

decide and act faster than the enemy. (8:26)

To fight a war, a commander must have resources and ways of employing them.

The resources are his people and equipment. The "way? are the tactics techni-

ques, training and procedures used to employ the resources.

To implement our warfighting philosophy, our resources must be organized in a

way that best facilitates their use. The "ways" must be focused on the most effective

use of the resources in accordance with our philosophy. Our command and control

(C2) systems should provide us the ability to recognize and exploit opportunities on

the battlefield. Accordingly, they must be structured to support our philosophy of

warfighting and, thus, complement the way we organize and employ of our resour-

ces. (5:9)

The current organization and C2 system for Marine Aviation is not structured in

accordance with our philosophy of warfighting. To implement our warfighting

philosophy and maximize the effectiveness of Marine Aviation, the Marine Aircraft

Wing (MAW) and the Marine Air Command and Control System's (MACCS) or-

ganization must be changed.

To accomplish this, we must first examine why we have Marine Aviation and how we

intend to employ it. We must also examine our concept of C2 and determine how

best to apply it to aviation. Additionally, we must examine our current aviation or-

ganizational concept and how it relates to our warfighting philosophy. Finally, we

must create a new organization and C2 system that supports our warfighting

philosophy.

No discussion of why we have Marine Aviation and how we intend to employ it

would be complete without a discussion of the employment of sea power and naval

aviation. The Navy uses air power to enhance sea power. Sea power theory entails

control of the sea lines of communication and the maintenance of advanced bases.

(9:453-455) To project sea power, ships position themselves on the ocean to control

strategic point. Air power gives our Navy the range to strike enemy forces at great

distances. (4:(2-1O))

Like aviation, Marines enhance sea power. They are the means by which naval

power is projected ashore for the seizure of advanced naval bases and control of

enemy land forces overlooking or endangering strategic points. (2:34) (4:(2-8))

The capability to come from the sea by force makes the Marines the service of

choice in many diverse situations. Often, they are used independently to achieve

political and strategic goals. (23:8)

Air power, with its inherent capability to move almost any place quickly, gives the

Marines strategic and tactical mobility. Unlike heavily armored, mechanized or

artillery forces of the Army, the Marines use their air to provide heavy firepower in

conjunction with the land battle. (2:58-59) Because of their air power employment

philosophy, Marines can travel to the theater by sea or air with relatively small

numbers ofships or aircraft compared to an Army force. (6:37-38) This strategic

mobility provides them the ability to respond rapidly. Marines use helicopters to

achieve tactical mobility on the battlefield, thus, allowing them to be considerably

less mechanized than Army forces.

The Marine Corps philosophy of aviation requires a great deal of CAS be con-

ducted and integrated with supporting arms to allow tactical maneuver of the

Ground Combat Element (GCE). (12:100-103) While CAS may not always be the

focus of effort for Marine Aviation, it is a routine vice an alternative method of

providing fire support for the GCE. (6:29-42) The Marines mission and warfight-

ing philosophy requires that ground and aviation operations occur simultaneously

and be mutually supporting (17:(2-1)-(2-2)) It is a closely integrated combat arm

that is used in a philosophically different way from the Army and Air Force to sup-

port the needs of the Corps. Knowing this, we must determine how we can best cre-

ate a C2 system that supports how we intend to employ our aviation. However,

before we can create a C2 system, we must first determine our C2 concept.

Near the same time we adopted our warfighting philosophy, we adopted a C2 con-

cept. It is unofficially called the C4I2 concept and is not documented in a single

publication as our warfighting philosophy is. While our warfighting philosophy

was evolving over a period of years, so was our C4I2 concept that supports the

philosophy. Originally, there was only the term Command and Control (C2), then

Command, Control and Communications (C3) and then the addition of a function

or a piece of hardware until we ended up with Command, Control, Communica-

tions, Computers, Intelligence and Interoperability (C4I2), thus the "C4I2 Concept."

Over time, we have been molding the concept into something that can increase our

effectiveness in war.

Throughout history, much has been said about C2 and, more recently, the integra-

tion of intelligence, communications, computers, and interoperabillty as means to

achieve more effective control. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz both said that knowing

your enemy and having an accurate understanding of the battiefleld situation are

of the utmost importance. (1:117-118) (7:96-101) They also acknowledged that the

battlefield will always be governed by chaos and uncertainty more commonly known

as "the fog of war". Many others, equally famous, have collectively stated that supe-

rior situational awareness, the ability to control forces and operate more rapidly

than the enemy in the chaos of battle is the key to success. Their collective state-

ments are the basis for our C4I2 concept which supports our warfighting

philosophy and is the foundation for how we build our C2 systems.

So, our C4I2 concept is much more that just pieces of equipment or operational

facilities. A key element of our C4I2 concept is that no matter how much equip-

ment and personnel we dedicate to the task, we will never overcome chaos and un-

certainty. (15:(1-2)-(1-3)) This should not preclude us from focusing on how the

commander can best use the C2 equipment and personnel he does have to influence

the outcome of battle.

To make our aviation system effective, we need to adopt a mission statement for our

C2 systems. Additionally, we need to define the system, identify its functions and

adopt common terms that describe its attributes.

A brief discussion, along with an explanation of why we will never overcome uncer-

tainty and how we can best employ our C2 systems, is germane. In earliest history,

C2 was accomplished by the commander viewing the entire battlefield. Once the

battle started, there was little he could do to influence the battle from the perspec-

tive of maneuvering forces. H coulld, however, go to the most critical point of the

battle and inspire those who could see him by his personal example. (22:55-57)

The first major advances in C2 came with the addition of signaling and subordinate

commanders. Next, came staffs, who collect, analyze, distribute information,

prepare and issue orders in accordance with commander's guidance. This allowed

the commander to observe and command by exception as moments of opportunity

arose. Additionally, the staff also freed him to go to the point of friction while his

intentions for the conduct of the battle continued to be carried out. Since the inven-

tion of the radio and the computer, we have experienced a quantum increase in the

volume and speed at which information is gathered and processed. The same effect

applies to the speed at which commands and orders are delivered. (22:1-4)

Despite these advances, the commander's influence on the battlefield continues to

be governed by uncertainty regardless of the quantity and quality of C2 systems.

This is caused in part by the decision and reaction process. A single decision by a

commander can result in a significant number of mutations in the way the decision

is implemented by subordinate commanders throughout the chain of command.

The enemy's response to the opposing commander's actions are subject to the same

process. To further complicate the process, commanders are continuously making

decisions that are interrelated and dependent. The net effect on the battle is an in-

finite set of responses, counter responses, and unintended consequences resulting

in a random and chaotic battlefield. (8:36-38)

Adding to the chaotic atmosphere, the battlefield is affected by an uncontrollable

and often intangible set of factors. Some notable ones are: weather, morale, train-

ing, equipment, time of day, psychological and political factors, therefore, in battle,

commanders are continuously faced with simultaneous and related problems. The

chaotic atmosphere will cause some actions to succeed while others, based on equal-

ly good logic, will not. Once forces are committed or engaged, the probabilistic and

chaotic atmosphere will cause the commander to have a reduced influence over the

outcome of the battle. (8:50-51)

Opportunities to win battles, campaigns and wars arise in a random manner.

When they occur, the commander must be able to recognize the opportunity and

have the ability to control his forces to exploit the situation. The conclusion is that

the commander can exert the most influence over winning the battle by employing

his C2 to increase situational awareness and control of the disposition of his forces

prior to the beginning of a particular engagement. Control of forces during engage-

ments can and will occur, but the influence over the direct combat results will be

diminished because of the chaotic nature of the battlefield. (8:47-51)

Thus we arrive at the mission statement for C2 systems. It is to provide the com-

mander the means to recognize and exploit opportunities on the battlefield." Thus,

if a C2 system does what it is supposed to do, It should act as a force multiplier.

This means the system operates with the effectiveness that makes the combat forces

the equivalent of a superior forrce. With a mission statement we can now move to

define a C2 system. The literal definitions of the words that comprise the abbrevia-

tion "C4I2" do not readily lead to an accurate understanding of what comprises a

system. The definitions are as follows: (3:77-83)

Command. This is an absolute state. It is the authority vested in a person to ex-

ercise authority over others by virtue of rank or assignment.

Control. Control implies taking action. It is something less than full command

exercised over subordinates or other organizations. C2 is the exercise of authority

and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the ac-

complishment of the mission.

Communications, Computers and Intelligence. These are disciplines within the

military that were created for the purpose of enhancing the commander's ability to

control. Since communications and computers imply pieces of equipment, they are

also facilitators.

Interoperability. This is an-imperfect state that contains degrees and levels. It's

the ability of units, systems and agencies to function effectively with each other.

We need a more concise definition for a C2 system if we are to use it in practical ap-

plication. It is as follows: "The combined use of tactics, techniques, training, proce-

dures, personnel and equipment to form a system which gathers and distributes

Information necessary for the commander to pre-empt enemy initiatives and con-

trol his forces with the speed, accuracy and efficiency necessary to gain and main-

tain the initiative." (15:(1-2))

With a definition, we can isolate certain functions that the system should perform.

The functions of C2 systems are to Monitor, Assess, Plan, Control and Crosstell.

(5:4)

Monitor. Every system must collect the enemy and friendly situation. If there

are subsystems, such as groups and squadrons which are a subsystems of a wing,

then each subsystem must collect the situaton and report it to other systems. This

is done because each system sees the environment from a different perspective and

each has information at a different level of detail.

Assess. In the assessment phase, the system must analyze and focus enemy in-

formation into probable intentions, targets of strategic and tactical value, and

potential vulnerabilities. Additionally, the system must analyze and focus friendly

information into probable disposition of forces that would best thwart enemy inten-

tions.

Plan. The system must continuously plan for future operations. This includes

planning for potential contingencies as well as actions to be taken in the near and

distant future.

Control. The system must be capable of controlling forces in accordance with

the current battle plan and implementing real-time changes in the plan based on

changing situations.

Crosstell. Systems must be continuously moving information among subsystems

and other systems. It is under this function that filtering of information occurs.

Filtering is used when there is information available that is not required by the sys-

tem. This prevents inundation of operators or the system's communications with

unnecessary data.

Having identified the functions, we can identify the attributes of our C2 system.

All C2 systems possess certain attributes. Their degree of importance is deter-

mined by the situation and mission. They are as follows:

Unity. The commander must have control of his system. In effect, the com-

mander and his system must act as an entity with the commander as the head and

the system as the body. (15:(1-2))

Speed. They key to our warfighting philosophy is speed. Our C2 systems must

operate at a tempo greater than the enemy's capacity to react. (13:31-32)

Operability. The system must lend itself to easy operation requiring a mini-

mum of training operate. (15:(1-2))

Resilience. The system must degrade gracefully. Specifically, there must be

enough redundancy and compartmentalization that, if one or several parts sustain

battle damage or catastrophic failure, other parts of the system will continue to

function. (16:13) A system's resilience can be enhanced by determining a succes-

sion of control for other systems to backup a particular system. Probably, the most

significant contribution to resilience would be the use of SOPs and training people

to use implicit communications based on mutual understanding and familiarity.

Continuity. The system must be able to operate continuously without breaks in

operation. Breaks in operations give the enemy opportunities to seize the initia-

tive. The culminating point of a campaign or battle must be driven by the limita-

tions of the warfighters, not their C2 systems. (15:(4-1))

Security. When working properly, high level systems will have an enormous

amount of valuable information. The system must provide for security of informa-

tion. This can range from the control of access to facilities to the use of secure com-

munications on the battiefield. (15:(5-1))

Sustainability. The system must not require personnel or logistics support that

can not be tolerated on a continuous basis. Also, the system must not make opera-

tional demands for input that cannot be reasonably met by all the source systems/

subsystems. (16:13)

Reliability. The system must function with the regularity that breeds confidence

in the system and acceptance by those who use and support it. (5:64)

Mobility. Dependent upon the threat and mission, the requirement for mobility

will vary. In war, mobility is a key attribute and, on many occasions, will be the

hardest attribute to balance with the other in communications based systems

such as those for aviation, stability enhances reliability, sustainability, and main-

tainability but may seriously degrade survivability. In most cases, increased

capability is inversely proportional to mobility. (16:12-13)

Maintainability. The system must be maintainable under adverse conditions

with reasonable effort. The maintenance plan must accommodate the attributes of

continuity, mobility and resilience. (16:13)

Suvivability. All reasonable actions must be taken to make the system surviv-

able. (16:13)

Flexibility. Systems must sacrifice some internal stability in order to be respon-

sive in the chaos of battle. In the long term, effectiveness will be achieved by con-

tinually trading off internal consistency and mechanization for the flexibility

necessary to adapt to the environment and exploit opportunities. (8:53)

Having determined our C2 systems' attributes, we have completed the statement of

our C2 concept. Having done this, It is obvious that Marine Aviation is not in con-

sonance with either our warfighting philosophy or our concept of C2. As previously

stated, the problems are rooted in the organizational structure of the MAW and the

Marine Air Command and Control system (MACCS). The two are inextricably

linked and the deficiencies of each cannot be discussed in isolation.

To address the problem we should first examine the current organizational and

aviation C2 structure. Figure 1 depicts the organization of the MAW. (12:15)

Click here to view image

For air C2, traditionally, the primary agencies are thought to be the Tactical Air

Command Center (TACC), the Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) and the

Direct Air Support Center (DASC). (14:(1-2)) Although these agencies are the

primary ones, there are agencies and elements scattered throughout the MAGTF

that have a role in air C2. Figure 2 depicts these elements and their parent units.

(14:(1-1)-(1-8)). When the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) of the MAGTF is

Click here to view image

employed in combat, the command structure for aviation is changed from the struc-

ture depicted in figure 1 to that depicted in Figure 2. The organizational concept

depicted in figure 2 is called centralized command and decentralized control.

(14:(1-3))

The centralized command aspect of the concept, in effect, causes the commanders of

the Marine Aircraft Groups (MAGs) to become resource providers for the Tactical

Air Commander (TAC) who sits at the head of the MACCS as the single com-

mander. (17:(3-15)-(3-16)) The TAC and his staff, which are derived from the

MAW and Marine Air Control Group (MACG) staff, now execute tactical control

through agencies which were formed from the squadrons of the MACG. Like the

commanders of the MAGs, the MACG commander becomes a provider of personnel

and facilities for the various tactical agencies of the MACCS. Thus, the focus of ef-

fort for MAG commanders and their staffs is on providing operationally ready

aircraft and flight crews. Similarly, the MACG commander and his staff are

focused on providing operationally ready C2 systems and crews to man them.

Neither the MAG nor MACG commander and their staffs are focused on the

employment of aviation to win the battle. This is the function of the TAC and his

staff.

Decentralized control means that, in theory, the TAC grants his authority to the

agencies of the MACCS to conduct air operations and make the real-time tactical

decisions necessary to best employ aviation in a rapidly moving situation. These

agencies are manned by personnel who generically can be called "air controllers."

The concept of decentralized control certainly implies that the air controllers' mis-

sion is to employ aviation to win the battle. The mission statements of the various

agencies, depicted in Figure 3, are focused on specific tasks vice the prosecution of

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the battle based on the functions of Marine Aviation which are depicted in figure 4.

(12:5-8) (14:(1-3))

Click here to view image

From this, we can see that the C2 agencies are not tasked with employing resources

to accomplish the aim of the air-war. This is also true of the TAC's staff which is

focused on the production of an Air Tasking Order that responds to requirements

coming from other elements of the MAGTF. (14:(2-5)-(2-8))

Neither aviators nor air controllers are trained in the employment of air power.

Air controllers, by virtue of their duties and the implied mission of their respective

agencies, frequently are well educated in the principles and procedures involved

with the employment of air power. Aviators, generally, are more focused on employ-

ment of a specific type of aircraft and the application of that aircraft to specific

types of missions. Regardless, neither are trained as air power employment of-

ficers. The employment of air power is generally considered to be the domain of

Military