Underlying Causes For The Iraqi Debacle AUTHOR Major Larry D. Huffman, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY UNDERLYING CAUSES FOR THE IRAQI DEBACLE A thorough discussion of the events which resulted in the recent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait must go beyond those found in current periodical literature or reported by the Cable News Network. Underlying reasons date back to the emergence of Iraq as a sovereign state in 1958 when the monarchy was overthrown and a series of unsuccessful governments attempted to find the key element which would unite a backward country. The history of Iraq from 1958, and its struggle to establish a socialist state among a populace influenced by the Muslim religion, is one of turmoil. Discord which developed with the West furthered the chaos which could not be controlled except by a strong central governing body. One man, Saddam Hussein, tempered by influences in his younger years, would govern only after years of struggle. The factors which influenced his personality development and leadership style are key elements in the underlying causes of the Kuwatti invasion. His successful attempts at economic reform, following the socialist model, required sacrifice generally accepted by the Muslim nation in their belief that whatever happened was the will of God. The Arab way of thinking and its distrust for Western values would strongly influence Iraq as Saddam ascended to the Presidency. Under Saddam the people of Iraq would at least enjoy stability that was unprecedented in recent Iraqi history. Their standard of living would rise to new found heights only to be severely degraded in the recent encounter. An understanding of the history of Iraq and the influences which shaped it, when combined with an appreciation for the religious and economic structure of that nation, will provide insight into the less understood causes for the Iraqi debacle. UNDERLYING CAUSES FOR THE IRAQI DEBACLE OUTLINE Thesis Statement. An understanding of Iraq's political history, and its economic and religious structure, beginning just prior to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and ending with Saddam Hussein's ascendance to the Presidency in 1979. will provide insight into the background which contributed to the recent invasion of Kuwait. I. Iraq's emergence as a sovereign Arab state in 1958 A. Turmoil prior to 1955 B. The Baghdad Pact C. The rise of Abid al-Karim Qasim 1. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in l961 2. Isolation and withdrawal II. Saddam Hussein's rise to power A. As a youth B. Underground after his failed 1964 coup attempt C. The successful l968 coup D. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1973 E. Saddam's developing leadership style F. Changes under the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) G. Saddam's rising influence H. Saddam comes to power III. Economic and religious development A. Development as a socialist society l. Land and agrarian reform 2. Industrialization B. Religious influences The 1991 debacle for Iraq was not the first time Iraq had been severely penalized for attempting to exert it's territorial claim on its Arab neighbor, Kuwait. An understanding of the country's political history, and its economic and religious structure, beginning just prior to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and ending with Saddam's ascendance in 1979, will provide insight into the circumstances which contributed to the recent invasion of Kuwait. This paper will not pursue more recent events which influenced Saddam's decision to strike out against another Arab state. Those events include the Iraqi military build- up, the economic consequences of the war with Iran, influence from the Russians.and the validity of the Palestinian question. By accepting that the Iraqi invasion was caused solely by these reasons would ignore some of the basic, chaotic underpinnings of what influenced Iraq's most recent attempt to annex Kuwait in August, 1990. The period preceding 1955 was one of political unrest, strikes, and police repression within Iraq. These destabilizing events continued, in part, due to dissatisfaction with Arab national borders. These borders had been arbitrarily dictated by European powers between the world wars. The country was then headed by Nuri al-Sa id, the regent, serving under what was to be the last Iraqi Hashimite king. The feelings of insecurity resulting from years of turmoil within the nation resulted in its entering into a fateful alliance, the Baghdad Pact of 1955. To foster internal stability, Iraq was determined that it must develop closer ties with the West. Eventually that Baghdad Pact included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan as well as Britain. The Nuri government did not feel comfortable allied with only Arab states as the unrest in other Arab countries paralleled those in Iraq. Although the United States did not become a signatory, they did serve on several of the Pact's committees. Iraq's association with Western powers was to cause severe consequences for the Iraqi monarchy. That opposition was led by the Egyptian government. President Nasser of Egypt was the most powerful and popular Arab leader of the time. He vehemently and publicly opposed the Pact because of its formal ties with the West. His opposition would doom the existing Iraqi government and monarchy. Nasser distanced himself from the Western alliance and claimed to have been taken by surprise by Iraq's actions. However, Nuri had discussed the plan with him in Nasser's Cairo office before entering into the Pact. The depth of the split with Egypt was profound. As a result, Egypt broadcast a speech over the Voice of the Arabs radio station in Cairo which was intended to oust the Iraqi government. Today ... the peoples and states of the Arab League are witnessing a new barefaced treason, the hero of which is Nuri al-Sa id. His insistence on this alliance, his challenge to the Arab peoples, and his trifling with their most sacred rights is an act of treachery against Arabism far more damaging to the Arab League than anything done by Israel or Zionism. (8:119) This broadcast, heard throughout Iraq, incited more demonstrations, strikes, and newspaper articles than Nuri could handle with his police. He knew the officer corps, the only group that could overthrow him, was listening to the Voice of Cairo. However, he determined their loyalty was secure as he had carefully provided them and their families with special compensations. The growing opposition within Iraq exploded when Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt in 1956. Massive protests were then held against the Western attack and Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact. Iraq was left in a no-win situation. They were allied with a Western nation which was now at war with a brother Arab state. Martial law was declared when the common tactic of controlling opposition with the police failed. The government had to close all colleges and universities after 5O police officers were wounded in Baghdad; secondary schools were also closed and strikes spread. Meanwhile the Nuri government continued it's attempts at developing the backward country to include the improvement of it's infrastructure; new dams, roads, and hospitals. These changes would prove to be inadequate to salvage the regime's image. (8:120) The time for change was obvious. Nuri offered his resignation and it came as no surprise when it was accepted. He would, however, return to assume leadership of Iraq. A disjointed effort to form another cabinet only demonstrated the disarray that had become pervasive. The monarchy's attempts at forming a new government resulted in the appointment of two prime ministers in quick succession. The first, Ali Jawdat, leaned away from the Baghdad Pact but the second, Abol al-Wahhab Mirjan, a Baghdad Law College graduate and supporter of Nuri, endorsed the Pact. (8:121) The cabinet selected by Abol indicated that the power again rested with Nuri. On 2 March 1958 Nuri once again assumed control after Abol resigned. This time his government was to last but 25 days. At about this time Jordan proposed an Iraqi-Jordanian federation to counter the recent alignment between Syria and Egypt. Iraq asked Kuwait, still under British influence, to join but Kuwait shunned the idea. Kuwait did not want to risk having its territory and natural resources consumed by Iraq and Jordan. Kuwait, even 3O years ago, feared aggression from Iraq. The opposition was uniting within Iraq. Now forced underground, it was feeding on the resentment brought on by the repression of demonstrators, an unpopular foreign policy, and the return of Nuri. The end of the Iraqi regent and monarchy came abruptly. Civil war broke out in Lebanon in May of 1958. King Hussein of Jordan asked for Iraqi troops to be sent to Jordan to protect its frontiers against incursion. Now mobilized, the army instead marched to Baghdad and ended the Iraqi monarchy in a bloody coup on 14 July. With the new government, relations with the West cooled, then deteriorated, never to recover. The rapid overthrow of the government would not go un- noticed by the weak but growing Ba'athist party. The military would not be allowed a say in the political destiny of Iraq when the Ba'athists later firmly established their government. The coup that overthrew Nuri and brought Abid al-Karim Qasim to power did not enjoy wide support. The coup had been spontaneous and executed by only a few officers. One event in Qasim's tenure stands out. Under his leadership Iraq first attempted to conquer Kuwait. The legitimacy of the Arab borders as established by Britain continued to serve as a catalyst for conflict. In June 1961 Kuwait and Britain agreed that Kuwait should no longer be subject to the protectorate of Britain. In essence, Kuwait was now a free state. Many countries sent notes of congratulations to tiny Kuwait but Iraq's response did not acknowledge Kuwait's independence. Kuwait, always suspicious of Iraq, asked for and received assurances that Britain would come to their aid if attacked. Qasim soon declared that Kuwait belonged to Iraq just as it had when the Ottomans ruled the region. British forces quickly responded to Quasim's declaration. Britain entered Kuwait on Kuwaiti invitation after Quasim would not rule out the use of military force in accomplishing his goal of taking Kuwait. The intrusion of the Western forces into Kuwait once again incited the Arab world. They could not bear the thought of anything that reminded them of colonialism or endangered the strength of Islam. This time Arabs united against Iraq and through the Arab League, sent a peace keeping force to replace the British in September 1961. The League's forces were removed the next year. The resulting failure and isolation in the diplomatic arena served to damage Iraq both at home and abroad. When Kuwait was quickly admitted to the Arab League, Iraq ceased to cooperate with that Arab body. Further, Iraq recalled their ambassadors from every country that recognized Kuwait as a sovereign state. The list of recalled ambassadors was extensive. This fiasco brought about the downfall of Qasim by a Ba'athist coup. His claims on Kuwait had isolated him within the Arab world, as well as from the West. As the Arab League forces were leaving Kuwait, Qasim had only the weak Communist Party in Iraq and a few army officers to count as his supporters. His attempt at domestic economic and social reform had also failed. Even his strongest supporters knew that Qasim's days were numbered. In 1963 no one would have guessed the catastrophe that lay ahead for Iraq as the Ba'ath party came to power. Of course, the Ba'ath party would eventually be fully controlled by one man, Saddam Hussein. Saddam was born a Sunni Moslem in a village near the Iraqi town of Tikrit. He was raised by his maternal uncle, Khayr Allah Talfah, who held a deep hatred for the existing regime that had ousted him from his post as an army officer and had him imprisoned. That hatred undoubtedly influenced Saddam during the impressionistic years of youth. This hatred for the Qasim government and its accompanying need for power, to overcome in order to obtain control, would influence Saddam throughout his life. Saddam's years as a secondary school student in Baghdad can be characterized as ones of activism. As a teenager, he joined the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and dedicated most of his time to working for party goals. As a militant nationalist he plunged into activities against the regime, was expelled from school and sentenced to six months in jail. He became enamored with socialism and the writings of Stalin. At age 22 Saddam was wounded in an assassination attempt against Qasim and began what might be determined as the legend of Hussein, a legend of courage and coolness. (8:218) After the aborted assassination attempt, Saddam fled to a safe house where he hid from the authorities. Unable to risk obtaining aid from a doctor, Saddam directed his friend as he cut the bullet from his leg. This anecdote would be included with others that portrayed Saddam as a tough, fearless contender and a revered leader dedicated to his beliefs. Saddam fled to Syria and later travelled to Egypt where he finished college and entered law school. When the Ba'ath party overthrew Quasim in 1963, Saddam returned to Baghdad where he continued his diligent efforts to further the socialist Ba'ath party cause. His marriage to his cousin. Sajidah Talfah, from an elite Tikrit family would further his influence as he rose to a commanding position in the Ba'ath party. Unfortunately, Saddam's education did not include study abroad, so prevalent in todays Arab world. This lack of contact outside his limited sphere of interest deprived Saddam of a basis for understanding Iraq's place in the world order. The absence of an understanding of world relationships would later contribute to grave miscalculations in his dealings with Western powers. His activism continued with a coup attempt in 1964. The plot was discovered and Saddam was again sent to jail. He diligently recruited members into the Ba'ath party during this 2 year period of incarceration. Eventually Saddam escaped and was forced to go underground where he took charge of the forces that would become the party's militia. During these years, as a hunted man, Saddam developed a propensity towards secretiveness, cautiousness and a distinct distrust of outsiders. He would come to trust only in himself and disregard the advice of others on any subject. His disregard for military advice would prove disastrous. The first Ba'ath regime was ousted from power as a result of their excesses but they were brought back to power by a July 1968 coup. Lessons regarding the sharing of power which had brought about the downfall of the first Ba'ath Iraqi government were well learned. A period of stability ensued aided by booming 1973 oil prices and the rapid, draconian suppression of outward displays of unrest. It was during this period, 1969 to 1973, referred to as the Radical Phase of Ba'th foreign policy, that Iraq again confronted Kuwait. The contested Kuwaiti islands, Warbah and Bubiyan, controlled the entrance to the southern Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. When Iraq occupied a border section of Kuwait during March 1973, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League quickly came again to the aid of Kuwait. Iraq was forced to withdraw and tension between Kuwait and Iraq remained high until the end of the 197O's.(8:221) By 1969 Saddam's growing influence was evident within the Ba'athist Party hierarchy. His personality and leadership style were coming into focus as he became vice- chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Phebe Marr described his growing reputation in her book, The Modern History of Iraq: In the offices of both men (Saddam and Aziz) there were submachine guns. Even at that stage, many features of Saddam's character were clearly evident, features that were preserved and developed further when he became leader of Iraq. He possessed a firmness that often turned into cruelty, a strong will bordering on implacable stubbornest, a readiness to go charging toward his goal, regardless of obstacles and the price, and an overblown understanding of such concepts as honor and dignity. Saddam was quite rational, but he had a penchant for making unexpected about turns. (8:41) On 9 November, 1969 the RCC broadened its power base within the state by expanding it's membership from 5 to 13. All new members of the Ba'thist party had outstanding party credentials and were all civilians except one. Saddam was determined that the military would not have the opportunity to overthrow him. This determination and the subsequent reorganization of the government would prevent disgruntled officers from seriously challenging him, even when two devastating wars with Iran and the United States led coalition forces tasked the military beyond it's capability. The new RCC dedicated themselves to improving the life of Iraqis through a new interim constitution. Iraq was to be a People's Democratic Republic with socialism as it's economic system. All natural resources would belong to the state who could better manage them for the good of the people. Each Iraqi would have the right to a free university education, medical care and the right to be employed. Power was centralized within the RCC and its president was given broad powers to appoint, promote, and dismiss judiciary, civil and military personnel.(8:214) A series of trials removed many in the leadership who were felt to be opposed to the Ba'athists. They were charged with spying, usually for the United States or Israel. Trials were held by secret military court resulting in executions or imprisonment. At least eighty six people were executed. (8: 13) The Army was expanded and developed an imposing regional military capability. By the end of 1977 the Iraqi Army was two and one half times the size of Algeria's, a comparable country in many ways. (1:33) Iraq's goal was to form an armed militia in every municipality and to increase its military strength to 200,000. Saddam, as the former leader of the militia, was exerting his influence. Saddam's power as a party lieutenant was reaching it's zenith in 1974 and President Hasan al Bakr was reduced to sharing power with him. Saddam's rise can be attributed to dedication, an ability to persevere, and the aid of the family name of Talfah. In 1970 Hasan Al-Bakr was retired in a ploy engineered by Saddam in his impatience to assume control of the party as well as the country. Saddam then declared himself President of the Republic, Secretary-general of the Ba'ath party regional command, chairman of the RCC, and commander- in-chief of the armed forces. (1:229) Another cruel purge ensued. Under the previous President, Al-Bakr, enemies of the state were executed, imprisoned, beaten, tortured, or exiled. Under Saddam there became but one punishment, execution. No one would Survive to challenge his rule. The first 22 arrested were executed for an alleged coup attempt against Saddam. Hostages were taken from the families of about one-third of the members of the RCC. Taking hostages allowed Saddam to control the RCC while maintaining all the outward appearances of legitimacy. The members of the RCC continued to execute the responsibilities of their offices and make official appearances; however, they were merely puppets. The tactic of using hostages for political purposes would be used by Saddam again. He eventually purged hundreds of his former colleagues and had them all killed including entire families. By 1 August 1979 there were reports that around five hundred high-ranking Ba'athists had been executed. (1:70) On the other hand, Saddam was also exercising his powers in a paternal manner. He kept hours in his office each week during which citizens could telephone and have their problems summarily addressed by the President. His picture was displayed in every manner of place, babies were given his name. .. .his virtue became part of the party legend.. (8:229) He was becoming a cult figure as described by Phebe Marr. ... and young party members emulated his walk, his dress, and even his manner of speech ... Typical of this adulation was an advertisement in the New York Times in July 1980 that asked whether Iraq would repeat her former glories and the name of Saddam Hussein would link up with that of Hammurabi, Asurbanipol, al-Mansur, and Harun al- Rashid? (8:229) But there was a difference in Iraq obviously not observed by the New York Times. During the change of power in 1969, the people were willing, active participants. In July 1979 they were spectators .. . . " (1:71) A comparatively stabilized political environment followed for Iraq. The government could, for the first time, follow a consistent policy correlating political, economic and social affairs and take steps to carry them out. - (6:112) The government's goal was to develop a socialist society, with social justice for all which would wipe out the injustices of the past. Improving the economic sector was seen as the key. The established Planning Board developed a five year plan as the basic building block for economic development. The President of the Republic, cabinet level political appointees and outside government experts were included. Young Arab managers trained in the West were to carry out the specifics of the plan, all under the Ministry of Planning. Prior government's attempts at land reform under the monarchy had failed. Landlords were disgruntled by having to give up their lands for redistribution to peasants and the peasants themselves had no experience in farming outside of the old feudal system. Two-thirds of the nation lived in the country as peasants forming 70 percent of the populace. (6:121) The Ba'athists seized farmland from landowners and established farm cooperatives in order to prevent the failures which occurred when unskilled peasants were given land under the prior regime. Within a cooperative, workers could share profits in accordance with their labors and the unskilled could be taught. The government's sincerity in agrarian reform was demonstrated by the doubling of expenditures for agriculture development in fiscal years 1974-75. The government was unable to pay the landlords for seized land that was distributed to the peasants. The Ba'athists rationalized this inequity by declaring that the landowners had received the land illegally as gifts from previous, corrupt regimes. Thus, there was no obligation to compensate them. This circuitous logic is typical of the Ba'athists in general and Saddam in particular. Peasants, in turn were forced to farm their land within the rules established for the cooperatives. They were provided with such facilities as needed to cultivate their land. (6:119) The Ba'athists improved the life of the peasant and increased production, even if not to the levels planned. The biggest problem became one of keeping workers on the farm when successful industrialization efforts of the Ba'athist's produced an increasing demand for workers in the city. The ultimate objective of industrialization was to achieve self-sufficiency and insure the country's economic independence. (6:133) The Ba'athists expanded the plans for industrial growth of former regimes and developed plans for expansion in new areas. Foreign oil interests were nationalized, providing the capital for the development of an industrial sector. Industries developed or expanded after 1968 included agricultural machinery, a paper mill, chemical, fertilizer, petrochemical, rayon textiles, steel. sulfur and sugar production. During 1970-71 the government provided job security by enacting a series of laws designed to protect the worker. Freedom from discrimination, a limited work week and a System to ensure equitable pay scales were adopted. These new laws were adopted because they reflected Ba'thist socialist teachings. Women were allowed to work and children were protected from work place exploitation. Trade unions were authorized and a process to settle disputes using union representatives was instituted. Strikes were allowed and procedures were enacted through which injured workers were paid during their recovery. Workers, employers and the government would jointly contribute to insurance and retirement plans. Strict adherence to the Socialist/nationalist Ba'thist ideology meant that Iraq would become a secular state. Freedom of religion was necessary in Iraq due to the diversity of Islamic beliefs found there. The majority of Muslims in Iraq were Shi'ites but the political power remained with the Sunni's.(3:27). The Kurds in the mountains of the Northeast, the Arabs of the northern plain and those living along the rivers of Baghdad were staunchly Shi 'ite. The Muslim belief in predestination contributed to their acceptance of Saddam's ruthless reform attempts. Muslims knew that true believers were inwardly protected by God. God determined how one's life would be cast and because of the predetermined plan there was no need to attempt to influence one's own course. No matter the sacrifices imposed upon them, Muslims would respond that it was God's will. It would appear to Westerners that contradictions in this philosophy abound; however, a Muslim would be very Surprised if this were pointed out to him. Planning ahead is even considered somehow sinful. To talk about one's own plan may be contrary to God's plan; thus, it is infrequently done. Further, to guard against just such an occurrence, the Iraqi Muslim will include with any statement such as , "Tomorrow I will go to the market," with "if it be the will of God." The inability to plan ahead has been ongoing for centuries. A typical example of the average Muslim's disdain for planning is demonstrated by the farmer who consumes grain which should have remained for seed. He must then borrow from a wealthy farmer in order to plant his next crop. Repayment with substantial interest makes him poorer and poorer. (8:151) One proverb further demonstrates by stating, "The provision for tomorrow belongs to tomorrow." The Iraqi Muslim feels he is released from the responsibilities of his life because one's fate is determined at birth. Thus, to plan is not part of Iraqi society as it relates to the average man. (9:153) Iraq's tumultuous political history resulted in the rise to power of one man, Saddam Hussein, who established order where chaos was the prevalent force of a weak and repeatedly humiliated nation. Socialism, supported by rich natural resources, was showing impressive improvements in the Iraqi agrarian and industrial sectors. Sacrifices by the people resulting from an inward looking, secretive Iraq reflected the personality of Saddam and were generally accepted by the nation under strict Muslim religious influences. These deeply imbedded factors were the genesis of more recent events that with hindsight, can be viewed as the great Iraqi debacle. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. al-Khali, Samir Republic of Fear. Pantheon Books, New York, N. Y., 1989. 2. al-Marayati, Abid. A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq. Robert Speller & Sons, New York, N. Y., 1961. 3. Axelgard, Frederick W., ed. Iraq in Transition. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown University, 1986. 4. Harris, George L. Iraq. New Haven: Araf Press, 1958. 5. Helms, Christine Moss. Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World. The Brookings Institution Washington, D.C. , 1984. 6. Khadduri, Majid. Socialist Iraq. The Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C., 1978. 7. Kimball, Lorenzo Kent. The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq. Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, Inc. New York, N. Y., 1972. 8. Marr, Phebe. The Modern History of Iraq. Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1985. 9. Patai, Raphael. The Arab Mind. Charles Scribner's and Sons, New York, N.Y., 1983. 10. Penrose, Edith and E.F. Iraq: International Relations and National Development. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1978.
