The Continuing Relevance Of Clausewitz: Illustrated Yesterday And Today With Application To The 1991 Persian Gulf War AUTHOR Major Herbert T. Holden, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - History EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF CLAUSEWITZ: ILLUSTRATED YESTERDAY AND TODAY WITH APPLICATION TO THE 1991 PERSIAN GULF WAR Introduction: The theories of Clausewitz are timeless because he analyzed warfare from the social, political, moral, and emotional perspectives. This paper addresses eight prominent Claueswitzian ideas. Each idea is explained and illustrated by historical examples of two types. The first set of examples are drawn from two centuries of war from the Napoleonic ara to 1990. The second set of examples are drawn from the recently concluded 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Nature of War: Clausewitz insisted that before any conflict begins, civilian and military leaders must understand the kind of war upon which they are embarking. A mistake in identifying the nature of the conflict can lead to defeat on the battlefield. Political: War is tightly intertwined with politics. War and politics cannot exist independently. War is so permeated by politics that to plan a war without political guidance is useless. Fog and Friction: These terms are often used interchangeably, but are clearly different words used to explain different events. The fog of war focuses on uncertainty. Friction is that force which separates real war from war on paper. Training can reduce friction but not eliminate it. Centers of Gravity: Clausewitz explains centers of gravity as being the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends. The center of gravity is the point against which all energies should be directed. Culminating Point of Attack/Victory: The culminating point of attack is the point when the attacker's strength is sapped and his superiority is exhausted. The culminating point of victory occurs when a country refuses to be beaten totally and that country rises up in a partisan war to prevent the total destruction of a country. It is necessary to understand both concepts or unfavorable results may occur. Diversions: A diversion is an attack in enemy territory that draws enemy forces away from the main objective. Clausewitz warms that diversions can be dangerous because resources committed to a diversion may be better used in the main attack. Moral Elements: The importance of moral should never be underestimated. Moral is beleiving and fighting for a cause. The cause may be a democracy, a nation, or a way of life. Moral runs deep and is not easily changed or swayed. Civilized Warfare: Clausewitz believed that conbatants should not mistreat POWs, level cities, or destroy the environment during the prosecution of a war. Conculsion: As a theorist of war, Clausewitz still has relevance. Terms such as fog, friction, and center of gravity are common military phraseology used to discuss and explain military events from the distant past to the conflict with Iraq. All indications suggest that Clausewitz's legacy and import will continue to grow. THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF CLAUSEWITZ: Illustrated Yesterday and Today with Application to the 1991 Persian Gulf War OUTLINE Thesis statement. The theories of Carl von Clausewitz can be applied to all wars, Napoleonic through the recently concluded Persian Gulf War. I. Nature of the War A. The Idea of Clausewitz 1. Understand Objectives of the Enemy as well as Our Own 2. Understand the Means that must be Expended B. Historical Examples 1. Peninsula War, 1808-1813 2. Vietnam War, 1954-1972 C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War 1. U.N. Objectives 2. U.S. Objectives 3. Iraq's Understanding of the Nature of the War II. Political A. The Idea of Clausewitz 1. Relationship Between Politics and War 2. National Political Aims are Paramount B. Historical Examples 1. Korean War, 1950 2. Vietnam War C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War 1. Political Factors Influencing President Bush 2. Political Factors Influencing President Hussein III. Fog and Friction A. The Idea of Clausewitz 1. Definition 2. Causes B. Historical Examples 1. Utah Beach, D-Day, 6 June 1944 2. Omaha Beach, D-Day, 6 June 1944 C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War 1. Effects of Fog on U.S. 2. Effects of Fog on Iraq D. Friction 1. Definition 2. Causes E. Historical Examples 1. Utah Beach, D-Day, 6 June 1944 (continued) 2. Omaha Beach, D-Day, 6 June 1944 (continued) F. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War 1. Effects of Friction on U.S. 2. Effects of Friction on Iraq IV. Centers of Gravity A. The Idea of Clausewitz 1. Definition 2. The Importance of Understanding B. Historical Examples 1. Vietnam War - U.S. did not define properly 2. Vietnam War - North Vietnam did define properly C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War 1. U.S. Clearly Identified Center of Gravity 2. Iraq Clearly Identified Center of Gravity V. Culminating Point of Attack/Victory A. The Idea of Clausewitz 1. Definition 2. Causes B. Historical Examples 1. World War II, 1941 2. World War II, 1944 C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War 1. Bombing Missions out of England and Spain 2. Quick U.S. Attack D. Culminating Point of Victory 1. Definition 2. Causes E. Historical Examples 1. Peninsular War, 1808-1813 2. Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945 F. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War 1. Quick Victory Prevented Culminating Point 2. Problems for U.S. if Iraq Held Out VI. Diversions A. The Idea of Clausewitz 1. Definition 2. Proper Timing B. Historical Examples 1. WWII, 1942 2. WWII, 1944 C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War 1. U.S. Diversions 2. Iraq Diversions VII. Moral Elements A. The Idea of Clausewitz 1. Definition 2. Why are they Important B. Historical Examples (High Moral) 1. French Revolution, 1789 2. WWII, Pacific Theatre C. Historical Examples (Low Moral) 1. Battle of France, 1940 2. WWII, Italy D. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War 1. American Moral Element 2. Iraq Moral Element VIII. Civilized Warfare A. The Idea of Clausewitz 1. Clausewitzian View 2. Governental Restraints B. Historical Examples (POW Treatment) 1. WWII, 1942 2. WWII, 1943 C. Historical Examples (Leveling Cities) 1. China, 1937 2. Battle of Britain, 1940-1941 D. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War 1. U.S. Conducted a High Technology War 2. Iraq made Three Fundamental Mistakes THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF CLAUSEWITZ: Illustrated Yesterday and Today with Application to the 1991 Persian Guf War Introduction The writings of Karl von Clausewitz continue to generate a great deal of discussion both within the military community as well as the civilian sector. He is often quoted to prove a point or to explain an event or situation. How can this be, when Clausewitz wrote about Napoleonic warfare, which occurred almost two centuries ago? In his day there were no airplanes, no laser guided bombs, no tanks, no submarines. Soldiers rode horses and fired individual weapons with very limited ranges. Moreover, his writings on the theory of war were found and published by his widow after his sudden death.(9:27) Von Kriege (On War), the title of this work, consisted of eight books, of which Clausewitz considered only the first chapter of the first book complete.(9:20) Considering all this, how can Clausewitz be relevant today? The theories of Clausewitz are timeless because he did not analyze war from the mechanical aspects of how battles were fought between opposing generals. Instead, he analyzed warfare from the social, political, moral, and emotional perspectives as well as the tactical and strategic levels. This paper addresses eight prominent Clausewitzian ideas. Each idea will be explained and illustrated by historical examples of two types. The first set of examples are drawn from two centuries of war from the Napoleonic era to 1990. The second set of examples are drawn from the recently concluded 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Nature of War The Idea of Clausewitz One of the most improtant and lasting contributions of Clausewitz is his insistence that before any conflict begins, civilian-and military leaders and strategists must understand the kind of war upon which they are embarking. The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish. . .the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.(9:88) Coming to grips with the nature of the war is the first, and most comprehensive, question that must be answered. A mistake in identifying the nature of the conflict can lead to defeat on the battlefield. The folowing must be carefully considered in this identification: 1) The political objectives of the enemy as well as our own. 2) The power and condition of the enemy's state as well as our own. 3) The character and capacity of the enemy's government and of his people as well as our own. 4) The political connections of other states and the effect which war will produce on these states.(9:585-586) Clausewitz said the "means" (capabilities) must be addressed when considering war.(9:90) The enemy's means are of primary concern, Questions that must be asked include: 1) Will he fight conventionally or unconventionally? Air, land or sea? 2) Will he likely give in easily? How much punishment can he take? 3) Will he fight according to the Geneva Conventions? 4) What will it take to be successful against him? Historical Examples 1) From 1808 to 1813, France was involved in the Peninsular War with Spain. The Spanish military forces were defeated and Napolean put his brother on the throne. French revolutionary reforms were institutes in the government and in the church. The Spanish people rejected these reforms, refused to be defeated, and 100,000 Frenchmen a year were killed in Spain during the ensuing harshly fought partisan war. Napoleon's military lost many fine troops that he could have used elsewhere. Because Napoleon failed to understand the motivations of the Spanish people, he could not possibly comprehend the nature of the war in Spain. 2) From 1954 to 1972, America was bogged down in a war in Vietnam with an elusive enemy and no clear objectives. America's high technology weapons were not suited to a jungle, guerilla type war. There was confusion regarding the enemy center of gravity. As the war dragged on and casualties mounted, American public support waned. The United States then accepted a political settlement designed to save face; many believed that thereafter a communist takeover was inevitable. Was it a civil war? A revolutionary war? A conventional war? A case of overt aggression from North Vietnam? American civilian and military leaders could not agree on answers to these questions--questions critical to identifying the nature of the conflict in Vietnam. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War The United Nations during the later half of 1990 established clear objectives for the conflict in Southwest Asia: 1) Iraq must leave Kuwait unconditionally. 2) The legitimate government of Kuwait must be restored. 3) Iraq must pay reparations for damages inflicted as a result of its aggression. These objectives were clear, and in line with guidance provided by Clausewitz. "No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." (9:579) During late 1990 and early 1991, the United States embraced the United Nations Security Council resolutions and established the following additonal objectives: 1) Restore some semblance of stability and ensure free movement of oil out of the Gulf Region. 2) Restore the international status quo and show would-be aggressors that aggression does not pay. 3) Destroy Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities. 4) Weaken Iraq's military and destroy Saddam hussein's ability to wage offensive war. 5) Remove Saddam from power (not officially stated). The Bush administration was careful to establish very specific objective early in the campaign. The administration did not want to be accused of not clearly establishing policy. Thus the administration produced a comprehensive stategy that proved to be a major asset for the Allied powers. American officials understood the kind of war that occurred in Southwest Asia. The SCUD firings at Saudi Arabia and Israel were anticipated. The SCUD firings at Israel were an attempt to get the Jewish state involved in the war and divide the coalition. These SCUD lauchings were Iraq's primary offensive thrust. It is reasonable to state that the Bush administration was fairly accurate in predicting the kind of war that evolved. On the other hand, it appears that Saddam did not understand the nature of the war upon which he embarked. Initially, he may not have understood that the invasion of Kuwait would mean opposing over half a million American and Allied troops with modern equipment. Nor did he choose to pull back in the face of this build-up. While Saddam continued to improve defensive positoins inside Kuwait, the first phase of the U.S. and coalition build-up began. This phase involved a near total embargo on imports to Iraq and the introduction of 250,000 U.S. troops into the theater. Phase II of the build-up included more than 200,000 additonal American troops and a stiffer embargo. The United Nations meanwhile, passed numerous resolutions denouncing the Iraqi invasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Still Saddam indicated no real intention of leaving Kuwait. Instead, he spoke of drowning the American forces in their own blood in the 'mother of all battles'. It is logical to conclude that he did not understand the kind of war that evolved. Political The Idea of Clausewitz One of Clausewitz's most lasting contributions is his pronouncement of the proper relationship between politics and war. He stresses that politics and political interactions between countries continue even after the outbreak of hostilities. Clausewitz is clear on this point: We maintain,. . .that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase "with the addition of other means" because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different.(9:605) It is readily apparent that war is tightly intertwined with politics. "War for Clausewitz is an inescapable part of political life."(7:64) War and politics cannot exist independently. War is so permeated by politics that to plan a war without political guidance is useless. Wars are fought for political reasons, not military reasons.(9:87) National political aims should always be center stage when contemplating going to war. The prime reason for the existence and continuation of a war is to achieve clearly defined political objectives. The military, therefore, must adapt itself to and work toward these objectives. Policy must provide the framework for appropriate military strategy. The role of the military in this political framework is to conduct operations according to guidance and direction from the National Command Authority. Attempts by military leaders to ignore, negate, or circumvent political guidance, can lead to disaster. It can be no other way according to Clausewitz. Military leaders must resign themselves to military strategies which are in harmony with political goals. Historical Examples 1) After communist China became involved in the Korean War in November 1950, General Douglas MacArthur wanted to expand the Korean War by blockading the Chinese coast, bombing air and logistical bases in Manchuria as well as Chinese cities. He also implied that he favored assisting General Chiang Kai-shek's forces in reentering mainland China to overthrow the communist Chinese government. This approach, however, was strongly rejected by President Truman and the Joint Chief of Staff because it threatened and challenged the administration's policy designed to keep Korea from turning into World War III. The administration's policy was based largely on the theory of containment of Soviet expansion advocated by George Kennan in his famous "Mr. X" article. President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the primary Soviet threat was in Europe, not the Far East. In fact, during the Korean War more American troops were sent to Europe than to Korea. Policy and politics dictated that the Korean War be limited in scope and intensity because the political goal was one of moderation--a show of force to prevent further Soviet military adventures. 2) A variation of this theme was repeated during the Vietnam War. Generally, American military leaders advocated, over the course of time, such things as invading Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail, blockading Haiphong harbor, bombing Hanoi and the Red River Delta dikes, and later invading Cambodia. All of these suggestions made sense from a purely military perspective. However, as in the Korean War, policy dictated different action. The Johnson administration had its allies, American public opinion, and potential reaction of the Soviet Union and China to consider. Again, South Vietnam was not worth World War III. One may disagree with the policy but we must understand that policy governs strategy. Historical Applicaiton to the Persian Gulf War Tactics and the manner on which high technology weapons were employed had significant political ramifications. For example, the Patriot missile system became a political weapon because it rendered the SCUDs ineffective and therefore kept Israel out of the war. The Allied air strikes into Iraq were politically sensitive. Smart weapaons enabled the U.S. to conduct a surgical air campaign aimed at keeping the coalition together. It destroyed Iraq's infrastructure with minimum Iraqi ciivian casualties. The air campaign successfully appeased the Arab/Moslem community and the United Nations, and sat well with the American public--diverse political groups which would have reacted negatively to heavy civilian casualties. President Bush and other coalition leaders clearly set the tone for the war. The military leaders, including General Colin Powel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of Coalition Forces, understood that it was President Bush's decision to begin the air war and his decision to commence the ground war. The hub of power and decision making lay in the White House, not in the hands of the military. President Bush cited the lessons of the Vietnam War when he announced that the hands of the military would not be tied with restrictions making prosecution of the war overly difficult. This attitude showed the close cooperation between the White House and the military leadership. The political leaders of the U.S. and Iraq had to deal with internal factors that influenced them. President Bush had to be aware of public opinion and the attitude of Congress. A key question was: Would public opinion and Congress turn away from President Bush in the face of an intensive ground war involving high American casualties? What if Kuwait were liberated but Saddam refused to surrender and the ground war continued in an effort to eliminate him? What if Israel entered the war and the coalition fell apart? Saddam also had to deal with internal factors. The religious leaders in Iraq were extremely powerful and could sway public opinion. The loyalty of the military, particularly Saddam's closest military advisors, was essential to avoid a coup. Additionally, the loyalty of the Republican Guard was essential in maintaining his political leverage in Iraq as well as his hold on military power. Being a dictator, he had to firmly control the political and military dealings in his country very closely. Fog and Friction Fog The Idea of Clausewitz Two words that are frequently used to explain events relating to war are fog and friction. These terms are often used interchangeably, but are clearly different words used to explain different events. The fog of war focuses on uncertainty as explained by Clausewitz: War is the realm of uncertainty; three-fourths of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth. (9:101) The primary cause of fog is that the true picture of the enemy is unclear. What has happened, what is happening, and what will likely happen is unclear under the best of conditions. The picture gets particularly muddy and confused when intelligence cannot provide accurate information, and command and control functions are degraded. Between combating nations there rarely exist a complete screen or fog. The fog of war varies in time and place. Sometimes it is impenetrable; at other times it permits glimpses; at other times it lifts altogether and events become clear. It is most common for each nation to have some idea of enemy intentions. How much of an idea largely depends on reconnaissance measures and security precautions taken by the combatants.(5:46) Historical Examples 1) When American paratroopers landed off target behind Utah Beach, on D-Day, 6 June 1944, the troops and their commanders did not know where they were. Even the higher level commanders, such as Montgomery and Eisenhower, did not know where many paratroopers had landed. There was uncertainty and confusion concerning the friendly situation. In this case, the uncertainty of where the paratroopers were related to the fog of war. 2) On D-Day, 6 June 1944, the 716th German Coastal Defense Division was defending Omaha Beach right up until the time of the Allied amphibious assault. Just prior to the assault, this division was moved to a position away from Omaha Beach and was replaced by the 352nd Assault Infantry Division, which had been defending well behind Omaha Beach. The 352nd Division was more capable and certainly inflicted more punishment on the Americans than would have 716th. Allied intelligence did not find out about this change until it was too late. The American troops hitting the beach had an inaccurate picture of who the defenders were. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War Before G-Day, 16 February 1991, the effects of the fog of war had a limited impact on Allied forces. The U.S. had tremendous intelligence assets at work, from spy satellites high above the earth to human intelligence spying on the ground. The U.S. knew where the Iraqi units were and could very capably track the movement of units. More importantly, the U.S. had a very effective command and control system which fed information up and down the chain of command keeping leaders informed and the fog or uncertainty of war greatly diminished but not totally eliminated. The effects of fog on Iraq were magnified because the command and control facilities had been substantially reduced by Allied bombing. Futhermore, Iraq's intelligence gathering assets were inadequate, even at the beginning of the air war. Iraq had a poor picture of the location of Allied forces and the ground order of battle. There were three major questions that the Iraqis could not answer and which contributed to the Iraqi fog of war: 1) Will the U.S. conduct an amphibious assault? 2) How long will the air campaign continue and when will the ground campaign begin? 3) How will the Allied Forces prosecute the ground campaign? Without an accurate picture of the enemy, the Iraqi military was confused as to enemy intentions. Without the "eyes and ears" needed to gather intelligence, Iraq was limited to reacting, and to delayed reaction at that. Uncertainty regarding the Allied ground forces and capabilities contributed greatly to the swiftness and totality of Iraq's defeat. Friction The Idea of Clausewitz Friction is a related but different idea. "Friction...is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult."(9:121) Friction and chance are closely connected. Examples of friction include: a tank not starting when it should, a messenger being delayed due to getting lost, elements of an amphibious assault attacking the wrong beach, or sand clogging up a rifle and causing it to misfire at a critical point. Friction can be reduced but not totally eliminated. Training is an important element in reducing friction. The old axiom, "The more we sweat in peacetime, the less we bleed in war," certainly applies. There is no substitute for hard, realistic training to prepare combat forces for the rigors and uncertainty of combat. Sharpening individual combat skills and carefully preparing equipment will reduce friction to a more manageable and therefore less crucial level. Experience in combat not only reduces friction but prepares soldiers to cope with and to overcome its effects. Recognizing the effects of friction, and good leader rehearses whenever possible, allows ample time for preparation, and permits subordinate leaders freedom of action in making decisions that were not previously covered by guidance. Clausewitz believes the best general is not the one who is most familiar with the idea of friction, but the one who does not expect a standard of achievement in his operations which friction makes impossible.(9:120) By understanding and accepting friction and its constraints, leaders are better able to master the effects of friction.(13:95) Historical Examples (continuation of Utah and Omaha Beach examples) 1) On D-Day, during the Normandy invasion, the American 82nd and 101st Divisions planned to land in drop zones behind Utah Beach. The first waves of paratroopers landed on target, but successive waves badly missed assigned drop zones due to poor visibility, antiaircraft fire, and less qualified pilots who were flying in the follow-up waves. It is estimated that more than one-half of both divisions failed to land in proper drop zones. This landing plan looked good on paper, but was very difficult to execute due to friction. 2) On D-Day, during the invasion of Omaha Beach, infantry and tanks (that could "swim") were to make a coordinated assault on the beach. The tanks, however, got caught in rough seas and sank or landed late. The initial infantry assaults went in without armor support. This landing also looked good when planned, but friction (rough water) jeopardized success on Omaha Beach. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War Friciton was not a big factor in the Allied coalition's air campaign. Highly trained air crews, with higly technical equipment, took the fight ot the enemy in the air over Iraq and Kuwait. Although friction certainly exists in an air campaign, it is usually less pronounced that in a ground campaign. Friction was certainly evident in the coalition ground effort. On at least two occasions, Allied planes bombed freindly positions, causing numerous casualties each time. Allied planes which had been sent to destroy Iraqi targets ended up destroying American and British personnel and equipment. This can easily happen unless very precise precautions are taken by air crews, especially in a fast paced, fluid battlefield. These crews must have detailed knowledge of enemy and friendly equipment. This knowledge is gained by training. Additioanlly, air crews must know where freindly as well as enemy locations are. This is gained by keeping up-to-date on the current situation and applying that knowledge, not on paper where friction is absent, but on the modern battlefield. Iraq, on the other hand, suffered greatly from the effects of friciton, mainly due to the destruction of much of their command and control system. The Iraqi high command was blind--virtually unable to obtain accurate and timely information on the enemy, or even the friendly, situation. The result was confusion and loss of cohesion. The Allied strategy from the beginning was to introduce as much friction into the Iraqi command and control system as possible. This was accomplished by Allied air strikes continually pounding critical centers of communication inside Iraq and Kuwait. By cutting off command and control, front line Iraqi commanders were often isolated from higher headquarters. Without this higher headquarters link, valuable enemy intelligence information was not received quickly enough to respond in a fluid, fast moving situation. Additionally, information from subordinate commanders to Iraqi higher headquarters could not be processed smoothly. This lack of coordination between higher headquarters and subordinate units led to a lack of unity of effort among Iraqi commanders. Thus, the Allied strategy designed to induce friction into the Iraqi military machine was successful. Centers of Gravity The Idea of Clausewitz Clausewitz explains center of gravity as being the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. The center of gravity is the point against which all energies should be directed. It is essential in war to understand the enemy's center of gravity and then to focus your efforts against it. Clausewitz wrote: . . .two basic principles that underlie all strategic planning and serve to guide all other considertions.... The first task, then, in planning for war is to identify the enemy's centers of gravity, and if posssible trace them back to a single one. The second task is to ensure that the forces to be used against that point are concentrted for a main offensive.(9:617-619) The idea is clean and clear cut. If possible, the enemy's critical vulnerability must be identified early, ideally before the war begins. Once identified, the task of the strategist is to strike repeated blows against this critical spot. Once this center of gravity has been identified and attacked, and the enemy thrown for a loss, he must be struck repeatedly and not given time to recover. Historical Examples 1) During the Vietnam War, the U.S. did not properly identify the enemy's center of gravity. By simple comparison of military power, the United States should have won and won quickly in Vietnam. Some believed the center of gravity was the Viet Cong, others believed the extended lines of communication between military supplies in the North and the military fighting in the South were the center of gravity. Even today, nearly 20 years after the American pullout, debate and controversy still rage. Not properly identifying the enemy center of gravity led to the confused execution of the war. 2) During the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese, on the other hand, clearly recognized the most vulnerable center of gravity in the United States, that is, the American people. Perhaps at the begining of the war, North Vietnam did not understand this. But clearly, as time passed, and dissent in America grew (especially after the Tet offensive in 1968), it was obvious that public support for the war was diminishing. All North Vietnam had to do was hold out and continue to inflict losses on American soldiers. The loss of American support caused immense political pressure for the U.S. to bring the war to a close as quickly as possible. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War President Bush clearly identified the correct center of gravity in Iraq as Saddam. This man was definitely the hub of all power and controlled everything of significance in Iraq. President Bush repeatedly said that the U.S. did not have a quarrel with the people of Iraq. The U.S. had, according to the President, a quarrel with Saddam Hussein. Although the President publicly said that it was not targeting Saddam Hussein, he repeatedly called for the Iraqi people and/or the Iraqi military to rise up and overthrow Saddam. The Bush Administration believed this would bring a quick end to the war, particularly if the war-weary military engineered a coup. Although clearly Saddam was the main center of gravity in Iraq, other less important centers of gravity existed such as the extended lines of communicaiton from Baghdad to the Iraqi troops in Kuwait. The bombing of logistics and supply convoys heading south had a telling effect. Captured enemy prisoners of war told of limited water supplies, sparse food rations, and unsanitary health conditions. These conditions contributed significantly to the mass surrenders and diminished fighting spirit among the Iraqi troops seen during the brief ground war. Other Iraqi centers of gravity included: 1) The Republican Guard. 2) The loyalty of military commanders who were cut off from higher headquarters. 3) The security apparatus that surrounded Saddam Hussein. 4) The people of Iraq, military and civilian, who had endured a longer war with Iran from 1980 to 1988. Saddam Hussein seemingly understood that the American center of gravity was American public opinion. If Saddam could have undermined American support for the war effort, his country, like North Vietnam, needed only to hold out to win. Parading American prisoners of war on television was an attempt by Saddam Hussein to undermine public support. Iraq fought a media war, using claims of large numbers of civilian casualties in an attempt to influence the American people that the war was unjust and fought unfairly by the U.S. and Allied countries. Saddam also realized that the coalition was a major center of gravity. His repeated calls for the Arab community to drive the infidels out of the Holy Land was an attempt to hammer a wedge into the coalition. Saddam Hussein also said, or at least implied, that Allied forces (particularly western forces) wished to destroy the Iraqi infrastructure in an effort to totally destroy the nation. These claims were made in the hope of destroying the coalition. Culminating Point of Attack/Victory Culminating Point of Attack The Idea of Clausewitz These two points need to be differentiated so that the real meaning of Clausewitz's writing can be understood. Both refer to reaching the highest level or zenith of a particular event. The culminating point of the attack is that point when the attacker's strength is sapped and his superiority is exhausted. Clausewitz stated: The attacker is purchasing advantages that may become valuable at the peace table, but he may pay for them on the spot with his fighting forces. If the superior strength of the attack--which diminishes day by day--leads to peace, the object will have been attained. There are strategic attacks that have led directly to peace, but these are the minority. Most of them only lead up to the point where their remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace. Beyond that point the scale turns....This is what we mean by the culminating point of the attack.(9:528) It is critical for the commander to identify properly this culminating point or his attack will be continued until he stretches his lines of communication to the breaking point. His exhausted forces are then vulnerable to enemy counterattack. A wise commander will realize when this culminating point is approaching and will take up temporary defensive positions until his lines of communication are restored and his forces rested. When the attack is continued beyond the culminating point, a situation of diminishing returns may develop. The attack may become less effective as the defender becomes relatively stronger. The defender is very likely falling back on friendly territory where: lines of communication are shortened, local population is supportive, reinforcement of personnel is easier, and the defense becomes more solidified. The object then is for the commander to use judgement and experience to avoid going past this point and overextending his forces. Historical Examples 1) In June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. At the end of three weeks, the spectacular attack had carried German armored spearheads up to 400 miles inside the Soviet Union. At this point, however, they were out of fuel and very low on ammunition, thereby forced to halt their offensive for four to six weeks while logistics support caught up with the spearheads. The attack had clearly reached its culminating point. 2) In 1944, Allied forces, racing across France, ran out of fuel as they approached the German border. Patton's 3rd Army was halted for some time while gasoline and other supplies went to Montgomery's forces. The entire Allied logistic situation was aggravated by Montgomery's failure to secure the approaches to the port of Antwerp. (He instead opted for the dramatic lunge toward the Rhine in operation Market Garden in which two depleted SS Panzer Divisions badly mauled the British 1st Airborne Division.) Due to unresolved logistical difficulties, the Allied offensive had temporarily reached its culminating point. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War During the air campaign, it appeared that the only chance of the culminating point of attack being reached was if Allied air forces ran out of ammunition. To lessen the chance of this happening, B52s flew missions directly out of Fairfield in the United Kingdom and bases in Spain where there were huge munitions depots. During the 100 hour ground campaign of the Persian Gulf war, the Allied campaign plan was one sweeping maneuver designed to cut off and destroy all Iraqi divisions in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. The 101st Air Assault Division was used to establish forward petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL) bases. Allied forces moved 60 days of supplies to the area immediately behind the line of departure for the 7th Corps' advance. These supplies turned out to be vastly more than what was needed to prevent a culminating point from being reached. Iraq never reached the culminating point of the attack. After the 2 August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraq maintained a virtually passive form of defense, except for improving already established defensive positions. Iraq consciously chose the military option of defense over offense and therefore never reached a culminating point of the attack. Culminating Point of Victory The Idea of Clausewitz The culminating point of victory is more difficult to understand. In certain cases it is not possible for one country to defeat totally another, unless that country virtually collapses. It is vital to understand the will of the people you wish to conquer and the limit of your resources before you embark on the road to war. Simply put, the country you are fighting may be too powerful or too difficult to defeat and/or conquer. Clausewitz wrote: "It is not possible in every war for the victor to overthrow his enemy completely. Often even victory has a culminating point. This has been amply demonstrated by experience."(9:566) As a war progresses the attacker may become relatively weaker because of his own successes. This may seem to be a contradiction but it is not. Because of one nations success in a war, other states may join in the war to prevent the utter destruction of the defeated nation. In addition, a whole nation may rise up in extremity to save itself by a people's war.(12:41) "It is necessary to know how far (our preponderance) will reach, in order not to go beyond that point and, instead of fresh advantage, reap disaster."(12:41) Historical Examples 1) During the Peninsular War between France and Spain, 1808 to 1813, the Spanish people resisted by waging guerrilla and partisan warfare against the French, even after Napoleon had defeated the regular Spanish Army and put his brother on the Spanish throne. Each year, 100,000 French soldiers died in a war Napoleon did not understand and the French could not win--a classic example of the culminating point of victory being exceeded, despite the defeat of the Spanish Army, and a French garrison of over 250,000 troops. 2) During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937 to 1945, Japan's Army had defeated major Chinese armies and occupied huge portions of Eastern China. Nevertheless, Japan was effectively stalemated by 1941, despite having committed 2,000,000 troops to the war. The Japanese were hard pressed to make futher gains; indeed, they had difficulty securing territory already won. Chiang Kai-shek had withdrawn his government to Chunking and refused to negotiate. The Japanese were overextened and overcommitted in China. In many ways it was their "Vietnam." Japan had reached the culminating point of victory in her war against China, and sought a way out of that impasse by widening the war to include the Dutch, British, and the United States, which she did in December 1941. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War A culminating point of victory might have been reached if Iraqi forces in Kuwait had the capability and will to fight effectively to the last man. Instead, their front line forces suffered from lack of supplies and replenishment which caused low morale and diminished fighting spirit. The Republican Guard, while giving more resistance than front line forces, did not live up to its reputation of a highly trained, vastly equipped, and spirited fighting force. Without continued and strenuous fighting from the enemy, no culminating point of victory was reached by Allied military forces. Another opportunity for reaching the culminating point of victory might have arisen if after the liberation of Kuwait, President Bush had felt compelled to drive to Baghdad and beyond to secure Saddam's removal from political power in Iraq. This could have occured if the Iraqi forces had withdrawn from Kuwait but Saddam had refused to accept all of the provisions of the United Nations resolutions and the Iraqi people and the Republican Guard had continued to firmly support him and his policies. Diversions The Idea of Clausewitz The term diversion, according to Clausewitz, means an attack on enemy territory that draws enemy forces away from the main objective.(9:562) There are two instances when diversions are useful: 1) When the enemy diverts relatively more forces from the point or area of the intended main attack than you have used in creating your diversion.(9:562-564) 2) If the enemy does not detect or react to the diversion, your diversion forces may gain an important secondary objective; such as something of value to the enemy or key terrain.(9:562-564) Clausewitz warns that creating diversions can be dangerous and should be done with utmost caution. It is dangerous, in fact, to use substantial forces over any length of time merely to create and illusion; there is always the risk that nothing will be gained and that the troops deployed will not be available when they are really needed.(9:203) In the latter case, the resources committed to a diversion may be better used in the main atttack. Successful diversions do not happen very frequently. They are extremely difficult to plan and can be risky if not successful. Historical Examples 1) The Japanese attempted what proved to be an unsuccessful diversion during the Battle of Midway in June 1942. The Japanese sent four large carriers against Midway Island. In an effort to create a diversion, two additional carriers were sent to the Aleutian Islands, specifically to attack the American base at Dutch Harbor. Although privy to parts of the Japanese plan through code breaking and other intelligence activities, Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet, diverted only a few cruisers and destroyers to counter the Japanese carriers moving to the Aleutians. Nimitz concentrated all three of his available carriers against the four Japanese carriers which struck Midway. The result was the dramatic American victory on 4 June 1942 in which all four Japanese carriers were sunk. Unfortunately, for the Japanese, the two carriers which might have altered the outcome of The Battle of Midway, were involved in and unsuccessful diverison a thousand miles from the main engagement. 2) During World War II, American deception plan in 1944 for Operation Overlord was particularly successful. The objective of the diverison was to freeze the German 15th Army in the Pas de Calais. This was accomplished primarily through the creation of a bogus army centered around General George S. Patton. Dummy equipment, such as inflatable rubber landing craft and tanks were used, along with fake radio traffic. Real units were also used--units which were scheduled to be moved to Normandy weeks after the D-Day assault. This deception took nothing away from the D-Day assault in Normandy and it kept the German 15th Army sitting in the Pas de Calais wondering when Patton's invasion was coming. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War In a recent news conference, General Schwarzkopf said that the Persian Gulf War will be studied for a long time to come. When asked to elaborate, he said the deception aspects of the campaign were especially noteworthy. The United States used the amphibious forces in the Persian Gulf to create a large scale diversion, forcing Iraq to commit up to six divisions to defend the coastline when they could have been used elsewhere inland. This diversion was enhanced by the use of heavy naval gunfire shelling the Kuwaiti coastline, which was a normal precedent to and opposed amphibious landing. This deception took very little away from the Allied ground campaign. Iraq was forced to keep approximately 120,000 third-rate troops positioned along the border with Turkey. If Turkey could have been persuaded to posture more aggressively, by moving more troops to the Iraq border threatening a second front, this passive diversion could have been made even more effective. This action might have forced Iraq to divert front line forces to the Turkish border. Turkey need not have intended to use these troops. The only requirement was to keep the Iraqi military guessing. The 7th Army Corps was involved in a massive deception plan that included the largest movement of tanks since World War II. This deception concentrated the initial tank build-up and subsequent probing attacks along the Saudi border with Kuwait. This plan tricked the Iraqis into retaining large mobile reserves, including the Republican Guard, behind the Kuwaiti-Saudi border--more than 100 miles east from where the main attack actually occurred. This deception worked so well that the attacking force had to move its plan ahead 10 hours to take advantage of very light enemy resistance. On the Iraqi side, the SCUDS were an effective diversion. Thousands of Allied sorties were diverted to find and destroy the SCUD launchers even though the Patriot weapons system was available to counter them. These sorties were diverted from the Baghdad area, the Republican Guard, and other military targets to go after a militarily insignificant target. This was sound military strategy on the part of Saddam, although it may have backfired politically. Moral Elements The Idea of Clausewitz Moral factors are extremely important in the view of Clausewitz. Moral factors include not only believing in what you are fighting for but fighting hard for what you believe in. Simply believing in a cause is not enought. The soldier must go one step further. The soldier must have a strong fighting spirit and professional pride. This feeling of professional pride is not new. Clausewitz wrote: No matter how much one may be inclined to take the most sophisticated view of war, it would be a serious mistake to underrate professional pride (esprit de corps) as something that may and must be present in an army to greater or lesser degree.(9:187) It is important to differentiate between moral an morale. Simply put, moral is believing and fighting for a cause. That cause may be a democracy, nation, or a way of life. Moral runs deep and is not easily changed or swayed. Morale, on the other hand, is transitory and is usually based on more shallow factors, such as the quality or temperature of the chow, timeliness of mail, or frequency of showers. An army which has esprit de corps will not lose cohesion under fire and will not run when rumors and fear spread. A unit with high moral qualities will not lose respect and trust for its officers even in defeat. A unit which understands what training and harship means to victory is a unit filled with military virture and efficiency. This esprit cannot be underestimated by the enemy or overestimated by the friendly govenment. In either case, disaster could be the result.(9:187) Clausewitz believed that: ...moral elements are among the most important in war. They constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole, and at an early stage they establish a close affinity with the will that moves and leads the whole mass of force, partically merging with it, since the will is itself a moral quanity... The spirit and other moral qualities of an army, a general or a government, the temper of the population of the theatre of war, the moral effects of victory or defeat--all vary greatly. They can moreover influence our objective and situation in very different ways.(9:184) Historical Examples (High Moral) 1) In the aftermath of athe Frence Revolution in 1789, Napoleon had the advantage of having troops who had something to fight for. Among other causes, the Frenchmen of this time were fighting for ideals of the French Revolution and Nationalism. The French also had the advantge of fighting against mercenaries whose interests were largely monetary. French armies could sustain tremendous casualties and still maintain a strong fighting force in the field. An example is the Battle of Borodino in Napoleon's 1812 Russian campaign. This battle represented the last chance for Russia to keep France away from Moscow. The size of the armies was relatively equal, about 100,000 plus. However, unlike many previous campaigns and battles, the Russian army, too, possessed strong moral fiber. Both armies suffered extremely heavy casuslties and both stayed on the field until finally the Russian commander withdrew his army in relatively good order. The result was a tactical victory, but a strategic defeat for Napoleon. The Battle of Borodino demonstrated the superior moral qualities inherent in both armies. 2) In World War II the Japanese armed forces demonstrated unusually strong moral fiber. Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen fought for their Emperor, national and family honor, and their personal destiny in the hereafter. Kamikaze pilots and banzai charges characterized the Pacific War. From one island to antoher, from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, most Japanese fought until the last man. American planners for the final invasion of the Home Islands in 1945 and 1946 had to assume that many Japanese men, women, and children would fight to the death. Only the atomic bomb and Russian entry into the war against them (both in early August 1945) compelled the Japanese to surrender before the planned invasion. Historical Examples (Low Moral) The lack of moral elements can lead to defeat and humiliation. Once defeatism spreads through an army and a nation, the affects can be very damaging. 1) Both before and during the Battle of France in 1940, the French army suffered from poor moral qualities. During the 1930's. French domestic politics saw bitter struggles between French political parties ranging from the far right to the far left. Indeed, many French rightists preferred Nazi domination and conquest of France to being governed by left wing parties, specifically the Popular Front Party. Additionally, France as a nation still suffered from the terrible ordeal of trench warfare in World War I which affected the smaller and older French population more heavily than it did the larger and younger German population. Finally, the French people and soldiers placed great faith in the vaunted Maginot Line--a system of fortifications on the Franco-German border. Therefore, when the Germans avoided the Maginot Line by suddenly striking through the Ardennes Forest and across the Meuse River and racing to the English Channel, thereby cutting off significant allied armies, France's moral cohesion collapsed. 2) Italy in World War II suffered from bad equipment as well as poor military and political leadership. Additonally, they fought the wrong enemy. Italy had traditionally been friendly with the United States and Great Britain and did not identify with Germany. But Mussolini's primary goal was to build a new Roman Empire and he believed it was in Italy's best interest to fight on the side of Germany. The result was a poor showing for Italy. The hearts of the Italian people were not in the war. The best example was when General Wavell routed and captured over 100,000 Italian troops with only two small British Imperial Divisions in Egypt and Libya in 1940-41. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War Americn troops had high esprit. Traditioanlly, American troops believe in their cause and transfer that strong belief into a firm fighting spirit. The Americn people remained united behind the policy in Southwest Asia, keeping moral elements at elevated levels. It is important to note, however, that hardships in Southwest Asia were not burdensome for a prolonged time. American and Allied ground forces did not have to undergo the hardships of prolonged, intense combat, which would have been a truer test of esprit and moral mettle. The Iraqi troops suffered from the effects of poor moral elements. Frequent defections and the surrender of battalion-sized units occured even before S-Day. On and after G-Day, Iraqi POWs presented a more serious problem to the Allied advance than did Iraqi resistance. In all fairness, many of these early POWs were second line fighters drafted off the steets of Baghdad who did not match up to the "elite" Republican Guard, which offered more resistance. General Schwarzkopf remarked that the Iraqi troops were tired after eight years of war with Iran and their "heart was not in it." Many of the Iraqi troops were battle hardened and certainly well acquainted with the horrors and rigors of combat. However, many ran when Allied troops approached. The poor showing by these forces, including the Republican Guard, is explained by a combination of other factors relating to fog, friction, training, equipment, and operational art, as well as low moral fiber. Finally, what exactly were the Iraqi troops fighting for? Saddam Hussein is a brutal dictator who used chemical agents on the Kurds in Northern Iraq. He also gave up gains which had been hard won in the war with Iran. Then, just days before G-Day, Saddam agreed to a "conditional" withdrawl from Kuwait--the so-called "nineteenth province of Iraq." What was left to fight for? Civilized Warfare The Idea of Clausewitz Clausewitz believed that war is a serious undertaking that should not be taken lightly. Joseph Greene wrote in The Living Thought of Clausewitz: ...he was the first man to express clearly the idea of war as a national affair....he was one of the first to write extensively about opening wars with a sudden stroke at the enemy with all the armed force a commander can bring to bear.(8:6) In fact, some historians insist that Clausewitz is the intellectual father of total war.(8:6) Clausewitz knew first hand that war is a tough business and it takes hard fighting to win. To introduce moderation into the philosophy of war would be absurd according to Clausewtiz. He believed that war is such a bloody spectical that it should be given due respect and entered into only after reason has been applied.(9:642) How then does civilized warfare fit into his writing? Even in war, Clausewitz believed there were restraints that governmental leaders must impose on the military and civilian populations in connection with the prosecution of war. Specifically, these restraints are directed against nonmilitary targets. If, then, civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death or devastate cities and countries, it is because intelligence plays a larger part in their methods of warfare and has taught them more effective ways of using force than the crude expression of insticts.(9:76) Clausewitz clearly said that combatants should not mistreat POWs, level cities, or destroy the environment during the prosecution of a war. Yet throughout history, countries have crossed over the line that not only Clausewitz but many others have drawn. Historical Examples 1) During the Bataan death march in April-May 1942, the Japanese forced 70,000 American and Filipino prisoners to march 70 miles to relocation camps. Malnourished and suffering from disease, many died during the march. Upon reaching their new camps, many more were tortured and deprived of proper medical care. Poor Japanese treatment of POWs is explained in part by the Bushido Code which stated that death was preferable to surrender. If the Japanese had no respect for their own soldiers who surrendered, why should they treat enemy POWs with respects? An answer is that as military strategists they should have been concerned about the American reaction to this practice and its impact on the American national will to fight for total defeat of Japan. 2) The Germans during World War II in North Africa and on the Western Front were generally recognized to have given adequate care to POWs. The war on the Eastern Front between the Germans and the Russians was totally different. a) From June through December 1941, approximately 3.5 million Russians were captured by the Germans. Treatment of these POWs was shocking. They were put in cattle yards and not given adequate food, shelter, or medical attention. Seventy-five percent of these POWs died within one year of capture. Part of the reason Germans treated Russian POWs so poorly was that Hiltler wanted Libensraum (living room). He needed room to spread out so that the German nation might grow. Additionally, Hitler believed in Untermenschen (under-people or sub-humans). He believed that the people he was killing really did not matter anyway. b) German POWs were also treated badly by the Russians. Specifically, during February 1943, 90,000 Germans surrendered at Stalingrad. These troops had been on low rations and were being provided poor health care even before their capture. After surrendering, they were forced to march long distances before they were put on trains bound for relocation camps in Siberia. Less than 4,000 of these 90,000 German POWs lived to return to Germany after the war. It should be noted, however, that the Russians did not have food, clothing, or medicine to spare for the POWs. As noted earlier, Clausewitz warns against the indiscriminate leveling of cities and their inhabitants. He realized that the practice of leveling cities can backfire and result in galvanizing public opinion. The following examples apply: 1) Late in 1937, the Japanese seized Nanking, the capital of Nationalist China, and sacked the city. Within seven weeks 200,000 Chinese were brutally massacred inwhat historians have called "the Rape of Naking". Eye witnesses reported that the Japanese threw babies into the air and caught them on bayonets. The rape of Nanking infuriated the Chinese Nationalists. On 26 December 1937, Chiang Kai-shek publicly stated, in great detail, that he rejected any possibility of a negotiated settlement with Japan, in part, because Japan had violated the customs of civilized warfare. 2) In the Battle of Britain, 1940 to 1941, Hitler directed the Luftwaffe to bomb London and other British cities in an effort to destroy the will of the British people. The bombing of Coventry is probably the best known example of this terror bombing campaign. The American news reporter, Edward R. Murrow, broadcast to the world daily ("This is London calling") describing the Luftwaffe attacks and the heroic reaction of the stout-hearted Londoners, who slept in the subways, sent their children off to the countryside, and carried on as best they could. The bombing served only to unite the British people with no appreciable damage to the British war effort. This attempt at uncivilized warfare backfired on Hitler and provided the background for Winston Churchill's inspiring leadership against the Nazis. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War The United States conducted a high technology war based on surgical precision rather than a meat cleaver approach. Targets were carefully selected to avoid civilian casualties and extremely accurate "smart" weapons employed to limit collateral damage and friendly casualties. Iraq charged (unsuccessfully) that the U.S. and the Allies targeted population centers, as well as religious and culatural artifacts. Iraq further charged (again unsuccessfully) that Allied forces attempted to destroy the infrastructure of Iraq through the bombing campaign. In the Persian Gulf War, the United States organized a coalition of western and eastern nations with diversified cultural, religious, and economic backgrounds. Members of the coalition had to be aware of differences in the way each intended to fight the war. If certain coalition partners had believed that the coalition air campaign had targeted Iraqi civilians or was designed to destroy the Iraqi culture, the coalition might have fallen apart quickly. The United States, even if otherwise inclined, had to avoid acting out of instinct as Clausewitz warned, and instead, use reason and caution in the prosecution of the war. Iraq, on the other hand, made three fundamental errors regarding the concept of civilized warfare: 1) Iraq failed to guage the reaction of the United States and the world when they placed Allied pilots on Iraqi television. These pilots appeared to have been beaten and perhaps drugged in an attempt to get "confessions" which may have been coerced. The intent, of course, was to show the Iraqi people that Allied pilots had been shot down and that these pilots did not support the war. This parading of POWs was staged to benefit internal Iraqi relations but backfired elsewhere because mistreatment of POWs goes beyond civilized warfare. 2) The launchings of SCUD missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia had little effect militarily, except--as pointed out earlier--to divert Allied sorties away from other targets. Whe indiscriminate launchings of these missiles were designed purely to inflict fear and terror into the civilian sector. Additionally, SCUD missiles are not precision weapons. These missiles are area weapons which can do enormous damage to targets such as cities. These missile attacks had little positive effect for Iraq, but united the coalition and increased international support. 3) We now know that Iraq attempted the virtual complete destruction of Kuwait (atrocities, killings, rape, torture, over 30,000 Kuwaiti citizens sent to Iraq, etc.). Over 800 oil wells were set on fire and the supporting oil industry devastated. Kuwait City was completely stripped, valuables taken to Iraq, and buildings destroyed. Kuwait is now faced with a monumental rebuilding effort. This destruction is tantamount to a scorched early policy. Conclusion Clausewitz expressed the modest hope that his writings on war "would not be forgotten quickly, and might be picked up more than once by those interested in the subject."(9:58) As a theorist of war, Clausewitz has come to mean more to this century than he did to his own.(10:39) That American civilian and military officials frequently explained policies and actions in the Persian Gulf War in Clausewitzian terms is a testament ot his still powerful contemporary influence. Terms such as fog, friction, and center of gravity are common military phraseology used to discuss and explain military events from the distant past to the recent conflict with Iraq. All indications suggest that Clausewitz's legacy and import will only continue to grow. The words of Michael Howard written 25 years ago (A Short Guide to Clausewitz On War) still apply today: For all serious students of the problems of war and peace, Clausewitz's great study On War is likely to remain a basic text for many years....the profundity and originality of his writings brought the study of war to an entirely new level: and his views on the relationship between war and policy, on the part played by `friction' in war, on the importance of morale, and on strategy in general remain the starting point for almost all later thinking on the subject.(11:ix) The modest hope put forth by Clausewitz, over 150 years ago, was certainly fulfilled as noted by Edward M. Collins in War, Politics and Power: "The reason for reading Clausewitz today is quite simple: he has something to say which is important, timely, and relevent to our situation."(3:1) BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Aron, Raymond. Clausewitz Philosopher of War. Tr. Christine Booker and Norman Stone. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985 2. Clausewitz Casyndekan. Colorado Springs: Casyndekan, Inc., 1969 3. Collins, Edward M., ed. War, Politics, and Power: Selections from On War, and I Believe and Profess. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962. 4. Eccles, Henry E. Military Concepts and Philosophy. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965. 5. Falls, Cyril. Ordeal by Battle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943. 6. Foch, Marshal. The Principles of War. Tr. Hilaire Belloc. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1903. 7. Gallie W.B. Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. 8. Greene, Joseph I., ed. The Living Thought of Clausewitz. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1943. 9. Howard, Michael, and Peter Paret, eds. Carl von Clausewitz On War. 1984 ed. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. 10. Howard , Michael, ed. The Theory and Practice of War. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965. 11. Leonard, Roger Ashley, ed. A Short Guide to Clausewitz On War. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1967. 12. Murray, Stewart L. The Reality of War: An Introduction to "Clausewitz". London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1909. 13. Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct of War. London: Unwin Hyman, 1983.
