From Over-The-Horizon Comes The Osprey AUTHOR Major Charles A. Hodges, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: FROM OVER-THE-HORIZON COMES THE OSPREY I. PURPOSE: To validate the military worth of the MV-22 Osprey. II. PROBLEM: Navy and Marine Corps amphibious doctrine is changing, requiring better tactics and assault craft. Changes are in order. III. DATA: Less than thirty days after taking office, the new Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Mr. Dick Cheney canceled the MV-22 Osprey program because of budgetary constraints. The Marine Corps desperately needs the Osprey to replace its aging fleet of CH-46 helicopters. Replacing the CH-46 with another helicopter is not the answer. Because of advanced anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, a faster, more survivable aircraft that can fly long distances quickly is needed. Independent studies have been conducted, and have proven that the Osprey is the best aircraft for the Marines in terms of cost and lift. 356 Ospreys will lift more and cost less than any mix of the alternative helicopters that were evaluated. IV. CONCLUSIONS: The Osprey is a state of the art aircraft that has an extremely expensive price tag. Even so, this aircraft is the best choice for the over-the-horizon and maneuver warfare missions that Marines will have to face in the future. V. RECOMMENDATIONS: The CH-46 helicopter fleet should be replaced immediately with the MV-22 Osprey. From Over-the-Horizon Comes the Osprey Outline Thesis statement: The helicopter is not capable of supporting the over-the-horizon amphibious assault from distances much greater than 50 miles at sea; however, the V-22 Osprey can support our changing doctrine. I. The 1946 Atomic Threat A. USMC post-WW II doctrine change B. Helicopter supports doctrine change C. Evolution of the helicopter II. The 1990 Threat A. Navy/Marine doctrine change 1. Over-the-horizon 2. Maneuver warfare B. Helicopters can not support doctrine change C. Evolution of the tiltrotor 1. History of the tiltrotor 2. Performance D. V-22 Supports doctrine change 1. Combat effectiveness analysis, V-22 vs helicopters 2. Cancellation of V-22 program 3. Cost Analysis, V-22 vs helicopters III. Conjecture A. The V-22 is the aircraft of the future. B. Our future enemy will possess the tiltrotor. From Over-the-Horizon Comes the Osprey Soon after observing the atomic bomb test on Bikini Island in 1946, General Geiger sent a report to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General A. A. Vandegrift, saying, "...Since our probable future enemy will be in possession of this weapon, it is my opinion that a complete review and study of our concept of amphibious operations will have to be made." General Geiger was concerned that the atomic bomb could easily destroy an expeditionary force, meaning the Marine Corps of 1946. He said, "...I cannot visualize another landing such as was executed at Normandy or Okinawa." (4:11) General Geiger's report prompted the Commandant to form a board to determine if Marine Corps amphibious doctrine was viable in the atomic age. This panel clearly concluded that some new method of assault support was needed to supplement landing craft. Members realized that Marines would have to be dispersed at sea to avoid atomic destruction. However, they would have to concentrate at a decisive moment to destroy the enemy. The panel came up with several options, and recommended the vertical assault capabilities of the helicopter as an alternative to the World War II frontal assault tactic. Two years after its conception, the vertical assault was born on May 23, 1948 when five Marine HO3S-1 helicopters made the first ship-to-shore movement with Marines aboard. (1:40) Since that first vertical assault, the helicopter has been steadily improved. The HO3S-l was underpowered and slow, but its successor, the CH-34, was an improvement. It could carry a heavier payload and had a faster cruise speed. Next came the CH-53 and CH-46 helicopters, the workhorses of the Corps. They came on the scene during the Vietnam War, and because of their versatility they became the cornerstones upon which current amphibious doctrine is based. The CH-53 and CH-46 fleets have served admirably for nearly three decades. The "lives" of these helicopters have been extended beyond their intended life cycles, and they are slowly becoming obsolete. As they wear out, parts are becoming scarce, and maintenance departments find it very challenging to keep the transports in the air. Slowly but surely, the CH-53D Sea Stallion is being replaced by the newer CH-53E Super Stallion. With twice the lift capacity as the Sea Stallion, the Super Stallion promises to provide the Corps with a sufficient heavy lift capability for the time being. Meanwhile, our medium lift assets are aging. Where does the Marine Corps stand with the CH-46, and how long can we safely employ this trusted steed? Because of the Survivability, Reliability and Maintainability (SR&M) program, the CH-46 is considered by many as our safest and most reliable helicopter. However, a thirty-year-old aircraft is still a thirty-year-old aircraft, and some say that the last "frog" pilot has yet to be born. The CH-46 is a good medium-lift helicopter that could prove its worth well beyond the year 2000--if technology would just stand still. With the CH-46/CH-53E mix, Marines could continue to assault hostile shores from now until the second coming of Christ if technology would just stand still. However, the technology of today is much like the technology of 1946; it is not standing still. Our medium lift prime mover, the CH- 46, along with our current amphibious assault tactics are clearly obsolescent. Marines of today face the same problem that General Vandegrift and Geiger faced in 1946. Advanced weapons systems are once again causing Marines to rewrite amphibious doctrine. In 1946, the threat was nuclear arms proliferation which caused the Marine Corps to develop the vertical assault concept. The helicopter made this concept a reality. Today, anti-ship weapons require the Navy-Marine team to stand offshore, over-the-horizon, in order to survive. The helicopter is not capable of supporting the over-the-horizon amphibious assault from distances much greater than 50 miles at sea; however the MV-22 Osprey can support our changing doctrine. To conduct over-the-horizon amphibious assaults, the Marine Corps will need both surface and air vehicles that can quickly transport Marines from ship to shore. Other elements are involved, of course, but only the aviation issue will be addressed in this paper. Like it or not, the over-the-horizon concept has been developed, and amphibious assaults launching from 50 to 200 miles at sea will soon become a requirement. Gone are the days of launching the Landing Force at the ten fathom mark. The over-the-horizon concept will be the way the Navy-Marine team will fight in the future. Why? Because enemy anti- ship weapons such as the Styx, the Exocet, and the Silkworm are becoming a reality for many unstable third world nations. If these weapons systems cannot be neutralized before D-day, the amphibious assault must be launched from over-the-horizon--out of the range of these deadly missiles. Clearly, since the Navy cannot afford to expose its fleet to such a threat, the Marines deployed on these ships will either use over-the-horizon tactics, or be incapable of fighting in the battle at all. General Thomas R. Morgan states: Today's situations require the full array of modern military force--Navy-Marine Corps, air- ground, combined arms, tactical imagination, and strategic focus. U.S. forces must hold a clear technical superiority over their opponents. Superior material, tactical methods, and effective training will give these forces a decided advantage when out-numbered. ... With the LCAC and the Osprey, the Corps will be able to conduct amphibious assaults from over-the-horizon, yielding surprise with increased survivability for the amphibious task force. Over-the-horizon operations will challenge our technology to provide solutions in the areas of naval surface fire support, precise navigation, secure long distance communications for C3I, enhanced night and all-weather capabilities, airborne early warning, mine countermeasures on land as well as at sea, and also CSS systems that will furnish a rapid logistics flow.... We must be able to deploy rapidly, project power at a point of our choosing, and win. Nothing else is acceptable. (2:30-31) The Marine Corps Combat Development Center in Quantico, Virginia, provides this analysis: Development of an over-the-horizon assault capability... is becoming increasingly imperative given a dynamic world situation, the expeditionary characteristics of our Corps, and the proliferation of relatively low-cost, precision guided munitions, and other advanced weapons among the world's nations. Such weapons will play a key role in low and mid-intensity conflicts, as shown by the use of anti-ship missiles in the Falklands War, and the light anti-aircraft missiles in Afghanistan. While these obstacles are not insurmountable, they compel modification and enhancement of current amphibious doctrine and training. The Marine Corps has already adopted maneuver warfare as a means of achieving victory on the battlefields of the future. (10:1) The over-the-horizon concept isn't a new goal of the Marine Corps. An unclassified USMC paper states: The over-the-horizon concept builds on cur- rent amphibious doctrine and advances in technolo- gy. ... It is a seaward extension of the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver war- fare. ... It emphasizes the principles of mobility, speed, and flexibility. It counters the enemy's anti-landing defense and high technology weaponry. ... There are two reasons why we would conduct OTH operations: to achieve a tactical advantage and/or a threat that compels us to launch our assault from further out to sea. ... (10:2) The over-the-horizon assault is a further refinement and expansion of amphibious doctrine. It combines the concepts of maneuver warfare with modern technology and equipment to enhance combat power.... (10:4) As surely as the vertical assault changed the Marine Corps tactics of yesterday, over-the-horizon tactics coupled with maneuver warfare will also change how we operate in the future years. Although the helicopter is tried and proven, it is nonetheless at the outer edge of its technological envelope. Very little can be done to make it fly faster or further, or carry more. It is limited by aerodynamics, and its perfor- mance has virtually reached its full potential. The amphib- ious assault from over-the-horizon will be extremely limited if helicopters remain as our vehicle of choice. For example, the helicopter is so slow that a single assault wave launched from 100 nautical miles offshore would take at least two hours to complete. Furthermore, with most of their fuel already spent, the pilots would be faced with either refueling ashore or flying back to the ship on empty. Given the above situation, how can the Marine Corps conduct over-the-horizon operations? The answer is in tilt- rotor technology. As far back as 1956, some forward thinkers recognized the limitations of the helicopter and began developing requirements for a replacement. Believe it or not, "The Department of Defense directed the Navy in 1958 to conduct a study on the feasibility of a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft that would satisfy the requirements of all the armed services." (1:40) Almost every conceivable rendition of the helicopter and airplane was investigated: lift fans, compound helicopter, X wings, improved helicopters, tilt wings, and finally the tiltrotor. The tiltrotor has proven to be the best of both the helicopter and the airplane worlds. The XV-3 was the first tiltrotor and was soon followed by the XV-15. The designs proved to have potential and led to the development and production of the MV-22 Osprey--which first flew in 1989. (7:1) As indicated by Figure 1, the Osprey operates as a helicopter when taking off and landing, but it can convert to a turboprop airplane once airborne. It can hover like a helicopter or accelerate to 300 knots like a turboprop aircraft. Click here to view image The Osprey is constructed primarily of lightweight composites and is considered an all weather, day or night, low-level, nap of the earth aircraft. It can fly in moderate icing, which helicopters cannot do, and aerial refueling extends its range dramatically. When compared to a helicopter, it performs similar to the CH-53D. It can lift approximately 10,000 pounds in the helicopter mode, but short, rolling takeoffs allow it to double its payload. It differs from the helicopter in that it can fly up to 300 knots and to an altitude of 28,000 feet. While in the helicopter mode, it burns fuel at about the same rate as the CH-53D. However, as shown in Figure 2, by converting to the airplane mode, the Osprey can carry twice as many troops as a CH-60 and can cover over four times the distance without refueling. (9) Click here to view image The Osprey is the perfect CH-46 replacement. Its speed, tactical radius, maneuverability, and ability to carry 24 Marines into combat make it the perfect over-the- horizon choice. It is also a great aircraft for maneuver warfare. "Marine Corps doctrine today is based on warfare by maneuver." (8:30) The importance of maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps is best summarized by General Gray. On March 6, 1989, he stated, "It (FMFM-1) is the Marine Corps' doctrine and, as such, provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and how we prepare to fight." (8:1) Although all warfare uses both fire and move- ment, these components provide the foundation for two distinct styles of warfare: an attrition style, based on firepower, and a maneuver style, based on movement. (8:28) Warfare by maneuver stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on. The goal is the application of strength against selected enemy weakness. By definition, maneuver relies on speed and surprise, for without either we cannot concentrate strength against enemy weakness. Tempo is itself a weapon--often the most important. (8:29) Two principles of maneuver warfare are concentration and speed. Concentration is developing superiority at the decisive time and place. It applies to time as well as to space. War is fluid and opportunities fleeting. We must concentrate not only at the decisive location but also at the decisive moment. Speed is rapidity of action. Like concentration, speed applies to both time and space. Speed over time is tempo--the ability to operate consistently at a faster rate than our opponent. Speed over distance is velocity--the ability to move fast. Speed can be a weapon, and its use will allow us to seize the initiative and dictate the terms of combat. (8:31) Sun Tzu stated, "Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions." (6:134) Surprise is striking the enemy quickly at a time or place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise is based on speed. Without surprise, superiority at the decisive point is hardly conceivable. The military that best uses concentration, speed, tempo, velocity, and surprise will be able to generate the momentum. "Surprise, often of decisive importance... Is difficult to achieve and easy to lose." (8:34) The Navy's over-the-horizon concept and the Marine Corps' current doctrine of maneuver warfare fit together like hand to glove. While the Navy wants to launch the landing force from over-the-horizon for self preservation, this tactic actually enhances the maneuver warfare concept of surprise. When the amphibious task force (ATF) is 50 to 200 miles offshore, the enemy can only guess as to where the Marines will land. Hopefully, this will make him to spread his forces thinly over a broad coastline. However, if the same ATF is only two to five miles offshore, the element of surprise is missing. The Osprey has the speed for maneuver warfare and the ability to fly the long distances required in over-the-horizon operations of the future. The Joint Services Operation Requirement (JSOR) for advanced vertical lift aircraft was developed by the four Armed Services in 1982. The JSOR specified that the aircraft of the future had to be capable of carrying 24 troops or an external load of 10,000 pounds. The perfect aircraft had to be capable of 250-275 knots and a radius of 200 miles. It had to be night operations capable (flir), ship board compatible, have environmental control (NBC), be able to fly in icing conditions, and air-to-air refuelable. Also, it had to be crashworthy, resistant to small arms weapons, and be flotation capable. Apparently, cost was not a factor. (3:4) There is only one aircraft that is capable of all these missions--the Osprey. Four alternative helicopters have been scrutinized by the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA). The CH-53E and CH-60 helicopters were considered the best of the helicopters evaluated, but they met only 45 percent of the JSOR. The V-22 was the only aircraft that met 100 percent of the JSOR. (3:4) The performance of the V-22 is superior to any helicop- ter alternative. The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) states that the V-22 consistently outperforms every helicop- ter alternative of equal-cost that has been proposed. (3:1) The following ten paragraphs are a summary taken from the Bell-Boeing V-22 Executive Summary, September, 1990, and are used to illustrate how much more effective a force can be when the Osprey is present. In 1987, an analysis of the combat effectiveness of the V-22 was conducted by BDM International, Inc. based on a Marine Corps approved mid-intensity vertical assault scenario in which three battalions of Marines were landed ashore from over-the-horizon (70 miles at sea). Two equal- deck spot aircraft fleets were sized to fit the amphibious ships supporting the operation. A fleet of 45 V-22's and 32 CH-53E's (77 aircraft) was compared to a fleet of 60 H-60's and 48 CH-53E's (108 aircraft). The aircraft were sized to provide an equal-lift mix. A Marine Corps criterion used in this study was that 70 percent of the vertical assault aircraft had to be available after delivery of the Assault Element to support subsequent operations. In this scenario, only the V-22/CH-53E force met this survival standard. As depicted in Figure 3, BDM's analysis of combat effectiveness concluded that the V-22/CH-53E fleet delivers more than twice the Combat Power in the first 60-90 minutes of the assault as the all-helicopter fleet. Click here to view image The first 60 to 90 minutes of the assault are deemed critical by the Marine Corps since this is the nominal reaction time for the buildup of responding enemy forces. Here, the V-22/CH-53E force delivered twice as much of each payload type as the all-helicopter force in 90 minutes (half the time). This gave the Marines on the ground a potential decisive advantage against the defending enemy forces. When carrying troops, V-22 survivability exceeded that of the H-60 by 7:1. Losses of troops, aircraft, and HMMWVs to enemy defenses for the V-22/Ch-53E force were one-third of those for the H-60/CH-53E mix. A note of interest is that when the all-helicopter mix used double-sling CH-53E loads, only 4 of 32 HMMWVs reached the landing zones. Also, the all-helicopter fleet did not maintain unit integrity, and resulted in significantly higher casualties. One interesting note was that a large percentage of CH-53E's survive the operation only when they are in the V-22 force, because they do not have to fly medium lift missions. It appears that the CH-53E needs the V-22 to survive. Finally, the V-22/CH-53E mix suffered only 1/7th as many losses than the all-helicopter fleet. The second phase of the BDM study called for a battalion sized blocking force to move 170 miles inland. BDM reduced the fleet to 30 V-22s and 16 CH-53Es (46 aircraft), and compared it to the all-helicopter mix of 60 H-60s and 48 CH-53Es (108 aircraft). Unbelievably, the V-22 mix delivered over 1.5 times the combat power in the critical 60-90 minutes with less than half as many aircraft. The H-60 could not perform this mission without enroute refueling. This required establishing a Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) and transporting an additional 314 tons of payload in 30 CH-53 sorties to support the FARP. About one-third of the sorties flown by the CH-53E's in the all-helicopter mix were to support the refueling of the H- 60s. BDM's last scenario of their combat effectiveness study required Marine forces to seize an objective in Southwest Asia (SWA) 370 miles from their launching point. The limited payload and range of the H-60 did not permit it to perform this mission. Therefore, the performance of 60 V- 22s was compared to 60 CH-53Es. The V-22 flew the round trip without refueling. The CH-53 had to refuel from a FARP. In less than 2.5 hours after take off, the V-22 fleet delivered the entire combat force of 930 Marines to the objective. It was not until 4 hours after take off that the CH-53E fleet completed the troop delivery. The speed and range of the V-22 also reduced the time available for enemy reaction, thereby lowering the number of casualties of friendly troops. The 1987 Combat Effectiveness Analysis led BDM to con- clude that with the V-22 to move troops and equipment, the ground commander can maneuver his forces in rapid dagger- like thrusts, taking advantage of surprise, mobility, and evasion. Before the enemy can react to counter the threat, the V-22 can transport the forces elsewhere, massing a new attack from a different position on the battlefield. (11:2- 5) This sounds a lot like what General Gray and FMFM-1 need to support maneuver warfare, doesn't it? In April, 1989, the Secretary of Defense was apparently not concerned with combat effectiveness when he decided to cancel the Osprey program less than 30 days after taking office. He then directed the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to conduct a cost and operations effectiveness analysis (COEA) and report its results in the Spring of 1990. What Mr. Cheney was concerned about was the cost of the Osprey. His decision to cancel the V-22 must have been based on the belief that 602 V-22's for the Navy and Marine Corps would cost $3.4 billion more than an equal lift capability helicopter alternative of H-60/H-53E aircraft. (3:1-2) IDA downsized the V-22 fleet to 356 aircraft to produce a V-22 fleet with an equivalent cost of an all-helicopter fleet (equal-cost). The study concluded that the V-22's speed, range, and survivability advantages could enable the 356 V-22's to be more effective than the proposed helicopter alternatives in all four Marine Corps missions. The V-22 was superior to all the equal-cost helicopter alternatives. The speed and built-in survivability features of the V-22 made it the most survivable aircraft considered in this study. Also, IDA stated that the 356 V-22's will yield a substantial improvement over the Marines's current capabilities for all missions. (11:8-3) The IDA study clearly concluded that the V-22 is more cost effective, more survivable, and the lower cost choice for medium-lift VTOL missions. (11:8-5) In conclusion, the Osprey is a unique aircraft that will certainly change the way Marines fight in the future. It will enhance maneuver warfare, but more importantly, over-the-horizon assaults will never become a reality without it. If we are fortunate enough to acquire the Osprey, the Marine Corps will be in the cat-bird seat. If we don't buy the aircraft, whether it be lack of vision or out of budgetary constraints, Marines will lose a great advantage that will be needed to counter the enemy of the future. The tiltrotor is more than a pipe-dream; it is a proven concept, and tiltrotor aircraft have logged thousands of hours of actual flight. While America lingers by debating the potential of the Osprey, Europe and Japan already have recognized its practicality. Europe has formed a coalition to build it, and Japan has already broken ground in Ft. Worth, Texas for a tiltwing factory. (12:1) It would be a tragedy for America to develop the Osprey, only to reject it for a cheaper helicopter substitute that is less capable and less survivable. Europe and Japan will build either the tiltrotor or tiltwing, and I am sure that it will find a place on some "third world" battlefield of the future. Ironically, we will compete against our own technology! It makes sense that the nation that developed the Osprey should also incorporate it into our military infrastructure. Truly, the Osprey can literally fly circles around a helicopter, so the battlefield of tomorrow surely will include the tiltrotor. Will Americans fly them or fight them? What General Geiger said about the atomic bomb could easily apply to the Osprey. "...Our probable future enemy will be in possession of this weapon...." (4:11) Will Marines fly the Osprey or fight it? BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Flanagan, LtCol. Robert M. "The V-22 is Slipping Away," Proceedings, August, 1990. 2. Morgan, General Thomas R. "A Look to the Future," Marine Corps Gazette, December, 1987. 3. "Placing V-22 Costs in Perspective," Bell-Boeing Executive Summary, September, 1990. 4. Rawlins, LtCol. E. W., Marines and Helicopters 1946- 1962. (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1976). 5. Shaffer, Col. Jim, USMC V-22 Project Manager. Guest lecturer, Command and Staff College, "Over-the-Horizon Symposium," February 28, 1991. 6. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Oxford University Press, 1963. 7. "The Case for the V-22 Osprey Program," Bell-Boeing Working Paper. 8. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM l, FMFM-1. Warfighting. Washington D.C. March, 1989. 9. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 5-1. Marine Aviation. Washington D.C. 1978. 10. U.S. Marine Corps. MCCDC. "Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Operations Concept." Unclassified Draft Paper. July, 1990. 11. "V-22 Military Studies and Analyses, Executive Summary." Bell-Boeing, September, 1990. 12. "V-22 Technology Transfer." Bell-Boeing Newsletter.
