Arms For Access: Success Or Failure
AUTHOR LCDR James R. Gilbert II, USN
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - National Security
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ARMS FOR ACCESS: SUCCESS OR FAILURE
Presidents Carter and Reagan each established a policy
to govern sales or transfers of conventional arms to foreign
nations. President Carter called for stricter controls and
an overall reduction in arms transfers to foreign nations.
President Reagan believed that arms transfers to friends and
allies strengthened the United States position in the world.
This essay analyzes the success of both arms transfer
policies in the Persian Gulf by comparing the dollar amount
and type of equipment actually transferred against the
formal Congressional Notifications (Arms Export Control Act
section 36b). Further, it examines proposed arms sales and
transfers with respect to strategic access of the Persian
Gulf during each administration.
Next the essay examines how the arms sales policies of
both the Carter and Reagan administrations helped the
coalition military forces and, in particular, the Bush
Administration in the recent Gulf War. Past arms sales to
Middle East and Persian Gulf countries provided an arsenal
of American weaponry for use against Iraq and was critical
to the success of the War.
Now that the Gulf War is over, critics state that
further military sales to some coalition members will lead
to further instability and more conflict in the Persian
Gulf. The Bush Administration does not agree with this
analysis. It sees the many political and economic benefits
of a carefully controlled arms sales program. These
benefits are strategic access without the presence of
American forces, more influence in determining a solution to
Arab and Israeli differences, and denying those countries
hard currency, trade with and exploitation of those Persian
Gulf countries.
ARMS FOR ACCESS: SUCCESS OR FAILURE
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. Using arms sales to gain strategic access
to vital areas of the world is a critical and successful
element of U. S. foreign policy.
I. Rise of Military Arms Sales and Transfers
A. Diminishing threat of nuclear weapons employment
B. Motivation to sell military arms
1. Political
2. Economic
3. Combination of both
C. Strategic Access
1. Changes since World War II
2. Chokepoints added to the geographic sea lines
of communication
II. Carter Administration
A. Arms Sales Policy Objectives
1. Ceiling on all foreign arms sales and related
services
2. Reduce transfer of U. S. weaponry to Third
World countries
3. Removal of incentive to pass down costs to
foreign buyers
4. Embassies forbidden to promote arms sales
5. Establishment of precise sales review process
6 Linking Human Rights issues to arms sales
B. Successes and Failures of the Carter Policy
1. Political
2. Economic
3. Strategic Access
III. Reagan Administration
A. Arms Sales Policy Objectives
1. Enhanced preparedness of friends and allies
through arms sales
2. Allied deployment and military exercises
3. Fostering peaceful resolutions to disputes
4. Enhanced U. S. weapons production
capabilities
B. Successes and Failures of the Reagan Policy
1. Political
2. Economic
3. Strategic Access
IV. Bush Administration
A. Influence of Past Arms Sales Policies
1. Success in the Gulf War against Iraq
2. Strategic Access to Persian Gulf
B. Current Proposed Armed Sales to Coalition
Countries
1. Critics view of current arms sales proposals
2. Benefits of future arms sales to coalition
countries
ARMS FOR ACCESS: SUCCESS OR FAILURE
An analysis of armed confrontations over the past 20
years demonstrates that the threat of nuclear weapons
employment is diminishing as an influence on government
stability and political ideology. Two examples are the
Soviet Union's invasion and later withdrawal from
Afghanistan and American involvement in Vietnam. In both
instances there was an unstated commitment not to use
nuclear weapons, though each had the capability. Both
superpowers committed troops, conventional arms, and
organizational skills in an attempt to sway the outcome.
This is not to downplay the political importance or the
technical credibility that a nation receives when it attains
a nuclear weapon capability. However, neither superpower
was successful in these armed conflicts shows the
diminishing deterrence capability of nuclear weapons.
Countries that recognize this trend have developed
industries to accommodate a strategy of using conventional
arms and technology for influence as well as profit. The
motivations for these industrialized countries to sell arms
can be grouped into a political sphere, an economic sphere
or a combination of both.
Politically, the struggle for dominance between East
and West plays the major role. The two major arms
competitors, the Soviet Union and United States, seek
expansion of their ideology and realize that if they do not
offer arms for sale, other nations will do so. Third World
recipients are most vulnerable if they lack funds or have to
barter with raw materials as payment for weapons. If a
country making a buy has the cash assets, oil-rich Middle
East states for example, it can turn to willing suppliers
that offer weapons without any political strings. Also, the
transfer of arms to friendly or regionally dominant states
can preclude a more direct form of military involvement.
This strategy was designed to influence the recipients'
military elite, thus gaining strategic access for transit
rights, base facilities and staging areas for the military
suppliers.1
Strategic access concepts have changed since the pre-
and post-World War II periods. Initially, the lifelines of
Europe and the West were divided into three major
geographical commercial trade zones. These zones
encompassed waterborne passages to the Middle East, the
Mediterranean Sea and the European coastline to the English
Channel. They were the foundation for NATO's offensive and
defensive strategies for keeping commercial sea lanes open
and provided the basis of a freedom of navigation
philosophy.2 Since 1970, this philosophy has changed
dramatically. Some of the factors that began this change
were instantaneous world-wide communications, the formation
of Organization of the Oil Producing Economic Countries
(OPEC) and the later rise in crude oil prices, Soviet Naval
expansion into a blue-water power and the rise of
nationalism in the Third World. The three original zones
have not decreased in their importance, but a modern theory
of strategic access has added navigational choke points to
the existing sea lines of communication (SLOC). These sea
lines and choke points extend to South America, Africa, the
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap (GIUK) and Australia.
This combined theory has redefined strategic deterrence as
the curtailment of Soviet Union expansion, the spreading of
Communist ideology and the dominance of a regional military
power. Strategic deterrence cannot be achieved without
attaining strategic access.
Economically, for the United States and other Western
nations, the sale of arms means money. Middle Eastern OPEC
members pay cash for goods and ask for nothing in return.
Cash plays an important role in lessening economic deficit
and in equalizing the international balance of trade
payments. Additional economic benefits are many. For
example, the greater the number of weapons made and sold
overseas, the greater the benefit from amortization of the
research, development and production set-up costs. Further,
foreign arms sales provide a market to reduce older weapon
inventories. Since the demand for newer technology drives
suppliers to invest more money and expertise in the
development of modern weapons, a self-perpetuating cycle is
generated. Thus, arms sales provide stable employment in
the short term and keep the military industry operating at a
wartime level in case a long term need should arise.
Finally, the sale of weapons opens the door for an inflow of
raw materials and helps develop civilian non-military
markets for other goods and services.3
Presidents Carter and Reagan each had a personal agenda
for dealing with these motivations. Within the
Congressional confines of the 36b notification process,
these administrations sold and shipped arms to Third World
countries. The following is a comparison of the two
Presidents and their conventional arms sales policies.
On May 19, 1977, President Carter announced a new
American policy regarding arms sales to foreign countries.
His policy was, in effect, a continuation of the
Congressional initiatives of the previous two
administrations. "Henceforth, the use of conventional arms
transfers would be viewed as an exceptional foreign policy
implement, to be used only in instances where it can be
clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our
national security interests."4 The policy established a set
of controls and checks on all foreign arms sales except NATO
members, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. A new political
perspective for controlling arms sales with an overt effort
to cooperate with Congress was a significant departure from
previous administrations.
President Carter's first objective was to provide a
self-imposed ceiling on all foreign sales and related
services. It was intended to reduce the amount of arms
sales agreements in fiscal year (FY) 1978 to a level below
FY 1977. The FY 1977 and FY 1978 figures for arms sales
transfer agreements with Third World recipients, published
by a House Subcommittee, was $9.96 billion and $10.31
billion respectively 5 (These figures exclude Military
Assistance Program [MAP] and MAP Merger funds). A similar
review of figures supplied by the Defense Security
Assistance Agency (DSAA) in Table 1 shows world-wide FY 1978
arms agreements of $6.7 billion and an actual cash arms sale
figure of $4.6 billion. The President reported a decrease
in arms sales between FY 1977 and FY 1978, but the previous
figures do not support that statement. Analysts believe
that any decrease perceived was due to canceled Iranian
contracts.
A comparison of follow-on data from the DSAA report for
fiscal years 1979 and 1980 in Table 1 shows a large increase
in world-wide sales, not a defined ceiling or a reduction.
Table 1
World-Wide Foreign Military Sales Agreements
Fiscal Years 1978 to 1981
($$ rounded nearest Billion)
Totals MAP MAP Merger Cash
Year Sales Funds Funds Sales
1978 6.7 2.1 0 4.6
1979 11.2 5.7 0 5.5
1980 12.6 2.0 0 10.6
1981 6.6 3.0 0 3.6
Data from the Congressional Notifications (36b) in
Table 2 show an increase of proposed sales during the Carte
Administration. Therefore, the objective of establishing a:
arms sales ceiling was never realized.
Table 2
Yearly Totals for Congressional Notifications (36b)
Fiscal Years 1977 to 1981
($$ rounded to nearest Billion)
President Fiscal Year Dollar Amount
Carter 1977 (9 months) .054
Carter 1978 12.006
Carter 1979 5.653
Carter 1980 17.407
Carter 1981 3 months) .245
Total: $ 35.365
Source: Senate Congressional Record 1977 to 1981.
Compiled by author.
The second objective of the Carter policy was to reduce
transfer of sophisticated and costly weaponry to Third World
countries. Yet, sales to some allies were exempted from the
qualitative constraint provision. A controversy developed
surrounding this particular objective because of the special
privileges some Third World countries received in acquiring
modern U.S. military equipment. Several examples illustrate
this. Egypt, before the Camp David Accords, received
42 F-5E jet aircraft and 35 F-4E jet aircraft valued at
$1.19 billion. After the Camp David Accords, Egypt received
40 newer F-16 jet aircraft valued at $961.1 million. Iran
received support agreements for continued support of their
F-14 and the Phoenix missile systems valued at $191.1
million. Jordan received 6 F-5E jet aircraft and an
improved Hawk Air Defense Missile System valued at $65.2
million. Saudi Arabia received 60 F-15 jet aircraft and
military construction valued at more than $5.0 billion.
Considering the strong ties and commitment the United States
has had with NATO and Israel since 1948, many national and
international leaders, as well as the Israeli lobby, were
concerned with supplying Israel's enemies and neighbors with
weapons. Some analysts argue these sales were made for
political (Camp David) and economic (oil concessions)
reasons, thus are to be considered isolated. Yet, the 36b
Notification records show that the Carter administration
proposed almost $40 billion in arms sales. This type of
arms sales commitment does not support an isolated incident
argument.
Objective three was an attempt, at the expense of sales
to Third World countries, to remove the incentive of
lowering costs to DOD. It was intended to make DOD
prioritize what equipment and services it could afford to
buy and what it could maintain under given budget
constraints. This objective was beneficial because it
caused more scrubbing of the military budget and cut excess
fat. An added benefit was that it made DOD take a closer
and more critical look at commercial contracts and
associated costs.
The fourth objective was divided into two parts. Part
one forbade embassies and military representatives from
promoting U.S. arms sales, but was ineffective because it
lacked proper support. Part two required commercial agents
to receive permission from the State Department before
signing a sales contact with any foreign buyer. It
established a more precise and systematic review process for
selling weapons abroad. This review process slowed
proliferation of unauthorized weapons and technology
transfers by creating a chokepoint, thus slowing the export
of illegal arms.
Multilateral restraint initiatives, called the
Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks, were the biggest
disappointment in Carter's arms control policy. He thought
the U.S. still had enough political power, credibility and
world influence to persuade other nations to reduce the flow
of military arms. The disappointing truth was that other
nations, in particular the Soviet Union, needed arms sales
to stimulate their own economies and establish individual
relationships with oil rich Middle East countries for crude
oil, hard currency and other consumer goods. This self-
imposed restraint on American arms sales enabled other
smaller industrialized nations to expand production
capabilities and enter the arms sales competitive market.
Table 3 shows the arms sales vacuum created by Carter's
unilateral restraint approach and the countries that
profited from this political void.
Table 3
Arms Transfers to the Third World, by Supplier
($$ rounded to nearest Billion)
Country 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
France 1.398 2.147 2.406 3.264 2.536
United Kingdom .834 1.641 1.200 .773 .703
West Germany .166 .204 .258 .162 .283
Italy .163 .294 .323 .975 .653
Soviet Union 4.875 7.231 9.035 10.480 9.085
Statistics shown are based upon estimated selling prices.
Source: SIPRI: Exports of major weapons to the Third World
Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85.
The last objective of the arms sales philosophy,
linking arms sales to the Human Rights issues, was perhaps
the most controversial of the Carter Presidency. The Human
Rights issue haunted the administration for the same reason
that the reduction in qualitative weaponry objective failed.
The Carter Administration overlooked human rights violations
if the buying nation was politically aligned with the United
States. Early in Carter's Presidency, Iran and Nicaragua
were the Administration's most vocal supporters. Their
dictatorial form of government and blatant human rights
violations against domestic and political enemies made them
a prime target of international media attention. Human
rights violations did not stop either economic aid or arms
transfers from the United States. President Carter made the
rest of the world aware of human rights issues, but
overlooked these two countries because of their regional
political support. This oversight lessened his credibility
and his policy.
In retrospect, the Carter arms sales policy as an
exceptional implement of foreign policy did not produce any
credible results. His policy raised expectations that were
unrealistic and never fulfilled. President Carter realized
this at the beginning of his last year in office. On April
29, 1980, he forwarded a letter to the Senate rescinding his
ceiling program.6 As a presidential candidate, Carter
stressed the need to restrict the worldwide flow of arms.
He did reach the self-imposed ceiling in 1979 but it was
because of the Shah's fall and Iran's cancellation of many
arms orders. Another significant change in Carter's arms
sales policy was made when U.S. aerospace firms were
permitted to design the "FX" fighter specifically for
foreign countries. This was an exception to the prohibition
of developing weapons for export.
The only real success in President Carter's policy was
the development of guidelines for commercial sales in the
arms market. This institutional framework established a
rigorous review of significant proposed sales before formal
letters of agreement with a foreign country.
From a strategic viewpoint the Carter Administration
made some positive moves toward peace in the Middle East.
The Camp David Accords and the modernization of Saudi
Arabian armed forces in exchange for strategic access are
two examples. In the other areas of strategic access there
were no improvements.
36b Notifications reveal there was a lack of U.S.