The Impending Gap In Naval Aviation AUTHOR LCDR John P. Gilchrist, USN CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation THE IMPENDING GAP IN NAVAL AVIATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On January 7, 1991, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney cancelled the Navy's highest-priority aircraft program, the A-12 Avenger "stealth" bomber. Like the A-6 it was designed to replace, the A-12 was to have the capability to navigate, identify and attack targets in "zero-zero" weather, but in a low- observable "stealth" airframe. It's range, payload, navigation and weapons delivery accuracy would have given the Navy's carrier fleet a formidable all-weather power projection capability well into the next century At the same time he cancelled the program, Secretary Cheney reiterated the need to develop a next generation strike airplane for our aircraft carrier task force to replace the aging A-6E Intruder bomber Designated the "AX" aircraft, at least 12 years will be required for program research and development alone. Initial production, flight testing and transition to full scale production will take another 3-4 years. Assuming everything goes well (a big assumption), we should see the AX aircraft deployed on carrier decks around the year 2008. The Navy is now forced to turn to a modified, upgraded version of existing naval aircraft to fill the gap until that time-either the A-6 Intruder, the F-14 Tomcat or the F/A-18 Hornet, or possibly some combination of these. With both the A-6 and F-14 production lines closed down, new production airframes of those aircraft have been ruled out. Existing airframes of both type can be modified in order to enhance their capability, but modification and/or remanufacture does not zero-time the airframe. And modification alone will not overcome limitations inherent in either airframe. Many of the A- 6's problems are due simply to the fact that the design is 30 years old. While the F-14 does not share all the A-6's problems, it too is relatively old technology, and even after modification it will not have the all-weather capability, range or payload of the current A-6 design. In current Defense Department planning, the F/A-18 is as secure as any weapons system; with production lines still open, the Hornet program will likely continue to grow. The Hornet upgrade, while falling short of current A-6 attack capabilities, initially appears to be a relatively affordable stopgap measure to keep the carrier's decks filled with attack-capable platforms. Like the upgraded F-14, however, the Hornet will not possess the all-weather capability, range or payload of the A-6 aircraft. Regardless of the fact that neither the Hornet nor the Tomcat upgrades will allow them to fly the A-6 mission, the A-6 inventory will continue to decline. By the year 2000, serious inventory shortfalls may occur in the Navy's carrier-based strike capability. As U.S. presence around the world is reduced in the post-Cold War era, naval aviation's role in deterring or quickly winning regional conflicts will become more and more critical. Will the Navy have the offensive punch to execute such a mission? OUTLINE I. Introduction II. A-12 aircraft program A. Design Specifications B. Technical Problems C. Program Cancellation D. Proposed Replacement: The "AX" III. Existing medium attack platform A. A-6E Intruder B. Strengths C. Weaknesses IV. Options available to overcome the forecast gap in medium attack capability A. A-6 upgrade B. F-14 upgrade C. F-18 upgrade V. Recommendation VI. Conclusion Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, on January 7, 1991, cancel led the Navy's highest-priority aircraft program, the A-12 "stealth" bomber. The decision, which surprised military analysts, was announced in a statement that said the builders of the $57 billion A-12 Avenger had defaulted on the program by failing to "design, develop, fabricate, assemble and test the A- 12 aircraf t within the contract schedule."1 The Navy had originally planned to purchase 620 A-12 aircraft to replace the medium attack, all-weather capable A-6 Intruder aircraft which has been the backbone of the Navy's carrier-based power projection capability for the last 25 years. The first A-12's were to have been delivered to the Navy in February 1992, and the plane would have completely replaced the A-6 by the late 1990's. 2 The A-12 Avenger, like the A-6 it was designed to replace, was to have the capability to navigate, identify and attack targets in "zero-zero" weather (i.e., zero visibility, zero horizon). Unlike current Navy aircraft, however, it was to use advanced "low-observable" shapes and materials that would have allowed it to slip into enemy territory with less chance of radar detection than more conventional planes. This "stealth" capability, coupled with its large, internally carried weapons payload, precise all-weather navigation capability and unusually large amount of fuel would have allowed the A-12 to penetrate sophisticated anti-aircraft missile networks and, without refueling, surgically strike targets deep within enemy territory. 3 It was to be one of an entire new generation of aircraft, which includes the B-2, created to counter increasingly sophisticated Soviet air defense systems. The high-tech A-12 was supposed to fill the Navy's need for carrier-based bombers well into the next century. But the contractors had major problems with some of the high-technology aspects of the airplane, particularly its skin, which was to have been made of non-metallic composite material. After repeated delays, the first flight of the plane had been scheduled for November 1991. Meanwhile, the program costs had skyrocketed; the latest estimate was $91 million per aircraft for the 620 aircraft buy. The plane was 19 months behind schedule, 10 percent overweight and neither the contractors nor Navy officials could estimate final program costs and time schedule. Aggravating the situation was the fact that not all problems were of a technical nature- there was evidence of fraud and deception in the program's operations. 4 Unable to determine whether the aircraft could be successfully developed and built at any cost, Defense Secretary Cheney made the decision to cancel the program. While Congress has frequently ordered the Pentagon to reinstate some programs cancelled in the past, such a move is unlikely in the case of the Avenger. Until recently a secret program, the A-12 has had no major constituency support outside the Fort Worth and St. Louis areas. Senior congressional leaders, in ordering major defense budget cuts coinciding with the end of the Cold War, had previously asked the Pentagon to reconsider some of its expensive aircraft programs such as the A- 12. 5 There is little effort underway in Congress to reinstate the program. Secretary Cheney also said, in announcing his decision, "My decision against a bailout [of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation and the General Dynamics Corporation] is solely in response to the problems with the current program," his statement said. "We will still need to develop a next generation strike airplane for our aircraft carrier task force to replace the aging A-6 Intruder."6 With termination of the A-12 program, Congress and the Pentagon must now rethink earlier decisions and fund a modifi- cation/modernization program for a current aircraft design which will suitably bridge the gap until the next generation carrier- based medium attack aircraft (designated the "AX") comes on line. Since January 9th, the Navy has studied several possible alternatives to the cancel led A-12 program, but each of them falls short of desired capabilities. There is nothing currently available in the Navy's inventory or even on the chalkboard that can meet A-12 standards. Indeed, one reason A-12 program development was proceeding in such a slow, costly manner was that much of the technology involved had to be "invented" as the program progressed. At least 12 years will be required for research and development alone for the AX program, according to Rear Admiral Jeremy Taylor, director of naval aviation plans. 7 Initial production, flight testing and the transition to full scale production will take another 3-4 years minimum. Assuming everything goes well, we will see the AX aircraft deployed on carrier decks around the year 2008. What to do until then? The Navy must now turn to a modified, upgraded version of the 29 year-old Intruder, the 19 year-old F-14 Tomcat or the 13 year-old F/A-18 Hornet to maintain, during the next 15 years or so, a viable power projection capability from the decks of its aircraft carriers. While the Navy has ruled out a reopening of the A-6 production line, modification and upgrade of existing A-6 airframes may prove to be the logical choice to find an interim fix until the Navy's newly proposed AX attack aircraft will be ready. Neither the proposed F/A-18E nor the F-14D Quickstrike can perform the all-weather mission, carry the payload or possess the range of the A-6E Intruder. By looking at the options immediately available to the Navy and the Pentagon, it will become obvious that while the decision will not be popular fiscally or politically, the A-6 is the only choice that will allow the Navy to maintain an all-weather, deep- strike, medium attack capability. If the Navy, Pentagon and Congress are willing to accept a degradation in the carrier's all-weather power-projection capability until the AX program is fully deployed, then other options can be considered. Let's begin at the heart of the problem: the 28 year old A-6 Intruder series aircraft. The venerable Intruder first flew in the early 1960's and was a workhorse in Vietnam. It was the only plane in the war that could navigate, identify and attack targets at night and in inclement weather. While numerous avionics and airframe changes have been incorporated into the A-6 since the Vietnam era, it's age, analog avionics suite, airframe limitations, poor R&M (reliability and maintenance) and relatively slow speed make it something less than the ideal weapons platform. Three years ago, the Pentagon decided against buying a modernized version of the A-6 because of these limitations inherent to the existing aircraft. 8 Another stumbling block to building a modernized version was the Grumman Corporation, which builds the plane, said it would take at least three years to gear up its production line and network of suppliers. 9 The decision was made instead to go ahead full speed with the A-12 program. With its cancellation, the Navy must completely reassess the situation. Some of the Intruder's shortcomings can be fixed with money, some can't. It's age, for instance, continues to demand ever higher levels of maintenance man-hours per flight hour. The fact that many of the aircraft in the inventory have reached or are approaching the end of their designed service life has resulted in many aircraft being grounded while others have been restricted from certain flight regimes which would place additional undesired stress on an already fatigued airframe. The current rewing program using composite wings will alleviate these G- restrictions, but inventory will continue to decline as airframes are retired due to reaching other structural fatigue-life limits. The limitations inherent in an analog data base could be fixed with money, but not cheaply. Reliability and maintenance levels would improve, thus Improving aircraft availability. Much of the initial RDT&E (research, development, test and evaluation) has already been done as part of the A-6F and A-6G upgrades proposed several years ago. An upgrade to a digital data base would not only improve R&M and aircraft availability, more importantly it would increase weapons delivery accuracy. 10 This would translate to fewer aircraft/fewer reattacks over the same target, resulting in less aircraft lost, fewer POW's and a lessened requirement for supporting arms (HARM, Shrike, ECM, etc). Current airframe limitations are largely a function of physics and cannot be fixed with money. Weight growth limits have been reached as more and more equipment and weight has been added over the years. Any additional weight will further stress landing gear and fuselage during carrier landings; it limits recoverable payloads; it would also mean that much less fuel aboard for the nugget pilot returning for a night trap on a pitching deck. This growth-weight limit doesn't just limit an increase in numbers of boxes, it actually limits upgrading of existing boxes. 11 Though a new, faster and more powerful computer may fit in the same space as the old computer, it is heavier because of its higher density. Radar cross-section is another limitation of the current airframe, a problem shared with all existing navy aircraft. It has been estimated that the A-12 was designed so it wouldn't be spotted by radar until it was just 10 miles away, and possibly even closer. By comparison, the A-6, F-14 and F/A-18 can be detected at a distance of 50 miles. 12 Poor R&M has many deleterious consequences, and short of a huge inflow of cash and engineering effort, is not something that can be totally remedied. While current A-6 reliability exceeds CNO requirements, it still falls far short of more modern aircraft like the F/A-18. Slow speed will likewise be difficult to fix by simply throwing money at the problem. However, the vulnerability inherent in medium sub-sonic speeds can be offset, by improved ECM and RHAW gear, more effective expendables (chaff, flares, decoys), and stand-off weapons. Current OP-501 and Naval Air Systems Command programs and proposals to upgrade/modernize the A-6 will minimize some of the limitations discussed above as well as enhance existing capabilities. Many of these improvements will be realized with the upgrade of current A-6E's to SWIP (System Weapons Improvement Program) Block 1 and eventually to the proposed SWIP Block 1A. R&M improvements include new CSD/S units (constant speed drive/starter units: provide engine start capabilities as well as drive the generators for electrical power); original CSD/S units are a maintenance nightmare in the A-6 community as well as a prime detractor in weapons system accuracy due to frequent, sudden and unanticipated power fluctuations/failures which degrade navigation and weapons delivery system accuracy. Old, brittle wiring suffering from corrosion and with thousands of splices from many years of operation is also a major contributor to poor R&M figures. ECP's (engineering change proposals) have been funded to begin correcting this problem. Survivability/vulnerability shortcomings are being minimized with the SWIP upgrade. This package provides a more formidable array of standoff weapons (to include HARM, Maverick, Walleye, SLAM and Harpoon 1C) as well as enhanced RHAW gear, expanded ECM capability and more effective expendables as well as a towed decoy. Navigation and weapons delivery accuracy would improve with the integration of an expanded digital avionics suite and a ring laser gyro inertial navigation system coupled with GPS {global positioning system} navigation capability. These improvements will also increase survivability and decrease vulnerability by allowing for passive navigation and ingress. SWIP Block 1A also increases by 25% the carrier recoverable payload weight, enhancing weapons recovery and increasing the amount of recovery fuel and the consequent safety margin. 13 The upgrades discussed above in no way make the A-6 an A-12. They will increase current A-6 R&M, aircraft availability, survivability and weapons delivery accuracy. Another potential carrier-based attack platform to help bridge the gap over the next 16 or so years as increasing numbers of A-6's are retired is the F/A-14 "Quickstrike" option. The F-14 was originally designed to carry air-to-ground weapons and serve as a strike fighter. But budget constraints and the Navy's push for the F/A-18 in the early to mid-1970's relegated the Tomcat to the air superiority role. 14 As the number of carriers has been reduced and operating costs have risen, more stress has been placed on the importance of dual-role platforms vice single-role platforms taking up precious deck space. At the same time, the inability of F-14 aircrews to lead strike missions because of the aircraft's mission limitations has led F-14 proponents to push for the expansion of the Tomcat's role in carrier aviation. The "Quickstrike" version is not without merit. The F-14D provides full growth capability for "smart" as well as "dumb" bombs, and the F-14D "Quickstrike" would incorporate (in an already Impressive air superiority fighter) not only this ground attack capability but air-to-surface missiles as well as ground radar modes, navflir and targetflir, and increased survivability by incorporating the same improved ECM/RHAW gear as the A-6E SWIP Block 1 package. The F-14D will have an expanded digital avionics suite as well as new wiring for increased R&M and aircraft availability. Some structural modifications are also made. Increased survivability will be achieved through an onboard inert gas generating system, self-sealing fuel tanks and foam in critical dry bay areas. It would enjoy commonality with the F/A-18C in computers, displays, software and weapons, making the Navy's sea-going logistics system easier to manage. 15 While the F-14D "Quickstrike" modification could be incorporated into remanufactured F-14A airframes, that is not the desired means. A major concern with remanufacturing existing airframes (A-6 and F-14 alike) is the amount of service life left in the airframe. The remanufacturing process does not zero-time the airframe (F-14 aircraft currently have a service life of 6,000 hours). 16 Consequently the logical means to produce the Quickstrike is via new production. The F-14 production line, however, is no longer operating, and Grumman would experience many of the same start-up difficulties as it would with the A-6 line. The fact that for two years now Secretary of Defense Cheney has been trying to kill the F-14 program 17 will certainly be an impediment to this program getting off the ground. The F-14D Quickstrike would be comparable to the F-15E Strike Eagle. What it will not be is an all-weather attack platform-it will not be able to navigate, identify and attack targets in zero/zero weather, nor will it have an all-weather terrain masking capability for increased survivability like the A-6E. Neither will it enjoy the weapons payload available to the A-6E. Nor will it possess a laser designator for on-board guidance of precision-guided munitions; this is a serious flaw to the potential effectiveness of the F-14D Quickstrike in the ground attack role. Desert Storm showed us that even in the age of increased navigation and weapons systems accuracy, 70% of unguided bombs still miss their targets;18 and while precision- guided munitions were far from perfect, one or two well-guided bombs were usually more effective than huge strings of unguided bombs. Another major flaw that the F-14 series shares with the A-6 series is relatively poor reliability and high maintenance man- hours required per flight hour. The F-14D upgrade will minimize some of these problems, and while the F-14 may not have problems to the extent the A-6 does, neither can compare in any way with the high R&M enjoyed by the F/A-18. Indeed, the R&M numbers enjoyed by the F/A-18 were used as the minimum standard for the high-tech, super-sophisticated and very expensive A-12. 19 The F/A-18E/F is the other option available to help fill carrier decks until the AX aircraft is deployed. The Hornet upgrade is not a response to the projected shortfall in medium attack inventory. It grew out of a SECDEF directed study to explore advanced versions of the Hornet for operations in the late 1990's and beyond. Without a structural upgrade program, the F/A-18C/D will reach its weight growth limit in FY 94 and will be unable to support continued modernization. F/A-18A/B airframe retirement will increase rapidly starting in FY-98, exacerbating the problem of A-6 and F-14 retirement which will be occurring at the same time. In current Defense Department planning, the F/A-18 is as secure as any weapons system and will most likely continue to grow. The Hornet upgrade to the E/F configuration, at least to its proponents, is a relatively affordable option to continue the modernization of carrier air wings. The E/F upgrade is primarily a structural upgrade program. It increases internal fuel capacity by 28%/3,000 lbs (improving mission radius/time-on-station perhaps 25%), increases CV recovery payload (and payload flexibility), increases engine thrust, enhances survivability (by reducing vulnerable area) and, not incidentally, will allow carriage of an Airborne Refueling Store. This "buddy store" capability, combined with the 480 gallon external fuel tank capability on three stations, will allow the Hornet to contribute to the air wing's organic tanking requirements. Maximum catapult gross weight would be greater than the Intruder's. This "stretched" Hornet will also provide additional weight growth capability as well as additional onboard space for new hardware, allowing for further modernization. It will have an onboard laser designator for the accurate guidance of precision weapons. It will still not possess the legs to give it a deep strike/interdiction capability, nor the payload to fulfill the medium attack mission. While it will have formidable night VFR navigation/attack capability, it will not be an all-weather platform. With American presence around the world being reduced, the ability of the United States to project sea-based air power onto hostile shores will become more and more important. Unfortunately, Naval aviation's capabilities are becoming limited at a time when their importance is increasing. We will not always have six months to prepare for an air war as we did in Desert Storm-there are many military contingencies where the only air power we will have available is what is sitting offshore on the carrier decks. The Congress, the Department of Defense and the Navy need to act quickly, decisively and intelligently if that power is to be a credible one. The continued absence of a coherent aviation strategy is hobbling the Navy's ability to effectively plan for the future. Following the termination of a number of high-priority aircraft programs over the past year and the reality of declining defense budgets, the Navy is struggling to draft a new long-range modernization plan. According to Rear Admiral Jeremy Taylor, director of naval aviation plans and requirements," with the newest budget, 46% of the reductions in the 14 major programs (that have been cancelled) comes out of naval aviation." 20 Navy funding devoted to aviation will decline to just $4 billion in the FY92 budget, a decrease of 60% from the FY91 budget. 21 Part of naval aviation's current difficulties can be attributed to poor planning in having so many different aircraft programs competing for funding in an austere budget environment. The shutdown of the A-6 and F-14 production lines and the cancellation of the A-12 program have only exacerbated current funding predicaments. Even if we see the successful production of the F/A-18E and the AX aircraft, these programs will not begin production until after the year 2000. As a result, when combined with the need to still procure dedicated replacements for the F- 14, EA-6B Prowler and E-2C Hawkeye aircraft, these programs will all be competing for funding again in the late 1990's. 22 If future defense budgets continue to decline as forecast, naval aviation will continue to face profound funding dilemmas. Politics, parochialism, and budget considerations aside, there is only one realistic option, only one platform, that will be able to perform deep strike interdiction, regardless of weather, and carry a weapons payload over twice that of the B-17 Flying Fortress and, with its laser designator, guide those weapons with deadly accuracy: the A-6 Intruder. Whatever the capabilities/limitations of the F-14D Quickstrike or the F/A- 18E/F, neither is designed to perform the all-weather medium attack mission. Unfortunately, as the 1990's draw to a close there will be fewer and fewer modernized, upgraded and unrestricted A-6's to perform that all-weather medium attack mission, either. The Navy, Pentagon and Congress, over the past fifteen years, have been remarkably lacking in management foresight and funding support towards naval aviation in general and the medium attack mission particularly, and the time has come to pay the piper. There is very little potential for even ten carrier decks to be adequately manned with unrestricted, SWIP Block 1A modified A-6's at the turn of the century, and the Navy simply has nothing else that can carry out that mission. For the next fifteen years, or however long it takes the Ax aircraft to be deployed in meaningful numbers, there may occur a real limit to the carrier's all-weather, deep-strike power projection capability. NOTES 1. Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Scraps $57 Billion Order For Attack Plane." New York Times, January 8, 1991. 2. Interview with Capt. D. B. McKinney, A-6 Program Manager (PMA 234), COMNAVAIRSYSCOM, March 7, 1991. 3. JOC Jim Richeson, "Coming Soon To A Carrier Near You." Naval Aviation News, November-December 1990. 4. John Isaacs, "Death To The Avenger." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1991. 5. Molly Moore, "Stealth Jet For Navy Is Cancelled." The Washington Post, January 8, 1991. 6. "Back To Square One." Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 21, 1991, p.17. 7. "AX R&D May Last 12 Years." Defense News, February 18, 1991. 8. Thomas G. Donlan, "Victory Bandwagon: Will The Defense Industry Get A War Dividend?" Barron's, March 18, 1991, p.10. 9. Molly Moore, op. cit. 10. Capt. D. B. McKinney, op. cit. 11. Capt. D. B. McKinney, ibid. 12. Everett Pyatt, "Failure Of A-12 Threatens Carrier Force Size." Defense News, March 4, 1991. 13. Unless otherwise noted, all information regarding the A-6 SWIP modernization program was provided by Mr. Andy Workala, A-6 Program desk, COMNAVAIRSYSCOM in a March 7, 1991 interview with author. 14. D.M. North, "New Engines, Sensors, Avionics Give F-14D Broader Combat Role." Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 17, 1991. 15. Unless otherwise noted, all information regarding the F-14D and F-14 Quickstrike were provided by Mr. Dan Alexander, Assistant F-14 Program Manager,COMNAVAIRSYSCOM, in a March 7, 1991 interview with author. 16. Stanley W. Kandebo, "F-14D Flight Evaluation." Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 17, 1991. 17. James Bernstein, "F-14 A Long Shot As A-12 Stand-in." Long Island Newsday, January 9, 1991. 18. Air Force Chief of Staff General Merril A. McPeak as quoted by Barton Gellman, "U.S. Bombs Missed 70% Of Time. "The Washington Post, March 14, 1991. 19. Unless otherwise noted, all information concerning the F/A-18 program was provided by Ms. Pam O'Dell, F/A-18 Program desk, COMNAVAIRSYSCOM. 20. Robert Holzer, "Navy Struggles To Find Funding For Ailing Aviation." Defense News, March 21, 1991. 21. Robert Holzer, Ibid. 22. Thomas G. Donlan, op. cit., p. 10. Bibliograpy 1. Alexander, Dan, Assistant F-14 Program Manager. Personal interview about F-14D Quickstrike. Crystal City, Virginia. March 7, 1991. 2. "AX R&D May Last 12 Years." Defense News, February 18, 1991. 3. "Back To Square One." Aviation Week and Space Technology. January 21, 1991. 4. Bernstein, James, "F-14 A Long Shot As A-12 Stand-in." Long Island Newsday, January 9, 1991. 5. Donlan, Thomas. "Victory Bandwagon: Will The Defense Industry Get A War Dividend?" Barron's, March 18, 1991. 6. Gellman, Barton. "U.S. Bombs Missed 70% Of Time." The Washington Post, March 14, 1991. 7. Holzer, Robert. "Navy Struggles To Find Funding For Ailing Aviation." Defense News, March 21, 1991. 8. Isaacs, John. "Death To The Avenger." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1991. 9. Kandebo, Stanley. "F-14D Flight Evaluation." Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 17, 1991. 10. McKinney, D. B., A-6 Program Manager. Personal interview about A-6E upgrade program. Crystal City, Virginia. March 7, 1991. 11. Moore, Molly. "Stealth Jet For Navy Is Cancelled." The Washington Post, January 8, 1991. 12. North, D. M., "New Engines, Sensors, Avionics Give F-14D Broader Combat Role." Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 17, 1990. 13. O'Dell, Pam, Assistant F/A-18 Program Manager. Personal interview about F/A-18 program. Crystal City, Virginia. March 7, 1991. 14. Pyatt, Everett. "Failure Of A-12 Threatens Future Carrier Force Size." Defense News, March 4, 1991. 15. Richeson, Jim. "Coming Soon To A Carrier Near You." Naval Aviation News, November-December 1990. 16. Schmitt, Eric. "Pentagon Scraps $57 Billion Order For Attack Plane." The New York Times, January 8, 1991. 17. Workala, Andy, Assistant A-6 Program Manager. Personal interview about future A-6E upgrades. Crystal City, Virginia. March 7, 1991.
