Will The Marine Corps Get The V-22? AUTHOR Major John T. Enoch, Jr., USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: WILL THE MARINE CORPS GET THE V-22? I. Theme: To state the factors that will determine whether the Marine Corps will receive the V-22 and explain how those factors are in favor of the Osprey's acquisition. II. Thesis: The probability of the Marine Corps acquiring the V-22 is favorable but not certain; several factors will determine the aircraft's fate. III. Discussion: The V-22 Osprey was the Marine Corps' priority aviation acquisition item to execute its future strategy of Over-The-Horizon amphibious assaults. Secretary of Defense Cheney attempted to cancel the V-22 program in 1989 but it has survived. Factors that will influence the Marine Corps' acquisition of the V-22 are: congressional support versus OSD opposition; the Marine Corps' position; sister service and unified/specified command requirements; V-22 test results; and lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm. Congress and OSD have waged their battles armed with the defense budgets and the expenditures of appropriated funds as their primary weapons. The Marine Corps will not directly oppose Secretary Cheney's position on the V-22. The Corps has, however, laid the onus of finding a CH-46 replacement on OSD, with the stipulation that the alternative aircraft has all the capabilities of the Osprey. Meanwhile, the Marines will continue to allow their junior Marines to state their opinion and focus Congress' attention on the need for a medium lift replacement. Only one of the sister services, the Air Force, can be expected to show any support for the Osprey. The-regional CINCs and special operations forces will give an additional impetus to the V-22 program. The Osprey's test results will be the bottom line in acquiring the aircraft. Any failures will kill the program. The lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm are: the value of technology, the importance of an amphibious assault threat, special operations potential of the V-22, and military success equates to increased political clout. All presently point to the necessity and probability of the Marine Corps acquiring the V-22. IV. Summary: Osprey proponents have a right to be optimistic; the deciding factors of its fate are in favor of the aircraft. V. Conclusion: The Marines may not see the V-22 in the fleet in the near future, but the odds are it will be there. WILL THE MARINE CORPS GET THE V-22? Thesis: The probability of the Marine Corps acquiring the V-22 is favorable but not certain; several factors will determine the aircraft's fate. I. Congressional support versus OSD opposition A. Reasons for congressional support B. Reasons for Secretary Cheney's opposition C. Congressional and OSD political maneuvering D. Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis II. The Marine Corps' position A. No direct confrontation with OSD B. Lay the onus on OSD C. Medium lift replacement III. Sister service and unified/specified command requirements A. Army B. Air Force C. Navy D. Unified/specified commands IV. V-22 test results A. Importance of success B. Successful results V. Lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm A. The value of technology B. Importance of an amphibious assault threat C. Special operations potential of the V-22 D. Military success equates to increased political clout WILL THE MARINE CORPS GET THE V-22? The late 1980s were good years for the Marine Corps. The memory of Vietnam was fading. The enlightened administrations of two Republican presidents had brought about a renewed pride in America and its armed forces. The Marines basked in the center of that pride. The Corps' personnel and equipment were of the highest quality in its history. Marine Corps leaders, under General Gray's tutelage, felt once again involved and prophetic in determining the future of their Corps. Their strategy of Over-The-Horizon amphibious assaults was every bit as farseeing as Major Earl Ellis's pre-World War II strategy of offensive advanced base operations had been. A key element to the Corps' future strategy was the acquisition of the V-22 Osprey, General Gray's number one aviation priority.(6:20) On 25 April 1989, however, newly appointed Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney struck a blow against that strategy while testifying before Congress: I think it's [V-22] probably a good aircraft, but I could not justify spending the amount of money that was proposed to be spent when we were just getting ready to move into procurement on the V-22 to perform a very narrow mission that I think can be performed in another fashion, specifically by using helicopters instead of the V-22. . .this was a capability that if we had to give someplace, this was one we could do without.(2:8-9) Many thought Secretary Cheney's statement was the death knell for the Osprey. Yet almost two years after the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) attempted to terminate the V-22, the program still survives. The probability of the Marine Corps acquiring the V-22 is favorable but not certain: several factors will determine the aircraft's fate. Those factors are listed in Figure 1. Click here to view image CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT VERSUS OSD OPPOSITION Congressional and OSD actions since April 25, 1989, have provided indications of how the battle for the V-22 will be fought and the probable outcome. Congressional response to Secretary Cheney's testimony was quick to follow. Congress's interest in the Osprey had been high since its inception with the Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft Program in 1981.(5:42) Years of courting by the military and industry plus numerous favorable studies of the V-22 had convinced Congressmen of the military necessity for the Osprey. Parochialism also played a part in congressional support. The components for the V-22 were to be manufactured in 44 states and a cancellation of the program would result in a loss of jobs. Full scale production of the V-22 with its commmercial versions and the development of vertiports, on the other hand, would create the potential for more jobs and more votes. OSD opposition to the Osprey was led by Doctor David Chu, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. It was Dr. Chu who convinced Secretary Cheney, within some thirty days after he had assumed office, to cancel the V-22. OSD proposed a number of CH-53Es and H-60s as a cheaper alternative to the Osprey. When studies proved this mixture of helicopters would cost more than the V-22, Dr. Chu quickly reduced the proposed quantity of helicopters saying they could perform the same mission at a cheaper cost. OSD criticized reports that favored the V-22 and began stonewalling Congress' requests for information. One Under Secretary of Defense memo dated 14 June 1989 stated that any information on the Osprey going external to the Department would go through the OSD for Legislative Affairs. The V-22 was the only program treated in this manner and information channeled to Congress was sparce.(17:6) Congress, against the wishes of OSD, provided for Fiscal Year (FY) 1990 Osprey research and development funding but no production funds. Congress further indicated that remaining 1989 production funds were to be used for further flight testing. Secretary Cheney was also directed to provide an independent Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) on the V-22 and alternative aircraft.(17:6-7) President Bush signed the FY 1990 Defense Appropriations Bill in November 1989 making Congress' demands legal. Both OSD and Congress awaited the results of the COEA to buttress their stands. On December 1, 1989, one day after Congress recessed and without its prior knowledge, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood signed a memorandum ordering an immediate termination of V-22 contracts funded by FY 1989 procurement funds. Some members of Congress were angry over what they considered an attempt by OSD to subvert the Congress.(14:180) OSD countered that since Congress had not impounded or reprogrammed FY 1989 procurement funds, its action was legally correct.(3:5) The administration later reversed OSD's action but the harm had been done. Ironically, many cancelled V-22 contracts had to be renegotiated which further increased the aircraft's cost. The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) was selected to conduct the COEA. The IDA is a federally funded research and development center which carries out studies and analyses for OSD, the Joint Staff, unified commanders, and defense agencies. The IDA project leader chosen for the COEA was a Dr. L. Simmons who was known as having ". . .been previously and openly skeptical of the Osprey."(17:7) A steering committee was provided to the COEA by the Department of Defense. It met with the COEA team five times and: ... included representatives from a number of OSD staff elements, in particular those responsible for program analysis and evaluation [Dr. Chu's branch], for overseeing the development and acquisition of tactical combat systems, for tests and evaluation, and for estimating the costs of future military systems. ... provided us [COEA team] with additional sources of information, occasionally suggested alternative approaches from the ones we had proposed and identified a wide range of sensitivies to be examined.(19:8) OSD clearly had input into the COEA while it was taking place. Both Dr. Chu and Dr. Simmons agreed, however, that the steering committee's guidance was only advisory and that the IDA study team's conclusions were its own.(19:71) The COEA's preliminary results were completed and briefed in April 1990 to OSD, but they were not briefed to Congress until July 19, 1990.(19:5) Some members of the Senate chaffed at the delay in receiving the COEA's findings. Senator Arlen Specter said: ... I would suggest that there is a very important subsidiary question in terms of. . .the good faith of the Department of Defense in terms of opening this process to the Congress. Last year, both houses of the Congress mandated an independent study: a study to determine the facts. As the process has gone forward, there have been reports of a preliminary conclusion not made available to the Congress. There were meetings on April 16 with no congressional participation. There was strong insistence in the Congress on getting access to the report which was finally made available under strong pressure by this Senator, talking to Dr Chu and finally to the Secretary of Defense, on Friday when we left for the Fourth of July recess, which has the unmistakable imprint of trying to delay it as long as possible until 535 Members of Congress have left town. (19:2) Dr. Simmons testified that the COEA had examined the V-22 and seven alternative aircraft: CH-53E, CH-46E, CH-60(S), Boeing Model 360, EH-101, CH-47M, and the Super Puma. Two different twenty-year life-cycle cost fundings for all V-22 and alternative fleets were also studied under various scenarios, The results: ... clearly concluded that the V-22 is more cost effective, more survivable, and, in the IDA proposed lower rate production scenario, the lower cost (in both the near and long terms) for medium-lift VTOL missions over the OSD alternative.(20:8-5) Dr. Chu, representing OSD, challenged the study before the senate subcouittee stating that some of the COEA's basic assumptions were incorrect. Dr. Chu went on to say that the cost of the alternate helicopter fleet was too much and disputed the findings that the Osprey fleets could outperform larger alternative helicopter fleets. Senate subcommittee members were skeptical of Dr. Chu's challenges, particularly since the COEA's steering committee included OSD membership and had met with the IDA study team five times. Senator Inouye said: To the best of my recollection, this is the first time that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has come out with full force to attack the assump- tions, the creditability, the results, and the recommendations of the IDA. (19:57) Despite the COEA's findings, neither Congress nor OSD would change their stands on the Osprey. The findings of the COEA, though, did force OSD to confine its arguments more to the V-22's costs. As one author aptly phrased it, "During last summer's long, hot debate, DoD apparently became convinced that it could not argue on purely technical grounds."(8:30) The Defense Department's FY 1991 budget proposal contained no monies for the Osprey. Congress countered DOD's desires by funding research and development and long-lead procurement for the V-22 in the FY 1991 budget to the tune of $238 million and $365 million respectively. OSD to date, however, has released no procurement funds and piecemealed out research and development funds grudgingly.(13) OSD's strategy appears to be to withold funds as long as possible, thereby increasing the difficulties of managing the V-22 program and increasing its costs to a prohibitive levels Representative Weldon described OSD's actions as, "...a behind-the-door action to curtail this program. "(9:8) Both houses of the Congress, in March 1991, attempted to counter OSD's strategy by proposing legislation requiring DOD to release FY 1991 funds for the Osprey within thirty days.(9:8) DOD's proposed FY 1992 budget once again has no funds slated for the V-22. Secretary Cheney certainly had the Osprey program in mind when he stated in hid 1991 Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress: But while many modernization technologies are possible, only a select number can be brought to fruition because of fiscal constraints.(18:64) Both Congress and OSD can be expected to gather all their forces to battle over the V-22 in the FY 1992 budget. Politics will once again be their weapons. Which side is favored? Congress seems to hold the stronger hand and presents a united front. "There are no anti-V-22 coalitions in Congress...", said one Representative.(9:8) The words of a prophetic Marine Lieutenant Colonel also come to mind, "After everything is weighed, it appears the Osprey will succeed due to enormous legislative support."(17:12) THE MARINE CORPS' POSITION Secretary Cheney's cancellation of the V-22 presented the Marine Corps with a genuine dilemma. How could the Marines acquire the aircraft they needed to conduct their future strategy without opposing the Secretary of Defense? Some difficult decisions had to be made. Those decisions soon became apparent in the rhetoric of Marine Corps leaders. In early 1989, the Commandant had stated: "The MV-22 program is the most important advance in military aviation since the helicopter. It is my number one aviation priority. "(6:20) One year after Secretary Cheney's testimony, General Gray stated: "No Marine Corps requirement is more pressing than the need to identify a solution for the replacement of our medium lift assault capability, "(7:65) Other statements by Marine Corps leaders made it evident they would not directly oppose Secretary Cheney, but they would demand an aircraft with the capabilities that could be found only in the V-22. General Pitman said: This program [medium lift assault] is our number one priority... .There is a common perception, in some circles, that inexpensive rotorcraft are avail- able today and that these aircraft can fulfill the the requirement for military applications. While this perception may have been true in the past, it is no longer the case.. The next generation of medium assault rotorcraft must be capable of operating in the same environment as our fixed- wing aircraft, especially at night and in adverse weather. (12:54) Junior officers, in contrast to their leaders, were allowed to state their opinions about the Osprey. The Corps wisely decided to lay the onus on OSD to find an alternative aircraft with the V-22's capabilities, knowing full well it was an impossible task. The COEA later proved the Corps' decision to be a wise one. Worried that a replacement for the CH-46E might not come about with all the political maneuvering, the Department of the Navy (DON) and DOD set aside funds in FY 1991 and proposed funds for FY 1992 for a Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) aircraft. The Marine Corps did not consider this event as another threat to the V-22. One knowledgeable Marine said "...that an improved helicopter could not approach the V-22 Osprey's capabilities and that the MLR was too poorly funded to succeed."(4) More than one Marine has expressed the hope that the MLR funds could be rolled into the V-22 program. The Corps can be expected to continue to beat the drum for OSD to choose a suitable medium lift aircraft with the Osprey's capabilities. Although the Commandant and his senior officers will not speak out against Secretary Cheney, junior officers will be allowed to freely express their opinions. Using this strategy, the Marines can still maneuver for the aircraft they really want. The Marines are no ingenues in this game-the AV-8 Harrier is flying for the Marines after it was cancelled eight times! SISTER SERVICE AND UNIFIED/SPECIFIED COMMAND REQUIREMENTS The desires of the Marine Corps' sister services and the unified commands will also be a factor in acquiring the V-22. Their opinions carry a great deal of weight with Congress. The unified commands will be helpful in getting the Osprey, but the sister services can be expected to be of little assistance. The Army was originally the executive service for the V-22, but later passed its leadership role to the Navy and withdrew from the program. Although the Army continues to watch the Osprey program closely, it will not come out in-support of the aircraft. The Army's highest aviation priority is its Light Helicopter program which it will not risk losing by supporting the V-22. The Air Force can be expected to show limited support for the Osprey. It would like to possess the capabilities inherent in the long-range special operations variant of the V-22 which the Air Force was scheduled to receive. The Air Force's support will not be very robust since it has higher aviation priorities than the V-22 and a limited budget. The Navy is the executive service for the Osprey. The Navy, however, will not come out in support of the V-22. The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Garrett, will not oppose the desires of the Secretary of Defense. When asked by Congressman Curt Weldon why he had not requested long-lead funding for the V-22, Secretary Garrett replied: "I conduct my business subject to [Cheney]. . "(1:320) The Navy is also the major spokesman within DON tasked with representing the interests of both Marine and Navy aviation. The Navy is required to assemble, prioritize, and submit aviation funding requests for both the Navy and the Marine Corps. The V-22, however, was not even on the Navy's top ten list. DON's greatest concern for the future will continue to be starting and funding another aircraft program to replace its cancelled A-12. The Navy is also hesitant to support production of the V-22 for the Marine Corps because the buy would consume about 47% of DON's Total Obligation Authority (aviation funds). The Marine Corps normally only receives 25% to 33% of these funds and the Navy will naturally oppose the release of any greater amount. (16) The unified/specified commands will generally be helpful in acquiring the Osprey. The Commander In Chiefs (CINCs) of the unified commands have favored the program for years. The capabilities the V-22 could give to forces in their theaters would be very advantageous. The U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Transportation Command are the only specified commands that have no requirement for the services of the Osprey; therefore, they have little interest in the aircraft. The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), however, would very much like to have an aircraft like the Osprey. General Stiner, the CINC for SOCOM, expressed such an opinion in a question and answer interview with Defense News: Q. SOCOM's list of top priorities for weapon systems includes long-range aircraft for covert operations and reliable yet advanced communication systems. Termination of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft forces SOCOM to rely on two modified medium-range helicopters to drop or take out commandos. Will the MH-47E and MH-60K helicopters meet the needs of special operations forces in the 1990s? A. We will have sufficient lift capability to satisfy our midrange infiltration requirements. But we still have a requirement for a long-range infiltration platform that can go out a distance to exceed 1,000 miles in one night, insert teams or pick up teams, and return the same night. It has to be able to land on roadways or on approved strips. So you're looking at some kind of technology similar to the V-22. That is a requirement. Q. Is SOCOM evaluating the V-22 specifically? A. We're looking at all options, and we are looking at all types of technology. We can get them (commandos] in right now with the Combat Talon [aircraft], but getting them out is the challenge. (10:22) Congress is well aware of SOCOM's desires. The generous funding and high regard Congress has given to the special forces units should be expected to continue. The result would be an additional impetus to the V-22 program. One thing, however, must be kept in mind when talking about the stated opinions of the service chiefs and unified/specified commanders. None can be expected to openly oppose Secretary Cheney's stand on the V-22. Such an action would be considered unprofessional and possibly detrimental to their services or commands when all are in keen competition for a tight defense budget. But, when the overall tally is taken, the influence of the sister services and unified/specified commands should favor the V-22. V-22 TEST RESULTS Perhaps the strongest factor in determining the fate of the V-22 will be the results of its flight tests. Any show stopper could kill the program. On the other hand, the achievement or surpassing of the original Joint Service Operational Requirements [operational requirements] on the aircraft would be one of the strongest arguments for the aircraft. Clearly, the V-22 must test successfully to be approved. Congressional proponents of the Osprey are of the same opinion: While the conferees [congressmen] continue to support the V-22, their support is not unqualified. The V-22 will have to prove successful in operational testing before the conferees make any final decisions on procurement. (11:1) The manufacturers of the Osprey are aware of the need for the V-22 to show positive test results. Its flight testing program was accelerated soon after Secretary Cheney first attempted to terminate the program. Major testing milestones have been successfully achieved since then: flight in the helicopter and fixed wing modes, initial shipboard compatibility and initial external load testing. The four aircraft flight tested so far have exceeded many expectations. The V-22 had achieved as of 19 February 1991: forward flight up to 349 knots, an altitude of 21,500 feet, angle of bank of 60 degrees, 50 knot taxi speeds, and load factors of 0.5 to 2.3 G's.(15:1) DOD's General Accounting Office (GAO) has frequently leveled criticism at the program citing discrepancies and describing the program as "behind schedule." The "discrepancies," however, have been rectified or can be corrected when the production models are manufactured. The delays that had occurred were "...a direct result of actions taken by DOD. "(11:1) Despite DOD's criticisms, there have been no show stoppers and the aircraft remains its own best advertisement. LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION DESERT STORM The lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm will support acquisition of the V-22. The most apparent of these lessons was the value of modern technology in the hands of well trained troops. Helicopter technology is limited. It has journeyed almost as far as science can take it. The Osprey's technology, however, has ample room to grow and is a generation ahead of any helicopters proposed as V-22 alternatives. Critics of the V-22 will argue that the Marines have failed to conduct a large scale amphibious assault against an armed foe since the Korean War, which they will contend proves the Marines don't have a requirement for the aircraft. Their argument, however, ignores certain facts. The fear of an American amphibious assault caused several Iraqi divisions to focus their defensive efforts solely on the Kuwaiti shoreline. Secondly, although a large scale amphibious assault has not occurred in about forty years, this does not mean one will not take place in the future. The military drawdown may also result in the Navy and Marines with their amphibious shipping to be the only armed services that can quickly be brought to bear on an enemy. Lastly, the argument ignores the fact that the V-22 can be used in many other missions. Dr. Chu himself acknowledged that there were 26 missions the V-22 could fulfill in addition to the six for which it was developed.(19:88) Special operation forces (SOF) and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) operations for coalition pilots were largely successful during the conflict. Although obscured in secrecy, the scant information revealed about their operations captivated America's attention. The V-22 variants were purposely designed for these missions and could perform them better than any helicopter. Osprey proponents will certainly argue that the V-22 could have reached downed pilots much faster, thereby increasing the number of successful rescues. Osprey proponents will also argue that SOF would have made very effective use of the V-22 in the manner General Stiner alluded to in his interview. The success of Operation Desert Storm will go a long way in increasing the military's clout in acquiring the equipment it desires. Secretary Cheney's clout, however, has also increased commensurately. One Marine commented, "No one wants to fight the Secretary of Defense because he's just won the world's biggest war."(13) Secretary Cheney's popularity will not last long though. Congressmen are already growing increasingly disgruntled over his reluctance to release appropriated V-22 funds. In March, the House attached a rider to the Dire Emergency Supplemental Funding Bill which requires DOD to release the appropriated V-22 funds. The Senate has an amendment before it which also requires DOD to release those same funds!(9:8) SUMMARY When all the factors are weighed, the battle for the V-22, though far from over, is leaning in favor of the Osprey. The opposing forces of Congress and the Department of Defense are strong factors in determining whether the Marine Corps will receive the Osprey. Congress should carry the day if it remains steadfast in its resolve. It has done so on numerous occasions. The Marine Corps' leadership cannot actively oppose Secretary Cheney. It has, however, wisely laid the problem of finding an aircraft that fulfills Marine requirements on the lap of OSD. Those requirements cannot be met by any other aircraft than the V-22. The Marines have also allowed their junior personnel to speak their minds to the members of industry, the media, and Congress about the type of aircraft they need. This strategy allows the Corps to continue to bang the drum for a replacement for the CH-46 while Congress listens. The Marine Corps' experience in reversing terminated aircraft programs and their strong desire for the V-22 are promising combat multipliers in the battle for the Osprey. How the sister services and the unified/specified commands will affect the V-22 program as a whole is harder to discern. The services rank as one neutral (Army), two pro (Marine and Air Force), and one against (Navy). The unified/specified commands, however, will swing the emphasis to the V-22. The special regard Congress has for the special operations forces should have the greatest effect in that regards. The outcome of the V-22's flight testing will kill or save the program. Everything else hinges on it. The manufacturers of the aircraft have conducted a very successful accelerated flight testing program thus far, and there are no show stoppers in sight. A successful test program will make the aircraft its own most influential advocate Osprey proponents have a right to be optimistic; the deciding factors of its fate are in favor of the aircraft. Although the Marines may not see the aircraft in the fleet in the near future, the odds are it's coming. The Marine Corps' amphibious capabilities, at that time, will be assured well into the next century. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1.Aerospace Daily, February 22, 1991. 2.Cheney, Dick. "Where We Must Cut the Defense Budget. . .and Why." Defense 89, July/August 1989, 2-11. 3.Cooper, Bert. V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft (Weapons Facts). Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, October 26, 1990. 4.Gisolo, Gary, Maj, USMC, Program sponsor (APW-52). Personal interview about V-22. Washington, D.C., 26 February, 1991. 5.Flanagan, Robert, Col, USMC. "The V-22 Is Slipping Away." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (August 1990), 39-43. 6.Gray, A.M., Gen, USMC. "The Annual Report of the Marine Corps to Congress." Marine Corps Gazette, 73 (April 1989), 15-22. 7.Gray, A.M., Gen, USMC. "The Annual Report of the Marine Corps to Congress." Marine Corps Gazette, 74 (April 1990), 60-69. 8.Harvey, David. "U.S. Defense Helicopters: The Picture's Not All Black." Rotor & Wing International, February 1991, 27-30. 9.Holzer, Robert. "V-22 Tilt Rotor Proponents Urge DoD to Release Program Funds." Defense News, 18 March, 1991, 8. 10."One On One, Gen. Carl Stiner." Defense News, 14 January, 1991, 21-23. 11.Osprey FAX. A Bell-Boeing Publication, issue no. 29 (22 October, 1990), 1-2. 12.Pitman, C.H., LtGen, USMC. "Aviation Posture Statement." Marine Corps Gazette, 74 (May 1990), 52-57. 13.Schaefer, J.H., Col, USMC. Lecture at The Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA., 28 February, 1991. 14.Scharfen, John, Col(Ret), USMC. "The Marine Corps in 1989." U.S. Naval Institute proceedings, Naval Review, 183-189. 15.Sexton, James, Col, USMC (OP 504C1) memo to OP-05, Subj: V-22 Program Update, dtd 8 Feb 91. 16.Sexton, James, Col, USMC, V-22 Osprey Requirements Officer (OP 504C1). Personal interview about V-22. Washington, D.C., 26 February, 1991. 17.Stoops, C. "To Kill An Osprey." (Research paper, National War College, 1990). 18.U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, January 1991. 19.U.S. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Institute for Defense Analysis Study of the V-22 Osprey. Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on S. Hrg. 101-934. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 1990. 20.V-22 Milijary Studies and Analyses, September 1990.
