The Ace Is Not A Maneuver Element: Yet! The Rhetoric Can Be Reality AUTHOR Major William H. Dixon, Jr., USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: THE ACE IS NOT A MANEUVER ELEMENT: YET! THE RHETORIC CAN BE REALITY I. Purpose: To achieve the full combat potential of the Air Combat Element (ACE), it must function in both maneuver and support roles within the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). II. Problem: Historically, the ACE has functioned within the context of the six functions of Marine aviation as a supporting element of the Ground Combat Element (GCE). III. Data: Due to the Marine Corps structure, the GCE lacks the fire power potential of its Army counterpart. This void is filled by ACE assets. In the joint environment of today, the MAGTF can ill afford to lose critical portions of the ACE to missions that do not support the MAGTF scheme of maneuver. The GCE has in the past, and continues to function as the maneuver element of the MAGTF. The result is a MAGTF planning cycle driven by the GCE. The ACE is relegated to supporting roles which can be fulfilled with Air Force, Navy, and Army air assets. The ACE must be assigned support and maneuver missions. History provides excellent examples of aviation assets that have functioned in various missions as a maneuver element with resounding success. When the issues are clarified concerning methods of employment and concepts of operation for the ACE (support and maneuver missions), the MAGTF commander will enjoy greater flexibility in fighting the battle of today and shaping the battlefield for the fight tomorrow. IV. Conclusion: The ACE is a supporting element of the GCE, but is equally capable of fulfilling the mission of a maneuver element. To use the ACE only in a supporting role denies the entire MAGTF of a potential asset that can make the difference between success and failure. V. Recommendations: That the traditional barriers be laid aside and that every opportunity be exploited to exchange ideas and interact with Marines of all operational backgrounds to better understand the basic concepts of maneuver warfare. With that understanding, then the members of the Marine Corps, through innovative thought, can exploit the potential of not only the ACE but all supporting arms to achieve the greatest impact upon the next battlefield. THE ACE IS NOT A MANEUVER ELEMENT: YET! THE RHETORIC CAN BE REALITY OUTLINE Thesis Statement. The full combat potential of the ACE can achieve fruition on today's battlefield when the ACE is employed as a support element and a maneuver element. I. The Facts A. Joint forces and the Omnibus Agreement B. Marine Corps structure C. Maneuver D. The GCE is the maneuver element E. The six functions of Marine aviation 1. Methods of employment 2. Concepts of operation 3. Support and maneuver operations 4. Apportionment and allocation II. The Missions A. Introduction 1. Not an innovative concept of today 2. Three premises for success 3. Missions tied to historical examples B. Gain and maintain air superiority C. Isolate enemy units on the battlefield D. Shape the battlefield E. Screen the GCE's left flank F. Destroy the strong points bypassed by the GCE G. During the offensive breakthrough, pursue and destroy the enemy H. Delay the enemy during the withdrawal I. Provide rear area security for the CSSE J. Provide a reserve force to the MAGTF commander III. Laying The Foundation A. The doctrinal renaissance B. Assumptions C. An example D. Responsibilities of the MAGTF commander E. Responsibilities of the ACE commander IV. Conclusion A. Traditional thought B. Resistance to change C. Building the bridges to close the gap D. The opportunity to excel is now THE ACE IS NOT A MANEUVER ELEMENT: YET! THE RHETORIC CAN BE REALITY THE FACTS In today's environment, inter-service competition has increased with the threat of military reductions. The survival of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), in this environment, depends upon the incorporation of its elements into a tightly knit fighting organization. Each element must be well-schooled in the contributions and methods of employment of the other elements. The reduction of military forces will require the Marine Corps to fight as a joint force. In that scenario Marine air assets become a very precious commodity coveted by the other military services. The Omnibus Agreement that has arisen from joint operations states that excess air sorties of any service can be used by the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) where he perceives the need. Underutilization or misutilization of Marine air assets by the MAGTF commander can dilute the fighting ability of the MAGTF. Concurrent with the development of military aviation technology, the Marine Corps through the years structured itself with the Air Combat Element (ACE) as an integral part of the task organization. Continually faced with an austere budget, Marine Corps leaders have made deliberate sacrifices to ensure that aviation remained a part of the Corp's structure. The impact of these sacrifices is not clearly apparent in the joint world, possibly not even by many members of the Marine Corps. With less than a full compliment of ACE assets, the MAGTF contains something less than a Ground Combat Element (GCE) and a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). The GCE, be it a battalion, regiment, or division, contains significantly less fire power than a comparable Army unit. The ACE was designed to satisfy those firepower requirements. The most notable deficiencies are in numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, and mechanized assets. In many scenarios, this leaves the GCE with too little firepower to fight the battle without firepower augmentation from the ACE. The full combat potential of the ACE can achieve fruition on today's battlefield when the ACE is employed as a support element and a maneuver element. Military writers have published numerous articles about the ACE as a maneuver element. Maneuver is defined as the employment of force on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to gain a position of advantage in respect to the enemy and to accomplish the mission. (1:220) The MAGTF is touted as being a cohesive fighting force of three distinctive maneuver elements: the GCE, the ACE, and the CSSE. Theoretically, the MAGTF is composed of three maneuver elements, although the GCE remains the maneuver element, doctrinally and traditionally. This fact is evident in the MAGTF planning cycle. The MAGTF planning cycle is the method used by the commander to transform an assigned mission into the plans and orders necessary for mission accomplishment. (4:49) Historically, the ACE and CSSE have functioned as supporting elements of the GCE instead of separate maneuver elements. Therefore, the MAGTF planning cycle has evolved into its present form with the GCE developing the possible courses of action for mission accomplishment. The ACE and CSSE then provide the concepts of employment and estimates of supportability. The ACE subsequently becomes a reactive force rather than a proactive force multiplier of the MAGTF. This situation can present significant problems when the ACE is the focus of effort for a particular phase of an operation, but is not the driving force in the planning effort. Current ACE employment is understood best in Marine Aviation (FMFM 5-1), that contains a thorough discussion of the six functions of Marine aviation. Unfortunately, this document contains no information concerning concept of operations. This document only addresses the support roles of the ACE. From an ACE perspective this doctrinal void is a stumbling block of maneuverist thinking. The six functions of Marine aviation are: air reconnaissance, air defense, assault support, offensive air support, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles. FMFM 5-1 clearly defines these functions and the requisite capabilities and limitations of each function. These functions are methods of employment. The ACE commander uses the six functional areas of employment to support the GCE in its ground maneuver. The ACE commander uses conceits of operation to fight as a maneuver element for the MAGTF commander. On the modern battlefield the ACE can do both types of operations, support and maneuver, as required by the situation. If the ACE participates in both support and maneuver operations, the MAGTF commander must determine the apportionment and allocation of ACE resources to best support his scheme of maneuver. Apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a given period of time. (1:32) Allocation is the translation of apportionment into total number of sorties (missions) by aircraft type available for each operation. (1:24) The assignment of ACE resources to maneuver element type missions will reduce the number of aircraft available to the rest of the force. The GCE and CSSE need to know the availability of air support for their planning considerations. The MAGTF commander must weigh the support and maneuver asset requirements to attain the full potential of the MAGTF as a fighting force. The Air Force, Navy, and Army can provide some or all the support necessary to fulfill the six functions of Marine aviation. However, support of the GCE is only part of the equation. The impact of the ACE as a maneuver element is far reaching. The variety of missions the ACE can perform as a maneuver element provides the MAGTF commander with a significant increase in planning flexibility. A Commander In Chief (CINC) will be very hesitant to take away a maneuver element that is an integral part of a fighting force. He will not be as hesitant to remove a portion of a supporting arm (the ACE) to augment the focus of effort, especially if the Marines are not that focus of effort. THE MISSIONS Maneuver missions assigned to the ACE are not an innovative concept of modern warfare. Since air power has evolved into a credible military asset, military leaders with an appreciation for the potential of air assets have prosecuted battles with great success. Historical examples of the ACE functioning as a maneuver element are plentiful. The words "ACE" and "maneuver element" may not have been used, but the essence of maneuver was evident nonetheless. To make the ACE an effective maneuver element, commanders of the past have accepted three premises. (10:9) 1. The air component's primary mission may not be the support of the rifleman. 2. Supporting relationships between the air component and ground component cannot be one-way. 3. Aviation tasking need not be centralized to be effective. Mission type orders from the force commander enable air assets to be flexible and responsive. The following missions are presented, not as an inclusive list, but as a thought provoking exercise for members of the ACE, GCE, and CSSE. Although some of the following examples involve a major portion of a particular aviation unit, there is not a requirement nor desire to involve the entire ACE in maneuver. The competing needs of the MAGTF elements must be considered. Whenever possible, historical examples support the following proposed missions. Each mission is preceded by an appropriate, concise mission statement. Gain and Maintain Air Superiority Air superiority is a necessity on today's battlefield. Since the German attack on Poland in 1939, the following facts have been established. No country has won a war in the face of enemy air superiority. (Vietnam is not an exception. Air power, while maintaining air superiority, was never allowed the freedom to engage the necessary ground targets to aid in the achievement of victory). No major offensive has succeeded against an opponent who controlled the air. (The TET Offensive in Vietnam is an excellent example of this fact). No defense has sustained itself against an enemy who had air superiority. (The most recent example of this is the Southwest Asia War.) (7:10) Possibly the only air mission that has been treated like maneuver warfare, to include mission type orders, is air superiority. This mission is of vital importance to the maneuver elements on the ground. Marine aviation historically has been allowed the flexibility to achieve the air superiority mission, permitting the ground forces to concentrate on the destruction of the enemy ground forces. Isolate Enemy Units On The Battlefield One of the premises of maneuver warfare is to pit strength against weakness. The MAGTF commander, in maneuver warfare, attempts to mass his forces against weaker enemy forces. Without the ability to isolate enemy units from reinforcement and impede the maneuverability of enemy forces already on the battlefield, the MAGTF commander may be forced to fight on a battlefield shaped by the enemy. Additionally, the MAGTF commander needs some method of cutting the enemy's lines of communication (LOCs) into the battlefield to deny force sustainment. Denying him avenues of approach, the enemy loses the capability to reinforce and shift forces, and sustain those forces. The ACE can achieve this mission effectively day and night. Shade The Battlefield The ability to shape the battlefield enables the MAGTF commander to ensure strength is placed against weakness at the place and time of his choosing. There are many ways to shape the battlefield. Denial of command and control communication (C3) radio frequencies can destroy enemy cohesion and adversely influence their tempo of operations. Actual denial of terrain or LOCs can force the enemy to move into preestablished kill zones or "fire sacks". ACE assets can shape the battlefield by disrupting or shutting down the enemy C3 abilities, channelizing enemy movement by denying terrain, and establishing ambush sites. These actions can force the enemy movement to conform to the MAGTF commander's plan of destroying the enemy with minimum friendly losses. Screen The GCE's Left Flank During World War II both sides used the screening mission with great effect. In 1940 the Luftwaffe covered the flanks of the army's deep armor penetration into France. The Luftwaffe played a key role in the summer of 1943 by turning back a massive Russian attack on the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army as they moved north for an offensive against the Kursk salient. (7:91) The Allies used air to screen their flanks in both the European and Pacific theaters. General Patton assigned the XIX Tactical Air Command the mission of protecting his exposed flank along the Loire River as he raced to the east. During September of 1944, General MacArthur used General Kenney's air force to guard his flanks as he moved to Leyte. On this occasion, General Kenney's air force protected the flank of one of history's longest operational penetrations. (7:92) Since the acquisition of the Light Assault Vehicle (LAV), the Light Assault Infantry (LAI) battalion routinely has been assigned the screening mission. The mobility of the LAV adds an increased capability but carries an inherent firepower liability as evidenced in Operation Desert Storm when the LAI unit encountered an enemy force that possessed superior firepower. The ACE adds a new dimension to the screening mission with speed and lethality. Supported by the LAI battalion, the ACE can provide a highly effective screening force for the MAGTF commander. This mission can be expanded into guarding and cover missions by adding heavier ground forces such as tank and mechanized assets. The superior speed, visibility and communication abilities of the ACE make it the ideal candidate for coordination and control of the ground attachments. Destroy The Strong Points Bypassed By The GCE During World War II, General Doolittle's 8th Air Force provided air support over the spreading battlefield of the Soar campaign. The bombers assaulted the obstinate Metz forts and attacked crucial targets across the front. (6:688) Maneuver warfare, unlike linear warfare, emphasizes mass against the enemy's weaknesses. Maintaining the offensive tempo requires bypassing enemy strong points. Those strong points must be addressed. Stripping firepower assets, armor or artillery, away from the GCE has the potential of defusing the offensive. ACE assets, fixed wing or helicopter, possess the firepower potential to deal with strong points swiftly and decisively. During The Offensive Breakthrough. Pursue, and Destroy The Enemy As General Patton overwhelmed the enemy during the Eifel campaign of World War II, General "Opie" Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command pursued the retreating enemy. The fighter bombers attacked relentlessly and dealt the enemy devastating blows. (6:758) Many times in military history the full fruits of victory were lost because the offensive was unable to pursue and destroy a retreating enemy. Many times this same enemy would be faced again on another field of battle. Reasons for this failure to pursue include terrain, lack of mobility assets, logistics, and fatigue. ACE assets are ideal for the pursuit mission. Speed, firepower potential, and observation enable the ACE to complete the enemy destruction. Observers of the aftermath from the Iraqi retreat from Kuwait could not believe the absolute devastation of the enemy that friendly air had achieved. This ACE mission has an added advantage. It serves to push the offensive culminating point into the future by relieving the GCE of part of its traditional offensive responsibilities. With ACE assistance, the GCE is not forced to continue the pursuit alone. This assistance allows the ground forces time to reconstitute. As the offensive is continued, the ACE can maintain pressure on the enemy while elements of the GCE refuel, rearm, and possibly relocate by vertical assault. Delay The Enemy During The Withdrawal During the fall of 1950, the Chinese forces surrounded the American forces at the Chosin Reservoir in Korea. The American retreat, better described as an orderly withdrawal, was successful in large part due to the delaying action of American air power. General MacArthur's armies escaped the trap almost intact with less than 13,000 killed or wounded. American air attacks accounted for 30,000 Chinese killed or wounded. More importantly, air power stopped a major enemy offensive, denying the enemy a repeat performance of their offensive drive earlier in the summer. (7:72-73) The Marine Corps does not like to think about a friendly force withdrawal and the word retreat is simply not tolerated. The withdrawal mission, however, must be considered from a practical standpoint and the Corps tradition of readiness in any "clime or place". Sometimes to retire and regroup, even if it involves only a small unit, provides the opportunity to fight another day. The inherent advantages of aviation make this force ideal for the delaying action. The firepower is rapidly available to blunt the enemy drive. Aviation reconnaissance assets can prevent a surprise envelopment or major ambush. Most importantly, the morale factor, if a withdrawal is necessary, is critical for successful accomplishment of the mission. The reassuring feeling of aviation assets on station can enable the Marines to repeat their much touted performance of the Chosin reservoir. When they walked out, it was with all their people and equipment. Provide Rear Area Security For The CSSE Rear area security has been the topic of numerous discussions and debates. The area occupied by the CSSE is a troublesome vital area for the MAGTF commander for two reasons: the amount of terrain involved and the personnel requirements. Enemy LOCs and logistical units are key targets for the MAGTF commander. Conversely, the CSSE is a key target for the enemy. Both sides realize the obvious implications of losing logistical sustainment, whether in the defense or offense. The CSSE can provide some limited security, but the paucity of personnel and firepower assets render these forces almost impotent in the face of an enemy surprise attack. Without a fire support coordination center (FSCC), the CSSE lacks the assets to coordinate and control supporting arms, even if the CSSE owned the assets. Rear area security on the linear battlefield did not merit the amount of concern that it does on the nonlinear battlefield. With forces spread out on a broad front, the ability of an enemy flanking movement was far more difficult than today where the areas of the battlefield are not defined as clearly. The GCE does not favor the rear area security mission because of manpower assets. In the current reduction of forces, each battalion is projected to lose the manpower equivalence of a company. The GCE cannot afford to give up personnel, armor, mechanized, or fire support assets and continue to retain confidence in mission accomplishment. The ACE, with some ground forces under its operational control, is far better suited to deal with rear area security. A task organized strike package to counter the perceived enemy threat possesses the kind of responsiveness the mission demands. If an LAI unit was operationally controlled by the ACE, the necessary supporting arms controllers would be available, when necessary, to direct air strikes close to friendly forces. The strike force with a command and control aircraft would direct the action against the penetrating enemy force. Provide A Reserve Force To The MAGTF The reserve force exists to exploit friendly success or to dissolve an enemy advantage. Historically, the GCE has provided the reserve force from within its own structure. Usually, a third of the force at each unit level is dedicated to the reserve mission. However, at times the GCE cannot provide a viable reserve force without weakening the strength of the main effort. A prime example is the initial stages of an amphibious operation when the buildup of forces ashore may not have reached the point of introducing the reserve forces. Supporting arms such as artillery, tanks, and mechanized assets may not yet be ashore, leaving the GCE in a vulnerable position. An ACE strike package task organized to counter the enemy threat can fill the void during those critical periods when the GCE needs the added muscle. LAYING THE FOUNDATION The Marine Corps is currently experiencing a doctrinal renaissance with maneuver warfare as the center of gravity. It naturally follows that many unresolved issues remain, particularly the essence of the MAGTF commander. Three assumptions are a mandatory requirement if there is to be any validity to the ACE as a maneuver element. First, the MAGTF commander is a warfighter. Currently, two schools of thought exist concerning the role of the MAGTF commander. The MAGTF commander is either a warfighter or an administrator. The interpretation of the MAGTF commander's role as either a warfighter or an administrator is critical to understanding the issues surrounding the controversy. The school of thought supporting the MAGTF commander as an administrator envisions his role as that of planning the battle 72 to 96 hours into the future. He does not direct maneuver units but instead relies upon the maneuver element commanders to fight today's battle. On the other hand, the MAGTF commander who functions as a warfighter reserves the right to maneuver forces on today's battlefield, shaping the battlefield of tomorrow. Second, the MAGTF commander requires some form of a FSCC to function as a warfighter. Monitoring the progress of the battle from the FSCC would enable the MAGTF commander to introduce forces under his control at a critical time to influence the outcome of the battle. For example, with information from the FSCC the MAGTF commander could commit a reserve force comprised of ACE assets to diffuse an enemy offensive. Finally, the entire ACE does not function as a maneuver element. Only those assets required to do a maneuver element mission would be committed. The MAGTF commander must decide which maneuver element can accomplish the mission most effectively during each phase of the operation. The intent of the first two assumptions is not to make the MAGTF commander a glorified GCE commander. The intent is to enable the MAGTF commander to fight the MAGTF in that grey area between the operational and tactical levels of war and influence the battle, when necessary, for the benefit of the MAGTF as a whole. The ACE can be used as both a maneuver and a support element in the same operation. As an example, the MAGTF is assigned a mission that involves an amphibious assault to capture an airfield and port facility for follow-on forces. The ACE is assigned the mission of the airfield and the GCE is responsible for capturing the port facility. In Phase I the ACE may be the focus of effort as air superiority is established and the force beach head line (FBHL) is isolated from the enemy. The ACE and GCE may share the focus of effort in Phase II as they secure the airfield and port facility. Supporting requirements would have to be established since the GCE will require air support and the ACE may require ground forces for air field security. The CSSE could be the focus of effort in Phase III as logistical support is established ashore. In the above scenario, the MAGTF commander must issue a clear commander's intent to the three maneuver elements indicating what he intends to do to the enemy. The commander's intent must include guidance regarding centers of gravity, significant strengths, and critical vulnerabilities of both the enemy and the friendly forces. He has to then issue mission-type orders as they pertain to each of the maneuver elements. GCE monopolization of the planning cycle must be eliminated. The focus of effort must be identified. The maneuver element identified as the focus of effort for a particular phase of the operation must formulate the courses of action for its portion of the overall plan. The ACE commander must be a maneuver force commander and not just a distributor of resources. The six functions of Marine aviation are concepts of employment, not courses of action. It is imperative that the ACE commander comprehend that. The six functions are tools for determining how to employ ACE assets in a supporting role. (5:5) Task organization is the ACE commander's tool for developing courses of action to prosecute a maneuver element mission. With this realization, the ACE commander, after receiving the MAGTF commander's intent and mission statement, must issue his own intent and mission statement to enable the ACE staff to fulfill its function, completion of the ACE commander's planning cycle. Apportionment and allocation of ACE assets must be formulated to satisfy the support and maneuver missions and assist the MAGTF commander in his decision making process. CONCLUSION The requirement for doctrinal changes, starting with Command and Staff Action (FMFM 3-1), is only the beginning of the process to make the ACE maneuver element a reality. The Professional Military Education (PME) program, at all levels, is an appropriate place for introducing these new concepts. Continual cross-training among all three MAGTF elements can break down many preconceived notions. However, traditional thought and resistance to change are two very stubborn barriers in the Corps that impede acceptance of the ACE as a maneuver element. Traditionally, the ACE has been nothing more than a supporting element of the Marine rifleman. Everything in the Corps has supported the rifleman. Given that, then the GCE to some extent, as the practice has been, should control all supporting assets to ensure that the needs of the rifleman are met efficiently and effectively. Marine officers of all ranks accept the preceding statements without question, hence the resistance to the ACE in a maneuver role. Many Marines generally believe "a force that cannot hold real estate on the battlefield is not a maneuver element." However, the definition of maneuver is defined as the employment of force on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to gain a position of advantage in respect to the enemy and to accomplish the mission. (1:220) The standard air request methods allow the ACE to function only as a supporting element. The air request system is centralized and time consuming. Many times the results of requested air support are not adequate to fulfill the needs of the GCE. The maneuver element concept is not intended to eliminate the support missions. Those missions are critical to the Marine on the ground. But, if a maneuver element of the ACE can defuse, delay, or destroy portions of the enemy prior to the ground forces reaching the GCE battle area, then the Marine rifleman's burden has been lightened. Resistance to change is a typical reaction from professionals in any occupation. The "if it isn't broken" mentality seems to apply here and many Marines believe it really is not broken. However, to fight the ACE only as a supporting element is to fight with one hand tied behind the back. When most people cannot articulate clearly the changes involved in maneuvering the ACE, the natural tendency is to discount those proposed changes. An element of fear may exist that the ACE could have too much voice in what occurs on the battlefield. Would a ground commander have problems taking tactical orders from an aviator? Would an aviator have problems being placed in a maneuver element role and forced to understand the scheme of maneuver as well as his ground counterpart? These issues are delicate and cross many boundaries, some of which are considered almost sacred. The rhetoric of the ACE as a maneuver element in addition to a support element can become reality. Bridges of understanding will have to be built to close the gaps between the GCE, ACE, and CSSE. Receptive attitudes to new ideas must be cultivated. Most importantly, every opportunity must be exploited to exchange ideas and interact with Marines of all operational backgrounds to understand better the basic concepts of maneuver warfare. The Marine Corps is preparing to turn a page in history. The Corps will be reduced to a smaller size than is enjoyed presently. Equipment and training assets will be harder to obtain. The future is going to be more austere in all areas. As professionals, Marines can approach the future with apprehension or with audacity. This time can be turned into an opportunity to excel by fine-tuning the Corps' structure, employing the assets presently owned with innovative thought, and beginning a new page in the Corps' history as a more capable, leaner, and more potent fighting force than ever before. BIBLIOGRAPHY Published Official Documents 1. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of Military Terms, JCS Pub l. Washington, D.C., 1987. 2. U.S. Marine Corps. Assault Support, FMFM 5-3. Quantico, 1979. 3. U.S. Marine Corps. Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support, FMFM 5-4A. Quantico, 1988. 4. U.S. Marine Corps. Command and Staff Action, FMFM 3-I. Quantico, 1979. 5. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1979. Published Books 6. Farago, Ladislas. Patton: Ordeal and Triumph. New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1963. 7. Warden III, Col. John A., USAF. The Air Campaign, Planning For Combat. Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989. Published Periodical Articles 8. Lanis, Captain Howard G., USMC(Ret). "A More Traditional View". Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988, pp. 49. 9. Lind, William S. "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation". Marine Corps Gazette, May 1989, pp. 57- 64. 10. Moore, Major R. Scott, USMC. "The Art of MAGTF Warfare". Marine Corps Gazette, April 1989, pp. 24- 29. 11. Saxman, Major John B., USAF. "The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver Warfare". Marine Corps Gazette, August 1989, pp. 58-63. 12. Sayen, Major John J., JR., USMCR. "Countering the Rear Area Threat, Part II". Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988, pp. 32-37. Theses 13. Astrzk, Major Lawrence W., USMC. "Marine Corps Doctrine: Can The Ace Support It?". U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Class of 1989- 1990. March 29, 1990. 14. Donnell, Major Steven B., USMC. "The Ace As A Maneuver Element". U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Class of 1989-1990. March 28, 1990.
